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Decentralisation, meaning the delegation of responsibilities from central to 
lower government levels is generally assumed to improve the delivery of 
local public services. The theoretical assumption is that local authorities 
are encouraged by decentralisation to behave in a more accountable and 
entrepreneurial fashion. At the same time, accountability and (public) 
entrepreneurship are distinct concepts and may even be considered to 
involve conflicting behaviours.  Therefore, decentralisation outcomes may 
vary depending on which behavioural pattern predominates. 
 
Previous research has focused on using large data sets to examine the 
impact of decentralisation on outcomes such as economic growth, 
disparities, poverty reduction and government performance. But there is 
also a need to better understand how decentralisation, and specifically 
fiscal decentralisation, may promote accountability and public 
entrepreneurship in specific settings. 
 
To contribute to closing this gap, this dissertation examines both fiscal 
decentralisation policies and contemporaneous changes in political 
arrangements. It identifies the incentives these changes create for Mexican 
local authorities to behave in more accountable and entrepreneurial ways 
and which may lead to differences in government performance. The study 
focuses on rural municipalities where achieving the predicted 
decentralisation outcomes is highly challenging.  
 
A mixed methods research design was used with two phases. In the first 
stage, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and changes in 
government accountability and entrepreneurship was investigated through 
statistical analysis based on fixed effects estimation using a sample of 505 
rural municipalities. For that purpose a longitudinal dataset was developed, 
comprising municipal level information between the years 1990 and 2009, 




involves multiple case studies of individual municipalities that were 
selected based on performance. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that decentralisation policy has tended to 
work against accountability but has increased entrepreneurial behaviour in 
rural municipalities, highlighting the potential tension between the two.  
The extent to which these effects occur seems to depend on the particular 
fiscal arrangement.  In addition, political competition seems to reinforce 
accountability and has an impact in entrepreneurship in a different way to 
the effects expected theoretically, though the effects are not as strong as 
with fiscal decentralisation. This study advances the public 
entrepreneurship literature and expands the understanding of fiscal 
decentralisation. Additionally, it provides suggestions for which policy 
arrangements are likely to promote accountability and entrepreneurial 
actions by public authorities. 
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In 1988 Daniel Bell wrote an article in the Washington Post with the heading – 
Previewing Planet Earth in 2013. In this article the following quotation stood out: 
 
“The nation-state is becoming too small for the big problems of life and 
too big for the small problems of life. It is too small for the big problems 
because there are no effective international mechanisms to deal with 
such things as capital flows, commodity imbalance, the loss of jobs….It is 
too big for the small problems because the flow of power to a national 
political centre means that the centre becomes increasingly 
unresponsive to the variety and diversify of local needs. In short there is 
a mismatch of scale“ 
 
Now in 2015, this statement still resounds. But, the answer to some of Daniel 
Bell‟s concerns in 1988 was already in the policy arena, i.e. decentralisation.  
Tiebout (1956) presented fiscal decentralisation as a “market-place mechanism” 
in the public sector that would ensure efficient provision of public goods and 
Oates (1972) reinforced this argument with his theorem of decentralisation 
based on efficiency arguments. He considers decentralised provision of public 
goods more efficient than centralized planning of public goods.     
 
Decentralisation is both a popular recommendation and an important trend in 
today‟s world. Due to theoretical reasons, a lot is expected of decentralisation; 
among them good government performance, economic growth, regional 
development, and welfare enhancement. This in turn increases our expectation 
in the government and in public authorities. In respect to government 
performance, which is the focus of this research, local authorities are expected 





Equally, other theorists highlight possible downsides of decentralisation; among 
them the weakening of central government stabilization functions; the 
worsening of regional redistribution due to unequal competition; and of 
particular importance for this study, corruption and administrative deficiencies.   
 
There are different types of decentralisation, various ways to decentralize and 
varying degrees of decentralisation. This research is interested in fiscal 
decentralisation, without which there is not much genuine decentralisation of 
power. Moreover, this research focuses on local governments, particularly rural 
municipalities, which represent the small jurisdiction at the lowest level in the 
governmental architecture.  
 
At present there is a large literature that is either theoretical or uses large data 
sets to examine the relationship between decentralisation and the variety of 
important benefits mentioned above.  In contrast, this study will focus on how 
decentralisation might or might not achieve the expected results in government 
performance.  
 
This research operationalizes two constructs reflecting the actual activity of 
decentralised units (in this case rural local governments) and these constructs 
are used to carry out statistical analysis. In this way, this research contributes to 
the literature both conceptually and empirically. In addition, this study also 
contributes to the research in decentralisation by examining, through case 
studies, whether the findings of the statistical analysis are consistent with what 
actually has happened over a period of progressive decentralisation.   
 
This research was carried out on rural municipalities specifically. Since they are 
neglected in the literature, it is important to understand whether the fiscal 
decentralisation process did benefit them. In addition, from the methodological 
point of view, it is helpful to delimit this research to a homogenous group in 
order to comprehend what is actually taking place. In this way some factors that 





The key constructs of this research are accountability and public 
entrepreneurship. These constructs were selected and developed because they 
allow operationalizing arguments made in the theoretical literature about 
productive and allocative efficiency. More precisely, the theoretical framework of 
this study is based on the general assumption that delegation of financial 
resources encourages some changes in the behaviour of local authorities 
related to both allocative and productive efficiency and these changes, in turn, 
lead to better government performance.  
 
In this research it is argued that productive and allocative efficiency changes 
are related to concepts of accountability and public entrepreneurship. 
Therefore, accountability and public entrepreneurship are mediating factors 
connecting decentralisation policies and outcomes, and are the main objects of 
direct study.  
 
Although both accountability and public entrepreneurship are highly desirable, 
there are some concerns that they may be incompatible (Bellone and Geoerl, 
1992; Borins, 2000; Bovens, 2010).   
 
At the same time, this study emphasises that researchers conducting research 
of this kind should be aware that what they observe may be a consequence of 
political, rather than fiscal changes. In this sense, the theory of democracy also 
claims that democracy promotes better government performance not only due 
to the right to ballot, but also because political competition is thought to promote 
better behaviour of politicians if they or their party want to continue in office. 
 
This research duly focuses on political changes as well as fiscal 
decentralisation. It explores the effects of political variables such as political 
competition, state-level opposition and political party affiliation.  
 
Thus, in the light of demands for better understanding of how fiscal 
decentralisation influences performance, the following research questions seem 




1. Has fiscal decentralisation been associated with changes in patterns of 
accountability and public entrepreneurship?  
2. Have differences in the level of political competition had a major effect on 
patterns of accountability and public entrepreneurship following fiscal 
decentralisation? 
3. To what extent is fiscal decentralisation in rural local governments 
associated with measurable changes in local government performance? 
 
If there is evidence that fiscal decentralisation has a marginal influence on 
changes in accountability and public entrepreneurship, the following research 
questions also seem pertinent: 
 
4. What are the identifiable changes affecting accountability and public 
entrepreneurship in rural local government? 
5. In which ways has fiscal decentralisation encouraged accountability and 
public entrepreneurship in rural local governments?   
 
1.2 Research approach  
 
This research takes the form of a country case study. The case study is Mexico. 
Mexico has experienced mainly expenditure decentralisation. Expenditure 
decentralisation is a “partial fiscal decentralisation” and it is a common type of 
decentralisation process around the world (Borge et al, 2014). Therefore, there 
is scope to extend some of the findings to other similar settings.   
 
In addition, recently Mexico has been engaged in important political 
transformation, which makes it a rich case study for lesson-learning. 
 
The methodology selected is a mixed methods approach, where information will 
be collected in two stages; each one using a different research method. In the 
first stage, research questions (1), (2) and (3) will be tested empirically running 




operationalization of concepts for this stage, indices for accountability and 
public entrepreneurship are developed and they are used for the selection of 
cases studies for the second stage.  
 
In the second stage, research questions (4) and (5) will be analysed based on 
semi-structured interviews. As described earlier, the unit of study will be rural 
local governments and the focus group are local government authorities; among 
them mayors, councillors and key political actors in the municipalities.  The 
municipalities selected are mostly “deviant cases” based on the indices of 
accountability and public entrepreneurship built for the purpose of this study. 
Deviant cases will benefit this research as they may broaden and confirm 
patterns emerging from the data.   
 
1.3 Organization of the thesis  
 
The remainder of this document is organized as follows:  
 
Chapters 2, 3, will be a review of the literature and to identify gaps in our 
understanding of fiscal decentralisation; the concepts of accountability, public 
entrepreneurship; and political incentives of fiscal decentralisation. Based on 
this discussion, the theoretical framework used in this study will be built and 
justified.  
 
Chapter 4 gives a rich description of the process of fiscal decentralisation and 
the political landscape of the country case study, Mexico. 
 
Chapter 5 gives a description and justification of the methodology and research 
design selected for the study, namely mixed research design.  
 
Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 describe the research methods employed in the first 
stage which involves longitudinal statistical analyses and it presents the 




the quantitative analysis in the first stage of this study and connects them to the 
research question to be addressed in the second stage.  
 
Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 describe the qualitative research methods 
employed in the second stage, which involves interviews with local authorities in 
selected rural local governments with deviant performance in accountability and 
public entrepreneurship. In addition, they present a discussion of the empirical 
findings. 
 
Chapter 15 integrates and summarises the findings for the research questions, 
presents areas of contribution in relation to new knowledge and policy 
application, discusses the limitations of the study and, lastly, outlines areas for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2 - On the theory of decentralisation 
 
This chapter introduces the general theory of decentralisation so as to frame the 
discussion of fiscal decentralisation in particular. It first defines decentralisation 
and discusses its different typologies. Subsequently, it presents a brief historical 
development of the decentralisation theory highlighting the importance of its 
policy and academic relevance.  
 
2.1 The definition of decentralisation 
 
There are various definitions of decentralisation and some of them are more 
frequently cited than others. An often-cited definition is Litvack and Seddon 
(1999, 2). They define decentralisation as:   
 
 
―The transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the 
central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government 
organizations or the private sector—covers a broad range of concepts‖  
 
As broadly said in the previous quote, it is highly important to recognize that 
such transfer of authority and the types of responsibilities take a number of 
forms and therefore, contain different elements of analysis. Fiscal 
decentralisation, which is the central attention of this research, is only one form 
of decentralisation. Table 2.1 presents several examples of typologies. But, in 
light of the particular interest of this research- fiscal decentralisation- the next 














Table  2.1 Decentralization Typologies by Dubois and Fattore (2009, 710)  
 
 
First, a well-known and useful classification is Rondinelli et al. (1983, 14). This 
classification differentiates between delegation, de-concentration, devolution 
and privatisation.  They define delegation as the transfer of authority and 
responsibilities for the provision of public goods and services to semi-
autonomous organizations such as public enterprises, which are indirectly 
controlled by the central government. De-concentration is the shift of 
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responsibilities from central government officials working in capital cities to 
those working in regions or provinces but under central supervision. In this 
case, sub-national officials are appointed by the centre and are responsible to 
higher authorities.  Devolution, on the other hand, is the transfer of authority 
and responsibilities to lower government levels such as municipalities, which 
enjoy a full or high degree of discretion over most local affairs. Finally, 
privatization is the transfer of government functions such as public service 
provision and social protection to voluntary organizations or private companies. 
This typology makes the case for different degrees of administrative autonomy 
by differentiating types of sectorial arrangements. In particular, fiscal 
decentralisation is often referred to as devolution- in this case of taxing and 
spending power- because it represents high levels of delegation of control. 
Despite this, full discretion is not usually passed down.    
 
Manor (1999) presents a similar classification as Rondinelli et al. (1983) adding 
default decentralization and fiscal decentralisation. Default decentralisation 
occurs when non-governmental organizations and civil societies- such as 
voluntary organizations- undertake public functions themselves due to central 
government‟s failure to deal with such. In those cases, the resources are 
obtained by non-governmental organizations. This category corresponds to a 
type of decentralisation that may be considered unintended because it emerges 
out of the government‟s failure to undertake the task rather than as a means of 
achieving efficiency (Manor, 1995, 4). In contrast, the remaining categories fall 
into a type of decentralisation considered intentional. In addition, Manor 
acknowledges the importance of delegating financial resources and therefore, 
includes fiscal decentralisation as a form of decentralisation and makes a 
clear differentiation between delegating administrative responsibilities (de-
concentration) and, delegating financial resources (fiscal decentralisation).  
Moreover, Manor emphasises the importance of democratization so as to 
achieve actual decentralisation on both de-concentrated agencies, such as 
executive agencies in UK that carry out executive tasks discharged by the 
central government, and devolved agencies, such as local governments in 
Mexico, which are lawfully autonomous and with legal personality. He quotes a 
World Bank report (1995, pp. 2) that “the decentralisation of resources and 
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responsibilities without… (democratizing) political reforms would have been 
incomplete and, probably, not conducive to socially effective results“.1 
 
Litvack et al. (1998, 6) and Falleti (2005) classifies decentralisation into 
Administrative, Political and Fiscal. Administrative decentralisation comprises 
the delegation of administrative and social services duties. Political 
decentralisation is the delegation of political authority and electoral capacity to 
local authorities and fiscal decentralisation refers to the transfer of policies 
related to raising revenue to achieve fiscal autonomy. However, Falleti (2005) 
views fiscal decentralisation only in terms of control over revenues and 
categorises expenditures under the administrative category whereas Litvack et 
al. (1998) includes both, revenues and expenditures under the label of fiscal 
decentralisation (Dubois and Fattore, 2009, 712).  Hence, in contrast to Falleti 
(2005), Litvack et al.‟s (1998) definition implies that it is important to study fiscal 
arrangements that result in higher expenditure assignments even if revenues 
are not collected locally and have some degree of restriction by other 
government agents.    
 
There are important insights drawn from these typologies in terms of analysis. 
First, the degree of autonomy varies depending on the type of agent under 
study. For this research in particular, the unit of analysis, local governments, are 
expected to have a degree of autonomy.  Second, fiscal decentralisation is 
bound up with decentralisation in other domains. A successful decentralisation 
requires some fiscal and some administrative decentralisation because: a) fiscal 
decentralisation supplies the financial resources and administrative 
decentralisation supplies the bureaucratic resources that are necessary for 
policy implementation or b) administrative decentralisation entails more 
responsibilities that need to be accompanied by financial resources.  In either 
case, political decentralisation is relevant. As noted in the previous discussion, 
democratization appears as an important element for a successful policy 
implementation. These types of decentralisation may occur simultaneously or 
                                                          
1
 World Bank (1995) Colombia Local Government Capacity: Beyond Technical Assistance. World Bank Report 14085-
C, Washington, DC: World Bank  
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separated, but once in place all domains are relevant when analysing a specific 
domain.  
 
This study is interested particularly in fiscal decentralisation. Throughout the 
remainder of this study, I will look at reforms which involve fiscal 
decentralisation as defined by Litvack et al. (as in table 2.1). In other words, I 
will analyse the decentralisation reform in the case study, Mexico, by looking at 
the  delegation of not only decision-making (i.e. administrative decentralisation) 
in revenue collection through taxes, but also decentralisation of revenues  
through conditional and unconditional funds which increases the expenditure 
decisions that can be made by local governments.   
 
Following the lesson learnt in the previous discussion, this study intends to take 
into consideration elements of all decentralisation domains that are important 
for analysis of, specifically, fiscal decentralisation. Next, I will present a brief 
historical evolution of the decentralisation trend in general before turning to a 
new chapter that presents the theoretical foundation of fiscal decentralisation in 
particular. 
 
2.2 Historical evolution  
 
The move from centralisation toward the empowering of local governments is 
considered by Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall  (2008, 54) as a „reversal of the 
nation and empire-building projects‟. They consider that decentralisation has 
challenged „…constitutions, ideologies and institutions which, in some cases, 
had been relatively stable for centuries‟.   
 
By 2000, the World Bank stated that 95% of democratic countries have 
decentralised to some degree as well as other non-democratic countries such 
as China (Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008, 54). Since then several dozens 
of developing and developed countries have embarked on new or extending 
decentralisation reforms (Faguet, 2012 cited in Faguet, 2015, 2).  
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In the same fashion, Lessmann (2009) found that between 1982 and 2000, in 
most OECD countries, the degree of decentralisation had increased, with 
exception of the United Kingdom. His findings suggest that Switzerland, Canada 
and the United States have decentralised revenue (including the taxes that local 
governments can determine autonomously) and expenditure - what he calls 
competitive fiscal federalism.  In contrast, Germany has strongly decentralised 
revenue and expenditure but has maintained central control over tax rate. He 
refers to this degree of decentralisation as co-operative federal systems.  
 
Similar analysis was previously carried out by Liu (2007). His findings suggest 
that Mexico is a highly decentralised country similarly to Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Germany, India, Italy, Korea, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain and 
Taiwan. These countries possess high levels of revenues and expenditures 
which are assigned based on fiscal decentralisation indicators at the country 
level. However, decentralised institutions lack taxing power, taxing revenues 
and borrowing power.  
 
Therefore, it can be argued that one of the most common types of 
decentralisation is “partial fiscal decentralisation” where local governments rely 
heavily on transfers or funds from central governments for their provision of 
basic public service duties. Borge et al. (2014, 36) reports that in the studies 
carried out by Shah (2004) in a large sample of developing countries, 42% of 
sub national revenue (local and provincial) came from transfers. In another 
study by Shah and Shah (2006) they showed that in a sample of ten lower-
income countries, 51% of their total revenue comes from central government 
transfers. In contrast, OECD countries have a smaller transfer share of 34%.   
 
Thus, the case study used in this research, Mexico, presents a common case of 
fiscal decentralisation and therefore, some findings of this research can 
contribute to the understanding of the decentralisation process in other 
countries.  Chapter 6 will present the reader with a more detailed discussion of 
the Mexican decentralisation reforms. 
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Turning now to the historical evolution of fiscal decentralisation, the trend 
towards decentralisation can be traced to the 1970s, at the time when the 
failure of top-down and state driven economy to achieve growth and equity led 
to the promotion of market economy and welfare state reduction (Agrawal and 
Ostrom, 1999 and Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004 cited in Rodriguez-Pose 
and Sandall, 2008, 68). 
 
Many factors account for the trend of decentralisation. Tanzi (1995, 296) 
considers that the breakdown of socialism in Europe and Asia is one of these 
factors. This breakdown required new fiscal arrangements and the passing 
down of responsibilities to sub-national governments due to diversity of ethnic, 
culture and economic composition especially in countries such as Russia. In 
Canada, the demand of some provinces for independence led toward 
decentralization; in China, the necessity of control over national public revenues 
led to fiscal reorganization. Similarly, major adjustments on revenues and 
expenditures were required during the economic crisis of the 1980‟s in 
Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria and India. These countries were often limited by legal 
arrangements on policy choice. 
 
In addition, Tanzi (1995, 296) adds as a factor the development of the 
European Union in the 1990‟s. The EU members had to decide the extent of 
economic power delegated to the central Union on issues previously managed 
by the member states.  Functions such as income distribution and stabilization 
policies had to be re-assigned among state members and the European Union. 
In this case, the redistribution of assignments is from member states to a higher 
level (central union). This is different to the type of decentralisation discussed 
previously and it might be considered centralisation of functions. However, it 
ultimately represents a transfer of responsibilities and resources.  
 
Tanzi (1995) also explains that at the political level, in the 1980‟s and 1990‟s 
there was a shift to conservative attitudes. The conservatives became 
suspicious of central government management on distribution of income, 
reduction of poverty and unemployment. Therefore, they promoted a smaller 
central government and favoured open market economy as well as the 
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empowering of lower government levels. However, this conservative political 
trend did not always result in a smaller government. An example is the United 
Kingdom during Margaret Thatcher‟s government. Margaret Thatcher‟s 
conservative government advocated a smaller government and ended up with a 
highly centralised administration. That is the Thatcher‟s administration paradox. 
However, she strongly advocated a specific form of decentralisation, 
privatisation.  
 
Last but not least, an important factor accounting for the trend of 
decentralisation is the support of decentralisation policies by the World Bank 
and other international organizations. 
 
This historical overview leads to the question of the underlying motivation of 
decentralisation. Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall (2008),  in their study of the 
evolution of decentralization, identify  identity, democracy and economic growth  
as the principal discourses or arguments.  The rhetoric behind the identity 
discourse is that the differences in identities, lifestyle and modes of interaction 
of the minorities can be preserved under decentralisation (Knight, 1982 cited in 
Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008, 56) while under centralization, homogeneity 
weakens the legitimacy of national or regional movements to the point of losing 
their distinctiveness (Massey, 1999 cited in Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008, 
56). Hence, in territories where there is a highly diversified culture, 
decentralisation can satisfy preferences better than a centralised government. It 
is also a tactic to maintain territories and groups with distinctive cultural heritage 
together. 
 
The democratic discourse has two perceptions depending on the political stand. 
The neoliberal theorists, on the right side of the political spectrum, consider 
decentralisation a solution to the problems caused by central government 
intervention. On the other hand, the left wing perceives decentralisation as a 
tool for empowering the poor left behind under centralised power (Rodriguez-
Pose and Sandall, 2008).  Both political strands consider decentralisation as 
„anticorruption‟ and as an improver of accountability (Shah, 2000 and Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2005 cited in Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008, 56). The 
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mechanisms which are posited in these arguments relating to anti-corruption 
and accountability will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Finally, the economic argument suggests that through decentralisation, 
territories involved in the globalisation game will benefit by becoming more 
adaptable to economic changes. By having freedom and flexibility, regional 
authorities may develop more appropriate projects leading to better economic 
results in the regions (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999 cited in Rodriguez-Pose 
and Sandall, 2008, 58). This argument is heavily associated with the neoliberal 
economic theory which depends on concepts of flexibility, competitiveness and 
innovation (Johnson, 2003 cited in Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008, 58). 
These arguments imply a more proactive role by local authorities in term of 
innovation, risk taking and proactiveness, all of which are aspects of the general 
concept “public entrepreneurship” which will be discussed in detail later.  
 
Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall (2008) also contend that the economic argument 
seems to be the current leading argument of decentralisation. Even though 
identity seems to be important in countries such as Spain with the Basque and 
Catalan states, and the United Kingdom with Wales and Scotland, the identity 
argument for devolution has not been consistent over time and in all settings. 
For instance, in Spain, the first argument in favour of decentralisation for the 
Basque governments was identity due to the differences in religiosity. However, 
it gradually shifted toward the economic argument. Eusko and Jauraritza (2004) 
presents an analysis of a policy document called “Economic Reasons for a New 
Institutional Framework” (cited in Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008, 60). In 
this document, the Basque government argues that the Basque regions did not 
grow economically due to the limited autonomy granted by the Spanish 1978 
Constitution which prevented the regions from adapting to modern economic 
challenges. This was the argument put forward for more devolution, not identity.   
 
In the United Kingdom, the Nationalists movements in Scotland and Wales, (as 
well as other less familiar movements such as Cornwall, Wessex and North 
Devon) often campaign for devolution arguing differences in cultural identity 
(see Bennett‟s study of 1985 about regional movements in Britain). But, 
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Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall (2008) argues that even with its remarkable 
differences in identity, the Scottish advocacy for devolution since the late 1960‟s 
and early 1970‟s appears to be highly motivated by economic factors mainly the 
North Sea oil rather than identity. This is also observed in the recent debate for 
the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence where the economic reason 
predominates. Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall (2008) also claim that in Wales, the 
shift of relevance from identity to economic arguments also appeared but not 
until the late 1990‟s.  Bradbury (2002) presents as evidence Labour‟s 1997 
White Paper. In this document, identity was not mentioned at all (as cited by 
Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008, 62). Hence, Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall 
(2008) warn not to exaggerate the importance of identity and point out that the 
economic argument predominates nowadays. 
 
In addition to decentralisation‟s motivation, which the previous discussion 
suggests to be volatile in some cases, the country's cultural and social 
background are relevant factors as to analyse the success or failure of policy 
implementation in general, and fiscal decentralisation in particular. This aspect 
was investigated by Putnam (1993). Similar to the aim of this research, Putnam 
analyses the performance of decentralisation policies but he studies the 
reasons behind uneven performance in the north and south of Italy in the wake 
of decentralisation policies introduced in 1970. He argues that „civic community‟ 
is the most important performance indicator, and it is, in fact, embedded in the 
historical background of the regions. By civic community, he means the civic 
engagement, the political equity, solidarity, trust, tolerance and the number of 
associations of all sorts present in the community.2 The north, which is the most 
developed economic area of Italy, presents a higher indicator of civic 
community while the south exhibited the opposite. The difference in civic 
community between the North and the South- and therefore, the difference in 
the decentralisation results- is that the South historically presents high vertical 
social and political relations owing to its historical autocratic governments. In 
contrast, central and north Italy became engaged in issues of self-governing 
                                                          
2
 Civic community is related to social capital. The elements of civic community, namely civic 
engagement, political equity, solidarity, trust and tolerance and network of civic participation are the 
products of social capital. Social capital’s‎elements‎are‎trust,‎norms‎of‎reciprocity‎and‎networks‎of‎civic‎
participation. It is suggested that norms come from networks and trust comes from both norms and 
networks.  
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earlier and, therefore, nowadays it presents a more horizontal collaboration in 
public affairs. 
 
Similar findings on the importance of history for policy outcomes were found by 
North et al. (2000). They studied the reason for uneven economic development 
of North America and Latin American countries. Although North and Latin 
America share similar experiences on constitutional reforms, abundant 
resources and similar international opportunities, North et al. argue that their 
different development dates from their colonial legacy.  While the United States 
benefits from a decentralised parliamentary English patrimony, Latin-American 
countries inherited a centralised and authoritarian system from late medieval 
Spain. In Putnam‟s words regarding North‟s evaluation, North America engages 
with civic traditions while Latino America is highly vertically dependent. Although 
this analysis is not based on issues of decentralisation, it draws an important 
insight in regard to the relevance of historical context for policy outcomes, and 
therefore, a call to be considered for analysis.    
 
In the previous discussion, we have seen that decentralisation is an important 
international trend and most countries have decentralised to some extent or at 
some point. In addition, it was discussed how decentralisation is driven by 
factors such as identity, democratic and economic arguments and how the 
countries‟ historical and cultural background play a role in the success of the 
policy. In the following section, arguments associated with fiscal 
decentralisation in particular will be looked at in depth, which are built up from 
the decentralisation theory in general. The arguments are largely discussed in 
the context of economic arguments as opposed to identity and democratic 
discourses.  
 
2.3 Theoretical foundations of fiscal decentralisation 
 
In this section the theoretical arguments in favour of and against fiscal 
decentralisation will be presented. The discussion of these theoretical 
arguments is divided into allocative and productive efficiency to help to frame 
the theoretical framework for this study. In addition, it presents the evolution of 
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the decentralisation theory from the classical theories to the so called Second 
Generation Theories (SGT).  
 
2.3.1 Potential benefits  
 
From a normative perspective, there are two economic arguments in favour of 
fiscal decentralisation. These arguments are based on efficiency grounds and it 
is often argued that fiscal decentralisation promotes both allocative and 
productive efficiency. Allocative efficiency refers to the mix of goods and 
services that matches the goods and services desired by the local citizens and 
productive efficiency refers to the production of public goods at the lowest 
possible cost (i.e. minimising the cost of producing the goods and services that 
people want). The next section outlines the theoretical arguments that have 
been advanced for and against fiscal decentralisation in both forms of 
efficiency.   
 
A. Allocative efficiency  
 
There are two major arguments in favour of the proposition that fiscal 
decentralisation advances allocative efficiency:  
 
 Greater allocative efficiency because of responsiveness to preferences 
 
In the classical literature of fiscal decentralisation, Tiebout (1956)‟s famous 
study of mobility where the model of local public good provision was presented, 
considers that „by voting with their feet‟, citizens select the community that best 
matches their preferences. He suggests that citizens will select the community 
based on the public services a local government provides and their own 
preferences; this increases the efficiency of resource allocation.  This is 
considered by Tiebout (1956, 388) as a pricing mechanism in the public sector. 
 
„Just as the consumer may be visualised as walking to a private market 
place to buy his goods, the prices of which are set, we place him in the 
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position of walking to a community where the prices (taxes) of community 
services are set. Both trips take the consumer to market. There is no way 
in which the consumer can avoid revealing his preferences in a spatial 
economy. Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart to 
the private market‟s shopping trip‟ 
 
Under this classical approach, Oates (1972)‟s decentralisation theorem also 
suggests that the most suitable level of government for the provision of public 
services is the one with comparative advantage in the provision of public 
services and in the satisfaction of diversified preferences. In this sense, central 
government should be left with functions relative to macroeconomic stabilization 
and income distribution, owing to the fiscal and financial constraints inherited by 
local governments. Under a centralised system, the provision of public goods 
and services is more likely to be uniform raising concerns about responsiveness 
to preferences. Oates (1972) claims that the efficient level of output in the local 
governments is likely to differ across jurisdictions. Two communities differ in 
terms of likes, hence, have different demands. Therefore, if public services are 
not delivered in accordance with local demands, the welfare of the citizens is 
damaged.  
 
This classical literature claims that fiscal decentralisation improves allocative 
efficiency in the public sector due to trade-off between preference matching and 
externalities. However, the theory is based on two important assumptions: first, 
each level of government is benevolent and second, the provision of public 
goods under centralization is uniform.   
 
 Greater allocative efficiency because it is easier to collect information 
 
Another relevant argument embedded in the classical literature is that central 
government has more disadvantages in acquiring local information regarding 
preferences (Oates, 1972; 1999). More decentralised countries may have better 
knowledge of their citizens‟ preferences either because they have access to 
information that is denied to the central government or because they are closer 
to their citizens. Hence, decentralisation will benefit public service provision 
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because local governments benefit from first-hand information. In the 
development literature, better information is considered a tool for implementing 
better development policies. By being well informed of the weaknesses and 
strengths of the city, officials can provide better policies than the central 
government (Lessmann 2009).  
 
The benefits of better collection of information, according to Hayek (1945), go 
beyond the problem of information transmission. He considers that the problem 
with information is its effective use. Small relevant changes should be faced 
immediately and some information cannot be captured in statistics. Hence, 
given the rapid changes in society in particular circumstances of time and place, 
decision-making is better left to the people who are familiar with the setting. In 
this way, they can work out better the rapid changes and solve problems more 
efficiently by knowing the resources available to them. Hence, in a manner, 
local governments may use the information more efficiently and better 
information favours the fiscal decentralisation arguments. 
 
Greater allocative efficiency because of inefficiencies in centralised decision 
making 
 
Evolving from the classical approach, a second stream of theories have 
emerged in the last decades. The SGTs also claim fiscal decentralisation 
improves allocative efficiency but instead of attributing the efficiency gains to 
the matching preferences, information and externalities, the theories hinge on 
the inefficient outcome of the centralised decision-making process (Oates, 
2005, 4).  
 
Oates (2005) recognizes that the classical theory assumptions are not entirely 
realistic because voters and officials have their own objectives and respond 
differently to institutional incentives. Hence, the SGTs relax the 
decentralisation‟s assumptions of benevolent behaviour and policy uniformity.  
 
Lockwood (2002) explains that the problem of inefficiencies is not policy 
uniformity, but inefficient choice of projects in the legislative bargaining process.  
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Thus, inefficiencies of centralisation are essentially because of the outcome of 
the bargaining process that in equilibrium is driven by cost-minimisation. This 
most likely leads to the selection of the cheapest provision of public goods 
instead of selecting provision of public goods based on the highest benefit. 
Thus, in balance, centralisation provides a level of public good below the 
efficient level (when externalities are small) or in other words, decentralisation, 
in some cases, is more desirable.  
 
Similarly, Besley and Coate (2003) also advances that decentralisation is more 
efficient than centralisation but their argument is based on the strategic choice 
of delegates by voters. They argue that heterogeneity creates conflicts of 
interest between citizens of different jurisdictions because voters would try to 
balance the public good provision towards their regions and this may affect the 
selection and behaviour of representatives, leading to poor legislative 
performance in public policies. 
 
B. Productive efficiency  
 
There are two major arguments in the association between fiscal 
decentralisation and productive efficiency: 
 
Greater productive efficiency because of competition 
 
One of the arguments of the classical theory of decentralization is that it 
promotes horizontal competition (Tiebout, 1956, Tanzi, 1995). By delegating 
more authority to lower government levels with regard to revenue and 
expenditure, local governments are able to compete with each other in order to 
seek better economic performance and therefore, improve public service 
provision. Productive efficiency is achieved by promoting competition for 
investment and revenues as well as by allocating expenditures in a more 
efficient way than other jurisdictions. 
 
Another mechanism to improve productive efficiency is through the leviathan 
hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). They argue that the 
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central government does not promote welfare and tends to monopolize the 
control over economic resources. The introduction of fiscal decentralisation 
creates competition- under the assumption of households and firms‟ mobility. 
This is thought to curb expansionary tendencies of government because it splits 
up the central government into smaller jurisdictions avoiding inefficiencies.  
 
Competition also improves regional development. Autonomy is assumed to 
provide local officials with instruments to compete for investment by applying 
attractive policies to businesses. Undeveloped regions have more advantages 
in a competitive environment because they can apply attractive investment 
conditions such as flexible labour markets and fewer welfare states. This was 
the case in the United States after the Civil War that left behind the Southern 
part of America. To overcome this, the South promoted flexible labour policies 
and other economic development policies. This improved the economy of the 
South (Qian and Weingast 1997). One other example is Ireland, which given its 
location‟s disadvantage decided to levy much lower taxes than other European 
regions resulting in rapid economic growth in the 1990s (Lessman, 2009, 4).  
 
In addition, Jin and Zou (2002) state that fiscal decentralisation downsizes 
central government and spreads power away from the centre and thus, 
decreases territorial imbalance (citied in Ezcurra and Pascual 2008, 1188). The 
relationship between downsized central government and territorial balance is 
based on the argument that a centralised system may favour politically 
important regions creating an unequal distribution of public resources. Hence, 
less central government power means more influence for undeveloped regions. 
This weakens favouritism, creates fair competition among regions and results in 
less territorial imbalance.  
 
Greater productive efficiency because of experimentation 
 
Another main argument from the classical literature is that decentralisation can 
promote „experimentation‟. According to Tanzi (1995), successful local policies 
can be learnt and transferred into other municipalities. However, policy transfer 
is not as easy as it seems. Transferred policies do not always lead to successful 
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results because of differences in economic development and institutional 
capabilities among local governments. Hence, careful adaptation is essential.  
But the core argument of experimentation is that productive efficiency is 
enhanced by correcting, improving and establishing new methods of service 
delivery and, in the context of fiscal decentralisation, revenue generation.   
 
2.3.2 Potential dangers 
 
Decentralisation is not without criticism. The counter-arguments, as the 
theoretical benefits, have not been entirely proved and they are not exclusive to 
one form of efficiency, allocative or productive efficiency. The next section 
details these counter-arguments according to both forms of efficiency as in the 
previous section. 
 
A. Allocative efficiency 
 
Citizens' preferences are not the drivers of public service allocation, but local 
priorities 
 
In the often-cited article “On the dangers of decentralization”, Prud‟homme 
(1995, 208) states that the model of fiscal federalism assumes that the main 
differences among local governments is their preferences or tastes. However, in 
reality communities are different from each other due to household income or, 
more specifically, potential tax base. He argues that the problem for local 
authorities in developing countries is not about revealing preferences, but 
satisfying „basic needs‟, which are mostly known. Therefore, the potential gains 
from matching preferences are not large. 
 
The local services are not drivers for mobility, but other factors 
 
The argument that citizens move from one jurisdiction to another in order to 
receive the public services they prefer does not consider „switching costs‟. 
Switching costs is the cost of moving out from one city to another leaving 
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behind friends and family (Oates 1972).  This argument puts in doubt the 
mechanisms (mobility and competition) used under decentralisation to promote 
allocative and productive efficiency. Under decentralisation, mobility is expected 
to enhance allocative efficiency by matching citizen‟s preferences with the 
range of public services delivered by the local government. 
 
Similarly, mobility expects to improve productive efficiency based on the 
assumption of a competitive environment. Mobility is assumed to open 
alternatives for citizens to compare and judge local government performance. 
However, if preferences are not the drivers of mobility, then, mobility may not be 
a relevant pricing mechanism. The substantial effect of mobility may be 
outstripped by the switching costs.  Consequently, by relying on mobility, there 
is a risk of under or over provision of public services which damage allocative 
efficiency.  
 
Some recent research on migration factors from the US suggests that property 
tax burden and sales tax burden increase the migration rate. This relationship is 
not significant for income tax. The explanation is that state personal income tax 
in the United State is only a small portion of the Federal income tax; therefore, 
individual behaviour is not highly affected. In contrast, local tax and sale taxes 
represent a large portion of the State and Local Government taxes. This leads 
to higher immigration rate among states (Chen, 2005 and Gius, 2011). 
 
Local governments are more prone to corruption and administrative drawbacks 
 
Prud‟homme (1995) and Tanzi (1995) state that local bureaucracies are often 
characterised as poorly motivated, unqualified and unresponsive staff. The first 
two adjectives are explained by Prud‟homme (1995) by comparing central and 
local career opportunities. He states that a central government attracts more 
qualified people than local governments because central government offers 
better professional career and promotion. In this regard, Murphy et al. (1991) 
(cited by Tanzi, 1995, 302) argue that talented individuals are likely to choose a 
profession with better opportunities to advance in the long run.  
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Nevertheless, the educational standard of the country might play a major role. 
In a country with a high educational standard, local governments are more likely 
to have professional employees than in countries where the standard is low. For 
instance, Tanzi (1995, 302) states that subnational governments in Germany 
and Scandinavian countries are likely to have employees who are as competent 
as employees at the national level.  
 
Following the same argument, Prud‟homme (1995) suggests that in the case of 
poor motivation and poor qualification, local bureaucrats are more prone to 
corruption. Under these circumstances, the problem of the principal-agent 
relationship is more apparent because even if the principal (mayors) want to 
satisfy the citizens‟ preferences, a mayor still needs to persuade the local 
officials (the agent) to support the bill.  
 
Nonetheless, there is not conclusive evidence that poor qualifications measured 
as a level of education are associated with corruption.  Research about 
corruption shows different perspectives at the macro and micro level of analysis 
in terms of qualification. At the macro level, some evidence suggests that 
education is highly correlated to less corruption. It means that most corrupt 
countries have less social capital stock (Svensson, 2005). However, other 
studies at the micro level or at the individual level -as in Gatti et al. (2003)- do 
not find a correlation between corruption and education. However, their 
evidence suggests that wealthier individuals are more prone to corruption.  
 
More specifically for this research, an investigation of the decentralisation 
process carried out in Bolivia by Faguet (1997) suggests that decentralised 
local governments and bureaucrats seem to be more honest than the central 
government officials. This behaviour is more evident in small rural municipalities 
where the level of education is expected to be lower. The reasons, he argues, 
are incentives and co-operation. Local bureaucrats have incentives to perform 
better and honestly because their relatives, friends and family are directly 
benefited- or affected- by their behaviour. Moreover, in rural municipalities it is 
easy to “wear the same shoes”, therefore, co-operation is facilitated.  
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Hence, Faguet (1997) points out that while central government can reach better 
productive efficiency in public services in the presence of economies of scale, 
local governments might be better on allocative efficiency. If local bureaucrats 
are fully accountable to local officials, they have a professional incentive to 
perform honestly. Central bureaucrats might lack such local incentives because 
their constituencies are broad and diverse. 
 
This argument opposes Tanzi‟s (1995, 301) view that local governments may 
be more prone to corruption because of a contiguity factor. Contiguity means 
that a close relationship is developed by local employees because they have 
known each other all their lives. Consequently, decisions might favour certain 
individuals or groups and public resources might be diverted to them. However, 
he acknowledges that the opposite can also be true.     
 
Another issue is administrative capability. Tanzi (1995) states that local 
governments, mainly in developing countries, suffer more from administrative 
flaws in accounting and budgeting, which are important when allocating 
resources.  For instance, in the 2009 survey of local governments in Mexico, 
778 out of the total number of 2456 local authorities claimed that one of the 
main financial issues faced by the municipality was related to administrative 
capacity, including human resources and training. Other issues involved 
municipal economic limitations and intergovernmental transfers issues. The 
consequence of poor finance administration is that it might restrict efficiency on 
resource allocation and it can potentially affect the collection of revenues.   
 
B. Productive efficiency 
 
 Centralisation generates higher productive efficiency due to economies of scale 
and externalities   
There are certain characteristics of public goods and services which distinguish 
them from private ones. The Economic theory suggests that in a capitalist 
system, due to market failure, some goods might not be supplied by the private 
sector in the same way as private goods.  These are called 'public goods' in the 
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public finance literature. Some of their characteristics are: first, non- rivalry 
which means that they cannot exclude citizens from consuming them, or one 
person‟s consumption of the goods does not reduce the amount available to 
others.  As a consequence, public goods are more prone to suffer from free-
riders. Second, non-excludability means that there is no way of preventing the 
consumption of these goods by people that do not pay.  The cost of public 
goods based on consumption is difficult to assign and there are positive or 
negative spill-over effects that may not be taken into account in the private 
sector. These characteristics have two implications: 
 
First, the presence of externalities and economies of scale imply that central 
government can supply public goods more efficiently because of the high level 
of cost-saving through uniform provision (Oates, 1972, 1999).  Oates, however, 
claims that few local public services demonstrate economies of scale. On the 
other hand, a decentralised local government is considered as an efficient 
supplier because of closeness to the recipients. Opponents consider that local 
governments may have the incentive to under-provide collective goods. The 
reasons being that the level of revenue required for the provision of certain 
public goods is high and there are positive externalities spread outside their 
jurisdictions which are either not considered - or politically considered- when 
taking decisions regarding public service provision (Oates, 1999). As a result, 
productivity is damaged. 
 
Second, the word „public‟ in public goods does not necessarily mean “State” 
provision. Since its creation, the Bloomington School (Aligica and Boettke, 
2009) opposed the argument  that a centralised organization was the problem 
solver to the metropolitan chaos of public service provision. As a result, its 
members developed the theory of public economy. They argue that public is not 
a synonym for government but collectiveness. They added as a characteristic of 
collective goods, co-production. Co-production means that production and 
consumption cannot be separated (for instance, the educational product is 
influenced by the effort of the student as users of educational services). Based 
on the last condition, associations of individuals can ensure the provision of 
collective goods.   They call these associations, „collective consumption units‟.  
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The collective consumption units can solve the problem of provision and, 
consequently, negative externalities. However, “collective consumption units” do 
not necessarily deal with production. In this case, they argue that provision and 
production can be separated. This gives the scope for different institutional 
arrangements where the private sector interacts. These institutional 
arrangements mean more decentralised decision-making. They also argue that 
concepts of market discipline (industry and entrepreneurship) can be adapted to 
collective goods, for instance, competition among producers‟ and citizens‟ 
voice, as a ballot box, rather than exiting, as in „voting with their feet‟.    
Unequal competition worsens regional redistribution   
 
As re-distributor, the government can change the allocation of income, wealth or 
other indicators with the aim of balancing the inequalities among regions as well 
as individuals. In this regard, central government is widely considered more 
efficient.3 The reason being that in the case of a local government or even a 
state government having freedom to tax, (with freedom to impose their tax rate), 
then tax payers have the option to move out from one jurisdiction to another to 
take advantage of lower tax rates. This disadvantage is stronger on local 
governments but it applies to both state and local levels (Kee, 2003). This 
disadvantage, however, can be seen from another angle. It may enable people 
to discover and express their preferences about their preferred combination of 
taxes and quantity/quality of public services as discussed earlier. 
 
Another challenge for local governments is tax competition. High tax rates drive 
capital away and reduce the local tax base; therefore, local governments may 
be reluctant to tax at a higher rate and this results in under-provision of public 
services. In case of co-operation among communities, the setting of a common 
rate may not have any fiscal effect according to the fiscal decentralisation 
rationale (Brueckner, 2004).  
                                                          
3 It is argued that local government engages on re-distribution policies when it works on health, welfare 
and education (expenditure side) and imposition of tax law, for instance 'exceptions' or 'exemptions' 
(revenue side). Hence the degree of intervention through redistribution policy depends on the 
decentralization degree in terms of autonomy and decision-making. Moreover, it is important to note that 
local governments can be easily influenced by central government via intergovernmental transfers.  See 
more on Bahl et al. (2002) States and Local government choices in fiscal redistribution. National Tax 
Journal, 55 (4) 723-742. 




The weakness of fiscal decentralization as a means of redistribution is well-
explained by Prud‟homme (1995, 19). He points out that it is a: 
 
“vicious circle… richer jurisdictions will have larger tax base (whatever 
the tax base chosen). Their tax rates will be either equal to the tax rate of 
the less rich jurisdiction or lower. In the first case, they will have more tax 
income and therefore provide more local public services. In the second 
case, they will offer the same services with lower tax rates. In both 
cases, these jurisdictions will be more attractive to households and 
enterprises…” Hence, equity among jurisdictions may even deteriorate 
under decentralisation. However, the assignment of major taxes is 
important because it defines the financial power of any government level. 
Thus, assignment of low burden taxes to local governments also 
provokes disparities”.  
 
Prud‟homme (1995) considers that a central government promotes regional 
redistribution by allocating resources from richer to poorer regions. This is 
supported by other scholars claiming that in a decentralised environment, 
developed local governments with better administrative and economic situation 
are likely to benefit (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010; Martínez-Vázquez and 
McNab, 2003). Developed cities are more attractive to mobile factors and they 
have larger tax base because of larger economic activities. The economic 
activities, in turn, increase the collection of revenues (Lessmann, 2009). Then, 
developing cities are left behind and become weak competitors for attracting 
capital, foreign direct investment and also skilled employees. As a 
consequence, the country ends up with large regional disparities. The 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and regional inequalities has been 
largely studied and it presents more conclusive arguments of potential negative 
effects in developing countries. Empirical studies seem to show that 
decentralisation is harmful for developing countries and inconclusive for the 
developed world when the US, for instance, presents diverse results. The use of 
different methodologies adds to these contrasting findings. It seems that case 
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studies tend to be more pessimistic, while cross country analysis more 
optimistic for developed countries (see Section 2.4 for more details).  
 
Weakening of central government stabilisation function   
 
In the classical literature of fiscal decentralisation, attention was devoted to the 
assignment of tax responsibilities due to concerns of economic distortion. The 
stabilisation function of government is how the government intervenes in the 
overall economic activity through fiscal and spending policies. In broad 
economic terms, changing the burden of taxation has a direct impact on 
aggregate demand.4 Hence, a fall in the burden should increase aggregate 
demand. It also affects competitive conditions among individual markets and 
industries; people‟s patterns of work and saving; and industries‟ investment and 
expansion. Central government is generally in charge of stabilisation policies. 
This implies the necessity of significant taxing power.  
 
Oates (1999) points out that provincial, state and local governments lack  
monetary and exchange rate control mechanisms and  Prud‟homme (1995) 
warns  that central government scope for macroeconomic intervention can be 
damaged by fiscal decentralisation because macroeconomic instruments, such 
as monetary and fiscal policy, require significant financial power to manipulate 
the overall demand through taxes and expenditures.  If this power is already 
committed to decentralised agents, taxes cannot be easily increased and 
expenditure reduced. Prud‟homme (1995, 21)  explains it as follows: 
 
“Consider a country in which total government spending represent 30% 
of GDP. Assume that the central government can, for stabilization 
purposes, increase or decrease its expenditures by 10%...Then, in a 
decentralised country with local government accounting for 60% of total 
government spending, the central government will be able to increase or 
decrease total demand by about 1.2%. In a centralised country, with local 
                                                          
4
 The use of counter-factual policies is challenged by the theory on Real-business cycle by Prescott 
(1986). This theory considers that government policies do not have an impact on the overall economy and 
attributes economic growth to the rise, above average, of productivity, called Total Factor Productivity. 
This theory actually suggests negative impact on economic growth when using counter-cyclical policies. 
Real-business cycle theory, however, has not been proved and approved completely by economists. 
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government accounting for 10% of total government spending, the 
central government margin of action will represent 2.7% of GDP. The 
difference between 1.2 % and 2.7% may well be the difference between 
an ineffective macroeconomic policy and an effective one”.  
 
Thus, a high level of decentralisation might weaken central government power 
to implement effective macroeconomic policies. An example is the United 
Kingdom during Margaret Thatcher‟s government. While central government 
was trying to reduce public expenditure, local governments were increasing 
them, frustrating the central government effort. As a measure for curbing local 
government expenditures, a tax poll was imposed (Perlof, 1985) (cited in 
Prud‟homme, 22). The consequences are well-known.   
 
Fiscal decentralisation may promote negative fiscal incentives  
 
While in the classical literature on fiscal decentralisation scholars focused on 
the “tax assignment problem”, the SGTs put more emphasis on fiscal 
performance and fiscal incentives (Oates, 2005, 361).  
 
In the classical literature, the recognition that poor tax assignment could lead to 
vertical and horizontal imbalance motivated classical scholars to address the 
issue of equalizing, lump-sum grants transferred from the central government to 
lower government levels as a means to avoid tax migration patterns and assist 
the poorer regions (Oates, 2005, 352). However, in the presence of those 
sharing mechanisms, other kinds of problems are created. The SGTs address 
these issues. 
 
Fiscal effort may be damaged. Raich (2003) defines fiscal effort as „the own-
source revenue that local treasury collects‟. He explains in a rational model that 
a rise in transfers may reduce the tax effort due to „fiscal laziness‟ because of 
political and administrative cost. It means that the local government might 
collect fewer revenues from local taxes and might prefer to rely on central 
government funds. There are two reasons to advance this argument. First, it is 
politically painful to put pressure on the collection of taxes, and second, it is 
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expensive to force collection and compliance and the financial benefit is not as 
significant compared with the revenues obtained via transfers.  Argentina has 
been cited as a case of fiscal perversity by Prud'homme (1995, 22).In 1986, 
provincial expenditure increased rapidly but revenues dropped from 5.6% to 5% 
of GDP. Central government financed provincial levels through transfers and 
borrowing. However, this led to a large central government deficit in the end.  
 
Raich‟s (2003) research of Mexican municipalities with the case study of Puebla 
State found partial support for the theory of „fiscal laziness‟ in the fiscal effort of 
217 municipalities with data from 1993 to 2000. He points out that small 
municipalities tend to diminish fiscal effort while bigger and more developed 
municipalities do not.  
 
Another problem is the so called „flypaper effect‟. The flypaper effect is the 
explanation of why local governments increase total expenditure without 
increasing tax collection. The theory suggests that money sticks where it hits 
like a fly to flypaper or that government grants increase local expenditures more 
than an equivalent dollar through tax collection. Melo (2002) shows the 
presence of the flypaper effect on the regional and local government in  
Colombia. The results show that the effects differ depending on fiscal structure, 
autonomy to collect taxes and manage resources. In other words, when there is 
a high dependency on central government transfers, the flypaper effect is also 
high, specifically, when the transfers account for more than 50% of total 
revenues. The opposite is observed when regional and local governments 
depend on taxes rather than transfers. Another interesting finding in Melo‟s 
(2002) study is that a reduction in per capita transfer seems to lead to a drop in 
public spending when the main source of revenue is taxes. In contrast, sub-
national governments tend to cover the reduction of transfer by using other 
sources.  
 
In addition, fiscal decentralisation may promote bailout incentives. Rodden 
(2002) investigated the effects of fiscal and political institution in the incentives 
of subnational government to ask for bailout from the federal government. 
Rodden (2002) argues that poor fiscal discipline is not entirely driven by 
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transfer-dependency. Instead he suggests that specific fiscal arrangements play 
an important role. On the one hand, long term balanced budgets seems to 
persist (if either) if any of the following hold: the centre imposes borrowing 
restrictions; sub-national governments have both own tax revenues and 
borrowing autonomy; borrowing is based on competitive capital markets 
(Rodden and Eskeland, 2003, 438-450) or if there is oversight by higher 
government levels (Rodden, and Eskeland, 2003, 450-455). Conversely, a large 
deficit is more prone to occur in sub-national units that are highly dependent on 
intergovernmental transfers and have freedom to borrow (Rodden, 2002); 
where distributions of responsibilities are  unclear; where subnational 
governments are responsible for the provision of national goods; or where there 
are weak or fragmented political institutions (parties) (Rodden and Eskeland, 
2003, 447-448). In addition to fiscal arrangements, there are political incentives 
related to the credibility of central government with respect to bailouts. Rodden 
(2006) explains that some rich subnational governments (e.g. states in a federal 
system) may think that they are too big to fail (asymmetric jurisdiction size) or 
interregional bargains may lead state officials to have high expectations for 
bailout because of distributive politics and legislative representation.   
 
2.4 Empirical evidence  
 
The potential benefits of decentralisation suggest that fiscal decentralisation 
might have a positive influence on economic growth, regional disparities, and 
government performance. Some empirical studies have attempted to prove 
whether the potential benefits of decentralisation have empirical foundations or 
whether the dangers are more plausible. However, many of the theories are 
difficult to operationalize and some of them are highly contradictory. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence in regard to government performance is 
actually quite thin compared to the research of other potential benefits. The 
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1. Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that fiscal decentralisation does not have 
positive results on economic growth in developing countries and it is 
inconclusive regarding whether it is negative or non-associated for the 
developed world. In the United States, some research using country case-
studies have found a positive association between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth at the state level (Akai and Sakat, 2002) and for metropolitan 
(Stansel, 2005; Hammond and Tosun, 2009). Hammond and Tosun found that 
the economic impact is not revealed on non-metropolitan cities. In China, Lin 
and Liu  (2000) found positive effects in economic growth at provincial level, 
and in Russia,  Desai et al. (2005)  also found a positive association in sub 
federal units.   Thieβen (2003) in a cross-country comparison for developed 
countries found that decentralization is positive until it reaches a peak and turns 
negative. This result was also found by Iimi (2005) for developing and 
developed countries. 
 
Other empirical research has found contrasting results.  Zhang and Zou (1998), 
Zhang and Zou (2001) and Jin and Zou (2005) found a negative relationship 
between decentralisation and economic growth at the province level in China. 
Similar findings were  presented Xie et al. (1999) for the three levels of 
governments in the United States. In cross-country research,  Woller and 
Phillips (1998) and Davoodi and Zou (1998) found negative effects on economic 
growth for developing countries but non-relation  for developed countries.  Other 
researchers did not find a correlation between decentralisation and economic 
growth (or statistically insignificant effect).  Thornton (2007), Baskaran and Feld 
(2013) and Hammond and Tosun (2009) did not find an association in OECD 
countries neither Xie et al. (1999) in the United States who, in fact, suggested 
that further decentralization may even be detrimental. Equally, one of the often-
cited studies regarding macroeconomic impacts, Fukasaku and DeMello (1998), 
is not optimistic about the impact of fiscal decentralisation in developing 
countries (but is more so in developed OECD countries), arguing that it 
generates fiscal and monetary imbalances that impede economic growth. The 
reason is the weakening of the fiscal position of the central government. Thus, 
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with regard to macroeconomic impacts, there is not enough evidence to prove 
either effect. Hence, decentralisation is not the magic solution for promoting 
economic growth. Others pre-requisites, such as the previous level of 
development, seem to play a major role. 
 
2. Fiscal decentralisation and regional disparity 
 
The relationship between fiscal decentralisation and regional inequalities 
presents more conclusive arguments of potential negative effects in developing 
countries. Empirical studies seem to show that decentralisation is harmful for 
developing countries and inconclusive for the developed world. Research using 
a case study approach such as Silva (2005)  for the Philippines; Bagchi (2003) 
for India; Bonet (2006) for Colombia; Hill (2008) for Indonesia; Pike and 
Tomaney (2009) for the United Kingdom; Warner and Pratt (2005) for the USA; 
and West and Wong (2005), Tsui (1993), Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2000), 
Kanbur and Zhang (2005) and Qiao et al. (2008) for China found a positive 
correlation between  fiscal decentralisation and regional inequalities. Hence, 
more decentralization is correlated with larger regional disparities. A negative 
correlation is presented by Calamai (2009) for Italy. In cross-country research, 
for developed countries, Ezcurra and Pascual (2008), Gil et al. (2004), 
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010), and Lessmann (2009) show a negative 
correlation while this is the opposite for the developing world (Rodriguez-Pose 
and Ezcurra 2010). Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2004) in an study of China, India, 
Mexico, Spain, US and Brazil found that fiscal decentralization rises inequalities 
in all the mentioned countries except Brazil.  Shankar and Shah (2001)  found 
that it is more likely for a negative correlation to be found in Federal countries 
than in unitary.  
 
3. Fiscal decentralisation and government performance 
 
The way to assess government performance varies greatly because it has 
evolved alongside public administration doctrines. In the 1970‟s, “good 
administration” was based only on the idea of traditional “military bureaucratic 
ideas” or Weberian style bureaucracy. The emphasis was on hierarchies and 
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elimination of duplication and overlap. Later, with the development of New 
Institutional Economics, the administrative reforms shift emphasis to user 
choice, transparency and incentive structure (Hood, 1991, 5).  This was 
followed by a wave of support for business type management indoctrinated by 
the New Public Management (NPM). NPM is citizen-centred and advocates 
more decentralised structures. In addition to the public administration doctrines, 
there has recently been a shift from government to governance and similar to 
the NPM, governance is a move away from centralized hierarchies but, in this 
case, the delegation of authority moves towards civic society and citizens.  
 
Hence, the empirical literature of fiscal decentralisation presents variation in 
regard to the delimitation and definition of government performance.  For 
instance, some studies have focused on demonstrating whether 
decentralisation is only associated with citizens‟ welfare which is a sign of good 
performance. These studies test the preference-matching hypothesis.  For 
instance, Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (1999) explain preferences 
heterogeneity in the United States over the period 1934-1970.  Their research 
was based on the selection of liquor regulation policy by individual States. The 
States were left with the decision to retain decision making on regulation or 
decentralizing it to local governments. Hence, questioning the reason of such a 
decision, and considering an association with preference heterogeneity, 
Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (1999) concluded that there is a strong 
association in the sense that States with more heterogeneous preference were 
more prone to decentralize decision making. Azfar et al. (1999),  in an study of 
provincial and local government in Uganda and Philippines, questioned whether 
citizens differ on preferences between and among countries. They evaluated 
whether public officials were aware of their constituents‟ preferences. The study 
was performed by surveying both citizens and officials.  The results were a 
significant variation in preferences between countries at the municipal level in 
the Philippines but not in Uganda. In terms of matching preferences, they did 
not find consistency. They found awareness of the local governments in regard 
to preferences, but the research also showed that the resources and 
procedures constrained them from being responsive.  Another case study that 
empirically demonstrates links between fiscal decentralization and citizens‟ 
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welfare in Bolivia is Faguet (1997). Faguet explains that the pattern of 
investment in social services and human capital changed significantly after the 
fiscal decentralization reform of 1994.  He found that investment in eight 
different sectors (education, water and sanitation, agriculture, transport, urban 
development and communication, health and energy) changed significantly after 
fiscal decentralization reform, and these changes were strongly and positively 
related to objective indicators of needs. Oates‟ preference matching hypothesis 
seems relatively well supported and the studies show that local governments, 
who are closer to the citizens, are more aware of citizens‟ needs. Nonetheless, 
this does not prove that awareness of needs is materialized in the policy 
process. 
 
Other investigations focus on the role of fiscal decentralisation to combat 
corruption or use the wider concept of governance which includes different 
dimensions. Huther and Shah (1998) assess the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and quality of governance of 80 countries. The governance 
index is composed of several dimensions including citizens‟ voice and exit 
(citizens‟ participation); government orientation; social development and 
economic management.  The findings suggest that only the dimensions of 
citizen‘s participation and government orientation were statistically positively 
correlated to quality of governance.  DeMello and Barenstein (2001) studied the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and governance of 78 countries. He 
found similar findings as Huther and Shah. Fiscal decentralisation is associated 
with different dimensions of governance such as less corruption, rule of law, 
voice and accountability, political instability and quality of bureaucracy. His 
findings suggest that the highest the share in total subnational revenues, the 
stronger the correlation. 
 
Fisman and Gatti (2002a), Gurgur and Shah (2005) and Arikan (2004), Altunbas 
and Thornton (2012), Ivanyna and Shah (2011)  and Padovano et al. (2011) 
found that fiscal decentralisation is correlated with lower levels of corruption. 
Fisman and Gatti highlight the importance of the origin of a country‟s legal 
system (for instance: English Common Law; French Commercial Code; German 
Commercial Code, etc.).  Gurgur and Shah claim that the effects are stronger in 
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Unitary than in Federal countries and argue that corruption is caused by lack of 
service-orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, colonial 
past, deficient internal control and centralised decision-making.  
 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskava (2007) test the theory that the results of fiscal 
decentralization depend on the level of the countries' political centralization. 
They found that the fiscal decentralization combined with strong national 
parties significantly improves the quality of government and public goods 
provision (as well as economic growth). Fan et al. (2009) found that fiscal 
decentralisation reduces corruption but this depends on the number of 
government tiers and more government tiers increase corruption. Kyriacou and 
Roca-Sagales (2011) found that fiscal decentralization in OECD countries has a 
positive impact on government quality. However, this positive effect is reduced 
in the presence of regional elections and multi-tier government structures. 
Adam et al. (2014) found a reverse U-shaped relationship between government 
efficiency in providing health and education services and fiscal decentralization. 
 
An interesting paper is Treisman (2002) in which Treisman challenged Fisman 
and Gatti‟s study (2002a). Treisman uses similar data than Fisman and Gatti 
but includes eight different measures of corruption. Treisman found that in 
countries with more tiers of government, the ones with strong legislative upper 
house and smaller local jurisdictions are associated with higher perceived 
corruption. Treisman points out that once religion (share of Protestants in the 
population) is controlled for, the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
corruption is no longer significant.  This highlights the sensitivity of adding 
different measures and controlled variables to this methodological approach. 
 
The previous discussion is not an exhaustive review and this research is 
delimited to the study of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
government performance. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this research to 
prove major economic relationships (economic growth and regional disparities). 
Nevertheless, the revision of the empirical literature presents meaningful 
insights of unattended issues and methodological considerations.  
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The revision of this literature shows that, in particular, the findings on 
government performance are inconclusive and, the use of different methodology 
and measurements yields contrasting results. In addition, most studies have 
focused on testing fiscal decentralisation and the expected outcomes such as 
government performance at the macro /country wide-level. There is a gap in the 
literature in regard to the mediating changes fiscal decentralisation is assumed 
to encourage. These mediating changes are accountability and public 
entrepreneurship. Each behavioural pattern might be more related to one form 
of efficiency, allocative or productive efficiency and therefore, the impact on the 
outcomes may differ.  
 
In addition, the empirical literature covers mostly fiscal decentralisation and 
allocative efficiency and there are fewer studies looking at productive efficiency 
(Barankay and Lackwood, 2007). The reason for this is that productive 
efficiency is particularly difficult to separate and quantify. 
 
2.5 The mechanisms of fiscal decentralisation  
 
In this section the types and characteristics of fiscal decentralisation 
mechanisms that this research intends to evaluate will be outlined and 
explained. 
 
As noted in the above discussion under the title dangers of fiscal 
decentralisation particularly productive efficiency arguments, devolving 
significant taxing power to local governments is not generally advised due to 
fear of weakening central government actions in macroeconomic policies, but 
also because, particularly for undeveloped areas, there is a danger that 
competition may worsen redistribution. 
 
Taxing power is a mechanism used to materialize the theoretical virtues of fiscal 
decentralisation, but it is not the only one. Indeed, taxing power is the 
mechanism that ticks key requirements for a successful (theoretical) 
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decentralisation process aiming at fiscal incentives; namely, financial autonomy, 
discretion, and a sense of financial responsibility.  
 
However, given the “dangers” it may cause and in order to fill the gap between 
revenues and expenditures created due to poor decentralisation of taxing 
power, most countries have adapted sharing mechanisms or intergovernmental 
transfers. The decentralisation of expenditure with lack of taxing power, taxing 
revenue and borrowing power, is a type of decentralisation close to what 
Lessmann (2009) refers to as the co-operative federal system. 
 
Fiscal transfers become relevant as a way of avoiding vertical and horizontal 
government disparities. Vertical imbalance is created when expenditure 
responsibilities at lower government levels do not match their revenue raising 
power. Horizontal imbalance means disparities on collection among different 
government units giving their public service responsibilities. 
 
Norregaard (1997) considers that intergovernmental transfers enhance 
budgetary action of local governments and, in some cases, the  fiscal 
arrangements might drive fiscal incentives. For instance, he claims that if the 
assignment of revenues is based on tax- benefit considerations, incentives are 
created. 
 
Therefore, an increase in intergovernmental transfer is also a mechanism of 
decentralised fiscal responsibilities in the sense that it delegates expenditure 
responsibilities and it is likely to be a mechanism driving fiscal incentives. It 
should be noted that sharing mechanisms can be formulated in many different 
ways. For the purpose of this study (rural local governments), I will refer to two 
broad categories.   
 
Unconditional funds are a set of revenue sharing funds assigned to lower 
government levels without labelled or controlled expenditures. Unconditional 
grants are created to deal with regional inequity (horizontal imbalance) when 
they are calculated considering economic differences. The important aspect of 
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unconditional funds is that local governments receive higher revenues and local 
authorities are granted with control in allocation of resources or high discretion.  
 
In contrast, conditional funds are revenue sharing with tied expenditure 
assignments. They are created in order to promote national standards by 
conditioning the funding to federal expenditure priorities. In this case local 
governments are granted with expenditure and redistribution power but they 
enjoy less discretion than under unconditional funds. There are different types 
of conditional funds and each type presents different levels of discretion. In this 
research, two types of conditional fund will be referred to because of their 
specific and separate relevance to the Mexican context: mandatory conditional 
funds and extraordinary conditional funds.  
 
Mandatory conditional funds are earmarked funds regularly and lawfully 
distributed among lower government levels. They do delegate some degree of 
discretion but to a lesser extent than unconditional funds.  This type of funds is 
assigned to broad expenditure categories. On the other hand, extraordinary 
conditional funds are discretionary funds for specific expenditures, which are 
not regular or repeated year after year. They are typically heavily regulated and 
delegate less discretion in allocation of resources than mandatory conditional 
funds. They are nonetheless a source of sporadic revenue for investment for 
local governments. 
 
Hence, what it is important to learn from this discussion is that fiscal 
decentralisation uses different mechanisms to delegate financial 
responsibilities, and each mechanism along with the fiscal policy arrangements 
and fiscal conditions drive different fiscal incentives.  
 
The level of revenues collected through taxes in rural local governments in 
Mexico is not significant with regard to total local revenues. Therefore, taxing 
power does not represent as high a fiscal incentive as intergovernmental 
transfers. This research will therefore focus on intergovernmental transfers as 
drivers of incentives, although use of taxing power will also be integrated in the 
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analysis when examining and measuring municipalities‟ levels of public 
entrepreneurship. This will be explained in more detail later in Chapter 8. 
 
2.6 Summary and conclusions 
 
To sum up, there are different definitions and typologies of decentralisation. 
This research is interested in fiscal decentralisation, particularly in the 
delegation of revenue and expenditure to local governments. However, for the 
purpose of analysis, different elements of all decentralisation domains should 
be considered.   
 
Decentralisation is an enduring international trend which has transformed itself. 
It initiated as a way to maintain together different “identities” and it has been 
transformed into a powerful economic argument embodying high expectations.  
 
Fiscal decentralisation is argued to achieve two major forms of efficiency, 
allocative and productive efficiency. During the previous discussion, I presented 
the arguments for and against decentralisation based on forms of efficiency to 
make a point to distinguish them.  This will be the base for developing later an 
argument that justifies the theoretical framework of this study.   
 
The theoretical arguments suggest that fiscal decentralisation might have a 
positive influence on economic growth, regional disparities and government 
performance. However, there are concerns that decentralisation is not 
automatically the driver of such benefits nor the solution for government 
efficiency and that the damage might outweigh the benefits. Fiscal 
decentralisation in particular is thought to a) worsen competition and 
redistribution among regions derived from existing uneven development; b) 
weaken central government power to stabilize the economy via macroeconomic 
policies; c) exacerbate corruption and inefficiencies due to administrative 
drawbacks at lower government levels; and d) it may weaken fiscal effort. 
These arguments are based on the economic discourse discussed in section 
2.2. 
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Taxing power is one of the main mechanisms of fiscal decentralisation, but it is 
not the only one. Intergovernmental transfers such as conditional and 
unconditional funds are also mechanisms that may drive fiscal incentives.  
However, the fiscal arrangements in each type of transfer create different fiscal 
issues and might drive different fiscal incentives. 
 
Figure 2.1 presents a visual representation of the theoretical relationships 
observed in the previous discussion. It focuses especially on how 
decentralisation might, in theory, promote positive outcomes, since this 
research intends to contribute to the decentralisation debate by examining one 
key possible outcome: changes in government performance.   
 
The key theoretical arguments are that fiscal decentralisation, in the form of 
increased conditional funds and unconditional funds, will promote increases in 
both allocative and productive efficiency. These forms of efficiency positively 
influence outcomes in several areas including government performance.  
  
 
Figure  2.1 Theoretical Implications of Fiscal Decentralisation  
  
 
Most studies have focused on testing fiscal decentralisation and the expected 
outcomes such as government performance at the macro /country wide-level. 
By contrast, this study will analyse the mediating changes, namely 
accountability and public entrepreneurship, which fiscal decentralisation is 
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assumed to encourage. These behavioural patterns will be operationalized 
separately to test their association with fiscal decentralisation and their impact 
on government performance. This analysis will be undertaken in the lowest 
government level and in the most vulnerable group, rural municipalities. 
 
There is a call to analyse these mediating changes because the empirical 
research tends to analyse outcomes but not the process leading to such 
outcomes. The relevant point here is that allocative and productive efficiency 
are distinct forms of efficiency and they are likely to result from different 
behavioural patterns. Of particular relevance, as discussed in Section 2.2, are 
behaviours related to accountability and behaviours related to public 
entrepreneurship.  
 
Productive efficiency is more likely to be related to public entrepreneurship than 
to accountability because it introduces elements of innovation, pro-activeness 
and risk taking. On the other hand, allocative efficiency is more likely to be 
related to accountability-related behaviours because it denotes responsiveness 
and responsibility to citizens‟ preferences. These are not absolute differences: 
productive efficiency may also, to a lesser extent, be a consequence of 
accountability behaviour. But the differences are likely to be important. 
 
The relevant theoretical implication here is that, if the arguments which posit 
positive outcomes are correct, then fiscal decentralisation will encourage 
changes (improvements) in both forms of behaviour, accountability and public 
entrepreneurship. These behaviours, in turn, might lead to higher allocative and 
productive efficiency.  Although both types of behaviour are highly desirable, the 
extent of the benefit of each behavioural pattern might differ significantly and 
affect the two forms of efficiency differently, and therefore affect the outcomes. 
Hence, there is a call for analysing these behaviours separately.  
 
In pure economic terms, accountability and public entrepreneurship might be 
simultaneously pursued without any problem. However, from a political point of 
view, these forms of behaviour may have contrasting and, perhaps, 
incompatible elements. The next chapter will develop this argument further. 




The literature review seems to present a lot of theoretical information simply 
based on very general observations and very little empirical evidence 
operationalizing behavioural patterns, in particular public entrepreneurship. In 
order to contribute to closing this gap in the literature, this research intends to 
shed light on how fiscal decentralisation encourages either/both accountability 
or/and public entrepreneurship and in which ways (if at all) these behavioural 
patterns are likely to affect government performance. These propositions are 
under the plausible assumption that local government performance is influenced 








In addition, this research is delimited to studying rural municipalities. As noted 
earlier, research focused on rural municipalities can contribute substantively 
and methodologically to fiscal decentralisation research.  
The inconclusive findings in the empirical revision are a consequence of 
methodological limitations. On the one hand, quantitative approaches fail to 
capture historical contexts such as the process of decentralisation in a specific 
country, the reasons behind the implementation of decentralisation policies and 
the actual degree of decentralisation, to name but a few. This is also true for 
behavioural analysis. Different incentives might appear depending on the group 
of actors under study such as rural local authorities in rural municipalities. On 
the other hand, qualitative research does not present a strong generalization of 
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findings because they depend on small samples and therefore it is often 
criticized in the methodology literature as being incapable of reaching a 
conclusion.  
 
This calls for different research instruments in order to balance the 
disadvantages of each methodological approach. 
 
Next, in Chapter 3, the researcher will define and discuss the key concepts and 
relationships composing the key part of the theoretical framework that this study 
intends to evaluate. 
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Chapter 3 - Behavioural approaches: Accountability and 
Public Entrepreneurship   
 
 
The possible outcomes of fiscal decentralisation put forward by theorists, 
and discussed in Chapter 2, are not in themselves sufficient to explain 
what occurs under decentralised settings. More recent approaches to fiscal 
decentralisation hypothesise that the delegation of financial functions 
creates incentives that foster local authorities to behave in  ways to allow 
allocative and productive efficiency to be achieved. Hence, it is important 
to undestand whether and in which ways these behaviours may be 
encouraged, especially given the inconclusive nature of current empirical 
research. The next section concentrates on two concepts which were 
identified in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2) and that can be operationalized 
and measured with some success: accountability and public 
entrepreneurship. 
 
The likelihood that accountability and public entrepreneurship behaviour 
are different and therefore affect differently decentralisation outcomes has 
been highly neglected in the empirical work. This research will evaluate 





In the context of this research, accountability is defined as the virtue of 
local authorities to behave according to public expectations that further 
improve efficiency. By public expectations it means transparent, 
responsive, and responsible government which matches citizens‟ 
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Accountability can take a variety of meanings and each meaning can 
suggest different drivers and forms of assessment. This research aims at 
evaluating the incentives related to the personal values and actual 
behaviour of local authorities. Therefore, this study focuses on local 
authorities‟ virtues within the public sphere.  The next section presents how 
the concept of accountability has evolved and discusses some of the forms 
it may take. 
 
3.1.1 Accountability concept and evolution 
 
Similar to others‟ definitions in social science, there is not a single concept 
of accountability owing to the nature of public institutions and the 
continuous development of the public administration literature5.  
 
A consensus, according to Kluvers and Tippett (2010, 46) is that 
accountability involves “rendering of an account and therefore provision of 
information”. At the present time, the term accountability used in public 
administration literature is far from its bookkeeping accounting roots. Some 
scholars agree that this transfer of meaning- from bookkeeping to public 
accountability- is somehow connected to the introduction of New Public 
Management discourse (Bovens, 2007; Funnell, 2003, Kluvers and Tippett, 
2010).  
 
Accountability is sometimes referred to as responsibility, because both 
denote a sense of duty. However, accountability and responsibility entail 
different aspects of analysis. Therefore, a key issue is to differentiate 
whether accountability is studied as “a concept” or as “a part of a concept”. 
For instance, Mulgan (2000) states that while accountability used to be 
considered part of responsibility as an external aspect (scrutiny), recently, 
                                                          
5
 See Mulgan (2000) for a detailed discussion of accountability definitions. 
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it has shifted to responsibility being part of accountability, as an internal 
aspect- individual morality.   
 
A similar distinction is presented by Bovens (2010). He claims that 
accountability can be conceptualised as a virtue or as a mechanism. 
Accountability as a virtue is related to the actual behaviour of the public 
agent. It is viewed as a positive quality. Bovens (2010) argues that this 
distinction leads to a different research agenda and “deficits” or 
inefficiencies. The research agenda as a virtue evaluates behavioural 
patterns. In other words, it analyses the factors that lead to being 
accountable.  On the other hand, accountability as a mechanism is more 
concerned with the relationship between an agent and “a forum” to which 
the agent is obliged to explain and justify his behaviour. Bovens (2010) 
argues that both concepts are important for democratic governance, but for 
different reasons. Accountability as a virtue encourages legitimacy and 
public confidence based on transparent, responsive, and responsible 
governments. As a mechanism, accountability is only an instrument to 
keep politicians virtuous.  
 
Some scholars have advanced that the ambiguity and multiplicity of the 
concept derives from the fact that accountability is an Anglo-Norman 
concept. Therefore, it does not  have an equivalent meaning in other 
languages such as French, Portuguese, German, Dutch and more 
importantly, Spanish- which is the language used in data collection in this 
research. Hence, there is no semantic distinction between “responsibility” 
and accountability” (Bovens et al, 2008, 226). In particular, in the Spanish 
language the word “rendimiento de cuentas” (render an account) is used 
as the closest word to “accountability”. However, it has two implications. 
First, it is a translation from “rendering an account”, the core accountability 
meaning. Nevertheless, it is not only used as a mechanism, but as a virtue; 
second,”rendimiento de cuentas” is only used as a noun, not as an 
adjective. The closest adjective used in this case is “responsable”, which is 
the translation for responsible.  
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The ambiguity of the accountability concept is not without consequences. 
Scholars argue that it may undermine the organization‟s performance, if 
the public agents are accountable in the wrong sense or in every sense, 
ending as a dysfunctional organisation (Koppell, 2005); it has prevented 
empirical progress in the topic (Bovens, 2010, 947); it is an “ever-
expanded concept” which has weakened its core meaning of external 
scrutiny and always requires a definition and categorization (Mulgan, 2000, 
555).  
 
Thus, the concept has evolved into two different branches (although many 
categorisations exist in the literature). One branch maintains its accounting 
origins of stewardship and external scrutiny and the second branch relies 
on aspects related to responsibility- morality and personal values.   
 
These definitions of accountability yield a separate theoretical perspective 
of the drivers and forms of assessment and the concept calls for a clear 
definition and delimitation according to the research interest.  
 
For the purpose of this research, accountability as a virtue or as a concept 
that includes responsibility as an internal aspect is more appropriate 
because it aims at analysing policy incentives- at the personal level- rather 
than evaluate the effectiveness of the policy in place (for example, 
loopholes). In this sense, “being held to account” is one of the dimensions 
of accountability. Hence, in this research accountability is defined as the 
virtues of local authorities to behave according to public expectations that 
further improve efficiency.  
 
By public expectations this research means the different dimensions that 
measure/ describe the concept of accountability. For the purpose of this 
research, three (out of the five) dimensions proposed by Koppell (2005, 
96) have been used, transparency, responsibility and responsiveness. 
These dimensions were also described by Bovens (2010) when discussing 
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the concept of accountability as a virtue. Each dimension responds to the 
following questions:  
 
Transparency- Did the organization reveal the facts of its performance? 
Responsibility- Did the organization follow the rules? 
Responsiveness- Did the organization fulfil the substantive expectation 
demand/need? 
 
Liability and controllability have been excluded because both denote 
internal scrutiny and relationship within government agencies. This 
research is more interested in the external scrutiny and the relationship 
with citizens.  
 
3.1.2 Fiscal decentralisation and Accountability 
 
Fiscal decentralisation might lead to greater accountability in terms of 
transparency, responsiveness and responsibility because delegation of 
financial resources to local authorities permits responsiveness to 
preferences through a constant communication with citizens and better 
information, but also because citizens can  relate actions to performance 
and politicians might be  encouraged to satisfy citizens‟ needs and desires 
in order to maintain their political position. In this sense, local authorities 
deliver the mix of goods and services in accordance with the goods and 
services desired by the local citizens. This can potentially lead to greater 
allocative efficiency, but also, to some extent, gains in productive efficiency 
resulting in good government performance. However, because fiscal 
decentralisation involves higher levels of financial resources, there is 
skepticism that accountability improves under decentralisation and the 
opposite is feared to occur. 
 
In the next paragraphs, arguments and some empirical findings will be 
discussed which shed light on whether or not fiscal decentralisation 
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increases accountability. Country and local government case studies are 
considered as these are the foci of the present research.   
 
a) Fiscal decentralisations increases accountability 
 
Faguet (1997) investigated the decentralisation reform in Bolivia. He found 
evidence that small-rural municipalities present higher Local Government 
Effectiveness. Based on these findings, he proposes an incentive-based 
local-leadership theory: in a context of mobile politicians and diversity of 
municipalities in regard to size and resources, corrupt politicians will select 
wealthy municipalities leaving small-rural ones with honest politicians. In a 
recent article, Faguet (2014) argues that the effects of decentralisation are 
the sum of local-level effects. In an empirical study of local governments in 
Bolivia and Bangladesh, he presents evidence that the outcomes of fiscal 
decentralisation are the result of underlying social and economic 
characteristics of the municipalities as well as the local political dynamics. 
However, at the aggregate level, he claims, decentralisation may improve 
government accountability and outcomes if there are more local 
governments with the characteristics leading to better competition and 
entrepreneurialism.  
 
Blair (2000) shows how decentralization improved the quality of democratic 
governance in both large cities and small towns in India, Bolivia, Mali, 
Honduras, India, the Philippines and Ukraine due to improvements in 
participation and accountability mechanisms.  
 
Rowland (2001) using a comparative case study between Mexico and 
Bolivia found evidence that the effects of decentralisation in small (rural) 
municipalities are different to the ones expected for urban municipalities 
because of patterns of participation and local public finance. This implies 
that the outcomes between rural and urban municipalities are likely to 
differ.  Therefore, it is important to study them separately. This is based on 
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the presumption that it is plausible to generalise Rowland‟s suggestion 
(2001) at least in similar countries.   
 
In Colombia, Escobar-Lemmon and Ross (2014) examine the extent to 
which three types of decentralization are perceived to lead to more 
accountable actions according to citizens. They found that administrative 
decentralization and fiscal empowerment is more important for improving 
the perception of accountability than political decentralization is. 
 
In Brazil, Gonçalves (2014) analysed the impact of Participatory Budgeting 
(PB) on service provision. Using a panel data of municipalities in Brazil, 
she found evidence that municipalities which adopted PB not only spend 
more on health and sanitation, but they also experience a drop in infant 
mortality. Therefore, she suggests that citizens‟ direct participation in the 
budgeting decision-making and close interaction between users and 
elected officials can influence spending patterns and living standard 
outcomes.    
 
In Mexico, Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2014) analysed a particular kind of 
decentralization, traditional collective choice methods (or usos y 
costumbres in Spanish) which is a self-government approach used by 
native Mexican communities to administer local governments.  Their 
findings suggest that municipalities using traditional collective choice 
method present higher improvements in electricity provision, sewerage and 
education than local governments elected through political parties, 
because of higher civic engagement. This is in spite of the negative 
influence expected from local elite capture.   
 
b) Fiscal decentralisation worsens accountability 
 
A quantitative analysis of 50 states in the US by Fisman and Gatti (2002b) 
exhibited an increase in corruption. Their findings show a positive 
association between conviction rates for the abuse of public office and 
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dependency on central transfers or larger federal transfers. Hence, their 
findings suggest that if decentralisation is not accompanied by revenue 
generating, corruption is likely to occur.  
 
In India, Jha (2002) found that high dependency of rural local government 
on government transfers  were followed by issues of political influence by 
the state government using funds to control rural local governments.  In 
addition, the budget data analysis suggests that fiscal effort in rural 
municipalities decreased or in other words, the share of their own 
revenues in total income has declined. However, the data also suggests 
that on average, revenue dependency in this group of municipalities has 
declined, implying that there are other sources of income being used, 
presumably shared taxes and loans.    
 
Kolstad and Fjeldstad (2006, 6 - 7) mentioned two case studies with 
malevolent behaviour caused by fiscal decentralization.  In Tanzania 
during the period 1996 to 2003, local governments were granted 
discretionary fiscal power and local authorities used coercion for raising 
taxes.  The reasons were deficient fiscal system and oversight. Similarly, 
Henderson and Kuncove (2004) claimed that in Uganda corruption surged 
along with decentralisation of power and authority to local governments 
(cited in Kolstad and Fjeldstad, 2006, 7).  Thus, these studies suggest that 
the fiscal arrangements matter for accountability incentives. Kolstad and 
Fjeldstad (2006) also analysed how citizens perceived different 
government levels in regard to corruption. They found that in both cases, 
rural municipalities were perceived less corrupt than other higher 
government levels.   
 
In Mexico, Herrera (2014) studied the commercialization of water and 
sewage provision in three local governments.  The findings suggest that 
decentralisation and commercialization practices have been unsuccessful 
in poor municipalities because it is politically challenging to finance these 
services and make the necessary increases in fees. Contrarily, in rich 
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cities the policies are more successful because of the presence of a strong 
middle class and a consumer base that provides self-financing.     
 
Thus, the empirical work suggests that fiscal arrangements may lead to 
different incentives. In addition, it advises that the effects in rural 
municipalities are different to the effects in bigger municipalities. Therefore, 
studying only rural municipalities controls for some (but not all) municipal 
characteristics and standarises to some extent political dynamics.  
 
The empirical findings are mixed, but there are some studies suggesting 
better accountability particularly in this group of municipalities due to 
closeness to citizens. This might suggest that the link between fiscal 
decentralisation and accountability is likely weak and its enforcement 
depends on citizens‟ involvement and participation. Therefore, the level of 
accountability might be conditional on the level of political development.  
 
The next section discusses the association between fiscal decentralisation 
and public entrepreneurship.  
 
3.1.3 The political mechanisms for accountability under fiscal decentralisation 
 
The relationship between democratisation and the potential of 
decentralisation to increase accountability is straightforward and has 
received considerable attention. However, there are also some counter-
arguments.   
 
 The optimistic view  
 
The literature illustrates that local authorities become more financially 
accountable because their performance can directly affect their reputation 
and further re-election (Shaw and Qureshi, 1994 cited in Tanzi 1995). 
Hence, politicians try to satisfy the median voter through improving 
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democracy and financial accountability. Being more accountable to the 
people is argued to decrease lobbying by interest groups. Lobbying is 
thought to distort policy choice and allow wastage of public funds 
(Barankay and Lockwood, 2007).  
 
Wehner and Renzio (2013) identified two important actors for budgetary 
disclosure in democratic countries, citizens and legislators. They tested the 
importance of these actors for budgetary disclosure in democratic 
countries compared to non-democratic countries. In the case of citizens, 
their findings suggest that the ballot box is a mechanism that empowers 
citizens to demand disclosure of information and this in turn may have an 
influence on accountability, and in particular, fiscal transparency.  
 
 The pessimistic vision 
 
Prud‟homme (1995) argues that under fiscal decentralisation, 
democratization can also lead to poor accountability and damage 
allocative efficiency due to increases in corruption. In addition, the 
presence of the political cycle- which means raising taxes after election 
and increasing expenditures before election- leads to negative 
externalities. Moreover, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 135) point out 
that in the presence of decentralisation, capture by local elites is prone to 
occur, which may compromise the advantages of decentralisation.   
 
3.2 Public entrepreneurship  
 
“Entrepreneurship occurs in the public sector where there is an 
uncertain environment, a devolution of power, and at the same 
time re-allocation of resource ownership, to unit management level. 
It is driven by those individuals, particularly susceptible to the 
“manipulation” of their stakeholders and with a desire for a high 
level of social “self-satisfaction”, who have the ability to spot market 
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opportunities and who are able through followers‟ “manipulation” to 
act on them (Boyett, 1997) (cited in Kearney et al, 2009, 28). 
 
The previous quote highlights that public entrepreneurship is a distinctive 
behavioural pattern. It also shows that devolution of power may be a 
means to promote this behaviour. This research argues that fiscal 
decentralisation theory implies entrepreneurial behaviour by local 
authorities which leads to efficiency of both forms, allocative and 
productive efficiency (see Section 2.2, p. 28). This assumption has been 
neglected in the empirical work related to fiscal decentralisation. Therefore, 
this research intends to contribute to the fiscal decentralisation research by 
evaluating whether decentralisation promotes public entrepreneurship, and 
how it does it.  
 
This research defines public entrepreneurship as the behaviour of local 
authorities to act in ways that improves efficiency. The entrepreneurial 
behaviour includes innovativeness, risk taking and proactivity. The next 
Section presents how the concept of entrepreneurship has evolved and 
discusses why this definition was selected.   
 
3.2.1 Public entrepreneurship concept and evolution 
 
The concept of 'entrepreneurship' was coined in 1734 in the work of 
Cantillon, who defines entrepreneurship as self-employment with uncertain 
return (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999, 1).  However, the work of the 
Austrian economist Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1934) is often referred to as 
the foundation of modern entrepreneurship with its depiction of 
entrepreneurship as a driver of innovation (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001, 
495; Zerbinati and Souitaris 2005, 48; Hederer, 2007, 2). Since then, 
theoretical and empirical work has been built. 
 
Drucker (1985, 177) in his well-cited book ―Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship‖ states that: 
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―Public-service institutions such as government agencies, labour 
unions, churches, universities, schools  hospitals, community and 
charitable organizations, professional and trade associations and 
the like, need to be entrepreneurial and innovative fully as much as 
any business does. Indeed, they may need it more. The rapid 
changes in today's society, technology, and economy are 
simultaneously an even greater threat to them and an even greater 
opportunity‖.  
 
However, he also acknowledges that in the public sector innovation is far 
more difficult. 
 
Theoretical discussion in regard to public-private differences in general, 
and entrepreneurship in particular has been timely in academia. These 
differences are considered by Drucker as obstacles to innovation.6   
 
Public entrepreneurship has been studied from different perspectives and 
research fields. The political science literature advanced the concept of 
political or policy entrepreneurship, which focuses on the politician‟s 
motivation and policy agenda formation. Lately, the public administration 
literature has shifted its research toward public managers. On the other 
hand, the business literature focuses on local public figures and regional 
developers. Although they explain the phenomenon from different angles, 
they coincide at a fundamental point, that financial rewards, in the public 
sector, are not the ultimate and only aim. 
 
There is not yet a consensus on the extent and aspects of public 
entrepreneurship. Table 3.1 shows some existing definitions. These 
definitions present some common elements that confirm a move from a 
definition of economic maximisation toward innovation and creativity. Many 
definitions include the words innovation, risk-taking and pro-activeness 
such as the definitions of Currie et al. (2008); Roberts (1992); Stone 
                                                          
6 See Zampetakis and Moustakis, 2007; Teixeira and Silva, 2012; Klein et al, 2010; Meller, 2003; Kearney et 
al, 2009 for discussion about these differences. 
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(1992); Morris and Jones (1999), Morris et al. (2008) (see Table 3.1). In 
addition, some definitions recognise that wealth creation is less important 
in public entrepreneurship than other types of rewards, such as political re-
election, social recognition and positive results for public institutions. This 










Table  3.1 Definitions of Entrepreneurship within Public Sector Organizations  
Ramamurti (1986, 143) „individuals who undertake purposeful activity to initiate, maintain, or aggrandize 
one or more public sector organizations‟ 
Shockley et al. (2006,  
205) 
“Public sector entrepreneurship occurs whenever a political actor is alert to and acts 
on potential profit opportunities, thus moving the system in which the actor is 
embedded toward equilibrium.” 
Kearney et al. (2007,  
277) 
 
“Public sector entrepreneurship, which for the purpose of this research refers to 
state enterprise/civil service, is defined as an individual or group of individuals, who 
undertakes desired activity to initiate change within the organization, adapt, 
innovate and facilitate risk. Personal goals and objectives are less important than 
the generation of a good result for the state enterprise/civil service.” 
Holcombe (2002,  143) “Political entrepreneurship occurs when an individual observes and acts on a 
political profit opportunity.” Roberts (1992, 56). 
Robert (1992, 56)  “Public entrepreneurship is defined as the generation of a novel or innovative idea 
and the design and implementation of the idea into public sector practice.” 
Currie et al. (2008, 989) 
 
“[…], entrepreneurship is seen as the process of identifying and pursuing 
opportunities by individuals and/or organizations. Further, this process is often 
characterized by innovativeness, risk-taking and pro-activity (Miller 1983; Covin and 
Slevin 1991; Morris and Sexton 1996; Morris and Jones 1999).” 
Morris and Jones (1999,  
74– 87) 
 
“Public sector entrepreneurship is the process of creating value for citizens by 
bringing together unique combinations of public and / or private resources to exploit 
social opportunities.” (based on Bellone and Goerl, 1992; Linden, 1990; Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992) 
 “Entrepreneurship implies an innovative, proactive role for government in steering 
society toward improved quality of life. This includes generating alternative 
revenues, improving internal processes, and developing novel solutions to 
inadequately satisfied social and economic needs.” 
Morris et al. (2008, p. 
103) 
 
“Organizations can be characterized, then, in terms of their entrepreneurial 
orientation or intensity, which is a reflection both of how many entrepreneurial 
things they are doing, and how innovative, risky, and proactive those things tend to 
be. The basic steps in this process identified [in the private sector] should be no 
different in a non-profit or public sector context.” 
Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992,  xix) 
“[Entrepreneurial institutions/public entrepreneurs] use resources in new ways to 
maximize productivity and effectiveness.” 
Roberts and King (1991, 
149–150) 
“Public entrepreneurship‟ is a process of introducing innovation to public sector 
practice.” 
Stone (1992, 31-32)  “An organizational process involving innovation, risk and pro-activity which results in 
a disjuncture from standard operating procedures and responses by current 
systems in order to achieve public purposes” 
Carpenter (2001, 30) “The incremental selling of new program ideas”  
Marcias (2000, 52) “The risky use of public resources in the creation of value for the people” 
Gansler (2003, 37)  “The development of separate fee-for-service entities operating within a 
governmental agency “ 
Edward, Jones, Lawton, 
and Llewellyn (2002, 
1548) 
“Driving the process of utilizing the energy and creativity of the community to 
support managers to identify needs and solutions to meet those needs” 
Zerbinati and Souitaris 
(2005, 61) 
“discovery and exploitation of rewarding opportunities (and not only profit-making 
opportunities), without current control of the required resources” 
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Source: Adaptation from Diefenbach (2011, 33), which in turn is based on Currie et al. (2008), and 
Kim (2010, 784) 
Most importantly, for the interest of this research, Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992, p. xix) recognise an association of public entrepreneurship and 
productive efficiency and allocative efficiency: 
“[Entrepreneurial institutions/public entrepreneurs] use resources in 
new ways to maximize productivity and effectiveness.” 
 
In Osborne and Gaebler‟s definition, public entrepreneurship is related to 
both forms of efficiency, productivity or productive efficiency and 
effectiveness, or allocative efficiency. In this research productive efficiency 
is considered mainly public entrepreneurship behaviour and allocative 
efficiency mainly accountability behaviour. However, this research 
recognizes the blurred boundary between accountability and public 
entrepreneurship. However, this research assumes that entrepreneurship 
might have a higher impact on productive efficiency than on allocative 
efficiency. As a consequence, the extent of the benefit of public 
entrepreneurship in the outcomes might be larger. For this reason, it is 
important to analyse accountability and public entrepreneurship separately.   
 
In Zerbinati and Souitaris‟s definition (2005) (see Table 3.1) the 
entrepreneurial motivation is assumed to emerge due to the lack of control 
over resources. This is opposite to this research purpose which intends to 
observe behaviour when resources are delegated. This research is more 
interested in the entrepreneurial motivation that emerges due to room for 
entrepreneurial actions.  
 
In Table 3.1, some definitions rely highly on innovation such as Robert, 
(1992); Robert and King (1991); and Carpenter (2001). Others omit 
innovation i.e Ramamurti (1986), or they emphasize pro-activeness; for 
instance Shockley (2006) and Holcombe (2002). All these dimensions are 
likely to be observed when delegating greater resources to local 
governments. The extent of each one is likely to vary considerably and 
overlapping is likely to occur. This study only intends to observe whether 
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fiscal decentralisation facilitates these actions. It includes these three 
dimensions for analysis but it is beyond the scope of this research to 
quantify their importance. 
 
Thus, this research defines public entrepreneurship as the behaviour of 
local authorities to act in ways that improve efficiency. These actions 
include innovation, pro-activeness and risk-taking behaviour. 
 
3.2.2 Fiscal decentralisation and Public Entrepreneurship  
 
This research is based on the assumption that local politicians can be 
incentivised and enabled to undertake entrepreneurial actions because of 
greater financial autonomy and discretion in decision-making as fiscal 
decentralization implies.  Public entrepreneurship involves proactivity, 
experimentation to improve/create new programmes and undertake 
projects that involve higher levels of risk. This can potentially lead to 
greater productive efficiency, and might also lead to gains in allocative 
efficiency resulting in improved government performance. 
 
It is important to notice that the risk taking dimension of public 
entrepreneurship might improve efficiency only in cases of successful 
outcomes and it might, in fact, have negative implications.  This research is 
concerned with behavioural patterns rather than mechanisms towards 
successful outcomes but it does consider the negative implications of risk 
taking.  
 
As mentioned earlier, research in fiscal decentralisation tends to focus on 
accountability and in elements of allocative efficiency. Few empirical works 
have advanced knowledge on productive efficiency and to my knowledge, 
there is no empirical and theoretical work particularly targeting the 
association of fiscal decentralisation and public entrepreneurship and 
differentiating between accountability and public entrepreneurship.  
 
 Behavioural approaches: Accountability and Public Entrepreneurship  
75 
 
Public entrepreneurship has been studied mainly from the organizational 
behaviour perspective or for specific programmes. There are three issues 
from the empirical investigations that are relevant for this research: 
delegation of resources, autonomy in decision-making and 
entrepreneurship in rural municipalities.  
 
1) Incentives for delegation of resources in public entrepreneurship 
 
There are two distinct views. On the one hand, delegation of resources 
under fiscal decentralisation may encourage public entrepreneurship 
because it gives room for entrepreneurial actions. For instance,  Schneider 
and Teske (1992) surveyed municipal clerks of 1400 suburban 
communities across the US to test the most likely local conditions that are 
necessary for the rise of an entrepreneur. Their findings suggest that the 
most important condition for the rise of an entrepreneur is the freedom to 
be able to allocate the public funds. The reason being that politicians can 
pursue their preferred policies.  Similarly, Meynhardt and Diefenbach 
(2012) explore the impact of organization antecedents in entrepreneurial 
orientation at the department-level in the Federal Labour Agency in 
Germany.  Their findings indicate that work discretion (or giving the 
flexibility to incumbents to decide on how to carry out their work) and 
resources have a high influence on entrepreneurial orientation among 
others. Therefore, they provide evidence that financial resources can drive 
public entrepreneurship in public organisations.  
  
On the other hand, fiscal constraints might also encourage public 
entrepreneurship because under these conditions (pressure), public 
entrepreneurs need to maximise efficiency in public services by innovating 
in order to achieve more, with less. For instance, Bartlett and Dibben 
(2002) investigated innovation and public entrepreneurship using an 
inductive analysis of 12 case studies of selected local governments in the 
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UK. Their findings suggest that local authorities are engaging in innovative 
enterprises due to fiscal pressure.  
 
This research is based on the assumption that fiscal decentralisation 
encourages entrepreneurship due to delegation of financial resources 
rather than due to fiscal constraints.  
 
2) Autonomy in decision-making 
 
 Kim (2010) evaluates the relationship between organizational 
characteristics and public entrepreneurship. He surveyed heads of state 
government departments in 48 U.S states. The study investigates how 
some organizational characteristics are defined by three dimensions- risk 
taking, innovativeness and proactiveness influencing entrepreneurial 
behaviour. His findings suggest that empowering employees by delegating 
more autonomy and participatory decision-making stimulates risk taking 
and innovativeness. However, this does not encourage proactive 
behaviour. The most significant characteristics are accountability and 
flexibility. While flexibility drives public entrepreneurship, accountability is 
associated only as a useful tool for legitimizing entrepreneurial activities. 
Hence, these findings suggest that there might be an overlapping and 
contending relationship between public entrepreneurship and 
accountability.  
 
3) Entrepreneurship in rural local governments 
 
Mack et al. (2008) took as a case study an innovative health care system 
called Telemedicine in the US which aims at providing better patient care 
and lowering costs through the use of audio-visual and portable medical 
equipment.  Two rural centres were selected. Their findings suggest that 
connection to local communities, domain expertise and networking are 
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statistically significant dimensions of public entrepreneurship while other 
variables which were expected to be related, such as age, gender and 
level of education are not.  
 
This is a relevant finding for this research because if the level of education 
is not a key variable in entrepreneurship, then public entrepreneurship in 
rural municipalities, which on average have a lower levels of education, 
might take place. These findings also suggest that public entrepreneurship 
in rural municipalities may be largely motivated by local politicians and 
authorities‟ close connection with the community.  
 
Similar findings are presented by Teixeira and Silva (2012). They studied 
the factors that determine public entrepreneurship in 108 local 
governments in Portugal. Their findings suggest that both individual 
conditions (such as gender, previous occupational status, age and 
managerial competencies of the mayor) and contextual conditions (such as 
communication accessibilities, population educational endowments, and 
the share of medium and large firms in the municipality) are important 
determinants of public entrepreneurship.  
 
To sum up, the empirical research shows that there are individual, 
organizational and contextual factors that are likely to drive public 
entrepreneurship. But more importantly, these studies present evidence 
demonstrating that increases in resources and discretion in decision-
making can also be important drivers of public entrepreneurship. These 
studies support the argument that fiscal decentralisation may lead to public 
entrepreneurship and this research is interested only in the factors derived 
from fiscal decentralisation theory, discretion and decision-making. 
 
In addition, the empirical studies mentioned above demonstrate that there 
is scope for entrepreneurial changes in rural municipalities and that 
accountability and public entrepreneurship may be intertwined but 
contending. 
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3.2.3 The political incentives for Public Entrepreneurship under fiscal 
decentralisation 
 
As argued in this study, fiscal decentralisation might also contribute to 
changes in behavioural patterns that might lead to public entrepreneurial 
actions.  And these entrepreneurial actions may or may not be reinforced 
in the presence of political competition. This section develops further this 
argument. However, it is important to point out that theoretically, the 
relationship between political variables and public entrepreneurship seems 
weaker than for accountability. 
 
A) The optimistic vision 
 
Faguet (2014, 6) explains:   
 
“if decentralization is to improve governance in a democracy as its 
proponents claim, then at least part of the chain of causality must 
involve political competition. Decentralization might recenter (some) 
competitive political discourse on local – as opposed to national – 
concerns, or increase levels of political entrepreneurship or 
heterogeneity by lowering the costs of entry, or provoke changes in 
the internal characteristics of political parties. Any one of these 
could lead to improvement or degradation in governance 
outcomes”.  
 
In addition, Faguet also claims that in spite of its importance this has not 
been at the core of the literature.  The point of the argument is that in a 
competitive environment, citizens can compare the performance of their 
politicians with the performance of politicians in other jurisdictions 
(yardstick competition) in respect to public service quality, economic 
prosperity and judge them electorally (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007). 
Therefore, political competition may prompt politicians to behave in a more 
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entrepreneurial manner as a way to differentiate themselves from other 
local politicians and for achieving re-election.  
 
B) The pessimistic vision 
 
Some scholars are doubtful that public entrepreneurship benefits 
government performance.  They worry about conflicting elements between 
the democratic values that lead to accountability and public 
entrepreneurship.  
 
 Bellone and Goerl (1992, 131) in their article “Reconciling public 
entrepreneurship and democracy” compare democratic values with the 
three common traits of entrepreneurship. First, they argue that 
entrepreneurship demands autonomy and discretion and, conversely, 
democracy promotes more accountability. Accountability is based on the 
notion of citizens‟ approval and therefore, damages autonomy and 
discretion.  Second, entrepreneurship calls for secrecy as a sense of 
competition while democracy promotes openness and public scrutiny. 
Finally, the last trait, risk-taking, is argued to conflict with democratic 
stewardship. Stewardship encourages high prudence of public trust in 
regard to public actions. Likewise, Terry (1993) (cited in Zerbinati and 
Souitaris, 2005, 45)  states that entrepreneurship cannot be adopted in the 
public sector because it includes antidemocratic characteristics such as 
reliance on domination and coercion, enthusiasm for extreme changes and 
disrespect for traditions.  
 
Some other contending elements can be found in Borins (2000, 498-499) 
in his empirical analysis over merits of public sector entrepreneurship. He 
summarises the counterarguments with three adjectives that describe 
entrepreneurs:  rule breaking, self-promoting and unwarranted risk takers. 
These behavioural characteristics can damage honesty, fairness, 
benevolence and justice, which oppose accountability virtues.  
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Bovens (2010, 956) contends these opposing elements but from a different 
angle. He claims that extensive democratic control and emphasis on 
corruption control is likely to damage creativity and efficiency in public 
organisation because it encourages bureaucratization and proceduralism.  
3.3 The drivers of performance   
 
The general theory of democracy per se is associated with better 
accountability and, at least theoretically, public entrepreneurship.  
 
The “retrospective vote theory” hypothesises that the performance of 
government influences the vote of citizens. As votes are used as a 
performance indicator, then good performance might lead to re-election. 
Therefore, political competition leads to responsiveness to citizens in order 
to maintain political power during elections (in Moreno-Jaimes, 2007, 133).  
As in the case of fiscal decentralisation, it can be argued that performance 
might take the form of more accountability and/ or more entrepreneurial 
actions. Political competition is thought to decrease private rents available 
to public officials since the opposition can cut the use of political favours 
(Ades and Tella, 1999) or democracy can make corruption less appealing 
as it might reinforce the undesirable perception of corruption in the society 
and this could make corruption less appealing for corrupt politicians 
(Kolstad and Wiig, 2011).  
 
However, political competition is also related to clientelism and elite 
capture which are claimed to interfere with democratic development in 
terms of political participation and accountability (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2000). Small municipalities are more prone to be captured by 
“elites” who keep control of elected politicians.  
 
As noted in the previous discussion, political competition is a key driver of 
both behavioural patterns. In addition, other democratic mechanisms 
derived from the level of political competition at the national level and state 
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level  that may affect performance are the political counter-balance of 
power, which from now will be referred to as state-level opposition, and 
party affiliation.  
 
State level opposition has been analysed in the Mexican literature. A 
vertically divided government may be encouraged to invest in infrastructure 
in order to differentiate themselves from others and gain advocates for 
their parties (Moreno-Jaimes, 2005a, 27). However, party clientelism can 
also occur and state-party oppositions may divert resources only to their 
party peers.    
 
There is not a clear association between political party affiliation and 
changes in accountability, public entrepreneurship or performance. 
However, in the political science literature, it has been argued that 
changes occur not only at the political system level, but also at the political 
party level (Harmel and Janda, 1994). There are different models that 
explain “party change”. The basic theory suggests that there are internal 
and external stimuli or “shocks” that may drive political parties‟ change. For 
instance for political parties that are voters‟ maximizers (or a political party 
that is motivated by the number of votes and seats rather than policy 
maximization), significant election failures may trigger a change in political 
tactics (i.e., holding public meetings), organizational structure (i.e. change 
its centralisation of power), issue orientation (i.e. political issues and 
ideology), organizational identity (i.e. emerging with another party) or 
organization death (Janda, 1990, 17). 
 
It is beyond the purpose of this study to test this theory. Nonetheless, the 
theory of party change suggests that performance may have been driven 
from the party level as a consequence of “a shock”. In the Mexican case, 
“a shock” happened in the 2000 elections when the hegemonic party lost 
power. Although PRI‟s political power had been in decline since the 1980s, 
this, along with previous changes in the fiscal arrangements, may 
represent an incentive for party change leading to better performance for 
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a) the political party under threat, PRI, and b) the political parties that 
benefited from the “shock”- such as opposition parties which might gain the 
opportunity to demonstrate their capacity and good performance during 
alternation. Hence, it makes sense to explore the relationship of party 
affiliation to performance and observe the difference among parties.  
 
3.4 Summary and conclusions  
 
In conclusion, this section confirms the unattended issues in the literature 
of fiscal decentralisation and the contribution of this study.  To fully 
understand the benefits of fiscal decentralisation, it is necessary to inquire 
into the incentives it promotes. It is important to look into the “black box” of 
the actions of the people that produce the results of fiscal decentralisation. 
 
Chapter 2 showed that fiscal decentralisation may have either positive or 
negative outcomes. In this chapter it is argued that there are two variables 
that affect the extent of success of those outcomes. These two variables 
are accountability and public entrepreneurship. The literature illustrates an 
association between them and both productive and allocative efficiency. If 
decentralisation increases either or both, the effects on government 
performance will tend to be positive. However, it may also be the case that 
behavioural responses to decentralisation are reinforced by political 
variables, in particular the level of political competition.  
 
There are clear channels of interaction between democratic mechanisms 
and fiscal decentralisation in regard to accountability and weaker but still 
important channels for public entrepreneurship. The political mechanisms 
for both behavioural patterns include mainly political competition, but also 
other mechanisms derived by the level of political competition at the 
national and state level such as state level opposition and party affiliation.  
 
Thus, political competition may be a key variable.  I hypothesise that it may 
either reinforce the impact of fiscal decentralisation, or it may, irrespective 
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of fiscal decentralisation, be a major independent factor that explains 
changes in behavioural patterns, as well as local government performance.   
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the research framework. Fiscal decentralisation may 
be reinforced by political competition and encourage accountability and 
public entrepreneurship or these behavioural patterns may be reinforced 
by the presence of political competition in the municipality regardless of 
fiscal decentralisation. In this regard, there is a clear association between 
political competition and accountability because democratization is at the 
core of the accountability argument whereas for public entrepreneurship 
the relationship is rather weak.  
 
The relationship between accountability and public entrepreneurship 
depicted in Figure 3.1 is that there are conflicting elements between 
accountability and public entrepreneurship. Accountability behaviour may 
impede the development of entrepreneurial actions. This clashes with the 
values of accountability, due to its close association with democratic 
values.  This may have a negative impact on performance. 
 
Local authority‟s behaviour, in turn, should impact on government 
performance by means of gaining allocative and productive efficiency. The 
extent of government performance may vary depending on the type of 
behaviour that predominates and the trade-off between both behavioural 
patterns given their conflicting elements. 





Figure  3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
There are sufficient theoretical grounds to associate fiscal decentralisation 
and both behavioural patterns, accountability and public entrepreneurship 
and there is also theoretical support for interaction between fiscal 
decentralisation and political competition. 
 
In addition to the theoretical foundations, we learnt in the revision of the 
empirical research that background and context matter. Hence, it is 
important to bear in mind that the decentralisation process might impact 
differently local governments with a particular level of development. Rural 
local governments face more challenges to achieve financial soundness. 
But, it is also the best scenery to observe both citizens‟ participation and 
the benefits of politicians‟ closeness to their constituents.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, citizens' participation and closeness 
to citizens are the cornerstones of fiscal decentralisation theory. Hence, 
more delimited research is needed in selective groups within the same 
level of government and level of development in order to understand 
clearly decentralisation outcomes.  
The next chapter presents the background and antecedents of the fiscal 
decentralisation reforms of the case study.  
 Country Case Study: Rural Local Government in Mexico 
85 
 
Chapter 4 - Country case study: Rural local governments in Mexico 
 
 
Democratisation and decentralisation reforms have swept through federal 
countries. However, real democracy is not easily achievable and 
decentralisation of expenditures tends to prevail. Mexico is one such case and 
recently has been engaged in important political transformations, which makes 
it a rich case study for lesson-learning.  
 
This chapter aims at giving the reader a contextual background of the case 
study.  The first section gives a historical description of the Mexican democracy 
at the national and local (rural) level; the second section describes the 
government structure and public finance composition in Mexico; the third 
section discusses the 1997 fiscal reform, which is the point of reference in the 
empirical chapter and the fourth section presents the antecedents and 
motivations of the Mexican decentralisation reform.  
 
4.1 Mexican democracy in context   
 
Mexico is a multi-level federal country. Power is divided into independent 
executive, legislative and judicial branches. It is divided into 32 states, a federal 
district (with 16 delegations) and consists of 2,438 municipalities with a total 
population of 112 million. Municipalities- or local governments7- are by law 
“autonomous”. This research is delimited to rural municipalities. Rural local 
governments, in this study, mean municipalities with less than 30000 
inhabitants and where the primary sector predominates. A total of 1074 
municipalities fit these criteria.  
 
Rural municipalities in Mexico are ruled similarly to other non-rural local 
governments.  
 
                                                          
7 The terms local government and municipality have been used interchangeably. 
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Mexico‟s democratic institutions were subject to a long period of democratic 
appearance. Elections were held routinely at all levels of government but for 70 
years, political control was held in the hands of a single political party- Partido 
Revolucionario Institutional (PRI). The PRI was the ruling party in the country 
from 1929 until 2000 when, for first time in history, it handed over the 
presidency to the opposition party, Partido Acción Nacional (PAN).  
 
During the period the hegemonic party was in power, the president of Mexico 
used to have arbitrary political power. He was de facto leader of his party, the 
PRI, and presided over decisions about political candidacies for the next 
presidential election, governors in all states of the Republic, deputies and 
senators at the national level; as well as the Supreme Court. Due to the lack of 
political competition, these candidacies took the form of almost direct 
appointments. At the state and local elections, the president‟s party had control 
over all elections (Moreno-Jaimes, 2005b, 5; Mizrahi, 2004, 142).  In this 
scenery, party loyalty was the only means of political life. 
 
This political power gradually decreased.  Moreno-Jaimes (2005b, 5, 6) 
advances two reasons: first, the constitutional reforms of 1977 and 1986; and 
second, PRI‟s internal fracture in 1986.  
 
The constitutional reforms of 1977 and 1986 modified the total number of seats 
and the share of seats designated to proportional representation. These 
constitutional reforms were the answer to the economic and political situation at 
that period. The factors include a) an economic crisis that left the government 
with poor economic resources to satisfy the demand of the working and middle 
class; b) the creation of political parties that were not officially registered and 
unions that were not controlled by the government; and c) in general, the loss of 
confidence in the system (Carpizo, 1980, 40-41). These reforms accounted for 
the gradual political defeat PRI faced after 1988 when it lost the majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies.    
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The PRI‟s internal fracture in 1986 led to the creation of a left-wing party, 
Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD). The way this party was born is a 
must tell Mexican political anecdote. In 1986, PRI rejected Cuauhtémoc 
Cardenas‟s candidacy and decided in favour of Carlos Salinas. Cuauhtémoc 
Cardenas is the son of a former president of Mexico Lázaro Cardenas; largely 
remembered for the expropriation and nationalization of Mexican oil and a 
significant and wide ranging agrarian reform. Cuauhtémoc, along with other 
prominent members of the PRI, left the party and Cuauhtémoc became the 
candidate of a left wing party coalition for the 1988 presidency election. He also 
became the author of the first competitive election for the presidency. During 
the count of votes, Manuel Bartlett- an eminent member of the PRI at that time, 
as well as in charge of the federal elections, announced “the fall of the system” 
at the very moment Cardenas was taking the lead.  Salinas was declared the 
winner under the stigma of massive electoral fraud. Nevertheless, PRI lost the 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Later, Cuauhtémoc created the left party, 
PRD. 
 
As a consequence of this loss of “legitimacy”, Mizrahi (2004, 142) argues that 
PRI gradually allowed opposition to gain spaces in the local governments as a 
way to deflect conflict away from national-level politics. However, this strategy 
did not favour PRI. Opposition proved to be successful and PRI was removed 
from power- eventually.   
 
Moreno-Jaimes (2007) indicates that in 1990 almost 90% of the total population 
was under the mandate of local authorities coming from PRI membership and 
by 2001, more than half of this population was governed by opposition parties. 
At that time, PRI governed 62% of local governments (1,510 municipalities); 
PAN governed 19% (473 municipalities) and PRD 13% (322 municipalities). 
Today, 64% of the total population in local governments are governed by PRI, 
23% by PAN, 9% by PRD and 4% by other political parties (FENAMM).8 
                                                          
8 FENAMM stands for Federacion Nacional de Municipios de Mexico (National Federation of Municipalities in 
Mexico) FENAMM webside [online information] Available from: 
http://www.fenamm.org.mx/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid
=127 [Accessed 26 March]   




Hence, Mexico has experienced an important political change in the last few 
decades. It turned from a country with a dominant party, to one where political 
competition is increasing constantly. This has changed the political games at all 
levels of government including rural municipalities.  
 
In rural municipalities as defined here, PRI won 91% of the total municipal 
elections in 1992 and only 62% of the municipal elections in 2010. This includes 
all the coalitions in which PRI participated. Therefore, other political parties such 
as PAN have gained terrain. In 1992, PAN won around 2% of the local elections 
and in the 2010 it gained 25%.   
 
Although far from perfect, the changes in the political landscape might represent 
an important source of incentives for public authorities. Therefore, political 
indicators are relevant for this study. 
 
4.2 Structure of Public Administration and finance in Mexico  
 
This section describes how Mexican local governments work. 
a) Intergovernmental relations 
The intergovernmental relations in Mexico are highly complex. Part of this 
complexity derives from the nature of federal systems where three levels of 
governments interact. The federal government is in charge of issues related to 
the whole country, macroeconomic policies, defence and development. State 
governments are in charge of matters related to education and health and local 
governments are responsible for some local public services (more details about 
the local public services shortly).   However, federal and local governments are 
co-responsible for school building and implementation of social programmes. 
Similarly, all levels of government are co-responsible for poverty alleviation and 
water management (see table 4.1). These overlapping responsibilities do not 
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only make the system complex, but are also likely to discourage accountability 
and innovation (Caldera-Sánchez, 2013, 10-11). 
 




Table  4.1 Allocation of Government Responsibilities for Key Public Services  
Public 
Services 
Federal State Local governments 
Health Regulations, standards and quality 
controls. Negotiation of salaries 
and employment conditions. 
Financing of hospital Infrastructure.  
Financing and operation of all 
hospitals belonging to the federal 
social security systems (IMSS, 
ISSSTE). 
 
Organisation and operation 
of health care services for 
the non-insured population. 
Responsible for primary 
care for both rural and 
urban poor. 
Administration and 
maintenance of hospitals 
for primary care that used 
to be operated by the 
federal Ministry of Health, 
as well as some state 
owned hospitals (for all 
care levels). 
 
Education Controlling plans, programmes of 
study, assessment of education 
outcomes; training of teachers; 
determining teachers' salaries; 
teachers' training and evaluation; 
financing of education through 
transfers  
Financing of university 
infrastructure. 
 
Operation of basic 
education (preschool, 
primary and secondary 
levels), teachers' training 
colleges and indigenous 
and special education. 





Co-financing with other 
government levels and 
maintenance of primary 
schools and some 
construction concurrent 




Funding of social programmes  
 




Implementation of social 
programmes 
Water Ownership of water resources, with 
the right to transfer titles to other 
parties. Co-financing of water 
infrastructure. Setting norms for 
compulsory standards for technical 
and operational aspects. 
Planning and developing large 
water infrastructures. 
 
Tariff setting (through State 
congress or water 
commission); co-financing 
of water infrastructure; set 
state-level regulation, 
including tariffs, design 
criteria for water 
infrastructure construction, 
environmental and health 
standards for water 
infrastructure.  
Water distribution, 
drainage and sewerage 
systems (also public 
lighting, garbage 
collection, public markets, 
public safety, cemeteries 




Road construction and maintenance are split between the three levels, with the construction 
mainly executed by federal and state governments, and maintenance mainly being done by the 
state or municipalities. Parks and public transportation are split with all levels of government 
providing services that correspond to their geographic area, with public transportation only rarely 
being managed by municipalities. 
Source: Caldera-Sánchez (2013, 10) analysis based on Cabrera Castellanos et al. (2008), OECD (2012a); Cabrero and 
Martínez-Vázquez, (2000); Fernández Martínez (2011); Martínez-Fritscher and Rodríguez-Zamora (2011). 
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b) Local government structure 
 
The structure of local governments is as follows. The municipality is headed by 
a mayor who is elected democratically for 3 years.  Recently some states have 
extended the number of years to four years.9  
 
There is no immediate re-election but local authorities can be elected after one 
government period. The council is composed of sindicos (councillors) and 
regidores (trustees). The majority of local governments elect the council by 
relative majority (plurality system) and proportional representation.10 Relative 
majority means that the winner in the election is the political party with the most 
votes during the election and proportional representation means sharing the 
seats proportionately to the number of votes received in the election. Trustees 
have a role as legal representatives of the local government and councillors 
have a legislative role. 
 
Proportional representation was established in all local governments during 
Miguel de la Madrid‟s government (1982-1988) with a constitutional reform in 
Article 115 (Madrazo, 1986).11 This, however, did not have a real impact. At that 
time, opposition parties had poor representation in most local governments. 
This was particularly true in rural local governments. This phenomenon has 
eventually changed and it will be discussed in Section 4.1.  
 
The number of seats by relative majority and proportional representation for 
trustees and councillors, and the distribution of seats among parties vary 
according to state legislations. The council is responsible for approving the local 
government‟s budget, their municipal development plan and other initiatives.  
                                                          
9 According to the National Federation of Mexican Municipalities in Mexico (FENAMM), this reform has 
been adopted by Coahuila (since 2006), Hidalgo (since 2012), and Veracruz (since 2014)  and the 
initiative is under consideration in others states such as Estado de Mexico, Tlaxcala, Durango and 
Nayarit .   
10
 There is a small group of municipalities that elect their representatives by customs (for instance 418 
municipalities in Oaxaca). These municipalities were dropped from the sample. 
11
 The first attempt to establish proportional representation at the local government was on 6th December 
1977 in a constitutional reform of article 155, which promoted proportional representation at the state 
legislation and local government but this reform was aimed at local government with more than 300,000 
inhabitants (For more historical background see Madrazo, 1986).   




The council should represent a counter-balance of political power in the local 
government by means of overseeing the mayor‟s work and legislation for 
minority groups. In reality, the electoral rules in most cases guarantee the 
mayor to acquire majority representation of his party in the council because the 
seats are distributed- in most cases- using first the proportional representation. 
It means that one seat is given to the parties that reach the minimum 
percentage of votes in the election. The rest is distributed according to the 
electoral ratio. It means that the party with the highest number of votes is 
assigned a second seat first, and then the remaining parties. In most cases few 
local and minority parties reach the minimum percentage of votes in local 
election. This ensures the winning party more seats in the council.  In addition, 
minority parties are often controlled by the strongest political parties and are 
only used to get an extra seat.  Recently, there has been a trend for party 
coalitions where the strongest party maintain political control.  
 
Besides, for many decades the council was used as a means of rewarding the 
loyalty of party members from the hegemonic political party Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional, (PRI) as well as a means of negotiation within 
party groups. This was more rooted in rural municipalities where PRI had 
absolute power. Therefore, at large, the council‟s role in rural municipalities has 
been limited to collect complaints and petitions for resources from their citizens 
and forward the request to the mayor who maintains absolute power.  
c) Local government responsibilities 
Since the 1983 constitutional reform of Article 115, local governments are 
responsible for drinking water, drainage, public lighting, refuse collection, 
cemeteries, streets, public parks, gardens, public safety, local markets and 
slaughter houses. Previously the main local public services such as water and 
drainage were the responsibility of federal agencies.  
 
According to Pineda (2002), a historical overview of water and drainage service 
shows how these services were decentralised and then re-centralized. In 1980, 
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a reform decentralised the service to state governments but in 1982 a new 
federal agency was created and took the responsibility for infrastructure 
including water and drainage. The 1983 reform advanced decentralisation to 
local governments. However, it left open the opportunity for States to provide 
services in case it was “necessary”. As a consequence, the main local public 
services such as drinking water and sewage were not decentralised quickly. In 
fact, by 1988 only 11 states had decentralised these services. The remaining 
states had the public services under state administration (Pineda, 2002, 52). 
Nowadays, these services are mostly decentralised.  
 
Another constitutional reform in 1999 clarified, to some extent, the responsibility 
of some local public services. For instance, sewage systems, treatment and 
disposal of waste water were added to the heading drinking water and drainage. 
Under the heading refuse collection, the service was modified to collection, 
transfer, treatment and disposal of waste. Under the heading street, gardens 
and public parks, the new reform added the “equipment” or infrastructure for 
these services (Fernandez, 2001, 273-274).  More notably, the 1999 reform 
supresses state government intervention in local public services and confers 
decision making to local governments over such services (Perez, 2000). These 
are local governments‟ duties and some of them are financed partly by 
conditional funds but not all. This will be explained shorty. 
 
Still, collaboration between state and local government exists in the provision of 
public services. Local governments are entitled, to a certain extent, to decide 
whether they want to provide the local public services directly or prefer to make 
an agreement with other public entities such as state agencies or with private 
companies.  Although they have a word in such decisions, they are constrained 
by regulations, mainly in regard to private sector outsourcing, which vary among 
states.  
 
The majority of states have a law of municipal administration (29 States in 
2010). These laws are applied to all local governments in each particular state.  
These laws and codes present the extent and limitations for private sector 
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outsourcing. For instance, 29 out of 31 states in 2010 did not permit public 
safety and traffic and road management to be outsourced to the private sector 
(Rivera, 2010, 36). In Table 4.2, it can be observed that by 2009, local 
governments delivered more than 74% of the services directly (cells highlighted 
in yellow) excluding local markets and slaughter houses. These services are 
also mainly delivered directly by local governments but the percentage appears 
low because of the large number of municipalities without these services (cells 
highlighted in yellow). The cells highlighted in green show that drinking water, 
sewage and drainage are the services with more forms of delivery- 36% with 
the agreement of the state; 22% by collaboration with the community and 32% 
by intergovernmental associations. 21% of cemeteries are provided by 
collaboration with the community and local markets are the service with most 
private outsourcing (42%) and public lighting with most association with the 
federal government (86% within forms of delivering). 




Table  4.2 Cross-Table of Local Public Services by Forms of Delivering the service in 2009  
Source: Own calculations from 2009 survey in local governments. This table includes all municipalities in Mexico (including the 16 delegations in Mexico City). * LPS stands for Local Public Services; the cells 
highlighted in yellow and green are the figures discussed above in the text. Yellow cells refer to percentages within local public services and green cells to the percentage within forms of delivery.  
 




























Count 1825 236 143 21 58 19 18 66 70 2456 
% within 
LPS* 
74.3% 9.6% 5.8% .9% 2.4% .8% .7% 2.7% 2.9% 100.0% 
% within FD 12.8% 36.2% 22.2% 6.5% 32.6% 5.4% .4% 6.3% 11.1%   
Public lighting Count 1856 112 42 14 23 303 11 25 70 2456 
% within 
LPS 
75.6% 4.6% 1.7% .6% .9% 12.3% .4% 1.0% 2.9% 100.0% 
% within FD 13.1% 17.2% 6.5% 4.3% 12.9% 86.1% .3% 2.4% 11.1%   
Refuse 
collection 
Count 2054 37 88 72 20 5 91 19 70 2456 
% within 
LPS 
83.6% 1.5% 3.6% 2.9% .8% .2% 3.7% .8% 2.9% 100.0% 
% within FD 14.5% 5.7% 13.7% 22.3% 11.2% 1.4% 2.2% 1.8% 11.1%   
Local markets Count 1044 14 77 138 4 5 986 118 70 2456 
% within 
LPS 
42.5% .6% 3.1% 5.6% .2% .2% 40.1% 4.8% 2.9% 100.0% 
% within FD 7.3% 2.1% 12.0% 42.7% 2.2% 1.4% 24.3% 11.2% 11.1%   
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Source: own calculations from 2009 survey in local governments. This table includes all municipalities in Mexico (including the 16 delegations in Mexico City). * LPS 
stands for Local Public Services; the cells highlighted in yellow and green are the figures discussed above in the text. Yellow cells refer to percentages within local public 
services and green cells to the percentage within forms of delivery.  
Forms of delivering (FD) 
Direct In 
agreemen
























Count 1825 236 143 21 58 19 18 66 70 2456 
% within 
LPS* 
74.3% 9.6% 5.8% .9% 2.4% .8% .7% 2.7% 2.9% 100.0% 
% within 
FD 
12.8% 36.2% 22.2% 6.5% 32.6% 5.4% .4% 6.3% 11.1%   
Public lighting Count 1856 112 42 14 23 303 11 25 70 2456 
% within 
LPS 
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% within 
FD 
14.5% 5.7% 13.7% 22.3% 11.2% 1.4% 2.2% 1.8% 11.1%   
Local markets Count 1044 14 77 138 4 5 986 118 70 2456 
% within 
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42.5% .6% 3.1% 5.6% .2% .2% 40.1% 4.8% 2.9% 100.0% 
% within 
FD 
7.3% 2.1% 12.0% 42.7% 2.2% 1.4% 24.3% 11.2% 11.1%   
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d) Local government finance 
Revenue collection for local governments can be classified as follows: taxes, 
user charges and „aprovechamientos‘ (literal translation in English- exploitation).  
Local taxes are collected by local governments but they cannot determine the 
tax rate. State parliament has this function but they can consider suggestions 
from the local authorities. The local taxes consist of the following: property tax, 
real estate transfer tax and other indirect taxes on agriculture, industry and 
commerce. User charges are categorized into „derechos‘ (literal translation in 
English- rights) and ‗productos‘ (literal translation in English- product). The latter 
are the fees obtained via the provision of public services such as the fees that 
taxpayers pay for the consumption of water. The former are the revenues 
collected for the use and exploitation of public goods such as the sale of public 
land or the rent of space on public markets. ‗Aprovechamientos‘ are all other 
revenues obtained which are not classified in the categories already mentioned. 
These are mainly fines and surcharges.  
 
The 1983 reform entitled local governments to collect property tax and since 
then property tax is by far the most important source of revenue in most local 
governments. Cabrero and Orihuela (2002)‟s analysis of local public finance 
describes the aftermath of the 1983 reform. From 1978 to 1983, the 
municipalities had a precarious financial situation. After local governments were 
given the ability to collect taxes in 1983 (property tax), the situation was slightly 
better.  Their own revenue increased slightly overall up to 1989; and from 1989 
to 1994, revenues increased modestly thanks to the full use of the property tax 
and users charges. However, from 1995 to 1998, own revenue collection fell. 
This fall in revenue could be attributed to the economic crisis of 1995 that 
curbed the collection of revenue but also to the 1997 reform which gave local 
governments conditional funds. The 1997reform will be discussed in Section 
4.3.   
 
Although local governments are entitled to property tax, they have the option to 
transfer the collection of property tax to state governments or other 
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organisations. By 2009, roughly 83% of all municipalities collected property 
taxes themselves, 12% through an agreement with state government and 5% in 
other ways. In the case of rural local governments, roughly 83% collected 
property tax directly, 14% through agreement with the state government and 3% 
in other ways.   
 
The main problem with property tax is updating information. In 2009, roughly 
28% of all local authorities stated that they update constantly, 45% stated that 
they updated the information one year ago, 9% updated 2 to 3 years ago and 
28% more than 3 years ago. Within rural municipalities, in 2009 roughly 16% 
stated that they update constantly; 52% within a year; 9% in the last two to 
three years and 23% more than 3 years.12 Clearly, there have been 
improvements in this area in the recent years. However, given the importance of 
property tax for municipalities, there is still room for improvement.  
 
In addition to their own revenues, local finances are composed of 
intergovernmental transfers. The system combines different types of transfers. 
Unconditional funds give a high degree of discretion to local governments over 
expenditure and allocation; and conditional funds give less discretion to local 
governments because they are designated to specific expenditures. They can 
take two forms, in general.   
 
In this study unconditional, mandatory conditional and extraordinary conditional 
funds will be referred to, in order to denote the degree of discretion. 
 
Unconditional funds or revenue sharing, as is commonly used in the literature, 
(participations) were designed to compensate for the centralisation of taxing 
power. They are the most important source of revenue for local governments. 
They are formed of different funds but the largest fund is called the General 
Fund of Participations (Fondo General de Participaciones) which accounts for 
                                                          
12
 Own calculations elaborated based on the National Survey for public safety and justice in municipalities 2009. 
Rural municipalities are classified here as 30,000 inhabitants and with a predominance of primary sector activities.  
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90% of sharing revenue.13 The allocation of resources from federal to state 
governments is through an established formula. 20% of the federal assignable 
tax collection is designated to the General Fund of Participation for states and 
the state should share at least 20% with the municipalities. The sharing 
formulas from state to municipalities are established by the state parliaments.  
Because the formulas are based on percentages from the federal assignable 
tax collection and then, subject to state regulations, the funds assigned to 
municipalities fluctuate every year. There is not a clear redistribution which may 
either lead to rent-seeking and corruption or different forms of incentives. 
 
Mandatory conditional funds or earmarked transfers (aportaciones) are 
mandatory funds to local governments. The relevant funds include: 
 
The Municipal Social Development Fund (FAISM) and Fund for Municipal 
Strengthening (FORTAMUN). FAISM is an earmarked fund only for investment 
on basic infrastructure projects in marginalised communities. The projects 
include water, sewage, rural electrification, and municipal urbanization, basic 
infrastructure in education and health, and rural productivity. This fund is 
distributed as follows: From the total federal assignable tax collection, the 
federal government distributes 2.197% to FAISM. They are allocated according 
to two formulas stipulated in the Law of Fiscal Coordination in Article 34 and 35. 
Article 34 builds the formula based on a global poverty index and Article 35 is 
based on a municipal poverty index. Article 35 should be applied only in the 
case there is no information to apply the formula in Article 34. Because the 
formulas are based on percentages from the federal assignable tax collection 
and then, based on a poverty index, the funds assigned to municipalities 
fluctuate every year. 
 
The fund for public debt and safety (FORTAMUN) was created in order to close 
the gap between expenditure responsibilities and revenues. The projects 
                                                          
13
 The other funds include: founds for focalization (1.25%); municipal development (1%); funds of 
compensation (18%); funds of extraction of hydrocarbons (0.46%). In all of them the state government 
should share at least 20% with the municipalities.  
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include programmes and actions that foster development in the municipality or 
financial investments. From the total federal assignable tax collection, federal 
government distributes 2.35% to FORTAMUN. These funds are distributed 
based on the number of inhabitants per municipality (redistributive criteria).  
Because the formulas are based on percentages from the federal assignable 
tax collection, the funds assigned to municipalities fluctuate slightly every year. 
 
The conditions are that local governments should spend these specific funds in 
the general spending category of basic public services and public debt and 
safety respectively. Other conditions include: A) local governments should make 
public the amounts of money they receive in each fund; the specific projects 
where they plan to spend the funds and the cost of each project; B) they should 
promote the participation of citizens in the planning, execution, control, follow up 
and evaluation of projects; C) they should inform citizens about the projects‟ 
results; D) they should report their spending to the government department in 
charge of social development (SEDESOL), through their state agencies. The 
report should follow the rules and guidance stated by SEDESOL; E) they should 
ensure the projects protect and preserve the environment and promotes 
sustainable development (INAFED, 2012, 120). 
 
A third set of funds are the extraordinary funds or matching transfers 
(convenios). Their aim is to promote the areas which are a priority for federal 
government. They are highly regulated and audited but also they lack 
transparency in their redistribution among states and municipalities. 
Extraordinary funds enjoy less discretion than mandatory conditional funds but 
in some cases, some decision-making is delegated to local governments.  
 
An important distinction between the different types of intergovernmental 
transfer is that unconditional and mandatory conditional funds are included in 
the local government accounts while the later- extraordinary funds- are not.  
Hence, the extraordinary funds have not been included in the quantitative 
empirical analysis. But they do appear as relevant in the qualitative empirical 
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part. Therefore, they will be reviewed in the second stage of this research (the 
qualitative Section). 
 
Some of the mandatory conditional grants were introduced in 1997. Therefore, 
they are a good point of reference to compare changes in performance and 
political behaviour at the local level. The 1997 reform will be discussed more in 
Section 4.3. 
 
It is important to note that the introduction of mandatory conditional funds 
significantly increased the amount of resources managed at the local level and 
reduced state and federal government discretion over allocation of resources 
among states and municipalities. This ensures all local governments receive 
specific funds for local development. Therefore, the reform is mainly an 
expenditure decentralisation. 
 
The reform per se led to higher dependency on central government funds and 
did not delegate full discretion over expenditure categories. Instead, it increased 
expenditure power of municipalities but left some degree of discretion in 
allocation. It activated the role of local governments as a redistributor of basic 
public services within the municipalities or the allocative efficiency role in the 
decentralisation theory. 
 
In addition, it empowered local governments with the tools to work towards 
productive efficiency given that they have discretion over the allocation and 
operation of the projects in the municipality. 
 
So far, only the results of the decentralisation reform of 1997 have been 
explained- the creation of the mandatory conditional funds. The next Section 
intends to clarify why this reform can be used as a point of reference to 
compare local government performance. 
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4.3 The 1997 reform- a watershed for local government incentives 
 
As discussed earlier, an important decentralisation reform for Mexican local 
governments was the creation of mandatory conditional funds in 1997 (it began 
in 1998). These grants significantly increased the municipalities‟ budgets and 
reduced state and federal government discretion over allocation of resources 
among states and municipalities. The conditional funds represent an important 
step to enable local government planning and to foster equal development.  
 
Mandatory conditional grants are important elements in local governments‟ 
incentives but are not necessarily positive.  These grants represent an 
important source of finance that increases municipalities‟ expenditure power but 
also they lead to financial dependency on central government transfers. 
 
Dependency raises a couple of performance problems by negatively affecting 
tax effort. Cabrero (2005)‟s descriptive analysis of local government finance 
concludes that urban municipalities tend to expand their administrative structure 
as their budget increase and rural municipalities are prone to become “passive 
receptors” as intergovernmental transfers augment.  Similar results were found 
by Raich (2003) who investigated the impact of a single type of conditional 
grant, FAISM (Municipal Social Development Fund). His findings suggest that 
FAISM is negatively related to tax effort. 14 He concludes that the rise of transfer 
discourages tax effort due to „fiscal laziness‟. 
 
Sour (2004) also conducted research on how conditional and unconditional 
grants affected the fiscal effort of 155 Mexican municipalities between 1993 to 
2000.  Her econometric analysis suggests that both types of grants have 
discouraged the fiscal effort of all municipalities, but the extent was higher in 
large municipalities compared to smaller ones. Another important finding is that 
medium size municipalities present, on average, better results. However, there 
                                                          
14
 His approach was descriptive statistics before-after the reform of 217 municipalities of the state of 
Puebla. He also employed qualitative methods as a secondary embedded approach.   
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are still significant differences across municipalities. This is important for this 
research because it means that it is still interesting to investigate small rural 
municipalities. Sour (2004) opens up the question for further research on 
whether these findings are applicable to local rural governments and predicts 
that they are not.  In another article Sour (2008) expands this study to 2,412 
municipalities from 1993-2004 and corroborates the findings.  
 
Moreno-Jaimes (2003) found similar results when analysing the impact of 
conditional funds in 2,013 Mexican municipalities of at least 50000 inhabitants. 
His explanation was that local authorities do not want to bear neither the 
political cost nor the organisational cost of enforcing tax collection.  
 
Looking from a different perspective, Moreno-Jaimes (2005a, 2007) evaluates 
local governments‟ budgetary choices using a panel data from 1990 to 2001 of 
almost all municipalities in Mexico. He investigates how democracy promotes 
investment in basic infrastructure rather than current spending. His findings 
suggest that a democratic environment plays an important role in the provision 
of public services under a decentralised setting and that basic infrastructure 
increases when local elections are held and when there is state-level 
opposition. But, more importantly, he contends that a democratic setting is not a 
“sufficient condition” to promote local public service provision. Autonomy in 
decision-making, he claims, is highly relevant.  
 
The literature clearly presents a pessimistic view of certain types of 
intergovernmental transfers in local government finance but only in relation to 
fiscal effort. To my knowledge, there are few studies in the Mexican literature 
that investigate to what extent decentralisation enables entrepreneurial activities 
which may include higher tax collection and whether it encourages local 
authorities to be financially accountable. 
 
The studies also confirmed that there is a pattern of high dependency on central 
government transfers. Nevertheless, performance in some areas is distinct by 
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group of municipalities. This calls for exploring the fiscal decentralisation 
hypothesis in specific settings- such as rurally. At the same time, the previous 
discussion shows that the nature of the most recent decentralisation process 
(the 1997 reform) is expenditure decentralisation. Hence, municipalities in 
Mexico remain revenue-dependent on central government, but nowadays they 
have gained some degree of expenditure-independency. They are entitled to 
higher sums of money to be spent locally. The conditionality of this expenditure 
(a general spending category) gives local authorities still some degree of 
discretion over allocation decisions.  Therefore, this reform is an excellent 
reference for before-after comparison. From here, it can be evaluated how 
changes and different degrees of discretion in expenditures impact the 
behaviour of local authorities.  
 
Hitherto the decentralisation reforms and how they impacted the local 
government finances have been described. The next logical question is why the 
decentralisation process occurs in this way and what are the underlying 
motivations of the decentralisation process- identity, democracy or economic 
growth.   The next Section intends to explain this. 
 
4.4 Antecedents and motivations of Mexican decentralisation  
 
As in most Latin American countries, Mexico has a long history of centralised 
political power inherited from its Spanish conquerors, as well as a strong 
regional identity that emerged in the post-colonial state. Initiating with this 
general context of a centralised state power, the decentralisation story began. 
In order to have an overview, the next Section presents the decentralisation 
reforms pursued by each federal administration.  
 
Rodriguez (1993) tracked the interest in decentralisation in Mexico since 
President Luis Echeverria (1970-1976). Until the start of the 1970‟s, Mexico 
experienced an “economic miracle” with a sustained annual growth rate of GDP 
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6% and low levels of inflation. The main economic policy was import 
substitution-industrialization.  This economic approach triggered regional 
disparities because industries were concentrated in the centre of the country 
and in some northern states (Cabrero, 1998) (cited in Mizhrai, 2004, 142).  
 
This miracle started to fade at the beginning of the 1970s and regional 
disparities were notorious. As a consequence, it is thought that Echeverria 
promoted decentralisation policies intended to strengthen regional development 
as well as urban integration (Mizrahi; 2004, 142). Among different reforms, 
Planning Committees were created in order to integrate states and local 
governments in the planning and expenditure decisions but maintaining 
centralised financial power and control.  
 
Lopez Portillo (1977-1981) was fortunate to have abundant state revenues at 
his disposall during his administrations thanks to high oil prices. However, his 
agenda did not contemplate decentralisation as a priority.  Actually, his reforms 
reflect, to some extent, the opposite. In 1980, the National System of Fiscal 
Coordination was created in order to improve revenue collection as well as 
better redistribute revenues across all the territory. In addition, the National 
System of Fiscal Coordination aimed at  avoiding double and even triple 
taxation with the state level (Moreno-Jaimes, 2003).  A problem at the time was 
that the same asset or transaction was in some cases taxed by both the state 
and the municipality.  
 
In 1980 the National System of Fiscal Coordination granted the right to the 
central government to levy and collect the most important taxes in the country 
such as income tax, the newly created value added tax and special taxes on 
production. State governments had to cede their rights to levy some indirect 
taxes.  Hence, instead of decentralising fiscal powers, central government 
centralised tax control. But, state and local governments were granted revenue-
sharing from the taxes collected by the central government- the ones discussed 
in Section 6.1d- based on pre-established formulas (Mizrahi, 2004, 145).  
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Unfortunately the next Mexican president, Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) was 
not as fortunate as his predecessor in economic terms. A fall in petroleum 
prices and debts deepened Mexico‟s incipient economic crisis. The interest in 
decentralisation was reborn. In this regard, Selee (2004, 7) argues that the 
1983 reform was triggered by citizens‟ discontent over the 1982 devaluation of 
the Mexican currency (peso).   
 
Miguel de la Madrid pursued economic development polices and “apparently” 
strengthened local governments with a constitutional mandate. He implemented 
several administrative reforms such as the National Plan for Development under 
which administrative competencies were redistributed among different 
government levels. In 1983, a reform of the Mexican Constitution notably Article 
115 delegated more resources and responsibilities to local governments. This 
article states the composition of local governments, their functions and financial 
autonomy. Municipalities15 were responsible for the provision of local public 
services mentioned earlier. Moreover, they were endowed with the faculty to 
collect property tax and other minor taxes. Prior to the 1983 reform these taxes 
were collected at state level and, then shared with the local governments. The 
entitlement to local taxes, and local revenue collection aimed to close the gap 
between expenditures and revenues. Local governments were granted the right 
to collect property tax. However, state parliaments were, and still are, in charge 
of setting the property tax rate.  
 
Cabrero (1998) (cited by Muñoz et al, 2006, 33) refers to this stage as 
decentralisation by decree. It was a top-down policy and local actors did not 
play an important role. This reform lacked incentives beyond the administrative 
arrangement it implemented.  
 
The next Mexican president was Carlos Salinas (1988-1994). His election was 
stereotyped as fraudulent. Yet during his administration, decentralisation 
                                                          
15
 In Mexico there are two forms of territorial division at the lowest government level: municipalities and 
delegations. States are divided into local governments or municipalities and Mexico City is divided into 
delegations. 
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policies became part of the main policy agenda but with a different twist. During 
his administration a programme called PRONASOL was created to allocate 
grants and other schemes directly to communities. These funds were allocated 
to community projects such as drinking water and paving roads. In many cases 
communities contributed financially or in labour, depending on the type of 
project. The main principle was that communities should get involved in 
decision-making and implement projects together with the government 
institutions. However, the decentralisation was toward parallel organisations 
(solidarity boards) and the projects were carried out under central government 
advice. Hence, this stage should also be characterised as decentralisation by 
decree as Cabrero defined. 
 
 It is worth mentioning that some academic studies suggest that PRONASOL 
was politically motivated. They argue that PRONASOL was directed to recover 
the PRI‟s legitimacy lost during the last presidential election. Nevertheless, 
some scholars claim that it neither helped to alleviate poverty (Dion, 2000) nor 
had a significant effect on the next presidential election to favour PRI (Bruhn, 
1996; Dion, 2000).  
 
Rodriguez (1993, 142) advances the argument that Madrid and Salinas‟s 
motivation to strengthen local governments was based on the intention to 
preserve the system as it was. In his view, the political elites of the time realised 
that extreme centralisation would inevitably result in the system‟s downfall. 
Hence, municipalities and the party -PRI- needed to be strengthened at the 
bottom. Up to this point, Rodriguez (1993, 142) argued that intergovernmental 
relations had changed because central government was “genuinely obliged” to 
delegate municipal autonomy due to “fear” of losing political control. 
 
Similarly, Selee (2004, 9) argues that the delegation of functions to subnational 
level and the increase of resources were performed in response to constant 
crises of “political legitimacy” as well as fear to the gradually increasing 
opposition.  
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The next important change took place in 1997, under Ernesto Zedillo‟s 
administration (1994-2000). The federal government created a budget for 
conditional funds to municipalities. These are the conditional mandatory funds 
discussed earlier in Section 4.2 d. They are resources assigned to specific 
spending categories (for instance, different type of basic local service 
infrastructure). Before 1997, conditional mandatory funds did exist but were 
highly discretional. Several federal dependencies working in favour of regional 
development were in charge of this share of the budget.  “Ramo 33”- as these 
conditional funds are sometimes called- grouped these shares and 
decentralised expenditures to local governments. This time the conditional 
funds were mandatory for all local governments and they increased local 
government revenues significantly. 
 
In addition, during Ernesto Zedillo‟s mandate after mid-term elections, when PRI 
lost the majority in the Congress, the main opposition party Partido Acción 
Nacional, PAN (for short) put pressure- and succeeded- in increasing the 
sharing of revenues.   
 
Zedillo got off on the wrong foot. First, he was president after he replaced Luis 
Donaldo Colosio, the PRI candidate who was assassinated; days after Zedillo 
took power, the guerrilla war in Chiapas exploded; a brutal economic crisis 
started and on top of that opposition party was becoming stronger. Hence, 
Zedillo had the difficult task of legitimizing his power and maintaining his party‟s 
hegemony. He recognized that the core problem in political and economic terms 
was “excessive political and economic centralism”.  Then, decentralisation via 
conditional mandatory funds apparently looked like they could be part of the 
solution. Perhaps, he expected this reform to legitimise his party.   However, in 
this specific matter Zedillo did not succeed since he was the first PRIista (this is 
a member of the central-left party, PRI) to lose a national election.  
 
Among criticisms of Zedillo‟s reform are that states and municipalities became 
more dependent on the federal government; it did not increase the local 
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governments‟ autonomy because they were mainly conditional mandatory 
funds; it did not change the centralisation of resources because the majority of 
total expenditure continued in federal hands and ambiguity in allocation of 
resources among different levels of government persisted (Mizrahi; 2004, 155).   
 
However, the mandatory conditional funds were distributed independently of 
party affiliations.  This may have curbed to some extent the paternalistic 
behaviour of the ruling party and may have increased the performance of 
opposition parties and their electoral opportunities.  
 
It needs to be taken into account that Zedillo did not belong to the ruling PRI 
political class of the time. Proof of this is that during his mandate, he appointed 
a PANista (this is a member of the right wing party, PAN) Antonio Lozano as his 
Attorney General and prosecuted Raul Salinas, the former president's brother, 
on charges of murder and corruption. During his mandate there were also 
important political reforms that to a large extent contributed to the 
empowerment of opposition parties. These reforms include strengthening the 
independence of the electoral institution and establishment of new methods of 
party financing and transparency. Then his motivations for the reforms seem to 
be a genuine attempt to improve the economic performance of the country. 
 
An alternative explanation of the rise of these reforms is that there was a large 
influence of multilateral organisms and an “atypical” consensus in the congress 
at the time the ruling party, PRI, did not have absolute majority (Muñoz et al, 
2006).  
 
From 2000 to 2006, the right wing PAN government fostered a programme 
called “Authentic Federalism” and created the National Institution of Federalism 
and Municipal Development (INAFED). Local governments were strengthened 
by promoting a direct relationship between federal and local governments. 
Taking into account the political context from 2000- 2012, these changes were 
highly convenient for local governments from the same federal ruling party 
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(PAN). In this way, the federal government may have overtaken state 
governments which are mainly ruled by its opposition, PRI. 
 
Mizrahi (2004, 157) considers that the decentralisation reforms (1983 and 1997) 
were designed for PRI to maintain political power rather than a means to 
change the balance of power among different levels of government and make 
them more efficient or increase accountability to local citizens.  She argues that 
the reason decentralisation in general and fiscal decentralisation in particular 
did not produce the results expected is because a) it was not the fundamental 
objective - if the federal government delegated responsibilities to subnational 
levels because they could not carry them out efficiently, then the reforms were 
not designed as instruments to change the balance of power but as 
administrative reform to maintain political power, and b) because of the poor 
democratic institutions in place. 
 
This is similar to Rodriguez and Andrew‟s arguments that competition for 
political control played an important (hidden) role in the decentralisation reform. 
This implies that in Rodriguez-Pose‟s rhetoric, decentralisation in Mexico was 
advocated from an economic discourse but under political incentives due to 
pressure from below- PRI losing political control at the bottom. 
 
The discussion seems to suggest that in Mexico, the attempts of 
decentralisation- even if “malicious” in motivation- result in more political 
competition, not the other way around. This could be the reason for the latest 
important democratic changes (which were discussed in Section 4.1). 
 
Thus, decentralisation might have led to changes in the behaviour of local 
authorities that are reflected in the political landscape. This reaffirms the 
necessity to look at changes in the political landscape together with the 
decentralisation reforms. But once they are both in place, political competition 
and decentralisation, the results or outcomes of decentralisation may be 
reinforced by the political situation. 
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Since the political motivations of the decentralisation process in Mexico are 
being focused on, it makes sense to explore the development and the state of 
democracy in the country. But, before turning the page, the state of the 
“municipal autonomy” will be briefly discussed.  
 
It will be argued that indeed, local governments are more autonomous 
nowadays; after the 1997 reform, than before. Expenditure decisions are part of 
what municipal autonomy is. However, this is only a part of it. Municipalities in 
Mexico are far from being autonomous as lawfully defined. This is not only a 
consequence of the revenue structure of the country with centralised revenue 
collection, but also because municipal autonomy is closely interconnected with 
the political landscape of the country. The next Section will clarify these 
arguments.   
 
4.5 Summary  
 
In short, the fiscal decentralisation reforms in Mexico after 1997 reflect the 
decentralisation characteristics of most Latin American countries and beyond. 
Therefore, some of the findings of this research can be extended to other 
similar countries. Municipalities in Mexico lack taxing power but are enjoying 
greater expenditure shares.  
 
There is some evidence that fiscal arrangements may influence -negatively- the 
behaviour of local officials in regard to fiscal effort. However, so far not enough 
attention has been paid to understanding whether and in what ways fiscal 
arrangements do influence each type of behaviour. In addition, in order to 
understand behavioural incentives, this review reaffirms the necessity to include 
a political dimension in the theoretical framework given the important political 
changes taking place at all levels of governments, in particular in rural 
municipalities.  
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Chapter 5 – Research methodology    
 
The following chapter introduces the empirical approach adopted to evaluate 
the theoretical framework developed in the previous section. The themes 
covered are: first, a discussion of the research paradigm and research 
approaches aiming at justifying the selection of a mixed methods research 
paradigm; second, a description of the research design explaining the paradigm 
emphasis, chronology of decision making, integration, and research strategies; 
and finally, it presents the decision drawn from a pilot study.  
 
It is important to notice that in this chapter a detailed discussion of research 
methods has not been included. Given that this study uses two different 
research methods (panel data analysis and interviews) in two phases, the level 
of detail can be overwhelming. The researcher believes it is easier for the 
reader to assimilate the detailed methodological information just before the 
empirical discussion.  Therefore, details of the methods are presented at the 
beginning of chapter 6 for the quantitative method and chapter 10 for the 
qualitative method.   
 
5.1 Research paradigm and approach  
 
The choice of paradigm is regarded as the first step to achieve the ultimate aim 
in the research process, the generation of knowledge. The validity of the 
knowledge claimed to be obtained through the research process depends on 
the philosophical stance it follows. According to Morgan, (2007, 50) paradigms 
are “shared belief systems that influence the kinds of knowledge researchers 
seek and how they interpret the evidence they collect”.    
 
This research uses mixed research methodology.  In recent years, mixed 
research methods have achieved growth in acceptance and importance with a 
number of dedicated textbooks, journal and conferences now available 
(Creswell and Plano,  2007; Mertens, 2009; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  




There is no consensus on the paradigm choice for mixed research. There are 
still issues being discussed by methodologists16, including whether mixed 
research should be considered a paradigm that could be classified under 
pragmatism (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Others believe it should be 
considered as a transformative view (Mertens, 2009) or as a link between 
paradigms and methods (Creswell, 2009; Creswell and Plano, 2007).  
 
This research uses a standard mixed methods research approach. By this it is 
meant that mixed methods research is considered as both research design and 
method. As a research design, it comprises philosophical assumptions that lead 
to methods for collection of data and analysis using both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. And as a method, it advances the collecting, analysing, 
and mixing of both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study. The 
premise is that combining both approaches, the researchers can gain a better 
understanding of the phenomenon under study than either approach alone 
(Creswell and Plano; 2007, 5)  
 
This standard approach seems flexible in regard to the relative weight given to 
different paradigms which have been combined. It also calls for a value-neutral 
stance for the researcher during data collection.  
 
There are two main reasons why the “standard” mixed methods research 
approach has been selected for this particular study. First, the research 
questions call for different paradigms and second, the nature of the research 
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 A very interesting and robust account of recent issues can be found in Creswell (2009).  
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a) Research questions 
 
This research intends to answer five questions that are based on two more 
general questions; what and how. What are the drivers of accountability and 
public entrepreneurship and therefore, government performance, and how are 
these effects achieved?.   
 
All five research questions clearly pursue a different research aim and 
therefore, each calls for different paradigms and research approaches. 
 
Q (1) seeks to find an association between fiscal decentralisation and two 
different behavioural patterns accountability and public entrepreneurship. This 
question intends to test the hypothesis that fiscal decentralisation leads to 
changes in behaviour patterns associated with accountability and public 
entrepreneurship behaviour.  
 
Q (2) seeks to test the strength and significance of political competition, which is 
another variable likely to influence accountability and public entrepreneurship, 
as voting is used to remove politicians who fail to provide the policies preferred 
by local citizens. Again, it seeks to find an association between political 
competition and both, accountability and public entrepreneurship.  
 
Q (3) asks whether fiscal decentralisation is actually associated with better 
government performance, which theoretically is assumed to be a consequence 
of changes in accountability and public entrepreneurship. 
 
These questions are designed to answer hypotheses and therefore, require 
deductive reasoning. They will enable the researcher to make inferences about 
what might lead to good government performance, and the quantitative data 
and analysis are appropriate.  
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By exploring “what” are the identifiable changes affecting accountability and 
public entrepreneurship in rural local government, (Q4) aims at checking 
whether the decentralisation reform can be identified as an important factor 
affecting behavioural patterns on the ground. It will give a contextual 
explanation to the findings and to any unexpected results of the analysis 
relating to Q (1), Q (2) and Q (3): whether fiscal decentralisation and/or political 
competition are associated with changes in patterns of accountability and public 
entrepreneurship and, in turn, whether these mediating mechanisms are 
associated with government performance.   
 
In addition, and finally, by studying “how” fiscal decentralisation may encourage 
accountability and public entrepreneurship (Q5) intends to explain the 
mechanisms or processes behind this phenomenon.  
 
Questions (4) and (5) require inductive rather than deductive reasoning. Using 
inductive reasoning permits us to look for patterns across the case studies and 
to make sense of the empirical observations and important elements overlooked 
in the deductive approach.  The aim is to understand and uncover complex 
relationships such as the contending elements of accountability and public 
entrepreneurship. Therefore, a qualitative approach is suitable. 
 
b) Nature of the Research 
 
Fiscal decentralisation is an international trend and has become part of the 
international, national and local focus of political actors. While much research 
has been done related to policy outcomes at the macro level, more research is 
needed on what drives changes on the ground in terms of behavioural patterns 
and whether these patterns are influenced by the fiscal arrangements the 
country has adopted or whether change is a consequence of the level of 
political development in the municipalities.  
 
 Research methodology  
116 
 
The impact of fiscal decentralisation has been studied primarily using 
quantitative methods but there are a few studies based on a qualitative 
approach. The empirical literature on the subject presents contrasting results 
likely to be related to the methodology choice. In this regard, case study 
methods seem to be more pessimistic and statistical methods more optimistic 
with regard to the impact of fiscal decentralisation, particularly in government 
performance. Therefore, mixed research that examines the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation and behavioural patterns from both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches may lead to a deeper understanding of how fiscal arrangements 
influence behavioural patterns and therefore, government performance.  
 
In addition, this are of research involves complex elements of analysis which 
are not easily measurable (accountability and public entrepreneurship) and it is 
difficult to isolate policy arrangements from personal attributes.  
 
Moreover, there is a large set of factors that are intertwined in local 
governments practices such as local politics, state politics, culture, 
development, economy and so on. All of the above considerations support the 
choice of the “standard” mixed method approach. As discussed above, Q (1), 
(2) and (3) are suited to deductive reasoning (testing of theories and 
hypotheses); Q (4) and Q (5) are suited to inductive reasoning (or discovery of 
patterns) and the interpretation stage will be based on abductive reasoning 
(uncovering and relying on the best of a set of explanations for understanding 
one's results) (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 17). This will enhance the 
validity and reliability of the findings.   
 
5.2 Research Design and Strategies 
 
 
The research design is the plan that guides the researcher through all the 
research process - gathering, processing and interpreting (Singleton and 
Straits, 1999). It sets the logic to make informed interpretations. 
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Some of the key decisions in mixed research are whether the researcher 
undertakes both methods at the same time (concurrent) or whether they are 
carried out at a different point in time where one stage will be completed, 
followed by another (sequential); and the relative weight of the different 
paradigms that are used. Figure 5.1 summarises the choices and decisions 
available to the mixed methods researcher. 
  
 
Figure  5.1 Mixed method design matrix with mixed method research design shown in 
the four cells (Source: Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, 22).  
 
Data assembly and collection occurred in two phases. In this sense, this study 
falls in the sequential category in Figure 5.1 above. It uses secondary 
databases for the first phase- the quantitative approach and a qualitative 
approach in phase 2.  According to Creswell and Plano (2007, 66), in the 
sequential design the researcher may select to start by either collecting and 
analysing quantitative first or by collecting and analysing qualitative first.  The 
reason to carry out the quantitative research first in this research is that the 
literature already presents some well-established theories, therefore it makes 
sense to start testing the hypothesis (Q1, 2 and 3) and then, look for further 
explanations (Q4, 5).   In other sense, this research also uses concurrent 
design because case study selection criteria for case development of the 
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interviews were carried out independently of the quantitative results and 
alongside the quantitative analysis to decide on the additional.  
 
The second phase involves the collection of qualitative information (see Figure 
5.2). In this case, a range of case-studies with “moderately” extreme scores are 
used to evaluate the same phenomenon; the impact of fiscal decentralisation in 
the behavioural patterns of local authorities in rural local governments in 
Mexico. Quantitative results were only used as a part of the selection along 
other important characteristics such as different funding approaches, 
demography and different patterns of behaviour.  
 
In regard to the weight of paradigms, this study gives equal emphasis to both 
paradigms to answer different but related research questions. In this way, the 
researcher can compensate to some extent for the limitations of each method.17 
The first phase is used to inform the selection of cases in phase two. However, 
this study is not considered embedded because an embedded design requires 
a type of data (qualitative or quantitative) to be of secondary role (Creswell and 
Plano‟s classification (2007, 71-72).    
 
One other important part of the design is the integration of information. This 
should respond to the overall strategy of employing mixed research methods. 
The use of the mixed research per se does not generate valuable results. The 
researcher should have a clear strategy to merge and combine both methods. 
According to Creswell and Plano‟s classification (2007, 66-68), this study 
integrates information during data collection, during data analysis and during 
interpretation.  
 
The first integration occurs at the end of the first phase. The actual scores of the 
indices constructed for operationalizing the variables Accountability and Public 
Entrepreneurship were used as a part of selection of case studies for testing the 
subsequent questions (mixing during data collection). In addition to actual 
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 A useful explanation of general typologies can be found in Cameron (2009).  
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scores of the indices, the selection considered states with different funding 
approaches, different demography, and also different patterns of behaviour (see 
Section 5.2.2).  Thus, the case studies were not selected purely based on 
econometric results.  
 
The researcher is aware that there are different approaches to integrating 
quantitative and qualitative approaches and data to select cases. This research 
used actual scores on the variable of interests as one of the criteria for selecting 
cases study municipalities. It did not select cases based on predicted scores 
from the regression models.18 The reason is that the qualitative part of the 
research was not designed to test a model. Its purpose was to operationalise 
and further investigate Accountability and Public Entrepreneurship through a 
different approach and additional research questions, prior to further integration. 
 
The second integration is during the second research phase when the 
qualitative paradigm is used to interpret the initial findings from the quantitative 
approach (mixing during data analysis).  
 
The final integration is during the interpretation stage of the overall research 
(see Figure 5.2). In this case, abductive reasoning has been used to reach a 
final interpretation. Using both sets of findings aims at giving greater validity to 
the research.  
 
                                                          
18
 Lieberman (2005) discuss different strategies to select cases in a nested research approach. He suggests 
that the assessing of the findings of quantitative approach should be based on whether the assessment of 
the regression model is satisfactory or not. If it is satisfactory, the qualitative analysis should be aimed at 
Model-testing. If it is not, the analysis should focus on model- building. One of the approaches that 
Lieberman (2005) suggests is to select cases based on predicted and actual scores on the independent or 
dependent variable derived from the regression model.   
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Figure  5.2 Overview of the sequential Research Model for this study 
 
5.2.1 Phase 1- Panel data analysis  
  
The first phase consists of using fixed-effects in a panel data analysis with rural 
municipalities as units of analysis between the years 1990 to 2008.    
 
Using data from a sample of rural local governments in the country, different 
hypotheses using different models and outcome variables are tested, 
depending on the research question being analysed. The hypothesis being 
examined is that changes in a) accountability, b) public entrepreneurship can be 
explained by increases in conditional, unconditional funds and/ or political 
competition.  In addition, whether these behavioural patterns and/or political 
competition are associated with government performance is also tested.  




Different types of data are used. Information is used of coverage of basic public 
services from census and population counts collected by the Mexican National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI); local governments‟ financial 
information from INEGI and political information such as party affiliation and 
political competition from an independent, not-for-profit think tank organization 
in Mexico, the Centre for Research in Development (CIDAC). 19 
 
Two indices were constructed, accountability and entrepreneurship, based on 
local government surveys from Mexico. These indices represent an effort to 
operationalize accountability and public entrepreneurship using secondary data 
bases.  These indices were also, in conjunction with other descriptive variables, 
when identifying cases for further investigation in the second phase of the 
study.    
 
More details of the statistical technique and operationalization of variables can 
be found in Chapter 8.  
 
5.2.2 Phase 2- Sub-Case Studies 
 
This research is interested in the impact of fiscal decentralisation in rural local 
governments in Mexico. The country-case study was not selected, but guided 
by the researcher‟s interest and familiarity with the country. However, sub-cases 
(municipalities) were carefully selected as part of the research strategy. 
 
According to Gerring (2004, 342), a case study is:  
  
“an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a 
larger class of (similar) units”. 
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 In Spanish- Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, A.C. 
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Flyvbjerg (2006, 219) states that some researchers argue that case studies are 
too limited to be generalised. They are considered as a part of a pilot study, not 
as a method to create knowledge or as a reliable and valid scientific method.  
 
Gerring (2004, 341) argues that case study and non-case study approaches 
involve trade-offs in weakness and strengths rather than “antagonistic” 
approaches to empirical research.  
 
For this research, the benefits are particularly important. Case studies can bring 
detailed enrichment for a better understanding of the reality in a context-
dependent phenomenon (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
 
In addition, case studies are well-suited for analysing and explaining how and 
why things happen as they do (Stake 1994, Pettigrew 1990). This is consistent 
with the researcher‟s interest in uncovering the process by which fiscal 
decentralisation may lead to changes in accountability and public 
entrepreneurship. In this research Q5 in particular responds to this type of 
questions- in what ways has fiscal decentralisation encouraged accountability 
and public entrepreneurship?. 
 
According to Teddlie and Yu (2007), multiple case studies can be used in order 
to achieve comparability. The selection of cases can be carried out in a 
purposeful manner using typical cases, extreme or deviant cases, intensity 
sampling or maximum sampling. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest that 
extreme cases ease the observation of contrasting patterns of constructs and 
relationships.  
 
The research questions proposed here can be addressed effectively by  
observing a range of case studies with different levels of accountability and 
public entrepreneurship because the fiscal decentralisation reform was 
undertaken by all rural local governments, but still their performance differ. 
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Gerring (2004) advances that case study should be understood as an approach 
to defining cases rather than as a method of analysing cases. Therefore, it is 
important to identify why the defined case studies are useful.  For the purpose 
of this research and following Gerring‟s (2004) propositions, case studies are 
useful because in the second phase of this research a) there is more interest in 
the depth of the proposition rather than breadth and boundedness; b) case 
comparability is more important than representativeness; c) the aim is to 
understand causal mechanisms rather than effects; and d) there is useful 
variance in the variables of interest.  
 
A critical decision in case study design is the selection of cases. Bryman (2006) 
suggests that in mixed research, the quantitative approach can be used to 
inform the sampling of cases.   
 
This research employs purposive sampling techniques with a range of case 
studies that are “moderately extreme”. It uses the actual scores of the variables 
of interest of the indices built in the first phase of the research, but also other 
variables, and specifically the approach taken to implementing fiscal 
decentralisation.  Purposive sampling technique yields a greater depth of 
information from a small number of cases because cases provide interesting 
contrasts with other cases. In addition, a range of different cases can also 
benefit the operationalization of concepts not evident in the statistical analysis 
(Lieberman, 2005, 441).  
 
Another aspect of the case selection in mixed research that needs to be 
considered is whether the selection of cases should be based on scores from 
the independent or dependent variable. Some scholars have criticized the use 
of the dependent variable scores (Lieberman, 2005, 444) and instead, they 
recommend using scores on the explanatory variable(s) and with the condition 
of not having knowledge of the dependent variable score or for using it for 
Model-testing after the preliminary quantitative analysis on nested approach 
(Lieberman, 2005, 444). However, as noted above, the case studies in this 
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research are not being used to test the model. The selection of cases is based 
on a number of variables of interest. The index scores are, in different parts of 
the quantitative analysis, both dependent and independent variables, and 
actual, not predicated, values are used. The score of the dependent variable of 
ultimate interest, Government Performance, is not considered.   
Decentralisation arrangements at state level are used as a central part of the 
case-study selection process, but were not part of the model. 
 
The main objective for the selection of cases was to obtain the following: 
 
CASE 1- A good performer town on both dimensions, Accountability and Public 
Entrepreneurship. 
CASE 2- A good performer town on Accountability 
CASE 3- A good performer town on Public Entrepreneurship 
CASE 4- A poor performer town on both dimensions 
CASE 5- An average performer town 
 
and also to ensure that all major state level approaches to decentralisation were 
represented. 
Case 4, Poor performer town, presents poor performance in both dimensions of 
interest Accountability and Public Entrepreneurship. The researcher did not 
investigate individual poor performers in each dimension separately because 
Case 2 and Case 3 make cases for poorer performance on Accountability and 
poorer performance on Public Entrepreneurship. In addition, from the 
methodological point of view, fewer case studies provide with more depth than 
breadth and avoid the burden of ending with thinner insights about more cases 
(Lieberman, 2005, 441).  
 
In order to achieve comparability and identify similarities or differences, 
Rousseau and Fried (2001) suggest addressing the same phenomena in all 
cases and to give a detailed description of the cases.  Following these 
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recommendations, the same phenomena were analysed in all cases and in 
Chapter 11 a rich case study description is presented. The description presents 
similar information about all cases in order to reveal systematic differences.  
 
The main source of information for the case studies was interviews. This was 
because of the lack of archival documentation in this group of municipalities. 
More details are given in Section 10.5.   
 
The selection of participants in each case study and the data collection methods 
used (semi structure interviews) in the second phase is described under the 
methods section in Chapter 10.  
5.3 Pilot study  
 
A pilot study was carried out before starting the first phase of the research. The 
pilot study was aimed at facilitating the researcher in becoming acquainted with 
the settings and assisting the decision for the statistical analysis as well as the 
selection of participants and questions in the qualitative strand.  
 
The interviews were carried out in a rural municipality of the state of 
Tamaulipas, Mexico. The State of Tamaulipas was selected due to accessibility 
and familiarity with the setting for the researcher. Further cases for the empirical 
investigation were selected based on a systematic procedure for ensuring 
coverage of all major state approaches to decentralisation.  
 
The five interviews correspond to two mayors, two councillors and one local 
government manager. The two mayors and councillors belong to different 
political parties (PAN and PRI) and they were in office in consecutive periods 
but mayors and councillors were in opposition.20  The manager belonged to 
PAN.  
                                                          
20
 PAN stands for Partido Accion Nacional. It is the right-wing party in power at the national level at the 
time of the study. PRI stands for Partido Revolucionario Institucional. This is the central/left-wing party 
which has previously been in power for 30 years.  




The municipality was selected due to its accessibility and the participants‟ 
selection based on the position they held and their party affiliation. Some 
decisions drawn from the pilot study‟s results are: 
 
1) Street level bureaucrats would be excluded because this particular group 
of municipalities have highly centralised managerial styles. Thus, this 
research assumes that mayors are the leaders in entrepreneurial actions 
and have the larger accountability expectation in the local government. 
2)  The pilot study helped to decide the more relevant participants in the 
study (mayors and councillors). In addition, it revealed the importance of 
including a local actor with experience in the local administration before 
and after the reform of 1997.  
3) The pilot study helped to assess the quality of some interview questions. 
As a result, some amendments were made after the pilot study. The final 
interview questions were also amended based on the initial findings in 
Phase 1.   
4) The pilot study was important for operationalizing the construct “public 
entrepreneurship”. Drawing from the literature and the pilot study, the 
most appropriate variables available in secondary databases were 
selected which were likely to reflect the different dimensions of the 
behavioural concepts. More details in Chapter 8.  
 
5.4 Summary  
 
This chapter locates the study within the appropriate research paradigm and 
justifies and describes the selection of methodology and research design for 
this study. 
 
After reviewing different research paradigms, the study is located within the 
“standard” mixed methods research approach. This is considered the best 
approach to obtain a comprehensive understanding of whether and how fiscal 
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decentralisation drives accountability and public entrepreneurship leading to 
good government performance.   
 
The nature of the research questions, the association of fiscal decentralisation 
to behavioural patterns and government performance and the creation of more 
knowledge around the process leading to such results, justifies a “standard 
mixed method research approach”. Through the mixing of methods, the study 
will obtain situational facts from rural local governments as well as rich 
qualitative data around the local actors‟ perceptions.   
 
The unit of analysis is the rural local government in Mexico. The standard mixed 
method research approach seeks to make most of the strengths of both 
paradigms and logics of enquiry. The study is carried out in two phases. In the 
first phase a quantitative approach uses data collection from rural municipalities 
during the years 1990 to 2008 with a modest number of cases, and the actual 
scores of the variables of interests operationalized for this analysis are used to 
assist in the selection of a range of different case-studies for the subsequent 
phase. 
 
In the second phase, a range of different case-studies were selected. From 
each case study, qualitative semi-structured interviews were carried out among 
local actors. The integration of information is carried out at different stages: 
during data collection, during data analysis and during interpretation. 
 
More details about the selection and processes of research methods are 
discussed before the empirical analysis of each research phase. Next, the 
discussion and findings for the first research phase are presented. The 
discussion and analysis of Phase 1 is divided into four chapters. Chapter 6 
presents detailed information of how the variables were operationalized and 
descriptive statistics. Chapter 7 tests the association of fiscal decentralisation 
and the two behaviours of interest, accountability and public entrepreneurship; 
Chapter 8 evaluates the association of the behaviours and government 
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performance and Chapter 9 presents an analysis of changes in government 















PHASE 1- A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
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Chapter 6 – Research Method, Operationalizing the Variables and 
Descriptive statistics  
 
This chapter investigates whether fiscal decentralisation is related to 
improvements in local government performance. The aim is not only to 
investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and outcomes such 
as the provision of public services, but also to uncover whether fiscal 
decentralisation has changed the behaviour of local authorities which are 
argued to be theoretically drivers of local government performance.   
 
To summarise the arguments presented in the literature review: if fiscal 
decentralisation is an effective mechanism in motivating local authorities to be 
more accountable and entrepreneurial, it might be found that changes in 
behavioural patterns due to fiscal autonomy result in better provision of local 
public services. Such changes may also be affected by factors other than fiscal 
decentralisation. 
 
In particular, in the Mexican case, at the same time as the fiscal reform of 1997, 
an increase in the level of political competition has enabled politicians from 
different parties to lead local governments which for many years were in the 
hands of one political party, PRI. These have changed the political panorama in 
rural Mexico. There are more opposition parties ruling local governments and 
there are more local governments with state level opposition.  
 
Theoretically, political competition leads to better government performance, in 
particular because it also involves changes in accountability and, to a lesser 
extent, public entrepreneurship. Therefore, the observed behavioural patterns of 
local politicians might be the result of the political competition‟s incentives rather 
than, or as well as, fiscal decentralisation. Equally, the process of fiscal 
decentralisation may itself be reinforced by changes in political competition.    
 
It has been pointed out that under fiscal decentralisation, the political 
mechanisms can result in either improvement in accountability and public 
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entrepreneurship or in principle deterioration of the same. Elections as a 
mechanism of reward or punishment lead to accountability behaviour and give 
an opportunity to local authorities to differentiate themselves from other 
politicians by stimulating public entrepreneurship. On the other hand, more 
resources in the hands of local government may lead to a higher level of 
corruption and public entrepreneurs tend to be risk-takers, which can damage 
accountability. 
 
In addition, the types of fiscal arrangement might influence accountability and 
public entrepreneurship in completely different directions. In the Mexican 
context, high levels of red tape generally attributed to conditional funds are, 
among other reasons, set in order to control corruption. However, a high level of 
red tape is likely to discourage creativity and pro-activeness of public 
entrepreneurs. Hence, the types of fiscal arrangements may affect 
accountability and public entrepreneurship differently and therefore, government 
performance.  
 
Before presenting the statistical analysis, the next section explains the research 
methods and strategies employed to operationalize and measure each variable. 
It also provides some descriptive analysis of the relevant variables. 
 
6.1 Research methods 
 
The first phase of analysis is a quantitative approach. The aim is to get the “big 
picture” and then, expand the findings in the subsequent phase to answer the 
appropriate research questions.  This quantitative analysis is not intended to 
obtain generalizable data. The analysis of quantitative data was primarily 
descriptive of situational facts, but included regression analysis to assess 
whether statistically significant differences were found in this group of 
municipalities.  
 
There are numerous techniques that have been developed and are used in 
social science. The selection of these techniques depends on the type and 
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availability of the data. The next Section describes and justifies the technique 
used in this research.  
 
6.1.1 Statistical models  
 
Fixed-effects estimation is used in a pooled time-series cross section with 
municipalities as units of analysis. The software used is SPSS and the 
technique Mixed Linear Model. Some models present fixed effects on both time 
and municipalities and others only on municipality-specific depending on the 
best model fit. This permits the elimination of bias created for (fixed) 
unmeasured municipalities‟ characteristics that may have additional effects 
such as culture and geography and if suitable, controlling for country-wide time 
shocks that affect all municipalities equally.  
 
This research follows the advice by Snijders and Bosker (1999, 46) for choosing 
between fixed and random models.  The reasons are:  
 
a) This group is regarded as a “unique category” (rural municipalities) rather 
than a sampled population (all municipalities in the country)  
b) It is aimed to draw conclusions about each of these municipalities, not 
from the population 
c) The sample size is adequate to run fixed effect model (+ 100). Therefore, 
the fixed effect parameters are likely to be estimated very accurately and 
random effects do not add much to this precision 
d) The research has an interest in within-group differences rather than 
between-group differences. Therefore, the aim is to control for between-
group differences without modelling as it adds complexity to the analysis  
 
It is important to clarify that validation and model predictions are not the focus of 
these analyses. Instead, they aim to use underlying trends to see the “big 
picture” as well as corroborating and integrating the findings in subsequent 
analyses. 
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This brings us to the next issue of validity and reliability for this method and 
technique. 
 
6.1.2 Reliability and Validity  
 
Reliability indicates the extent to which measurements are repeatable and 
stable (Nunnally, 1978; Bollen, 1989) and validity refers to whether researchers 
are measuring what they intend to measure (Cook and Campbell, 1979).  
 
In this regard, the reader is reminded that the choice of research strategy 
(mixed) was precisely because of these issues.  In social science and non-
experimental designs reliability and validity are inherent problems and reliance 
on survey data raises even more difficult questions in regard to validity. 
 
The choice of models as discussed above was based on the approach that 
validity is not the main concern of this quantitative analysis; instead it is an 
exploratory study for these particular samples and it does not attempt to 
generalize findings. However, for the validity of the entire study, this research is 
also interested in knowing whether what is measured is what it is intended. 
 
Most of the variables included in these analyses have been justified 
theoretically and have been used in other studies (such as the political 
variables).  Although this is not a valid argument of reliability and validity, it is 
still a conventional and valid approach in social science research.  
 
As argued in the literature review, it is difficult to operationalize these heavy 
theoretical ideas and there is very little empirical evidence operationalizing 
these concepts, in particular public entrepreneurship. These statistical analyses 
attempt to do that. An empirical measure is constructed from theoretical idea. 
Therefore, it is an important contribution to social knowledge.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to clarify that strong model fitting and effects are 
not expected. The measures used here attempt to uncover changes at the 
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margin. It does not seek to unpack the whole municipal organization by its 
roots. Therefore, it is expected to see changes that might make a difference at 
the margin.    
 
Particularly with the public entrepreneurship index, the researcher is very 
conscious of having imperfect measures. This is precisely one of the reasons it 
was particularly important to look at case studies on the ground. Then, the 
effects on the empirical estimates in the quantitative analysis are not expected 
to be remarkable huge. Nevertheless it is believed the index is good enough to 
find some effect in case they exist.   
 
6.1.2.1 Mitigation of threats to reliability and validity in the multiple 
regressions 
 
The internal validity of studies based on regression analysis relies on two key 
elements: (i) the unbiasedness and consistency of the estimated regression 
coefficients; and (ii) the significance level of the estimated results (which 
depends critically on the standard errors of the estimates. 
 
Following Stock and Watson‟s (2011) framework, the most important potential 
threats to internal validity for this study is omitted variable bias. This threat has 
been addressed by controlling for other potential determinants of the dependent 
variable under analysis, beyond the key explanatory variables of interest. Of 
primary importance are the political variables that were added to the model in 
stepwise manner, political competition, state-level opposition and political 
parties, since they are likely to be correlated with both dependent and 
independent variables of interest in the model. In addition, the researcher 
explores other potential factors such as population size, population density and 
size of municipality as measured by its area in squared kilometres.  The 
variables population size, population density and size of municipality were not 
statistically significant and the estimated coefficients of interests did not change 
significantly after their inclusion. Therefore, these controlling variables are not 
present here as they do not add strength to the model. The approach was to 
select the simplest model for presentation to make it more reader- friendly. 
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Nevertheless, still some potential threats to internal validity persist. It is 
important to acknowledge the danger of further omitted variables bias, perhaps 
arising because the control variables do not capture characteristics of the rural 
municipalities such as, but not limited to, the proximity to more developed 
municipalities or cultural characteristics. In this regard, to address issues of 
potential omitted variables arising from variables that are often hard to quantify,   
this research compiles and analyses data from different points in time for the 
same municipality (Stock and Watson, 2011, 359) and the models were run 
controlling for municipality and time differences and the best model fits 
presented for discussion and the second best fit added in the annexes. This 
mitigation of omitted variables can also minimize what is called by Stock and 
Watson (2011, 369) as “serial correlation” which can arise in panel data.  
 
This research was also checked for non-linarites in the regression function for 
the relevant variable Coverage of Basic Public Services. Quadratic and cubic 
specifications were attempted as well, which did not result in a significant 
improvement of fit, thus it was opted for the simplest model.    
 
Stock and Watson (2011, 363) indicate that error in the measurement of 
independent variables even in large samples can lead to a biased estimated 
coefficient.  This research relies on secondary databases as to the best of the 
researcher‟ knowledge the data does not suffer from measurement errors. 
However, as it is described in the next subsection, the research did follow a 
structured approach in order to identify and to deal with outliers.  
 
Although there is enough theoretical background for direction of association 
between variables, the problem of simultaneous causality cannot be disregard. 
However, similar to the measurement error problem, simultaneous causality can 
lead to inconsistency of the estimated coefficient which is not the ultimate aim in 
this study. 
  
Another issue in the data base use for analysis in this research was missing 
data. Based on checks of missing values patterns in SPSS, there are no 
Research Method, Operationalizing the Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
136 
observable patterns associated with independent or dependent variables in the 
missing data. Therefore, the best approach was to reduce the sample size but 
not introduce bias (Stock and Watson, 2011, 364).   
 
Conventional checks have also been followed to test violations of the model‟s 
assumption. For instance, the normal distributions of variables have been 
checked and it did not appear to be an issue. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error regression has also been checked using standard SPSS test. 
Heteroskedasticity did not appear to be an issue. In addition, the models are 
robust to alternative control variables and proxies for the key explanatory 
variables of interest. 
 
The estimated effects arising from alternative specifications were not only 
systematically significant but also quite similar almost identical in magnitude. 
Some of the results are in line with studies that have investigated the effects on 
government performance of decentralisation mainly the negative association of 
fiscal arrangements to performance (Moreno-Jaime, 2003, 2007; Sour, 2004). 
 
6.2 Sampling and Data Treatment 
 
The analysis takes as a reference point the reform of 1997. This reform, as 
discussed earlier (Section 4.2) increased the municipal budgets significantly. 
The research uses longitudinal municipal data from the period 1990-2009.  
 
The information on the coverage of basic public services comes from the 
census (1990, 2000, and 2010) and population counts (1995, 2005) collected by 
the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).21 The 
financial information (SIMBAD, System of State and Municipalities Dabatase) 
was also collected by INEGI. 
                                                          
21
 Census and population counts aim at enumerating the country population. Both are carried out every 10 years but 
the census is carried out the years ending in zero (last being in 2010) and the population counts in the years ending in 
five (last being in 2005).  
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Political information used to compute measures of party affiliation and political 
competition comes from the independent, not-for-profit think tank, Centre for 
Research in Development22 (CIDAC) (from 1990 to 2010). Finally, the 
accountability and entrepreneurship indices (which will be described in Section 
8.4.2) were computed using information from the SIMBAD (for the financial 
information) as well as surveys carried out in 1995, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009 
by different research institutions. 23 
 
The study is interested in rural local governments. For the purpose of this 
study, rural municipalities are those municipalities that fit the following criteria: a 
population of less than 30,000 inhabitants and predominance of primary sector 
activities (percentage of employed inhabitants per municipality working in the 
primary sector with respect to secondary and tertiary sector by 2000). This 
sample has further filtration in the following respects: 
 
a. Since 1997, 71 municipalities have been created.  These municipalities 
were excluded because they do not have information to compare before 
reform 
b. In addition, the state of Oaxaca has 418 municipalities that are not ruled 
by democratic election but by customs and traditions, and the Federal 
District has a different constitutional status with respect to its territorial 
division (16 delegations rather than municipalities). These are also 
excluded. 
 
Inasmuch as possible, the sample was checked for random and systematic 
errors. A random error is defined as any factor that may randomly influence the 
measurement of a particular variable across sample and a systematic error is a 
                                                          
22
 In Spanish- Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, A.C. 
23
 INEGI is an autonomous agent of the Mexican government in charge of gathering statistical information such as 
census, counts and economic information; the 1995 survey was elaborated by INEGI along with INAFED, a 
decentralised agency in charge of promoting federalism. Subsequent surveys were carried out by the ministry of 
social development in conjunction with INEGI. The surveys collect information about local government 
administrative and financial development. CIDAC is a non-profit independent think tank devoted to study and 
promoting policy changes. 
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type of error that affects the measurement of a variable and the sample 
thoroughly (Lewis-Beck et al, 2003, 1109). 
 
Table  6.1 Missing data and outliers 
Variable  Missing data Outlier  
Survey indicators 354  
Political variables  121  
Financial variables  53 (+ year 2001)  
Water and Sewerage 
indicator 
20 43 
Population Growth  0 42 
 
 
Table 6.1 presents the number of missing observations data and outliers24 
excluded for the analysis per type of variable.   
 
Numerous data points are missing for some financial variables. This was 
particularly in year 2001 for entire states and there is no evidence of being 
related to the variable of interest. These years are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Another concern for systematic error was that coverage of basic public services 
could have a ceiling effect for municipalities with high levels of coverage 
(meaning municipalities with high levels of coverage at the start of the analysis 
present invariably lower changes overtime). Patterns were checked for within 
this group of municipalities but no relevant issue was observed.  
 
The database also contained some potential random errors. For instance, some 
variables have observations with high deviation from the mean- outliers (values 
above 1.5 Interquartile). Some of these outliers were municipalities with nearly 
100% coverage of basic public services. This raises the concern that the 
variable basic public services could have kurtosis, with a heavily (fat) tailed 
                                                          
24
 The data was depurated eliminating extreme values. The outliers are defined as values above 1.5 
Interquartile. 
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distribution. As mentioned in Section 6.1.2.1, a test for the curve fit of the 
variable of interest was performed and the simplest model (linear) was chose 
and some extreme values were excluded. 
 
Some municipalities presented large changes in the indicator of population 
growth25 from one census to the next. These changes are particular to these 
municipalities (and no relevant pattern was found) and may yield misleading 
values for the mean parameter of the indicator coverage of basic public services 
which is calculated considering population.   
 
Hence, the researcher was faced with the decision to either manipulate the 
missing data and outliers to include a bigger sample or to use listwise analysis, 
which includes only complete cases. Given that no obvious patterns were found 
regarding missing observations or outliers (i.e. no association with particular 
type of municipalities), the approach taken to treat missing data and outliers 
was to exclude them from the analysis altogether.  
 
This approach downsized the sample significantly. However, this decision was 
based on the overall research strategy. The study aims at selecting cases for 
further investigation. Hence, manipulating the database by adding missing 
values and transforming variables can seriously damage the selection of cases 
and, therefore, any further interpretation. In addition, the aim of the analysis is 
exploratory, not inferential. Therefore, the sample size should not represent a 
concern.  
 
The sample was finally reduced from 1074 municipalities which fit the criteria for 
a rural municipality by 2010 to 505 cases which provided viable data for this 
analysis for the years in between 1990 and 2009.  Different years were used 




                                                          
25
 This is calculated by determining the change in percentage from two consecutive censuses.  
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6.3 Overview of variables within the theoretical framework  
 
The analysis of government performance is based on a set of local public 
services which Mexican local governments have been lawfully obliged to 
provide since 1983. These services are granted a priority by local authorities.  
 
Local governments in Mexico have different ways to finance these public 
services; among them tax collection and intergovernmental transfers in the form 
of unconditional and conditional mandatory funds. Following Litvack‟s definition, 
all these sources of finances will be analysed because all of them increased the 
expenditure decision of local governments.  
 
Their major source of revenues is from unconditional funds and mandatory 
conditional funds. As observed in Figure 6.1, unconditional funds represent the 
largest proportion of revenues in local finance from 1990 to up 1997 when the 
mandatory conditional funds were created. Since then, mandatory conditional 
funds increased (but the highest change in this sample is observed in 2001) and 
unconditional funds continue to be an important source of finance but now along 
with mandatory conditional funds. Unconditional and mandatory conditional 
funds are both intergovernmental transfers. Therefore, there is a clear pattern of 
dependency on central government transfer before and after the 1997 reform. 
 
Another source of revenue is own revenue, which consist of taxes (mainly 
property tax), user charges and other types of revenue (such as 
‗Aprovechamientos‘ which includes all other revenues not classified into taxes 
and user charges, these are mainly fines and surcharges). The proportion of tax 
revenue to total revenue represents the fiscal effort of local governments to 
collect their own revenues.  The fiscal effort has steadily decreased in 
proportion to the total local revenue. Finally, in Figure 6.1 the remaining sources 
of local government revenues are categorized under the label “other revenues”. 
These include borrowing and other revenue categories. These sources of 
revenues have been excluded from the analysis.    
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Figure  6.1 Percentage of Local Revenues according to Origin  
This graph presents the total local revenues divided into own revenue (tax subjects, 
user charges and other types of revenues); intergovernmental transfers (conditional 
and unconditional grants); and other revenue. The graph depicts the source as a 
percentage of total revenue from 1989 to 2009 in the working sample. Source: Own 
calculation using SIMBAD database (Municipal System Database) by INEGI.  
 
Unconditional funds, conditional mandatory funds and own revenue are different 
types of decentralised mechanisms. However, unconditional funds and 
mandatory conditional funds represent the largest source of revenue in rural 
municipalities and therefore, the main means for financing public services.   
 
Thus, in this research both intergovernmental transfers, unconditional and 
mandatory conditional funds will be used as indicators to measure fiscal 
decentralisation. 
 
One other source of investment in local governments is the extraordinary 
conditional funds. These funds are earmarked to specific expenditures. They 
have different policy arrangements and in some cases they are delegated to 
local governments with some decision-making  (such as work execution). 
However, they are managed by federal and state government agencies and 
they are usually aimed at patterns of investment different to basic public 
services. These funds are allocated in a more discretionary way. This data is 
not used in this quantitative analysis because it is not available in the local 
government accounts. However, to have an idea of the amount of resources it 
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represents for a rural municipality, the researcher requested information about 
extraordinary funds to a rural municipality (the municipality  that will be 
presented in the qualitative analysis as an average government performer). This 
rural municipality received 31% more of its total budget within three years of 
administration or 60% more of its budget between 2010 and 2014.     
 
As mentioned above, the other source of revenue is own revenue. Own- 
revenue has declined steadily as a percentage of total revenues (Figure 6.2). 
However, as shown in Figure 6.2, it has increased slightly in per capita terms.   
 
 
Figure  6.2 Revenues by Category in a Sample of Rural Municipalities from 1990 to 
2008 
The vertical axis represents revenues in pesos per capita adjusted to 2010 (Source: 
Own calculation using the SIMBAD database- Municipal System Database by INEGI. 
Sample size: 505). 
 
In general, it is clear that own revenue or the fiscal effort of rural municipalities 
is important, but not a sufficient revenue source. Although own revenue is also 
a fiscal decentralisation mechanism, the interest is more in the fiscal effort of 
local authorities and in this research it is used to represent an entrepreneurial 
action along with other indicators (more details in Section 6.4.2.2). 
 
A contribution of this study to the decentralisation research is the 
operationalisation and application of the concepts, accountability, and, 
especially, public entrepreneurship. Having these two behaviours as 
measurable variables is quite a step forward. Even though the indices are 
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imperfect, they are nonetheless measurement tools which can be used to look 
at patterns across a country. Thus, using data from a sample of rural local 
governments in the country, different hypotheses are tested using different 
models and three outcome variables depending on the model.  
 
The hypothesis examined is that changes in a) accountability and b) public 
entrepreneurship can be explained by increases in mandatory conditional and 
unconditional funds which are measures of decentralisation (see Figure 6.3 
below). It is important to separate accountability and public entrepreneurship 
values because they present conflicting elements, and this may have a negative 
effect on performance.  
 
To answer research question 1, which inquires whether fiscal decentralisation is 
associated with changes in patterns of accountability and public 
entrepreneurship, accountability and public entrepreneurship indices (which will 
be described in greater detail in subsection 6.4.2) are used as dependent 
variables. As discussed in detail below, different dimensions of both 
accountability and entrepreneurship are examined: scores were derived for 
each, and summed across dimensions to provide overall, composite index 
scores for each municipality in the sample.  
 
To answer research question 2, which asked if the differences in the level of 
political competition had a major effect on whether and in what ways patterns of 
accountability and public entrepreneurship change following fiscal 
decentralisation, this research adds political competition variables to the model 
and explores differences in the presence or absence of state-level opposition 
and party affiliation. Hence, this research tests to what extent changes in 
accountability and public entrepreneurship can be explained by an increase in 
fiscal decentralisation and/or political competition.    
 
The first two sets of analyses described above examine behavioural patterns as 
outcomes and explore whether particular fiscal arrangements affect local 
government behaviour in important and relevant ways.  
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To answer research question 3, a direct, though partial, measure of local 
government performance is examined – the coverage of basic public services. 
In particular, the relationship between this direct measure of performance and 
changes in accountability and entrepreneurship measures will be explored. 
Coverage of Basic Public Services is used as a dependent variable to answer 
question 3- the extent fiscal decentralisation is associated with measurable 
changes in local government performance. The researcher will also examine 
how far any apparent relationship between the two is explained by changes in 
political competition, as the overarching model suggests.   
 
In addition, the hypothesis that will be explored is that the introduction of the 
1997 decentralisation reform led to an improvement in local government 
performance. This is done by comparing the association of local government 
performance with the political variables before and after the reform. The 
analysis is replicated in two databases (one database from 1990 to 1997 and 
the other from 1998 to 2009) rather than using the periods as a dummy 
variable.  
 
In Figure 6.3, the reader can visualize the research questions and the 
theoretical framework this study is based on.  
 
Figure  6.3 Theoretical Framework and Research Questions  
  
In the remainder of this Chapter (6), the research method will be described and 
how each variable is measured and treated for analysis will be explained. In 
addition, descriptive statistics for each variable included in the proposed models 
will be presented. 
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6.4 Operationalization of Measurement instrument  
 
Following the theoretical model, the set of variables to be studied are:  
conditional mandatory funds and unconditional funds, which represent the fiscal 
decentralisation arrangements in place; accountability and public 
entrepreneurship, which are argued to affect the extent of success of policy 
outcomes; political competition including specifically  the presence or absence 
of state-level opposition.   
 
In this section, the way in which each of these variables is operationalized and 
derived for the analysis is explained and justified. This is followed by a 
discussion of the descriptive statistics of the sample. 
 
6.4.1 Fiscal decentralisation indicator 
 
Decentralisation is defined and measured in terms of the fiscal arrangements in 
place. Thus, a concrete measure of decentralisation is the amount of resources 
local authorities get yearly in conditional mandatory and unconditional funds.  
More specifically, for analysis purposes, the following are: 
 
Conditional funds: The total annual amount received for conditional funds 
converted to 2010 real prices and divided by population.26 
 
Unconditional funds: The total annual amount received for unconditional funds 
converted to 2010 real prices and divided by population. 
 
The annual revenues for conditional and unconditional funds by municipality 
were collected by INEGI in the database called SIMBAD. The annual revenues 
were converted to 2010 real prices and divided by population. The 
decentralisation indicator was calculated for the years 1995, 2000, 2002, 2004 
and 2009 which are the years local government surveys were carried out.   
                                                          
26
 The population use for the years between census and counts are determined by progressive growth.  
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The assumption is that local authorities enjoy higher discretion in allocation and 
expenditure when they use unconditional funds and lower discretion in 
expenditure with resources from conditional funds. The degree of discretion 
over decentralised funds might have an impact on the behaviour of local 
authorities.    
 
Unconditional funds have increased steadily from an average of 968 pesos per 
capita in 1990 to an average of 1031 pesos per capita in 2009 at real values 
2010 in the working sample (505 municipalities). The level of funds via 
unconditional funds are usually higher than the level of conditional funds. 
However, since 2002, the gap between them started to close.   
 
The introduction of conditional funds in 1997 eventually resulted in a high 
increase of total local budget in the sample. In 1995 the average conditional 
mandatory funds per capita was 45 pesos and by 2009, it had increased to an 
average of 1037 pesos per capita. Both conditional mandatory funds and 
unconditional funds fluctuate significantly as shown in Table 6.2 (the reader can 
also refer back to Figure 6.1).    
Table  6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Local Revenues (in pesos per capita based on real 
values 2010) by Category in a sample of Rural Municipalities from 1990 to 2008  
  






1995 968 972 45 228 
2000 1275 1283 464 689 
2002 1248 1245 1007 564 
2004 1523 1532 988 557 








Thus, the 1997 reform resulted in important changes in the local government 
budget. These changes, theoretically, might lead local governments to perform 
better, be more accountable and more entrepreneurial because they have more 
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funds, they are closer to their citizens and they have information advantages 
compared to central government. The next section presents how accountability 
and public entrepreneurship were operationalized and their respective 
descriptive statistics. 
 
6.4.2 Behavioural Patterns     
 
Two indices were constructed in order to explore changes in accountability and 
public entrepreneurship following the respective definition and dimensions 
mentioned earlier. The data for both indices come from five local government 
surveys carried out in 1995, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009 and from yearly 
financial data from SIMBAD database. 
 
Due to missing data, the entrepreneurship index only includes three 
observations over time for the years 2000, 2002 and 2009, whereas the 
accountability index includes five observations over time for the years 1995, 
2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009.  
 
The indices are composed from a set of indicator variables found in the 
government surveys and financial data. Some of these indicators are closed-
ended questions with two possible scores (for instance, yes/no). In these cases, 
the indicator is classified into good or poor performance where good 
performance takes a value of 2 and poor performance takes the value of 1. 
 
In contrast, some indicators, from both financial data and the survey data, are 
continuous. Therefore, they can take an intermediate score. The scores are 
classified into good (given a value of 2), moderate (a value of 1) or poor 
performance (a value of 0).  All indicators from the financial data are continuous 
and are again allocated to one of three levels.  Thus, the indicators included in 
the indices are scored to give a maximum value of 2 and a minimum of 0.  
 
The limits for the variables with three levels are set based on mean values of all 
time observations. For instance, the indicator Investment outside Municipal Seat 
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(from surveys) is continuous- the percentage of households covered by local 
public services in the municipal seat. The mean value for the year 1995 is 51%, 
for 2000, 58%; for 2002, 58%; for 2004, 57% and for 2009, 43%. In this case, 
58% in the year 2002 is the highest mean value over these five years. Then, 
58% is set as the upper bound limit for moderate performance.  
 
The lower bound for moderate performance is the average of all means. 
Following with the same example, the average of all means (per year) is 
calculated and divided into five (51%+58%+58+57%+42%/5= 53%). This is set 
as the lower bound for moderate performance. In this case, the lower bound 
limit is 53%.  Then, the value of 0, 1 or 2 is assigned for each one of the years 
for each municipality. Municipalities that have coverage of Other Basic Public 
Services between 53 to 58% are categorized as moderate performers (1), more 
than 58% represents good performers (2) and less than 53% poor performers 
(0). 
 
It is important to highlight that this approach was chosen so that the scores that 
each municipality achieves measure relative performance for this particular 
(rural) group of municipalities. This gives a more realistic picture of what can be 
achieved and how well or badly rural local governments are performing in each 
index. The selection of some variables and the way in which the variables were 
computed is derived from the work of Carrera et al. (2010) of Red de 
Investigadores en Gobiernos Locales Mexicanos (IGLOM) (Network of 
researchers in Mexican Local Governments). 27  
 
The different measures are summed across categories to provide an overall, 
single composite index score, treated as a continuous variable, for each 
municipality in the sample. It was decided to analyse a composite index rather 
than to assess individual variables for two reasons. First- a composite measure 
was used because in this way it is possible to summarize and capture multi-
dimensional and complex concepts in a simple manner. In contrast, the analysis 
of single variables would yield insufficient information to get the big picture. The 
                                                          
27
 Carrera et al. (2010) were working on an index for institutional development and municipal 
sustainability. Their approach is used to measure some indicators. The indices also share some indicators.  
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use of composite scores will allow the analysis of the situation in a particular 
municipality as it stands in comparison to others as well as observed progress 
over time and highlight the cases where a case study could be valuable.  This 
follows the strategy of my research design. Second- secondary databases are 
used. Therefore, there are limitations in regard to the number and types of 
indicators available. For instance, in the survey databases some relevant 
indicators are measured at categorical and interval levels.  Thus, it makes more 
sense to convert continuous variables into interval variables. Then, unweighted 
composite scores are calculated in order to convert the scale scores to a 
continuous measurement scale. This allows running parametric statistics and 




This research defines accountability as the virtues of local authorities to behave 
according to citizens‟ expectations improving efficiency. As discussed in Section 
3.1.1- Accountability concept and evolution- the concept of accountability is 
ever expanding and multi-dimensional. Therefore, it is necessary to define and 
delimit the concept. Following the discussion in Section 3.1.1, this research 
adopts Koppell‟s (2005) accountability dimensions, transparency, 
responsiveness and responsibility.  
 
Different indicators were used as proxies for each dimension. The study does 
not intend to measure each dimension. Instead, it seeks to include relevant 
measures that describe each dimension. The scores were derived for each 
indicator, and then, summed across all categories to provide an overall, single 
accountability index score for each municipality in the sample. After the total 
score was derived, the total score was averaged out.  
 
1. Transparency. This dimension responds to the question: did the 
organization reveal the facts of its performance? (cited in Koppell, 2005, 96). 
Adapting this question to this research and data availability, transparency is 
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measured by the level of openness to citizens‟ involvement in public affairs 
and clear regulatory methods. Two indicators are used: 
 
a) Promotion of citizens‘ participation 
 
Source: The information for this variable is from local government surveys from 
1995, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009.  
 
The new public administration doctrines call for citizens‟ involvement in 
decision-making (Osborn and Gaeber, 1992; Huther and Shah, 1998). This is 
considered critical to developing relevant local public policies. In addition, the 
decentralisation theory contemplates citizens‟ participation as a means to 
collect accurate information about needs and preferences. Citizens‟ 
participation is the influence of collective organisation in allocation decisions for 
the collectivity. Citizens‟ participation in local public affairs should be a 
permanent commitment by local authorities. Therefore, local governments 
should have in place a system where citizens from different groups and 
ideologies may express their voice. This indicator denotes a permanent attempt 
rather than a single measure of participation during political campaigns by 
casting votes (electoral turnout), which might be another indicator used to 
denote participation. Hence, local authorities should implement mechanisms to 
open up to citizens‟ voices and involvement. This indicator denotes the action to 
actively engage political stakeholders in decision-making.  
 
The indicator is a binary variable and comes from the local government surveys. 
It responds to the question whether the municipality has a mechanism that 
promotes citizens‟ participation (Yes/No). Values are assigned for this indicator. 
An affirmative answer is considered as a good performance (2) and a negative 




Source: The information for this variable is from local government surveys from 
1995, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009.  
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Local governments in Mexico have the constitutional right to issue regulations 
related to their activities. A regulation issued in the local governments not only 
enables higher government levels to inspect and verify local activities, it also 
establishes procedures and processes that limit political preferences and 
embezzlement. Hence, although this indicator is a rough measure, local 
authorities that advance in issuing local regulations are to some extent 
implementing a system of transparency because they are formalising 
procedures and processes. This will reduce bureaucratic discretion.   
 
In the survey, the question for this indicator asks local authorities to tick (from a 
list) the regulations that the municipality has in place. With this information a 
ratio was constructed between the number of regulations the municipality has in 
place and the total number of regulations listed in the survey. Each survey lists 
a different number of regulations. Therefore, the variable is survey specific. 
 
In addition, the indicators of each time period were converted into interval 
variable with three performance levels- good, moderate and poor performance.  
 
For this particular variable, the interval levels limits were selected in an intuitive 
way. The reason being that the indicator for this variable, as mentioned above, 
contains a different number of regulations in each survey (for instance, in 1995 
the list consisted of 15 regulations and in the survey 2009 of 31 regulations). In 
addition, once the regulations are legislated they are likely to be in place for a 
couple of administrations, or even permanent.  
 
As shown in Table 6.3, the mean for the number of regulations in 1995 was 
around 30%; therefore, the average was expected to increase overtime. A value 
of 0 was assigned to those municipalities with less than 30% of regulations; a 
value of 1 was assigned to those municipalities with an average regulation 
between 31% and 69% and a value of 2 to those municipalities with an average 
equal or higher than 70%. They were not divided equally because the number 
of regulations in survey 2009 includes some regulations that are not 
immediately relevant, in particular for this group of municipalities. Table  6.4 
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presents detailed information of the interval levels used as well as the survey 
questions used to elaborate the indicator.   
 
2. Responsiveness: This dimension responds to the question: Did the 
organization fulfil the substantive expectation demand/need)?  (cited in 
Koppell, 2005, 96). Adapting this question to this research and data 
availability, the dimension of responsiveness indicates how local authorities 
act according to citizens‟ demands and needs in regard to fairer allocation of 
resources. The indicators used to denote the level of responsiveness are:   
 
a) Fair distribution of resources  (two indicators: Investment inside municipal 
seat and Investment outside municipal seat) 
 
Source: The information for these two indicators are from local government 
surveys 1995, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009.  
 
In Mexico, municipalities are entitled to the conditional Municipal Social 
Development Fund (FAISM). This conditional mandatory fund is earmarked for 
basic public services as a general expenditure. However, this does not mean 
that public services investment is entirely limited to this fund. In this conditional 
mandatory fund, there are no detailed rules for the distribution of resources 
within the municipality. It is earmarked for general expenditure in public 
services. Therefore, discretion in allocation gives the authorities the opportunity 
to redistribute the resources more efficiently.   
 
The evidence suggests that at present the allocation of resources tends to be 
higher in the municipal seat or town28 due to electoral incentives (see 
Hernandez and Jarillo, 2007). The municipal seats have the highest number of 
votes in local election and mayors may invest proportionally more there in order 
to keep the citizens‟ sympathy for their parties, compared to the more scattered 
and less populated areas. Other possible explanation could be that a municipal 
seat expands at a high rate therefore, higher investment is needed. 
 
                                                          
28
 The municipal seat is the area where the local government bodies are located.  
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Hence, looking at investment patterns, and distribution of resources for a variety 
of purposes, is a way of examining whether allocation of resources between the 
municipal seat and outside the municipal seat follows the accountability 
expectation of fairness. Considering that basic public services are a priority in 
these municipalities and that most funds in rural municipalities are still directed 
to investment in basic public services, it makes sense to look at patterns of 
investment in different key public services.  
 
In the survey, the question for this indicator requires local authorities to indicate 
the percentage of coverage of each public service listed for both the municipal 
seat and for all villages outside the municipal seat. These indicators are not 
completely accurate because local authorities are asked to give an estimate 
percentage. However, there is no reason to suggest that the levels of accuracy 
are systematically different across surveys.  
 
For this analysis, all basic public services, with the exception of water and 
sewage, were used. The average coverage of key public services was 
calculated for each, both for (a) municipal seat (Investment inside the municipal 
seat) and (b) outside the municipal seat (Investment outside the municipal 
seat).  These averages were then combined to create an „investment‟ indicator.  
Water and sewage are excluded from this part of the analysis in order to hold 
back some data for use as dependent „government performance‟ variable in 
later statistical models. In some of these, one of the dependent variables 
includes water and sewage measures.  
 
Thus, the indicators Investment inside Municipal Seat (IIMS) and Investment 
outside Municipal Seat (IOMS) are based on the combined averages of the 
following services:  street lighting, public safety, traffic, street cleaning, and 
garbage collection inside the municipal seat. The indicators of each time period 
for both variables were transformed to interval variables with three levels of 
performance: good, moderate and poor performance. The complete rural 
government dataset was used for these calculations. It should be emphasised 
that the aim of these indicators is to explore both changes in public service 
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investment, and also fair distribution of resources: i.e. whether the changes 
occur inside and outside the municipal seat.   
 
The highest mean score in the five years under study for Investment inside the 
municipal seat was 58% and the average of all five means was 53% (see Table 
6.3). Therefore, the value of 2 was assigned to municipalities with average of 
basic public services equal to or higher than 59%. The value of 1 was assigned 
to municipalities with average of basic public services between 53% and 58% 
and a value of 0 to municipalities with average of basic public services equal to 
or less than 52%.  
 
The highest mean score in the (five) time periods for Investment outside the 
municipal seat was 43% and the average of all five means was 33% (see Table 
6.3). Therefore, the value of 2 was assigned to municipalities with average of 
other basic public services equal to or higher than 44%. The value of 1 was 
assigned to municipalities with average of other basic public services between 
33% and 43% and a value of 0 to municipalities with average of basic public 
services equal to or less than 32%. The Average increase in other basic public 
services reflects the increase in investment in these public services. As stated 
above, the aim of these indicators is not only to take into account the change in 
services, but also the fair distribution of resources in and outside the municipal 
seat. This is the reason two separate indicators have been calculated.  
 
Thus, a municipality acting in a fair manner is expected to increase the 
investment in basic public services and to do so in both the municipal seat and 
outside the municipal seat. A fair and responsive municipality can get a 
maximum score of 4 in the variable Fair Distribution of Resources and 
therefore, in the Responsiveness Dimension (maximum score of 2 for IIMS plus 
a score of 2 for IOMS).  A less fair municipality can get a maximum score of 3 (2 
for IIMS and 1 for IOMS, or vice versa) and a municipality with unfair 
redistributive actions might typically get a total of 2 (2 for IIMS and 0 for IOMS 
outside the municipal seat, or vice versa).  
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3. Responsibility: This dimension responds to the question: Did the 
organization follow the rules? (cited in Koppell, 2005, 96). Since this 
research is more concerned with financial rules and regulations and on the 
basis of data availability, the dimension of responsibility indicates how local 
authorities allocate administrative spending (current spending) and public 
work investment. 
 
a) Administrative spending level  
 
The information for this variable is from SIMBAD database from 1990 to 2009. 
 
This indicator is aimed at evaluating the effort of local authorities to avoid 
overspending in administrative costs, mainly in accounts related to 
administrative expenses, travel allowance and similar financial records.  This 
indicates local mayors‟ commitment toward efficiency in financial management 
and it represents better financial compliance. Better financial compliance might 
result in better allocative efficiency and productive efficiency.     
 
The financial data are grouped into revenues and expenditures and the 
expenditures classified into different categories.29  In the database, all monetary 
values are expressed in nominal pesos.  
 
From this information, the administrative spending was calculated using only the 
category „personal service‟, which is a critical spending category.  This includes 
spending in remunerations. The percentage the administrative spending 
represented was calculated from the total expenditures for each year and then, 
the average score for each time period was computed using the years between 
surveys. As follows:  
 
Indicator for year 1995- Average of the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 
Indicator for year 2000- Average of the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 
Indicator for year 2002- Average of the years 2001 and 2002 
                                                          
29 Expenditures is classified into personal services; materials and supplies; transfers, assignments, grants and other 
allowances; movable, immovable and intangible property; public investment; financial Investment and other 
provisions; other expenses; public debt. 
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Indicator for year 2004- Average of the years 2003 and 2004 
Indicator for year 2009- Average of the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 
200930 
 
Thus, the indicator is measured as the ratio between the average in 
administrative spending accounts and total expenditures between surveys‟ time 
periods.  
 
Once the indicator was calculated, the indicators of each time period were 
converted to interval variables with three levels of performance: good, moderate 
and poor performance but in particular for this indicator, the data was reversed.  
Thus a high score for this indicator represents a poor performance. 
 
The highest mean score in the (five) time periods for administrative spending 
was 25%. Therefore, the value of 0 was assigned to municipalities with an 
average administrative spending of 25% or more; the average of all (five) 
means was 21% (see table 8.2). The value of 1 was assigned to municipalities 
with an average administrative spending between 24% and 21% and the value 
of 2 was assigned to those municipalities with an average administrative 
spending of 20% or less. Table  6.4 presents more detailed information.  
 
b) Public works investment 
The information for this variable is from SIMBAD database from 1990 to 2009. 
 
Similar to the previous indicator, public works investment illustrates the local 
authorities‟ commitment to financial compliance. Even though decentralization is 
aimed at enhancing the quality of public services, this is not always the case. 
Some studies have even warned about reduced provision of services either by 
reducing efficiency or due to the loss of accountability (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; 
                                                          
30 This variable was computed using average between surveys’‎time‎periods‎for‎instance‎an‎average‎between‎years‎
1991 to 1995 is the value of the indicator for year 1995 and the average from year 1996 to 2000 is the value for the 
indicator 2000.  In 1995 and 2000, surveys of local governments were carried out and these surveys were used to 
build the indices. Therefore,  in order to smoth out the value of the indicators considering that the number of years 
between surveys is not equal, it was decided to average the indicators.    
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Woller and Phillips, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 1998; Sow and Razafimahefa, 2015). 
Public service investment is considered  vital for economic growth and human 
development. Therefore, local government should devote a high proportion of 
its resource to this account- even beyond the earnmarked funds for this line 
item.  
 
As in the indicator for administrative spending, the financial data for public work 
investment is expressed in nominal pesos in the database.  
 
From the financial data, the expenditure category called public work investment 
was selected. This spending is aimed at building up infrastructure through 
public works that contribute to the formation of capital. 
 
The percentage of total spending represented by public works investment was 
calculated, with the average score for each time period computed from the 
individual years between the surveys. The same logic is used for calculation as 
for administrative spending.  
 
Thus, this indicator is measured as the ratio between the average public works 
investment and total expenditure between surveys‟ time periods. The higher the 
percentage invested in this account, the better the performance of the 
municipality. This indicator has three performance level- good, moderate and 
poor performance.   
 
The highest mean score in the (five) time periods for public work investment 
was 43%. Therefore, the value of 2 was assigned to municipalities with an 
average public work investment equal to or higher than 44%; the average of all 
(five) means was 33%. Then, the value of 1 was assigned to municipalities with 
an average public work investment between 33% and 43% and the value of 0 
was assigned to those municipalities with an average public work investment 
equal to or lower than 32%.  
 
All indicators are added and divided by the number of variables.  12 is the 
higher score and divided by 6 variables equals 2, which is the highest score 
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(see Table 6.3 below). The indicator takes a value between 0 to 231 and it is 
treated as a continous variable. The index is based from 0 to 2 because it is 
easier to interpret by following the same logic of poor/moderate/good 
performance used during the index elaboration.  
                                                          
31
 The values that the indicator can take are the following: .0167, .333, .500, .667, .833, 1, 1.17, 1.33, 
1.50, 1.67, 1.83, 2.  
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Table  6.3 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Variables used as indicators in the Accountability Index 
 
 
Note: The mean value denotes the average percentage of the financial indicator over total expenditures. The grey highighted cells are the figures used 
to assign the interval level “moderate performance”.  
 
 
Table 8.2 continues on the following page…. 
 
. 
Period REGULATIONS FAIR DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES IN OTHER PUBLIC SERVICE  
  INVESTMENT INSIDE MUNICIPAL SEAT INVESTMENT OUTSIDE MUNICIPAL SEAT 
 N Min. Max. Mean SD 
 
N Min. Max. Mean SD 
 
N Min. Max. Mean SD 
 
1990-1995 720 0.0 .78 0.274 .184 720 .000 0.969 0.508 0.169 720 .00 0.75 0.247 0.15 
1996-2000 
722 0.0 1.00 0.364 .240 720 .000 1.000 
0.575 
(58%) 
0.180 720 .00 0.90 0.348 0.18 
2001-2002 
722 0.0 1.00 0.414 .235 720 .009 0.995 
0.575 
(58%) 
0.202 720 .00 0.95 0.341 0.19 
2003-2004 723 0.0 .94 0.369 .259 720 .000 1.000 0.566 0.196 720 .00 1.00 0.386 0.20 
2005-2009 




Average of all  
means 
   N/A     Average 





    0.332 
(33%) 
 






Note: The mean value denotes the average percentage of the financial indicator over total expenditures. The grey highighted cells are the 
figures used to assign the interval level “moderate performance”. 
 
 
Period ADMINISTRATIVE SPENDING LEVEL PUBLIC WORK INVESTMENT 




Max.  Mean SD 
 
1990-1995 723 .00 0.70 0.292 0.132 723 .00 0.64 0.255 0.109 
1996-2000 724 .00 0.66 0.257 0.094 724 .00 0.58 0.182 0.101 
2001-2002 724 .00 0.66 0.225 0.105 724 .00 0.74 0.326 (33%) 0.145 
2003-2004 724 .00 0.69 0.256 0.114 724 .00 0.78 0.319 0.159 
2005-2009 724 .00 0.58 0.212 (21%) 0.109 724 .00 0.73 0.308 0.144 
Average of all  means    0.248 (25%)     0.278 (28%)  
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Table  6.4 Accountability Indicator  
Column 1  shows the dimensions of the index; Column 2 lists the variables used to measure each 
dimension; Column 3 describes how the variables are measured. In the case of survey question, the 
question as it is presented in the survey and how the question is answered are both shown. In the case 
of financial data, it indicates how the indicator was calculated; Column 4 presents the years that the 
surveys were carried out and the question number (the subsections are in  brackets) from where the 


























SURVEY YEAR Values and 
Ranges:  
G= Good; 
M= Moderate;  
P= Poor 















Is there an area that 
promotes citizens‟ 










Yes= 2 (G)  
 No= 0 (P) 
Regulation Number of 
regulations available 
in the local 
government 
36 63 8 10 32 2= ≥ .70 (G)  
1= .31 -.69 (M) 

























by  a number of 
different local public 
services (street 
lighting, public safety, 
traffic, street 
cleaning, garbage 
collection) inside and 
















2 ≥ .59% (G) 
1= 53-58% (M) 
0= ≤ 52% (P) 










2= ≥ 44% (G) 
1= 33-43% (M) 

















spending over total 
expenditures  
YEARLY INFORMATION TAKEN FROM 
FINANCIAL DATABASE (SIMBAD  
DATABASE) 
2= ≤ 22% 
(Minimum mean 
from 1990 to 
2009) (G) 
1= 25 – 21% 
(Mean from 
1990 to 2009) 
(M) 
0=  ≥ 26 % (P) 
Public work 
investment 
Percentage of public 
work investment over  
total expenditures  
YEARLY INFORMATION TAKEN FROM 
FINANCIAL DATABASE (SIMBAD 
DATABASE) 
2= ≥ 33% 
(Maximum 
mean from 
1990 to 2009) 
(G) 
1= 28 – 32% 
(Mean from 
1990 to 2009) 
(M) 
0= ≤ 27% (P) 
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Next, descriptive statistics for the variable accountability are presented.   
 
The accountability index is, as explained earlier, composed of five indicators 
which include: level of regulation, fair distribution of resources (investment 
inside the municipal seat and investment outside the municipal seat), 
administrative spending level and public work investment. There are five time 
periods for every municipality: 1995, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009. Unfortunately, 
there is no information in between these years for some variables. Therefore, 
this study is limited to these five time periods and the analysis based on five 
indices. As shown in Table 6.5, the average value of the accountability index for 
this group of municipalities has increased from 1995 to 2009. In 1995, the 
average index was .616 and by 2009, it turned to 1.07 out of the maximum 
value of 2. The changes are expected to be small.  Although desirable, good 
performance in public institutions is not attainable by single policy instruments. 
So, if it had been very large, it would not have been credible. However, it gives 
room for examining in detail whether the data are consistent with the 
hypotheses regarding how fiscal decentralisation or, otherwise, political 
competition will affect such patterns.  






















Accountability index 1990 505 0 1.83 0.616 0.364 -.453 *** 0.022 
Accountability index 2000 505 0 1.83 0.733 0.416   
  
Accountability index 2002 505 0 2.00 0.922 0.378     
Accountability index 2004 505 0 1.83 0.868 0.400     
Accountability index 2009 505 0.08 1 1.07 0.320 Case base   
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The change on accountability index from 1995 to 2009 is statistically significant 
in the predicted direction, r (505) = -.453, SE= .022, p<.001 (see Table 6.5). 
 
Turning to individual indicators within the accountability index (see Table 6.6), 
the level of regulation has improved moderately over time. In 1995, only .3% of 
municipalities were categorized as good performers because of the number of 
regulations in place. The number of municipalities with good performance 
increased to 12% by 2009. There are a considerably higher number of 
municipalities with moderate performance in this indicator. It needs to be 
noticed that the number of regulations listed in the surveys has increased 
considerably since the first survey. Therefore, the changes in good performance 
are substantial.   
 
The level of promotion of citizens‟ participation has not progressed in this group 
of municipalities but rather slightly decreased. In 1995, 37% of rural local 
governments had a formal mechanism and by 2009 only 22%.  An explanation 
could be that this group of municipalities already have high levels of 
participation regardless of the formal mechanisms implemented for citizens‟ 
participation. In this sense, formal mechanisms are not considered necessary. 
An alternative explanation is that the formal mechanisms of citizens‟ 
participation introduced with conditional funds- which are highly regulated by 
higher government levels (called citizens‟ committees) may have replaced other 
formal local mechanisms such as a department for promotion of citizens‟ 
participation. However, it could also be the case that the lack of formal 
mechanism is part of a tactic to avoid inclusion of citizens that did not support 
the mayor/winning party during election and this may have become more 
common with the rise of political competition.  
 
The variable Fair Distribution of Resources (FDR, for short) measures how 
investment in specified basic public services has been distributed in urban 
areas and the distribution of investment in basic public services in the villages. 
Results of the individual components show the changes in coverage for the 
services involved (street lighting, public safety, traffic, and street cleaning and 
garbage collection) and both indicators together indicate whether the 
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municipality has distributed the resources fairly in and outside the municipal 
seat. The number of municipal seats with good performance in investment has 
increased from an average of 37% in 1995 to 77% in 2009. Only in 2004 did the 
average step back from its incremental change. The number of localities outside 
the municipal seat with good performance in investment increased steadily from 
11% to 55.4%. In most cases, there is a progressively higher number of 
municipalities with moderate performance rather than poor performance, 
particularly investment outside the municipal seat. Once both indicators are 
added together in the index of accountability, then the variable FDR presents a 
considerable change in the pattern of investment. As shown in Table 6.7, the 
number of municipalities with the highest performance score (4) has increased 
progressively and highly from 8.2% in 1995 to 50% in 2009. However, it is 
important to notice that this information is not completely accurate because 
local authorities provide only estimated percentages.    
 
The number of municipalities with good performance in administrative spending 
changed from 36% in 1995 to 41% in 2000. The average increased to 51% by 
2002 but then decreased to 40% in 2004. From 2004 onwards the numbers of 
municipalities with good performance in administrative spending increased 
again from 40% to 54%. The number of municipalities with moderate 
performance is low and stable. This suggests that there is a strong change from 
one period to another.  
 
The number of municipalities with a good performance level in public work 
investment increased substantially from 25% in 1995 to 43% in 2009. It 
progressively increased with the exception of 2000. This is rather surprising as 
this is immediately after the reform, which by definition increased public work 
investment. However, given that this is not a large difference, it is plausible that 
this reflects the fact that the largest increase in conditional mandatory funds 
occurred after 2000 (refer back to Figure 6.1). 
 
Even though overall, the accountability index has increased, individual 
indicators present important insights in regard to specific aspects of the 
accountability dimension. It suggests that fiscal decentralisation might improve 
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some aspects and deteriorate others. The transparency dimension has 
improved but only in regard to formal mechanisms that seek to legitimize local 
authorities‟ work such as regulations. However, it seems to be less effective in 
the inclusion of citizens for decision-making.  The dimension of responsiveness 
has improved the most. This is highly related to the fiscal decentralisation 
reform because it represents the benefits of responding to citizens‟ wellbeing.  
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Table  6.6 Descriptive Statistics of Accountability Indicators  
Year Value  
Regulations  
Promotion of citizens' 
participation 
Other Basic Public 
Services in the 
municipal seat 
Other Basic Public 






F % F % F % F % F % F % 
1995 
0 490 68 454 63 376 52 545 76 427 59 436 60 
1 228 312   
 
78 11 92 13 35 5 107 15 
2 2 0.3 266 37 266 37 83 11 258 36 177 25 
Valid 
number   720 100 719 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 
2000 
0 400 56 486 67 261 36 381 53 368 51 594 82 
1 277 38     68 9 126 17 60 8 49 7 
2 43 43 234 33 391 54 213 30 292 41 77 11 
Valid 
number   720 137 720 100 720 99 720 100 720 100 720 100 
2002 
0 306 43 486 68 264 37 377 52 306 42 270 38 
1 333 46     73 10 124 17 45 6 94 13 
2 81 11 234 32 383 53 219 31 369 51 356 49 
Valid 
number   720 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 
2004 
0 362 50 572 79 241 33 301 42 389 54 280 39 
1 305 42     91 13 142 20 45 6 81 11 
2 53 8 148 21 388 54 277 38 286 40 359 50 
Valid 
number   720 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 
2009 
0 472 66 563 78 121 17 3 0.4 296 41 311 43 
1 158 22     44 6 318 44.2 39 5 99 14 
2 90 12 155 22 555 77 399 55.4 385 54 310 43 
valid 
number   720 100 718 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 720 100 
(Y= Survey year; P= Performance; 0= Poor; 1= Moderate; 2=Good; F=Frequency)  
This table shows the number of municipalities in each performance bound (poor/moderate/good) per year and the equivalent percentage it represents 
from the total sample. 
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Table  6.7 Descriptive Statistics of Fair Distribution of Resources  
 
Survey year 
Combined scores of 
Investment Inside of 





Number of Municipalities % 
1995 0 = Poorest performance 331 46.0 
1 91 12.6 
2 176 24.4 
3 63 8.8 
4=  Highest Performance 59 8.2 
Number valid 720 100.0 
2000 0 = Poorest performance 212 29.4 
1 66 9.2 
2 169 23.5 
3 94 13.1 
4=  Highest Performance 179 24.9 
Number valid 720 100.0 
2002 0 = Poorest performance 215 29.9 
1 78 10.8 
2 148 20.6 
3 89 12.4 
4=  Highest Performance 190 26.4 
Number valid 720 100.0 
2004 0= Poorest performance 165 22.9 
1 83 11.5 
2 154 21.4 
3 100 13.9 
4=  Highest Performance 218 30.3 
Number valid 720 100.0 
2009 0= Poorest performance 1 .1 
1 95 13.2 
2 57 7.9 
3 207 28.8 
4=  Highest Performance 360 50.0 
This table shows the total performance in the indicator Fair Distribution of Resources per year 
and the equivalent percentage it represents from the total sample. 
 
6.4.2.2  Public entrepreneurship  
 
This research defines public entrepreneurship as the behaviour of a public 
entrepreneur to act in a way that improves efficiency. The concept is defined 
based on three dimensions: risk taking, innovativeness and pro-activeness. 
However, it is not the intention of this research to evaluate each single 
dimension.  
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It is a challenge to measure abstract concepts such as public entrepreneurship. 
Its accuracy is debatable, but it is the only available means of understanding the 
general changes in a summarised way.  Moreover, it is useful in order to 
explore general trends as well as identifying specific cases.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, if public entrepreneurship is not easily 
defined in the academic debate, it is also difficult in the field work. In addition, 
secondary data analysis presents its limitations. In this case, the database 
available only provides information about administrative and financial actions.  
 
Keeping in mind these issues, during the pilot study participants were asked to 
identify and explain an entrepreneurial action (for details about the pilot study 
see Section 5.3). Based on their accounts, three types of entrepreneurial 
actions were identified which were of potential importance to improving local 
government performance, and which were also potentially measurable:  
 
1. Co-operation: The use of co-operation to minimise costs for local 
projects. 
 
2. Grant-application facilitation: Local government can assist and 
participate actively with local groups who are eligible for funds 
granted by the state or federal government directly for a specific 
sector. This activity requires resources (money). 
 
3. Win-win Negotiation: Local government can negotiate with groups 
and communities for sharing costs for focused projects. Again this 
requires resources. 
 
These entrepreneurial actions helped to operationalize the concept of 
entrepreneurship. However, it is important to point out that the dimensions, risk 
taking, innovativeness and pro-activeness are not mutually exclusive and that 
the actions identified as entrepreneurial do not stand in a one-to-one 
relationship with the three dimensions either. On the contrary, the three types of 
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entrepreneurial action identified in the pilot can involve either all or only some of 
the dimensions. The types of entrepreneurial actions are not one-dimensional, 
but multi-dimensional. Given data limitations, it is thus not possible to separate 
and analyse each dimension independently. General trends can, however, be 
identified. 
 
Hence, the operationalization of the concept of public entrepreneurship in rural 
local governments was based on the definitions selected earlier- the behaviour 
of a public entrepreneur to co-operate with private, public and social bodies in a 
way that improves efficiency. Based on this operationalized concept and the 
three entrepreneurial actions identified in the pilot study, three indicators from 
local government surveys were selected. These indicators map onto a specific 
entrepreneurial action identified above.   
 
a) Co-operation with public organisations and public service associations 
(two indicators)  
 
The information for these two variables is from local government surveys 2000, 
2002, 2009. 
 
These indicators denote whether local governments have undertaken actions 
that involve co-operation under the assumption that these actions aim at 
minimizing cost. These indicators correspond to the first type of entrepreneurial 
action, co-operation.   
 
Moret (2008) explains that the decentralisation process has sometimes 
encouraged association of municipalities as a way to foster regional 
development because the delegation of public service provision to local 
governments transferred functions of economic and social development to 
municipalities. In addition, they contribute to governance because local actors 
collaborate in order to solve a common problem. They go beyond public service 
provision to promotion of local development through co-operation with different 
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actors.  In Bolivia, many rural municipalities have been associated in order to 
improve roads, health centres and education (Moret, 2008, 9). 
 
Engaging in co-operation as to provide public services or other sorts of projects 
with other municipalities requires political willingness. This is not a statutory 
requirement. Therefore, local authorities‟ commitment to do so envisages an 
entrepreneurial action.  
 
These indicators are constructed using the following questions from surveys 
carried out in local governments: 
 
Has the local government been associated with other local governments with a 
specific end? 
Is the local government associated with other institutions to provide local public 
services? 
 
Each question has only a Yes or No answer. A value of 2 was assigned to local 
governments that responded “Yes” to the question and those that responded 
“No” were assigned a value of 0. Hence, the maximum score is 2. See Table 
6.8 below for more details.  
 
b) Financial autonomy (two indicators) 
 
These indicators represent the effort of local governments to obtain “own 
revenues”, which can potentially be used for obtaining more federal and state 
grants as well as undertaking focused projects, often in collaboration with other 
groups, that otherwise cannot be financed through conditional grants. Levels of 
fiscal effort are important in determining whether or not a municipality can 
undertake these and serve as indicators of whether it is entrepreneurial. 
 
As discussed earlier, fiscal decentralisation entitles local governments to more 
money and spending discretion; but leaves them highly dependent on central 
government. Hence, there is room for local authorities to rely on both 
conditional mandatory funds and unconditional funds and discourage fiscal 
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effort. However, if they want to be entrepreneurial with respect to the second 
and third type of entrepreneurial actions, grant application facilitation and 
win-win negotiation, they will need to raise and call on „own revenues‟. 
 Property tax update 
 
Source: The information for this variable is from local government surveys 2000, 
2002, 2009. 
 
Updates in property tax take effort and money. The effort is  not often 
comparable with the money raised throught property tax. As a consequence, 
rural local governments do not update property tax registers regularly. Updating 
the property tax can increase the level of own revenue collection. Therefore, it is 
an opportunity to collect higher revenues.    
 
Each survey presents the answers for these questions in a slightly different  
format. The question is:  
 
 Has the land value on which the property tax is based been updated in the last 
– two/three years?  Or when was the land value updated?  
 
If the land value has been updated in the last three years, which is the period 
for a local government, a value of 2 was assigned. Otherwise, it takes the value 
of 0.   
 
 Fiscal effort  
 
The information for this variable is from SIMBAD database from 1995 to 2009.  
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The financial data is grouped into revenues and expenditures and the revenues 
are classified into different categories.32 All monetary values in the database are 
expressed in nominal pesos.   
 
From the revenue information, the variable fiscal effort was calculated by adding 
up taxes, user charges (contribuciones de mejora), duties (derechos)33, product 
(producto), and exploitation (aprovechamientos). This includes the revenues 
collected and administered by local governments. Then, how much percentage 
their own revenues represented from the total expenditures for each year was 
calculated and then, the average score for each time period was computed 
using the years between surveys. As follows:  
 
Indicator for year 2000- Average of the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 
Indicator for year 2002- Average of the years 2001 and 2002 
Indicator for year 2009- Average of the years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008 and 200934 
 
Thus, the indicator is measured as the ratio between the average in own 
revenues and total expenditures between time periods of the surveys. A high 
percentage indicates high levels of fiscal effort. Once the indicator was 
calculated, the indicators of each time period were converted to interval 
variables with three levels of performance: good, moderate and poor.   
 
The highest mean score in the (three) time periods for fiscal effort was 15%. 
Therefore, the value of 2 was assigned to municipalities with an average fiscal 
effort of 16% or more; the average of all (three) means was 9%. The value of 1 
was assigned to municipalities with an average fiscal effort between 9% and 
15% and the value of 0 was assigned to those municipalities with an average 
fiscal effort of 8% or less. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 present more detailed information.  
 
                                                          
32
 Taxes, fees, user charges (contribuciones de mejora), duties (derechos), product (producto), 
exploitation (aprovechamientos), unconditional funds, conditional funds, other income, financing.  
33
 The literal translation‎ of‎ “derechos”‎ is‎ “rights”‎ but‎ in‎ the‎ fiscal‎ context,‎ derechos are related to 
payment of duties due to use of public land.  
34
 As for the index of accountability, this variable was computed using an average between surveys’‎time‎periods‎
in order to smooth out the averages considering that the number of years between surveys is not equal.  
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All indicators are added and divided by the number of variables (3). The 
indicator takes a value ranging fom 0 to 235 and it is treated as a continous 
variable.  
 
Table  6.8 Descriptive Statistics of the financial variable used as an indicator in the 
Public Entrepreneurship Index 
 
Note: The mean value denotes the average percentage of the financial indicator over 
total expenditures. The grey highighted cells are the figures used to assign the interval 















                                                          
35
The values that the indicator can take are the following: .25, .50, .75, 1, 1.25, 1.50, 1.75,  2. According 
to Rhemtulla et al. (2012) five to seven categories can be treated as continuous variables and yield 
acceptable performance.  
 
Period FISCAL EFFORT 
 N Min. Max. Mean SD 
 
1990-1995 721 .00 .53 .146 (15%) .109 
1996-2000 722 .00 .39 .081 .067 
2001-2002 706 .00 .48 .071 .074 
2003-2004 712 .00 .61 .060 .063 
2005-2009 715 .00 .45 .064 .069 
Average of all  
means 
   .085 (9%)  
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Table  6.9 Public Entrepreneurship Indicators 
 
This table presents detailed information of the indicators used.  Column 1  shows the dimensions which in this case are 
not separated; Column 2 lists the indicators used to measure each dimension; Column 3 presents how the variables are 
measured. In the case of the survey questions, the questions are shown as presented in the survey and how the 
questions are answered. In the case of financial data, it indicates how the indicator was calculated; Column 4 presents 
the years that the surveys were carried out and the question number (the subsections are in brackets) from where the 
question derived; and column 5 shows the values and ranges for each indicator. 
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Next, descriptive statistics for the variable public entrepreneurship are 
presented.   
 
The public entrepreneurship index has four component indicators. There are 
only three observations (2000, 2002 and 2009). Data from the surveys in 1995 
and 2004 were not included because of a large amount of missing data for 
these specific variables. As described above, the index consists of four 
indicators: property tax update, fiscal effort, public service association and co-
operation with public organisations. The public entrepreneurship index also 
shows a steady increase but to a lesser extent than the accountability index. As 
shown in Table 6.10, the mean increased slightly from .709 in 2000 to .912 out 
of 2 in 2009. This is consistent with the reasoning that accountability and public 
entrepreneurship have distinct behaviour. 
 
Table  6.10 Descriptive Statistics and Statistical Significance Change in Public 
Entrepreneurship Index 















            
Intercept   











.25 1.75 .823 .321 





.25 1.75 .912 .451 
 Case base   
Valid N (listwise) 50
5 
        
  
  
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05 
 
The changes on entrepreneurship index from 2000 to 2009 is statistically 
significant, r (505) = -.203, SE= .023, p<.001.  
 
Entrepreneurship indicators denote, as discussed earlier, pro-activeness, risk-
taking and innovativeness of rural local governments.  The dimensions are not 
separated because they might overlap with each other. These indicators are 
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difficult to achieve by most municipalities which indicates the entrepreneurial 
aspects of them. Over the period (see Table 6.11): 
 
 Fiscal effort shows a fall in collection of revenues in the working sample 
in respect to the total municipal revenues. The number of municipalities 
categorized as good performers increased from 12% in 2000 to only 
15% in 2009 and the municipalities with poor performance increased 
gradually from 58 to 64%.  Therefore, the moderate performance has 
decreased and most municipalities have fallen into the poor 
performance category.    
 
 More municipalities are updating their Tax Property Valuation within a 
three year period; the numbers are up from 270 (37%) in 2000 to 407 
municipalities (72%) in 2009.   
 
 The percentages of municipalities that have been associated with other 
institutions for the provision of public services fell from 70% in 2000 to 
46% in 2009.   
 
 The percentage of municipalities that have been associated with other 
local governments or organisations for the common good has increased 
from 75 (10%) municipalities in 2000 to 306 (46%) municipalities in 
2009.  
 
 More municipalities are updating their property tax at least once in their 
government period.  The number of municipalities with good 
performance has progressively increased from 37% to 72%.   
 
This shows that co-operation has become important for rural municipalities but 
particularly in areas distinct from basic public services. This could be interpreted 
as a sign of entrepreneurship.   
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It is important to notice that a lot of data were missing in these variables. This 
accounts for the further reduction in the working sample size.  
 
Table  6.11 Descriptive Statistics of Public Entrepreneurship Indicators  









F % F % F % F % 
2000 
0 421 58 452 63 215 30 647 90 
1 212 30             
2 89 12 270 37 507 70 75 10 
Valid number   722   722   722   722   
2002 
0 442 61 396 55 109 15 579 80 
1 87 12             
2 193 27 326 45 613 85 143 20 
Valid number   722   722   722   722   
2009 
0 469 64 160 28 360 54 360 54 
1 152 21             
2 106 15 407 72 306 46 306 46 
Valid number   727   567   666   666   
 
This table shows the number of municipalities in each performance bound 
(poor/moderate/good) per year and the equivalent percentage it represents from the total 
sample. (0= Poor; 1= Moderate; 2=Good; F=Frequency). 
 
 
6.4.3 Political competition and other political variables  
 
Political competition  
 
The information for this variable is from the CIDAC database from 1990 to 2010. 
 
For the purpose of this investigation, the margin of victory between the two 
principal contesters is used to measure political competition. This measure has 
been used in Mexican literature because it emphasises the risk faced by 
politicians and political parties to lose political power which is the underpinning 
argument liking political competition with improvements in performance 
(Moreno, 2005, 68).    
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Political competition is the main political variable analyzed in this research 
because political competition might either impact or reinforce accountability and 
public entrepreneurship in a decentralised setting.  The indicator of competition 
in local elections (electoral competition) is measured as follows: 
 
Political competition: 1 minus the difference in the share of votes obtained by 
the two strongest parties. 
 
Therefore, a high index means high levels of competition (because the parties‟ 
levels of support were close to each other) and a low index the opposite. For 
instance, a rural municipality in the state of Tamaulipas had local election in 
2001. For first time in the history of the town the opposition party won the 
election. The total votes were 11,405, and the share of votes by party was PAN 
(opposition party) 5,657, PRI 5,447 and the rest accounted for other parties and 
cancelled votes. The difference between the two strongest parties was 210 
votes. This represents 0.02 or a 2% difference in percentage. Hence, the index 
results in .98 (1-0.02) or 98%. This was indeed a highly competitive election- 
and the first one in the history of the town. 
 
It is important to notice that local elections in Mexico do not occur 
simultaneously across the country, and so they occur at different points in 
relation to fiscal decentralisation changes. This varies not only among states, 
but sometimes even within states. The latter occurs in special cases, for 
instance when an election is repeated or postponed in specific circumstances.  
The date mayors begin their governing period also varies. However, most 
municipalities start their governing period in the last half of the year or at the 
beginning of the next year after the election is held.  
 
The database from CIDAC presents the results of the elections. Therefore, it 
indicates only the year the election was held. Thus, for the use of this study, the 
elections‟ results were added to the following three years after the election was 
held based on a mandatory office period of three years. For instance if the 
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election was held in 1990, the electoral competition indicator as well as the 
winner of that election is given to the subsequent three years (1991, 1992 and 
1993).36  
 
The political-electoral variables portray important democratic changes in recent 
decades. Figure 6.4 below shows, from the working sample of rural 
municipalities, how elections in rural municipalities are becoming highly 
competitive. The vertical axis in Figure 6.4 measures the mean level of political 
competition (as defined before) for rural municipalities in the working sample. 
 
From 1990 to 2000, political competition increased remarkably. After 2003, the 
rate of change slowed down. This might be a result of a ceiling effect of high 
levels of competition. This is an important change in the political landscape of 
Mexico. To some extent, it captures the weakening of the hegemonic party, PRI 
(descriptive statistics are found in Table 6.13 at the end of the section).  
 
 
Figure  6.4 Political Competition 1990-2008 in the working sample of Rural 
Municipalities 
 
                                                          
36
 Halaby, C (2004) presents an important discussion about the time-invariant exploratory variables in a 
fixed effect model. He argues that evidence suggests a fixed model does not sacrifice all information 
about time-invariant variables if they have enough time-variance to identify a base line effect. Based on 
this premise and the number of observations in this analysis, the time-invariance exploratory political 
variables should not be a concern.   
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If we compare the changes in political competition before and after the 1997 
reform, it can be observed that the highest changes occurred before. The 
average mean of political competition before the reform was 0.488 or 49% and 
0.829 or 83% after the reform. Thus, on a scale of 0 to 1 (or from 0 to 100%), 
where 1 or 100% means highly competitive, a change from 49% to 83% is 
substantial and statistically significant at p< .000 (see Table 6.12 below).  
 
As stated above, the main political variable studied here is political competition.  
However, the categorical political variable state-level opposition  can also 
present important differences for performance.  
 
Table  6.12 Descriptive Statistics and Statistical Significance of Political Competition 


















Before the reform from 1990-1997 461 .481 .237 -0.347 *** (.012) 
After the reform from 1997 to 2008 505 .829 .125 Case base  









1990 466 29% .321 
1991 473 31% .320 
1992 474 33% .321 
1993 500 45% .346 
1994 501 48% .336 
1995 501 54% .328 
1996 501 70% .265 
1997 500 72% .254 
1998 505 75% .245 
1999 505 76% .234 
2000 505 78% .233 
2002 505 79% .225 
2003 505 86% .156 
2004 505 85% .159 
2005 505 86% .154 
2006 505 87% .134 
2007 505 88% .120 
2008 505 88% .121 
NOTE: The indicator for political competition is interpreted as: the higher the indicator, the more 
competitive the election. 





The information for this variable is found in the CIDAC database from 1990 to 
2010. 
 
The CIDAC database only presents the party winner by election. Following the 
same strategy as for political competition variable, a database was built per 
year by government period. The party winner was added to the following three 
years after the election which was held based on a mandatory office period of 
three years. 
 
Parties are added as a dummy variable. The parties are identified as Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (central-left-wing) and coalitions (PRI+C); Partido 
Acción Nacional (right wing) and coalitions (PAN+C); Others + Coalitions 
(OTHERS+C). Notice, the two strongest political parties also include coalitions. 
For instance, if PRI has arranged a coalition with PANAL (Partido Nueva 
Alianza) and they win the election, the party is identified as PRI+C. In this case, 
it is assumed that PRI and PAN are the dominant parties in coalitions and that 
in rural municipalities “small” parties are used by the main party for political 
strategies. There are three reasons to sort out the political parties in this way.  
 
First, in the post-reform period, there has been a considerable increase in the 
number of coalitions in local elections, which are mainly led by the two strongest 
parties, PRI and PAN. The political control remains in these two political parties. 
This is mainly the case of PRI which has used this as a strategy after it started 
losing political power.  
 
Second, PRI was in power for 71 years at the federal level and in the majority of 
state and local governments.  This political power at all levels of governments 
may still benefit PRI by lobbying for investment of basic public services 
compared to other political parties. This was the concern of opposition parties in 
the pre-reform period and one reason to decentralise in the first place. 
Therefore, it is important to observe any changes in relation to CBPS before 
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and after the reform. The differences in political parties permit inferences to be 
made in regard to the extent fiscal decentralisation has diminished party 
paternalistic behaviour and to what extent it has encouraged or enabled 
accountability and public entrepreneurship.   
 
Third, the high political control PRI maintained over many years and still 
maintains in some municipalities, mainly rural, may affect its performance 
negatively compared to other parties.  High political control can bias the 
selection process of candidates or lead the party to ignore investment in basic 
needs over other political strategies. On the other hand, it may influence 
positively the performance of other political parties because they see the local 
administration as an opportunity to differentiate themselves (leading to higher 
investment in CBPS). This may occur regardless of the level of political 
competition. In this case, it is hypothesised that there is a party-specific effect.   
 
As a result of higher levels of political competition, rural local governments in 
Mexico have gradually experienced the alternation of parties. From the working 
sample of rural municipalities, it can be observed that the conservative party 
(PAN+ coalitions) and other small parties and coalitions have gained ground. As 
shown in Figure 6.5 this trend seems substantial after the 1997 decentralisation 
reform. In 1997, PAN + Coalitions governed 40 municipalities in the working 
sample and Other Parties + Coalitions, 49 municipalities. By 2008, PAN + 
Coalitions governed 137 municipalities and Other Parties + Coalitions, 108. On 
the other hand, PRI + Coalitions went from 499 municipalities in 1997 to 260 in 
2008.  This is a substantial change for rural municipalities if we consider that 
before the reform from 1990 to 1994, the number of municipalities governed by 













Figure  6.5 Number of Municipalities Governed by Party on the working sample of Rural Municipalities from 1990 to 2008
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State-level opposition  
 
The information for this variable is derived from the CIDAC database but the 
indicators are the researcher‟s own calculations from 1990 to 2009. 
 
The variable state-level opposition was introduced in Mexican literature by 
Moreno-Jaimes (2007) who called it Juxtaposition. The variable identifies the 
municipalities where the mayor and the state governor belong to different 
political parties. Moreno-Jaimes hypothesized that municipalities with state-level 
opposition have more limited access to state government grants, and as a 
consequence, lower coverage of service. In his analyses, he did not find any 
differences in service coverage in municipalities with state-level opposition. This 
finding is somewhat surprising, given the literature on political competition, and 
this study therefore includes the variable and revisits Moreno-James‟ results for 
rural municipalities only. 
 
For the purpose of this study, state-level opposition is defined similarly to 
Moreno- Jaimes. A municipality whose mayor in a given period belongs to a 
party different from the state governor is given a value 1 for that period, 0 
otherwise.  
 
The CIDAC database only presents the party winner by state election. Thus, 
similar to the strategy used for political competition, a database was built per 
year by government period for the state-level, grouping the political parties into 
party coalitions (minority parties are included as part of the two strongest 
political parties). Then, the information was combined to obtain the state-level 
opposition variable.  
 
Turning to descriptive statistics, the rise of political competition is observed in all 
government levels. Therefore, there are also more local governments with 
state-level opposition. In Figure 6.6 a solid increase of municipalities with state-
level opposition can be observed from the working sample of rural 
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municipalities. This is a consequence of substantial loss of political power of the 
hegemonic party (PRI) in both states and municipalities.  
 
The previous description shows how the political landscape has changed in the 
last two decades. These political changes are aligned to the pro- theoretical 
arguments that link better the political environment to local government 
performance. However, political competition in this group of municipalities has 
not changed drastically after the 1997 reform while other political indicators 
have.  Therefore, it is important to explore all of them.  
 




Figure  6.6 State-level opposition on a sample of rural municipalities in Mexico from 1990 to 2008  
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6.4.4 Local government performance indicator 
 
Source: The information for these variables is listed on the Census of 
Population and Housing 1990, 2000 and 2010 and Count of Population and 
Housing 1995 and 2005. 
 
Local government performance is the key focus of the overall research study 
because it is the ultimate policy aim. It is, however, difficult to define, let alone 
measure it. This concept has evolved alongside public administration doctrines 
and is not captured by a single indicator (see Section 2.4, number 3).  
 
A measure of performance that has been used in Mexican literature is the 
coverage of basic public services in local governments. The range of public 
services the municipality is lawfully obliged to provide is extensive. However, 
accurate data for all public services is not available for longitudinal 
studies.37The only well-documented public services are coverage of sewerage 
and water. These indicators are highly significant for rural municipalities 
because these public local services are still underprovided and therefore, still a 
priority. 38  
 
Official data is released every five years. Therefore, an average was calculated 
between those years. Firstly the yearly progressive increment/decrement of 
coverage of sewage and water for each municipality between censuses and 
counts was calculated (i.e. an average incremental change from 1990 to 1995). 
A yearly progressive increment/decrement of population count was calculated 
between the same censuses and counts. Then, these two indicators were used 
to calculate the percentage of households covered by each service. Hence, this 
is an estimated average.  
                                                          
37
 The indicators for Investment inside and outside the municipal seat are only estimates and were 
collected via surveys.  
38
 As a reminder, water and sewage services are not induced in the indicator for Other Basic Public 
Services because the various analyses carried out in this research include these variables as dependent 
(Coverage of Basic Public Services) and independent (Other Basic Public Services as part of the 
Accountability index). This may lead to argue that the variables contain similar indicators and might 
account for the significance correlation. However, these analyses ensure that the same data are not 
used in any given analysis for both the dependent and the independent variable.  
 




The reason to calculate a yearly measure is because the researcher works with 
different databases and the measures are from different years including years in 
between the census and counts.  
 
The indicators are measured as follows: 
 
SEWERAGE: Absolute coverage of sewage per year. It is interpreted as the 
relation between the number of houses with sewage services and the total 
number of houses in the municipality in the same census or population count.  
 
WATER: Absolute coverage of water per year. It is interpreted as the relation 
between the number of houses with water service and the total number of 
houses in the municipality in the same census or population count.  
 
The periods are divided into the pre-reform period from 1990 to 1997 and the 
post-reform period from 1998 to 2008. 39 
 
These two indicators are added up and averaged to obtain the indicator named 
Coverage of Basic Public Services. 
 
Coverage of Basic Public Services, or CBPS for short, is the average coverage 
of Basic Public Services measured as the absolute change of water and 
sewage in the municipality.  
 
The decentralisation reform has left the expansion and restoration of basic 
public services in the hands of local governments. Basic public services 
constitute an important element for development. The World Bank considers 
basic public service infrastructure a key element in reducing poverty (Briseño, et 
al, 2004) and the quantity and quality of basic infrastructure is argued to bring 
development in the area (Fourie, 2006).   
 
                                                          
39
 The pre-reform and post-period were not included as dummy variables. The database was divided into two different files.  
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The coverage of water specifically in rural localities has improved over time in 
the world, in Latin American countries and in Mexico (the world from 62% in 
1990 to 80.72% in 2011; Latin American countries from 63% in 1990 to 82% in 
2011; and Mexico from 59% in 1990 to 89% in 2011) 40. Nonetheless, there are 
still persistent problems in basic public service provision and in particular in 
rural municipalities.  
 
In the working sample of municipalities, there is a steady growth in public 
services. The coverage indicates the percentage of housing in the local 
government having water and sewage services. The coverage of basic public 
services, which is the average of both services, has increased progressively 
from 41.31% in 1990 to 72.9% coverage in 2009 (see Table 6.14 at the end of 
the section). The descriptive statistics present other important insights. For 
instance, even though municipalities created after the reform are excluded from 
the analysis, the lowest level of coverage at the beginning of the study in 1990 
is .5% and the highest 91% in the same year. This highlights a wide level of 
inequalities.   In addition, if the sample is divided into 8 economic regions, the 
northwest and central-west rural municipalities present a better level of 
development in the composed indicator CBPS.41 The rest of the states show 
lower coverage with an important gap between them. 
 
In addition, the level of investment varies depending on the public services. In 
the working sample, investment in water has been larger than the investment in 
sewage. This is observed in Figure 6.7. The level of coverage in water service 
has been historically higher than sewage service but lately- since 2000- the 
sampled rural municipalities had a significant increase in coverage of sewage 
service, presumably due to higher investments and higher levels of coverage in 
water service.  
 
                                                          
40
 World Development Indicators (http://www.wssinfo.org/) 
41
 Zone 1 North-west  Baja California Norte, Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit; Zone 2 North Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Zacatecas 
Y San Luis Potosí; Zone 3 North-east  Nuevo León y Tamaulipas; Zone 4 Central-west  Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Colima, Michoacán 
y Guanajuato; Zone 5 Central-east  Querétaro, México, D.F., Morelos, Hidalgo, Tlaxcala y Puebla; Zone 6 South Guerrero, Oaxaca 
y Chiapa; Zone 7 East Veracruz y Tabasco; Zone 8 Península of Yucatán Campeche, Yucatán y Quintana Roo. 




Figure  6.7 Coverage of water and sewage from 1990 to 2008 in the working sample  
 




Table  6.14 Descriptive Statistics of Coverage of Basic Local Public Services  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
1990 499 .005 .914 .413 .205 
1991 498 .013 .925 .440 .205 
1992 498 .023 .936 .450 .205 
1993 498 .033 .946 .461 .205 
1994 498 .043 .956 .471 .205 
1995 504 .000 .971 .553 .219 
1996 504 .042 .967 .558 .212 
1997 504 .040 .965 .556 .212 
1998 504 .038 .963 .554 .212 
1999 504 .036 .961 .552 .212 
2000 505 .070 .952 .579 .202 
2002 505 .084 .955 .604 .195 
2003 505 .082 .953 .602 .195 
2004 505 .080 .951 .600 .195 
2005 505 .055 .985 .711 .185 
2005 505 .124 .985 .721 .179 
2007 505 .128 .989 .725 .179 
2008 505 .132 .993 .729 .179 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
498         
 
 
6.5 Summary  
 
In this chapter a justification and explanation of how the different empirical 
variables are measured has been given. In this research it has been argued that 
if there is an impact on performance derived from the fiscal decentralisation, 
thus the implication is that fiscal decentralisation drives first accountability and 
public entrepreneurship behaviour. To test this hypothesis, the variables that I 
will be used for an empirical analysis have been presented in this chapter. Two 
measures of decentralisation have been introduced based on the type of funds 
municipalities are entitled to- conditional mandatory funds and unconditional 
funds. These funds have different arrangements (and degrees of discretion) 
which may drive different behaviour. It has also been shown how the 
behaviours- accountability and public entrepreneurship- will be measured and 
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the indicators that compose them justified. In addition, the other explanatory 
variables likely to influence the behavioural patterns and government 
performance have been introduced namely, political competition, state-level 
competition and party affiliation. Finally, how government performance is 
measured has been explained.  
 
In addition, individual indicators have been explored and it has been shown that 
in general both behaviours and governance performance have improved over 
time as have all explanatory variables. However, an important finding to be 
noted is that fiscal effort has indeed declined as a percentage and own 
revenues has showed only a slight increase in absolute real terms. This is 
consistent with the theoretical literature which suggests that expenditure 
decentralisation might create incentives for local government to become 
financially dependent from higher government levels. This is in spite of how 
important local taxes are in the general theories of decentralisation such as 
Tiebout (1956).  
 
The next step is to empirically explore whether these positive changes over time 
can be attributed only or partially to fiscal decentralisation and how 
decentralisation drives such changes. 
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Chapter 7 - Fiscal decentralisation and Behavioural Patterns: An empirical 
analysis correlates 
 
In this chapter different statistical analyses are run to explore the relationship 
among the theoretical variables. Each analysis intends to answer a specific 
research question.  However, as stated before, validation and model predictions 
are not the scope of this analysis. Instead, it aims at exploring possible 
association among variables.  
 
As seen in the previous chapter (Section 6.4.2), there have been changes, over 
time, in the mean values of the key variables under discussion, namely 
accountability and public entrepreneurship behaviour.  However, we need to 
examine how far there is evidence to support the relationships inherent in the 
formal hypotheses. 
 
In this chapter the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and changes in 
behavioural patterns (accountability and public entrepreneurship) of Mexican 
rural governments are examined in detail. Different models are constructed to 
test whether fiscal decentralisation has contributed to behavioural changes and 
the same is done for political competition.  
 
Based on the previous review there is evidence in favour of changes in actions 
related to accountability and public entrepreneurship, therefore, it makes sense 
to investigate whether these changes were related to the decentralisation 
reform.  This section corresponds to research question 1.   
 
In addition, fiscal decentralisation is not the only theory that suggests promoting 
accountability and public entrepreneurship. The political-electoral theory also 
relates political factors- such as political competition- with improvement of 
accountability and to a lesser extent to changes in public entrepreneurship. In 
addition, some fiscal decentralisation arguments are based on political factors 
to make decentralisation work. Hence, political competition may also play a role 
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in the behavioural pattern of local authorities. It can either better explain the 
changes in behavioural patterns or reinforce the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation.  
 
Therefore, it is indeed possible that the changes are not the results of fiscal 
decentralisation at all but of other policies or circumstances associated with it 
such as political changes. This is a common problem in social science, and in 
this case, as explained in Chapter 4, Mexico has gone hand in hand with major 
political changes. Then, it is necessary to explore whether the changes in 
accountability and public entrepreneurship, which might lead also to better 
performance, are the result of political competition and in what ways fiscal 
decentralisation arrangements and political competition may interact and/or 
strengthen each other. This section corresponds to research question 2.   
 
Figure 7.1 presents (in black) the part of the theoretical model to be evaluated.  
 
 
Figure  7.1 Research question 1 and 2 in the theoretical framework  
 
 
This research argues that specific fiscal arrangements under fiscal 
decentralisation may affect the behaviour of local authorities differently. It may 
encourage better accountability but suppress public entrepreneurship or vice 
versa.  In addition, accountability may be reinforced by the presence of political 
competition in the municipality once fiscal decentralisation is in place or political 
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competition may be the main force affecting accountability and/ or public 
entrepreneurship.  
 
7.1 Fiscal decentralisation and changes in accountability    
 
This Section seeks to answer part of research question 1 about whether fiscal 
decentralisation can, in fact, be related to changes in patterns of accountability. 
It presents a statistical analysis of the influence of conditional mandatory funds 
and unconditional funds on accountability.  
 




where  is the outcome variable of interest: the accountability index in 
municipality i at time t.  The index is a continuous variable between 0 and 
2.  
 
UFit and CF it measure the absolute level of per capita unconditional and 
conditional mandatory funds in municipality i in year t, respectively. 
Pit is a vector of political variables and include: 
 
Political competition measured as a continuous variable of 1 minus the 
difference in the share of votes obtained by the two strongest parties in 
municipality i at time t. 
 
Political party is a categorical variable that denotes the party governing in 
municipality i at time t. The parties are identified as: 
 
PRI+C (Partido Revolucionario Institucional and Coalitions). This is the omitted 
category. 
Fiscal Decentralisation and Behavioural Patterns:  




 PAN+C (Partido Acción Nacional and Coalitions)  
 
 OTHERS+C (Others + Coalitions) 
 
State-level opposition is a dummy variable taking a value of 0 if the mayor of 
municipality i at time t belongs to a different political party than the state 
governor or 1 otherwise.   
is a municipality fixed effect to account for municipality-specific and time 
invariant factors such as culture, geography or any other persistent 
characteristics, that might affect the outcome of interest. 
 
t is a time fixed effect controlling for country-wide shocks that affect all 
municipalities equally. 
 
The variables will be added in a stepwise manner to the model.  
 
This model is estimated for the sample of 505 municipalities using data for the 
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Table  7.1 Statistical Analysis Models of Accountability  































































(=1 if there is state-level 
opposition;=0 otherwise) 












OTHERS PARTIES AND 
COALITIONS  
Omitted category =PRI+C 





(0)* Political Competition  
      -.054 
(.043) 
Pseudo R
2   
 
.068 .067 .073 .072 .072 .072 .072 
No. Municipalities  505 505 505 505 505 505 505 
Years 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Observations 2525 2525 2525 2525 2525 2525 2525 
Note: Dependent variable ACCOUNTABILITY. Standard errors are in brackets. The results are 
presented in standardised values. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05. McFadden's Pseudo R
2 
with best 
fitted model (-2 Restricted Log Likelihood
 )  
is used. All models include municipality and time 
fixed effects.  
 
 
In model 1 and 2, the hypothesis is that improvements in accountability can 
be explained by increases in conditional mandatory funds and unconditional 
funds.  
 
In this case, a positive association is expected to be found between 
unconditional funds and accountability levels based on the theoretical argument 
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that increases in these grants might motivate local authorities to be more 
accountable because they are close to their constituency and are judged by 
citizens in local elections. The assumption is that additional grants might give 
them the opportunity to respond to citizens‟ preferences. 
 
Therefore, under fiscal decentralisation, local authorities can make good use of 
resources because they are aware of what citizens‟ prefer. In addition, citizens 
can relate to where and how the grants have been spent. This clarifies 
responsibility and, to some extent, imposes more control over local authorities.  
 
Drawing from the literature review, increases in conditional mandatory funds are 
also expected to be associated with accountability based on the assumption 
that conditional mandatory funds have tougher financial controls which control 
corruption but the association is expected to be weaker as conditional 
mandatory funds delegate less discretion than unconditional funds.  
 
Unconditional funds as a single effect 
 
Unconditional funds delegate financial resources to local authorities giving them 
the opportunity to allocate the funds according to local necessities. In other 
words, they have freedom of allocation. As seen in Section 6.4.1, Table 6.2, 
these rose from an average of 45 pesos per capita to 1011 pesos per capita 
from 1995 to 2009.  
 
Theoretically, it is possible to argue that this type of funds should encourage 
local authorities to behave in a more accountable fashion. The reasons being, 
that unconditional funds give local authorities the opportunity to act according to 
citizens‟ preferences and therefore, increase the chances for their political party 
to succeed in the following elections.  
 
Since Tiebout (1956) advanced that citizens “vote with their feet”; this theory 
implies that local authorities would prefer to act in a more accountable manner 
in order to keep their citizens happy. If this does not work as a “pricing 
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mechanism” for citizens, it is still the level of government with comparative 
advantages in the provision of public services and for the satisfaction of 
diversified needs, according to Oates‟ (1972) theorem. This gives scope to 
allocative efficiency and, to some extent, productive efficiency.  
 
However, there are serious concerns that particularly fit with the group of 
municipalities studied here. Local governments rely on federal transfers rather 
than own revenue collection.  Theoretically this may lead to misuse. Local 
authorities can just become “fiscally-lazy” and be discouraged from increasing 
their local revenues or they may increase total expenditure without increasing 
tax collection, the so called “flypaper effect” (Melo, 2002).   
 
In addition, in this group of municipalities, there are strong contiguity factors, as 
Tanzi (1996) called it. People have known each other since childhood and this 
may lead to coalitions and preferential treatment among citizens. Besides, local 
bureaucrats are likely to be poorly qualified and professionally unmotivated 
because there are no progression schemes or good salaries (Prud‟homme, 
1995; Tanzi, 1995).  
 
Hence, Model 1 tests whether the pro-theoretical assumptions hold for this type 
of funds in rural municipalities. The empirical results, shown in Table 7.1, show 
that as a single effect positive changes in the quantity of unconditional funds are 
negatively statistically correlated to accountability index r (505) = -.094, SE= 
.018, p<.001.   
 
This suggests that an increase in the level of financial resources in 
unconditional grants is associated with one or more of: administrative 
overspending, decreased public work investment, and to some extent, a decline 
in transparency and citizens‟ inclusion in local decision-making (these being the 
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Conditional mandatory funds as single effect 
 
Conditional mandatory funds are resources delegated to local governments 
earmarked to specific types of investments. This type of funds increases the 
local governments‟ budget but also imposes more restriction in the allocation of 
resources. Recalling the criticism on fiscal decentralisation, Prud‟homme (1995) 
claims that priority public services are the drivers of public service allocation, 
not citizens‟ preferences. In this case, the conditional mandatory funds are 
mainly earmarked to basic public services. So, local authorities allocate 
resources based on the priorities indicated in this type of funds. However, it is a 
reasonable assumption that citizens‟ preferences are aligned to these priorities 
because rural municipalities still lack basic public services.  
 
Another important difference between this type of funds and unconditional funds 
is that there is more technical and financial supervision by higher government 
levels. This by no means implies that unconditional funds are not supervised. 
However, there are more rules involved in conditional funds. Therefore, the 
alleged effects of contiguity factors and poor qualification should have less 
impact. 
 
As shown in Table 7.1 (Model 2), in contrast to unconditional funds, the amount 
of conditional mandatory funds appears to be positively correlated to 
accountability index r (505) = .072, SE= .021 and is highly statistically significant 
at p <.001.  
 
This result suggests that an increase in the level of financial resources through 
conditional mandatory grants is associated with one or more of: less 
administrative spending, an increase in public work investment and to some 
extent, encouragement of transparency and citizens‟ inclusion in local decision-
making.  
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Hence, the fiscal arrangement based on conditional mandatory funds supports 
the theoretical argument that fiscal decentralisation might be positively 
associated with changes in accountability behaviour.  
 
A model of Accountability and fiscal arrangements  
 
The previous analyses show how important the fiscal arrangement can be in 
encouraging or discouraging accountability. As the decentralisation theory 
implies, delegation of financial resources may lead to changes in behaviours. 
However, the findings suggest these changes might be counter-productive and 
the effect seems to depend on the type of fiscal arrangement.  
 
Based on these findings, it can be argued that there is partial evidence of 
positive association between the fiscal decentralisation arrangements and 
accountability, particularly in relation to unconditional funds. Therefore, it makes 
sense to test the effect of both of them in accountability index. 
 
As shown in Table 7.1 (Model 3), conditional mandatory funds and 
unconditional funds are highly significantly correlated to accountability. 
Unconditional funds are negatively correlated with r (505) = -.160, SE= .021, 
p<.001 and conditional mandatory funds are positively correlated with r (505) = 
.157, SE= .023, p<.01. In this model, unconditional funds explained the 
accountability index relation slightly more.  In other words, the negative impact 
on a municipality‟s score of increases in unconditional funds is slightly larger 
than the positive impact of conditional mandatory ones.   
 
These findings suggest that, as the theoretical literature would lead one to 
expect, the type of fiscal decentralisation arrangement contributes to how local 
authorities behave. However, contrarily to the pro-theoretical assumption, fiscal 
decentralisation may damage accountability in rural municipalities through the 
use of unconditional funds but this can also be slightly offset with the use of 
conditional mandatory funds. Therefore, its benefit in regard to accountability is 
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in doubt. An intriguing question is how these positive and negative relations 
actually happen. This will be examined in the second empirical phase.  
 
Models of Accountability, decentralisation and political variables  
The following models investigate the relationship between accountability, 
decentralization and a range of municipal political variables. 
 
The hypothesis is that political competition and state-level government may 
interact and strengthen each other. In addition, accountability may be reinforced 
by the presence of political competition in the municipality once fiscal 
decentralisation is in place.  
 
The first analysis showed that conditional mandatory funds and unconditional 
funds are important indicators of accountability. Unconditional funds are 
negatively associated and conditional mandatory funds are positively 
associated; unconditional funds being the variable with a slightly higher impact. 
The addition of political variables in Table 9.7 does not add power to the model 
of accountability and, from the political variables, only the political party 
variable reaches statistical significance at 5%.  However, the introduction of 
political variables increases more the (negative) parameter of unconditional 
funds than the (positive) parameters of conditional mandatory funds.   
 
In all models, the fiscal decentralisation variables- conditional mandatory and 
unconditional funds- present the same direction of association and continue 
being highly statistically significant. 
 
In Model 4, the addition of the main political variable- political competition- is not 
as relevant as theoretically claimed for this group of municipalities. It does not 
reach statistical significance in the models and the direction of association is 
opposite to what would be expected theoretically up to Model 7 where it 
becomes positively associated with the introduction of the interaction variable 
state-level opposition by political competition. However, the parameter is very 
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small. In an alternative model (Annex 1), if only municipal-specific factors are 
controlled, the parameters of political competition appear positively and highly 
statistically significant until the interaction state-level opposition*political 
competition is included in the model. However, the parameters are still 
considerably smaller than the parameters of fiscal decentralisation variables.   
 
Thus, an effect (either positive or negative) of political competition cannot be 
discharged, though the analyses tend to show a negative effect. More 
importantly, it seems that the decentralisation variables have a higher impact 
and are more robust predictors.   
 
In Model 5, the state-level opposition variable appears statistically insignificant. 
The sign suggests that after controlling for the fiscal decentralisation variables 
and political competition, municipalities where the governor is from the same 
political party have a lower score in accountability than those with state-level 
opposition. This may suggest that the presence of political opposition per se 
drives accountability actions. This interpretation holds for Models 6 and 7.     
 
In Model 6, the political parties reach a conventional statistical level at 5% and 
the parameters suggest that PAN + Coalitions and Others Parties + Coalitions 
have on average a lower score in accountability index than PRI + Coalitions.  
 
In Model 7, the interaction state-level opposition and political competition are 
added. The reasoning for adding this interaction is that if political competition 
does not explain many changes in accountability, it can be the case that it is 
reinforced when the state and local governments are in opposition or vice versa. 
So, the higher the political competition, the more accountability actions may be 
pursued by municipalities with or without state-level opposition. In other words, 
higher levels of political competition condition the effects of state-level 
opposition.   
 
This variable should be interpreted in context.  As discussed above, 
municipalities where the governor is from the same political party appear to 
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have lower scores in accountability than those that are in state-level opposition. 
Thus, the interaction variable inquires whether this still holds in the presence of 
high political competition.  
 
The interaction variable does not a reach conventional significance level.  
However, the parameters suggest that the higher the political competition, the 
less accountability changes take place in municipalities that belong to the same 
political party as the governor. Hence, if both variables are read together, state-
level opposition and the interaction variable, municipalities that are from the 
same political party as the governor appear to undertake fewer accountability 
actions regardless of the political competition level.  
 
Reading this differently, opposition parties may become involved in more 
accountability actions than non-opposition as a way to differentiate themselves 
from others. This may be the case because a) opposition may interpret high 
competition as a probability of losing the next election or b) they might be more 
concerned about financial soundness due to fear of party reprisal as the state-
level monitors and allocates part of the intergovernmental transfers.    
 
This may suggest that being in opposition per se drives accountability actions. 
However, this claim is not empirically supported here as the statistical analysis 
does not reach a conventional level of statistical significance.  However, it 
draws a general picture that can be investigated further.  
 
This analysis shows how important the fiscal arrangements are for 
accountability. However, opposite to the hypotheses tested here, the models 
suggest that there are slightly more negative effects on accountability with 
increases of unconditional funds, than the positive effects on accountability due 
to increases in conditional mandatory funds. These contrasting results seem to 
hide complex relations that cannot be visualized here.  
 
In addition, the findings suggest that political competition is not as relevant with 
regard to accountability (or at least as robust) as the financial arrangements in 
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place and the political variables seem to indirectly reinforce the financial 
variables, mainly the negative effect of unconditional funds (since the 
parameters get higher when political variables are included).  
 
Another interesting finding, though not empirically supported in these models, is 
that “being in opposition” appears to be a driver of accountability. The reasons 
are not entirely clear in this analysis and should be pursued in the following 
empirical phase.   
 
Hence, in answering part of question 2- whether differences in the level of 
political competition had a major effect on whether and in what ways patterns of 
accountability change following fiscal decentralisation- the results appear to 
indicate that political competition does not have a major effect on patterns of 
accountability after these two decentralisation arrangements were introduced 
and the findings seem to indicate that the political variables may reinforce (the 
negative effect of) fiscal decentralisation through unconditional funds. 
  
In the next section, the researcher will investigate whether these results 
are also applicable to entrepreneurship behaviour.  
 
7.2 Fiscal decentralisation and changes in Public Entrepreneurship  
 
Another theoretical implication of fiscal decentralisation is that it encourages 
public entrepreneurship by enabling local authorities to use their local 
knowledge and adapt policies. Its benefits go beyond information advantage 
and it involves “experimentation”, as Tanzi (1996) suggests. This gives scope to 
productive efficiency, and to some extent, allocative efficiency.  Therefore, 
increases in unconditional funds are expected to be positively associated with 
public entrepreneurship because these types of grants provide local authorities 
with discretion in allocation of resources and expenditures and may encourage 
entrepreneurial actions.  
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The reference regression model is the following: 
 
 
where  is the outcome variable of interest: the public entrepreneurship index 
in municipality i at time t.  
  
UFit, CFit denotes the unconditional and conditional mandatory variables 
measured as before and Pit is the vector of political variables, and includes 
political competition, state-level opposition, political party affiliation as before. 
 
is a municipality fixed effect to account for municipality-specific and time 
invariant factors such as culture, geography or any other persistent 
characteristics that might affect the outcome of interest. 
 
t is a time fixed effect controlling for country-wide shocks that affect all 
municipalities equally. 
 
All variables will be added in a stepwise manner to the model.  
 
This model is estimated for the sample of 505 municipalities using data for the 
following years 2000, 2002, and 2009. 
 
The hypothesis is that improvements in public entrepreneurship can be 
explained by increases in conditional mandatory funds and unconditional funds. 
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 Table  7.2 Statistical analysis models of Public Entrepreneurship 
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opposition (0)* Political 
Competition  
      .081 
(.052) 
Pseudo R
2   
 
.028 .028 .028 .028 .027 .026 .026 
No. municipalities  505 505 505 505 505 505 505 
Years  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Total observations  1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
Note: Dependent variable ENTREPRENEURSHIP. Standard errors are in brackets. The results 
are presented in standardised values. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05. McFadden's Pseudo R
2 
with 
best fitted model (-2 Restricted Log Likelihood
 )  
is used. All models include municipality and time 
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Unconditional funds as single effect 
 
Unconditional funds give financial resources and discretion to local authorities 
which might encourage them to try new and innovative ways to improve 
productive efficiency of local public services. Based on this theory, the 
researcher tested whether increases in unconditional funds are related to 
changes in public entrepreneurship.  
 
As shown in Table 7.2 (model 8), the results indicate that unconditional funds 
are positively and highly statistically related to public entrepreneurship with r 
(505) = .096, SE= .025 at p<.001. 
 
Conditional mandatory funds as a single effect 
 
A weak association between conditional mandatory funds and public 
entrepreneurship is expected, based on the assumption that conditional 
mandatory funds have tougher financial controls, which control corruption, but 
may constrain entrepreneurship as the contending discussion between 
democratic accountability and public entrepreneurship suggests. At the same 
time, conditional mandatory funds significantly increase the amount of local 
budget, which may be more relevant as an entrepreneurial driver than 
discretion.  
 
In this case, the results in Table 7.2 (model 9) show that as a single effect, 
increases in conditional mandatory funds are positively and highly correlated to 
public entrepreneurship with r (505) = .092, SE= .026, p<.001. 
 
A model of public entrepreneurship and fiscal arrangements  
 
Contrary to the hypothesis set here, models 8 and 9 found that both funds seem 
to encourage public entrepreneurship. Conditional mandatory funds seem to be 
an important predictor of public entrepreneurship- not weak predictors.  And 
there is evidence to suggest that unconditional funds are associated with public 
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entrepreneurship. This follows the idea that higher resources and discretion 
give more room for entrepreneurial actions. Therefore, the results support the 
argument that not only discretion but in general higher financial resources per 
se might encourage public entrepreneurship.  
 
Adding both variables in a model (10), unconditional mandatory funds still 
maintain their highly positive correlation with r (505) = .072, SE= .027, p<.001 
and conditional mandatory funds present a slightly lower parameter r (505) = 
.060, SE= .028 and reach statistical significance only at 5%.   
 
Thus, the evidence suggests that both types of funds explain improvements in 
public entrepreneurship. In other words, they appear to be associated with 
potential entrepreneurial actions including co-operation management, grant-
application facilitation and win-win negotiations (Section 6.4.2.2). These actions 
might reflect a more proactive, risk taking and perhaps, even innovative 
behaviour. The conditional mandatory funds might encourage public 
entrepreneurship because the entrepreneurs are motivated by the entitlement of 
higher resources they can allocate among citizens, driving co-operation. In 
addition, the restrictions and conditions imposed by other government levels 
may motivate them to maximize efficiency. Unconditional funds might give room 
for entrepreneurial actions because of high levels of discretion. 
 
These results, however, are not highly consistent. If the model does not control 
for time fixed effects, the significance level of conditional mandatory funds still 
persist and the parameters become larger than for unconditional funds, for 
which statistical significance disappears (see Annex 1). However, this overview 
gives signs that positive changes in entrepreneurial behaviour are encouraged 
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Models of Public Entrepreneurship, decentralisation and political variables  
Up to this point, the results show that fiscal arrangements impact local 
authorities‟ behaviour differently. The two fiscal decentralisation indicators seem 
to explain positive changes in public entrepreneurship.  The next models 
investigate, whether and to what extent public entrepreneurship is affected or 
reinforced by the presence of the political variables will be tested.  
 
It needs to be highlighted that theoretically, the relationship between political 
variables and public entrepreneurship is weaker than for accountability. The 
association is that, in particular, higher political competition encourages local 
authorities to act in a more entrepreneurial fashion in order to win the next 
election. In this case the assumption is that higher political competition indicates 
a higher probability of losing the next election. Yardstick competition takes place 
where citizens compare the performance of their politicians. Therefore, local 
politicians are encouraged to act more entrepreneurially as a way to 
differentiate themselves from others and ensure that their party remains in 
power. 
 
In contrast to the Accountability models, both fiscal decentralisation variables 
appear to be positively correlated and statistically significant for Public 
Entrepreneurship in all models. However, unconditional funds lose their 
significance power once the interaction variable is included in the model. This 
indicates that the importance of unconditional funds may be conditional to the 
political circumstances in the municipality or in other words, the incentives of 
unconditional funds are linked to the political conditions in the municipality.  
 
As shown in Table 7.2, in this case political competition reaches statistically 
significance at the 5% level. However, it has a negative direction of association 
and this negative effect is reinforced by the interaction variable state-level 
opposition * political competition. Thus, in contrast to the theoretical 
assumption, this indicates a small direct but negative effect of political 
competition on public entrepreneurship.   
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Thus, as opposed to the analysis of accountability and the hypothesis for public 
entrepreneurship, the political variables appear to be more relevant for 
entrepreneurial behaviour. However, the fiscal decentralisation variables are 
likewise relevant.  
 
In Model 11, the political competition variable was added.  As in the model for 
accountability, the political competition variable follows a negative relationship. 
This is different to what is theoretically expected. This negative effect is 
reinforced with the introduction of the interaction variable in Model 14. 
 
In Model 12, state-level opposition was included and the parameters also 
present similar results as those for accountability- local governments from the 
same political parties as the governor have on average a lower score in public 
entrepreneurship. The rest of the models present similar results. However, it 
also does not reach statistical significance and the parameter is very small.   
 
In Model 13, the political party affiliation presents different results than for the 
Accountability model. In this case, the centre-right party (PAN) and coalitions 
have on average higher scores in public entrepreneurship index than the 
centre-left party (PRI) and other parties and coalitions have on average a lower 
score. However, the results are not statistically significant.  
 
In Model 14, the interaction variable reinforces the parameters of the political 
competition variable and decreases the significance level of unconditional 
funds, but it does not reach conventional statistical level. Contrarily to the 
accountability models, the parameters suggest that the higher the political 
competition in the municipalities, the more entrepreneurial actions take place in 
municipalities that belong to the same political party as the governor.  
 
Thus, high political competition seems to change the behavioural patterns of 
local authorities that belong to the same political party as the governor. The 
findings suggest that they might undertake fewer actions related to the 
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accountability score and more actions related to the public entrepreneurship 
score.  The results for entrepreneurship reach statistically significance if time 
fixed effects are not controlled (see Annex 1).  
 
As a reminder, after controlling for fiscal decentralisation and political 
competition, the state-level opposition variable indicated that local authorities 
from the same political party as the governor were likely to undertake fewer 
actions related to the accountability score and fewer actions related to public 
entrepreneurship score. Thus, the presence of higher political competition 
seems to condition the entrepreneurial behaviour of municipalities without state-
level opposition.  
 
Thus, political competition seems to have a direct effect on public 
entrepreneurship similar to the fiscal decentralisation indicators. However, 
contrarily to the fiscal decentralisation variables, the results suggest that 
political decentralisation seem to discourage public entrepreneurship.  
 
The model controlling only for municipal effects presents a similar direction of 
association but the significance level among them differs (see Annex 1). For 
instance, in the alternative model, the variable „unconditional fund‟ appears 
positively associated. However, it does not reach conventional significance level 
in the models with conditional mandatory funds.  
7.3 Empirical findings 
 
The empirical findings illustrate how important financial arrangements are in 
motivating local authorities to be more efficient.  Each type of grant seems to 
foster different types of actions. Changes in the level of unconditional grants 
appear to be negatively associated with accountability actions and this 
association explains most of the changes in the accountability index. On the 
other hand, changes in unconditional and conditional mandatory funds seem to 
make a significant contribution to explaining changes in public entrepreneurship 
(parameters are not too different but still unconditional funds appear to influence 
slightly more). However, only increases in conditional funds appear positively 
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associated with accountability and unconditional funds are highly negatively 
associated. Therefore, the positive effects of unconditional funds seem to trade 
off efficiency.    
 
This pattern may be explained by the financial dependency of rural 
municipalities.   Fisman and Gatti (2002b) suggest that corruption will depend 
on the appropriate level of revenues decentralised, with high dependency likely 
to follow corruption.  As explained before, this group of municipalities are highly 
dependent on state and federal funds. Thus, the concern in the fiscal 
decentralisation literature that high discretion in revenues may increase 
corruption might be reflected indirectly in limited public work and increased 
current spending.  
 
In contrast, the arrangements of conditional mandatory funds allow less 
discretion to local authorities but it increased local budget. In this case, the 
findings are consistent with the argument that tougher financial control imposed 
in conditional funds keeps local authorities accountable.   
 
The interesting point here is to find conflicting results- conditional mandatory 
funds improving accountability and unconditional funds discouraging 
accountability and encouraging public entrepreneurship. This brings us back to 
the discussion of the opposite virtues between public entrepreneurship and 
accountability values. The results may lead to the interpretation that 
entrepreneurs are likely to behave accountably to the extent they legitimize their 
entrepreneurial actions rather than as an accountability virtue. This may lead to 
poor use of unconditional funds in order to achieve their entrepreneurial aim.  
This is a complex relation beyond what these empirical indicators can explain. 
Therefore, it will be addressed in the second empirical phase.   
 
Previous empirical works in Mexican literature (Cabrero, 2005; Sour, 2004) 
have found that both fiscal arrangements under decentralisation result in 
problems of high dependency and as a result damage fiscal effort. In this 
research fiscal effort is a major component of the entrepreneurship index, so 
Fiscal Decentralisation and Behavioural Patterns:  
An empirical analysis correlates 
215 
 
this implies discouragement of entrepreneurial actions/a negative relationship 
with entrepreneurship scores. Indeed, in the sampled municipalities studied 
here, the descriptive analysis (Figure 6.2) shows little improvement in this 
aspect with a very slight increase in real values over almost 20 years. This is 
highly relevant for fiscal effort if we compare this trend to the sharp and 
consistent increases in grants. The fiscal effort- own revenues over total 
revenues- was on average 14.5% from 1990-1995 and decreased to an 
average 6.4% from 2005-2009 (see Table 6.8). The number of municipalities 
with good performance increased in the working sample slightly in contrast to 
the number of municipalities with poor performance which increased more and 
progressively.  Thus overall, fiscal effort has declined in the time period studied 
here- 2000, 2002 and 2009.  
 
It needs to be considered that achieving higher levels of own revenue collection 
is especially challenging for this group of municipalities because there are not 
only political costs, but also financial costs involved. Nevertheless, the empirical 
findings suggest that for every increase in conditional mandatory funds, rural 
local governments are not only likely to be more accountable, but also likely to 
act more entrepreneurially by engaging in more co-operation with different 
organisations and sectors. However, given the results, it seems that conditional 
mandatory funds are not the only and unique factor encouraging entrepreneurial 
behaviour. Unconditional funds may play a role and there are other unobserved 
factors.   
 
Thus, the results showing that conditional mandatory funds might promote 
positive changes in both accountability and public entrepreneurship challenge 
one of the theoretical assumptions of fiscal decentralisation - the claim that 
autonomy and discretion are key aspects to encourage better performance. 
Unconditional funds - which denote higher levels of discretion and allocation 
decision than conditional funds- are negatively correlated to accountability but 
positively related to entrepreneurship. The benefits from unconditional funds 
seem to be cancelled out or likely to be more detrimental for accountability as it 
seems the effect is higher in accountability than public entrepreneurship. In 
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contrast, conditional mandatory funds are found to encourage both 
accountability (partially as we cannot explain how it interacts with the negative 
impact of unconditional funds) and entrepreneurship. This implies that for rural 
municipalities, discretion might not be the only determinant for entrepreneurial 
behaviour and that dependency might not always demotivate local authorities 
as long as it is accompanied by higher levels of funding.    
 
In answering Question 1, the hypotheses drawn from the literature in which 
fiscal decentralisation encourages both accountability and public 
entrepreneurship is not entirely confirmed. The analysis suggests that the 
direction of association might depend on the type of fiscal arrangement. In rural 
municipalities, accountability and public entrepreneurship benefit from increases 
in conditional mandatory funds. The increases in entrepreneurship due to 
unconditional funds might be cancelled out by its negative effects on 
accountability. How and in what ways this happens will be investigated in stage 
two.  
 
The contending findings of conditional mandatory funds and unconditional funds  
supports the argument that fiscal decentralisation may lead to different 
behavioural patterns. 
 
In regard to the political landscape, the findings suggest that political 
competition and the rest of the political variables seem to reinforce the negative 
effects on accountability and it also suggests that political competition might 
have a more direct and larger (negative) impact on public entrepreneurship in a 
decentralised setting compared to accountability.  
 
A consistent interpretation is that, “being in opposition” seems to be an incentive 
for both accountability and public entrepreneurship. The evidence is that in both 
models (accountability and public entrepreneurship) political parties that belong 
to the same political party than the government have lower changes in 
accountability and public entrepreneurship than the ones that are opposition.  
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In answering part of question 2- whether differences in the level of political 
competition had a major effect on whether and in what ways patterns of 
accountability and public entrepreneurship change following fiscal 
decentralisation, the results appear to indicate that: 
 
a) Political competition does not have a major effect on patterns of 
accountability but the political variables may reinforce (the negative effect 
of) fiscal decentralisation through unconditional funds 
 
b) The political variables might play a more direct (negative) role on public 
entrepreneurship but the financial variables are likely to have similar, but 
positive, effects. 
  
 7.3 Summary  
 
In this chapter the association of fiscal decentralisation and political competition 
is empirically explored in relation to both forms of behaviour, accountability and 
public entrepreneurship. In both cases, the financial arrangements explain more 
of the changes in behavioural patterns but in distinct directions. This seems to 
support the arguments that accountability and public entrepreneurship lead to 
different behavioural patterns and that they have contending values.    
 
The decentralisation variables appear more relevant in explaining both 
accountability and public entrepreneurship than political competition and the 
findings for fiscal decentralisation are more robust.   
 
Up to now behaviours have been explored separately, based on the assumption 
that these patterns are related to the outcomes (government performance) and 
that they might impact the outcomes differently. In the next chapter, these 
assumptions will be explored empirically using the same constructs for 
accountability and public entrepreneurship. 
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Chapter 8 - Behavioural patterns and government performance: An 
empirical analysis correlates 
 
 
This Chapter intends to answer research question 3 that asks about the extent 
to which fiscal decentralisation in rural local governments is associated with 
measurable changes in local government performance. However, in order to 
answer this question, it is first necessary to explore whether the behaviours 
measured here are associated with government performance. Drawing from the 
literature, these behaviours should have a positive impact on performance, 
independently of the fiscal arrangements effects.  
 
In this research, government performance is measured as Coverage of Basic 
Public Services. It is acknowledged that Coverage of Basic Public Services is 
only a small part of government performance but nevertheless it is a significant 
indicator for rural municipalities and the best indicator available over time.  
 
8.1 Behavioural actions and changes in Government performance  
 
In the previous analysis, there was some evidence to suggest that the type of 
fiscal arrangements explain more the motivation of local authorities to behave 
either with more accountability or more entrepreneurially than political 
competition does. In this Chapter, to some extent, it is intended to corroborate 
these findings.  Whether accountability and public entrepreneurship actions, 
respectively, are associated with changes in government performance is first 
tested, and then the importance of political indicators is analysed.  
 
Local government performance is a key focus of the overall research study 
because it is the ultimate policy aim. For the purpose of this research, 
government performance is measured as the absolute change in the coverage 
of potable water and sewerage in the municipality or Coverage of Basic Public 
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Services, for short (CBPS). Figure 8.1 illustrates the part of the theoretical 
framework it intends to assess.  
 
 
Figure  8.1 Research question 3 (Part 1) and the theoretical framework  
  
 
As in the previous section, accountability and public entrepreneurship are 
explored separately because time observations are different. First, the main 
independent continuous variables will be presented in a simple model. In this 
case the continuous variables are accountability and public entrepreneurship. 
Then the political variables will be added to these models.  
 
8.1.1 Accountability, political variables and changes in Government 
performance  
 
In this section, the association between accountability and political variables 
with government performance is explored. The dependent variable is CBPS, as 
a measure of government performance.  
 
The reference regression model is the following: 
 
 
where  is the outcome variable of interest: Coverage of Basic Public Services 
in municipality i at time t. The index is a continuous variable between 0 and 
100%.  
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 is a measure of accountability in municipality i at time t as measured before. 
 
Pit is the vector of political variables, and includes: political competition, state-
level opposition and political party affiliation, as before. 
 
is a municipality fixed effect to account for municipality-specific and time 
invariant factors such as culture, geography or any other persistent 
characteristics, that might affect the outcome of interest. 
 
All variables will be added in a stepwise manner to the model. 
 
This model is estimated for the sample of 505 municipalities using data for the 
following years 1995, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2009. In this model the analysis 
controlling only for municipality-specific is presented because the model fit is 
better.  In Annex 1 the reader can find the model with time-fixed effects. 
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Table  8.1 Statistical analysis models of Government Performance and Accountability 







































Non-State-level opposition (0) 
 (=1 if there is state-level 
opposition;=0 otherwise) 












OTHERS PARTIES AND 
COALITIONS  
Omitted category =PRI+C 




Non-State-level opposition (0)* 
Political Competition  




 0.45 0.55 0.56 .056 .56 
No. municipalities  505 505 505 505 505 
Years 5 5 5 5 5 
Observations  2525 2525 2525 2525 2525 
Note: Dependent variable CBPS. Standard errors are in brackets. The results are presented in 
standardised values. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05. McFadden's Pseudo R
2 
with best fitted model (-2 
Restricted Log Likelihood)
   
is used.
42
 These models include municipality-specific fixed effects. 
 
Accountability as single effect 
 
The hypothesis is that improvements in CBPS can be explained by changes in 
accountability.   
 
                                                          
42
  Mixed linear model does not provide with a model of fit. The most common Pseudo R
2  
 used in this 
type of analysis is the McFadden's Pseudo R
2  
 in the form of: 
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Drawing from the literature, a positive (but not very strong) association between 
accountability levels and government performance is expected to be found 
based on the theoretical argument that changes in these actions are reflected in 
the government‟s outcomes. In other words, better accountability actions impact 
the level of efficiency in local governments.   
Accountability might lead to government performance because the 
accountability actions studied here may lead to deliver the mix of goods and 
services in the way local citizens prefer. This can potentially lead to greater 
allocative efficiency, but also, to some extent, gains in productive efficiency 
resulting in good government performance.  
 
If the theoretical framework is correct, and the arguments valid, the 
accountability index should be positively associated with government 
performance but its impact on government performance should be smaller and 
weaker than the entrepreneurship index (this will be compared in Section 8.1.3). 
 
As shown in Table 8.1 (Model 15), the statistical analysis shows that 
accountability index is positively correlated to CBPS (r (505) = .067, SE= .007). 
This means that changes in accountability lead to better government 
performance as predicted. The parameter is small but highly statistically 
significant.  
 
Models of Accountability and political variables  
 
Table 8.1 shows the different models discussed next. In all models, the 
accountability index holds the direction of the theoretical framework. It is highly 
positively associated with government performance.  
 
In Models 16 to 18, political competition appears to be also highly statistically 
significant at p<.001 and with the expected direction. In model 19 the 
significance level drops at p<.01.  
 
Behavioural Patterns and Government Performance:  
An empirical analysis correlates 
223 
 
In model 17, the state-level opposition variable appears statistically insignificant 
but the parameters suggest that municipalities that belong to the same political 
party as the state governor have on average smaller changes in CBPS. This 
appears to be a constant finding. In the previous analysis, the association 
between state-level opposition, accountability and public entrepreneurship 
indicated analogous results.    
 
In Models 18 and 19, the variable political party affiliations for PAN + Coalitions 
reaches conventional significance level at 5% and others parties + Coalitions do 
not reach a conventional statistical level but the parameters suggest that both 
political parties have a slightly higher score than PRI + Coalitions.   
 
In Model 19, the interaction variable does not reach a conventional statistical 
level but it affects (decreases) the parameter and significance level of political 
competition variables. The parameters of the interaction variable suggest that 
the higher the political competition in the municipalities, the higher the average 
of CBPS in municipalities that belong to the same political party.    
 
Similar to the previous analyses, the political variables are not as robust as, in 
this case, behavioural patterns (see Annex 1).  
Hence, in these models accountability and political competition are important 
indicators for government performance but accountability has a slightly higher 
effect. 
 
After reading these findings, the first question to consider is why political 
competition appears positive and relevant for government performance, but the 
direction of association appears negative for the behavioural patterns. This 
question will be reviewed during the empirical discussion of this Section.  Again, 
these are very interesting findings but we need to test whether they hold once 
the public entrepreneurship variable is in the picture.   
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8.1.2 Public Entrepreneurship, political variables and changes in 
Government performance  
 
Public entrepreneurship might lead to improved government performance 
because the public entrepreneurship actions studied here intend to portray the 
involvement of local authorities in more projects (pro-activeness) that may 
involve higher levels of risk and innovation. This can potentially lead to greater 
productive efficiency, but to a lesser extent, it might also lead to gains in 
allocative efficiency resulting in good government performance. Thus, the 
association between public entrepreneurship and government performance is 
analysed as well as the association of political variables.  
 
In this section, whether public entrepreneurship is associated with local 
government performance will be explored and to what extent it is influenced or 
reinforced by the presence of the political variables. 
 




where  is the outcome variable of interest: Coverage of Basic Public Services 
in municipality i at time t as above.  
 
 is a measure of Public Entrepreneurship in municipality i at time t as 
measured before. 
 
Pit is a vector of political variables and includes political competition, state-level 
opposition and political party affiliation. 
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is a municipality fixed effect to account for municipality-specific and time 
invariant factors such as culture, geography or any other persistent 
characteristics that might affect the outcome of interest. 
 
All variables will be added in a stepwise manner to the model as before.  
 
The observations in this analysis are the years 2000, 2002, and 2009. There 
are less time periods because of the large set of missing data for the public 
entrepreneurship index in the other surveys. This analysis includes only 
municipality fixed effect. In Annex 1 the models are presented with municipality 
and time-fixed effects. A positive association between public entrepreneurship 
and government performance is expected to be found. 
 
In Annex 1, the models controlling for both time and municipality fixed effects 
are also added.  
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Non-State-level opposition (0)  
 (=1 if there is state-level 
opposition;=0 otherwise) 












OTHERS PARTIES AND 
COALITIONS  
Omitted category =PRI+C 




Non-State-level opposition (0)  * 
Political Competition  









No. municipalities  505 505 505 505 505 
Years 3 3 3 3 3 
Observations  1,515 1,515 1,515 1,515 1,515 
Note: Dependent variable CBPS. Standard errors are in brackets. The results are presented in 
standardised values. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05. McFadden's Pseudo R
2 
with best fitted model (-2 
Restricted Log Likelihood)
   
is used.
43
 These models include municipality-specific fixed effects.  
 
 
Public entrepreneurship as a single effect 
 
If the theoretical framework is correct, the public entrepreneurship index should 
be positively associated with government performance and it should a have 
higher impact than the accountability index.  
                                                          
43
  Mixed linear model does not provide with a model of fit. The most common Pseudo R
2  
 used in this 
type of analysis is the McFadden's Pseudo R
2  
 in the form of: 
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As shown in Table 8.2 (Model 20), the statistical analysis suggests that the 
public entrepreneurship index is highly positively associated with CBPS (r (505) 
= .080,    SE= .012, p<.001). This means that changes in public 
entrepreneurship lead to better government performance. The parameter is 
slightly larger than for the accountability index as predicted.  
 
Models of Public entrepreneurship and Political variables  
Another theoretical implication is that CBPS is encouraged by political 
competition because it works as a reward or punishment mechanism where 
citizens judge local authorities. Therefore, local authorities try to satisfy voters 
by undertaking actions that improve efficiency of any sort.  
 
In all models, public entrepreneurship index follows the direction of the 
theoretical framework. It is positively associated with government performance 
and statistically significant at p<.001.  
 
In Model 21, political competition reaches a conventional statistically 
significance level at 1% but the parameters are lower than the public 
entrepreneurship variable. The significance level decreased with the addition of 
other political variables. 
 
In Model 22, the state-level opposition variable reaches a conventional 
statistical significance level at 1%.  The parameters seem to indicate that 
municipalities belonging to the same political party as the governor have on 
average smaller changes in CBPS, after controlling for public entrepreneurship 
and political competition. This result has been constant through all the models 
studied so far.   
 
In Models 23 and 24, similar to the accountability and governance model above, 
the parameters suggest that, PAN + Coalitions and Others parties + Coalitions 
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have on average a higher score in CBPS than PRI + Coalitions. In this case, the 
variable PAN + Coalitions is statistically significant.   
 
In Model 24, as in the accountability and government performance model, the 
interaction variable does not reach a conventional statistical level and the 
parameters suggest that the higher the level of political competition in the 
municipalities, the lower the average of CBPS in municipalities that belong to 
the same political party.  It affects the parameters of the political competition 
variable and the significance level of PAN + Coalitions.  
 
Similar to the previous analyses, the political variables are not as robust as, in 
this case, the entrepreneurship variable (see Annex 1).   
 
Thus, the public entrepreneurship index follows the theoretical framework 
direction. It is highly positively associated with government performance and it 
is the most important and robust indicator explaining changes in government 
performance in the model.  
 
8.1.3 Empirical findings 
 
The findings seem to corroborate that the measures of accountability and public 
entrepreneurship used in this research are related to government performance 
in the indicated indirection.   
 
This adds more reliability to the results.  Answering research question 3- to 
what extent fiscal decentralisation in rural local governments is associated with 
measurable changes in local government performance, the main finding is that 
public entrepreneurship explains more of the changes in CBPS than both 
accountability and the political variables. In addition, accountability explains 
slightly more than the political variables in CBPS.  
 
Therefore, as conditional mandatory funds are highly related to public 
entrepreneurship, then fiscal decentralisation via conditional mandatory funds is 
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likely associated with positive changes in local government performance due to 
changes in public entrepreneurship.  However, the opposite is true for 
unconditional funds as they seem to cancel out the benefits of public 
entrepreneurship with the deterioration of accountability. The negative impact of 
unconditional funds seems to be larger than the positive impact of conditional 
funds on accountability and still larger than the positive effects on public 
entrepreneurship.  
 
Returning to the question of why political variables are more relevant in the 
model of government performance compared to the model of accountability and 
public entrepreneurship and why they have a different direction of association, 
the interpretation of the researcher is that the parameters are capturing the 
political favouritism in the municipalities. The indicator of governance is 
measured in absolute changes of two basic public services. This indicator can 
be influenced easily by favouritism in the municipality as other government 
levels might favour specific municipalities for grants that facilitate investment in 
this account. In contrast, the behavioural index measures actions that are not 
easily related to favouritism and therefore, it might indicate a negative influence 
of political competition. In other words, in the theory of fiscal decentralisation the 
means and ends are different. 
 
To some extent, these findings support the argument that the extent of 
government performance may vary depending on the type of behaviour that 
predominates. Therefore, it is evidently important to understand what drives 
each type of behaviour.  
 
Thus, in this chapter the relationship between the behavioural patterns of 
accountability, public entrepreneurship and government performance have been 
explored. The results suggest that there is evidence of positive association 
between these variables as theoretically expected but to a different extent. 
  
This supports the hypotheses that each fiscal arrangement might promote 
specific behavioural patterns; and that each type of behaviour impacts 
Behavioural Patterns and Government Performance:  
An empirical analysis correlates 
230 
 
performance differently, with public entrepreneurship being the one with the 
greater effect.  
 
Up to this point, information has been analysed after the introduction of 
conditional funds. Given the relevance of conditional funds to behavioural 
patterns and as argued here, government performance, it makes sense to 
explore whether and in what ways government performance changed with the 
introduction of these funds. As there is not enough information to measure the 
indicators of accountability and public entrepreneurship evaluated here before 
and after the 1997 reform, the changes in the political landscape have been 
explored.  
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Chapter 9 - Fiscal decentralisation and Government performance before 
and after the 1997 reform: An empirical analysis correlates 
 
In this section, two similar models are built to observe changes in government 
performance before and after the introduction of conditional funds. A model is 
run that explores the political landscape in rural local governments before the 
conditional mandatory funds were created and then, exactly the same model is 
run for the period after the introduction of the reform.  
 
As in the previous analysis, political competition is expected to encourage 
investment in public services because local authorities a) feel a stronger social 
commitment with their electorates and 2) their performance might impact their 
party‟s further re-election knowing that opposition is also strong.  
 
In contrast to the previous statistical analysis, the aim of these models is to 
observe changes in the political variables as these may show some relevant 
changes that could be used for interpretation.  
 
Figure 9.1 illustrates the part of the theoretical framework that this chapter 
intends to assess. In one of the analyses, conditional mandatory funds did not 
exist. In the second analysis, the conditional mandatory funds were already in 
place.  
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Figure  9.1 Research question 3 (Part 2) and the theoretical framework  
 
 
9.1 Government performance and political competition before and after 
the 1997 fiscal reform.  
 
It is important to notice that conditional mandatory funds after the reform are not 
added to this model because the CBPS variable is closely related to conditional 
mandatory funds. Some conditional mandatory funds are earmarked to basic 
public services including the ones studied here. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the level of investment in basic public services increased in these specific 
services after the conditional mandatory funds were introduced and therefore, it 
is not surprising that an increase in conditional mandatory funds should be 
highly related to improvements in CBPS.  Therefore the statistical relationship 
between conditional mandatory funds and government performance is not 
observed. Instead the focus is on what has changed in the association of 
political variables and government performance before and after the creation of 
the conditional mandatory funds. 
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For that purpose the baseline model is estimated: 
 
 
where , is the outcome variable of interest: Coverage of Basic Public 
Services in municipality i at time t measured as before.   
 
 is a measure of political competition in municipality i at time t as before.  
 
Pit is the vector of other political variables, and include: state-level opposition 
and political party affiliation as before. 
 
is a municipality fixed effect to account for municipality-specific and time 
invariant factors such as culture, geography or any other persistent 
characteristics that might affect the outcome of interest. 
 
t is a time fixed effect controlling for country-wide shocks that affect all 
municipalities equally. 
 
All variables will be added in a stepwise manner to the models as before. 
 
These models are estimated for the (same) sample of 505 rural municipalities 
as before. The model is recreated twice, once for the pre-reform period from 
1990 to 1997 and once for the post-reform period 1998 to 2009. Periods are not 
included as dummy variables. The analysis was run with different databases. 
Table 11.2 presents the pre-reform and post-reform models.  
 
The model is recreated twice: for the pre-reform period (from 1990 to 1997) and 
the post-reform period (1998-2009). Periods are not included as dummy 
variables. The analysis was run with different databases. These models are 
estimated for the sample of 505 rural municipalities. 
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The assumption is that before the 1997 reform, from 1990-1997, federal 
government had highly centralised decision making in terms of basic public 
service provision and, from 1998-2009, local governments were granted 
conditional mandatory funds, specifically those for basic public infrastructure 
and they enjoyed more decision making and freedom in allocation. This may 
have changed the association of political variables before and after the reform.   
 
By now, an idea of what should be expected in the post-reform period is already 
emerging. To recall, the models of government performance and behavioural 
patterns discussed earlier also explore the relationship between the outcome 
variables and political variables. There are two differences between these 
models: 
a) The post-reform model to be studied here does not include the 
variables for accountability and public entrepreneurship as do the models 
of government performances and behavioural patterns. Therefore, the 
focus of the post-reform model is on the political landscape of the 
municipality 
b) The post-reform model includes more time periods in the data from 
1997 to 2009. The models of government performance and behavioural 
patterns only include the years 1995, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009 in the 
analysis  
 
Based on these findings the hypotheses that can be drawn are that the 
introduction of conditional funds did make a difference in government 
performance if:  
 
a) Political competition was a stronger indicator before the reform.  
b) Municipalities with state-level opposition before the reform had limited 
access to resources allocated to basic public services by the state. This 
might lead to lower mean scores in CBPS in the pre-reform for 
municipalities with state-level opposition.  
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The reason for lower mean score before the reform is political rivalry. Governors 
might have denied grants to the municipalities governed by opposition parties. 
The higher score after the reform may imply that the reform of 1997, which gave 
municipalities autonomy to allocate public services and eliminated state 
discretion by establishing mandatory conditional funds encourage/ enable 
performance even in the presence of state-level opposition.   
 
The majority of Governors were from the political party PRI. Therefore, it can be 
the case that opposition parties were discriminated against the distribution of 
grants as they were opposition. This might lead to (statistically significant) lower 
mean scores of CBPS for PAN+ Coalitions and Other Parties and Coalition in 
the pre-reform.  
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Table  9.1 Models of Government Performance Pre and Post-reform 


























Non-State-level opposition (0) 













OTHERS PARTIES AND COALITIONS  
Omitted category =PRI+C 








 0.048 0.083 .090 .089 
Municipalities  505 505 505 505 
Years 8 8 8 8 


























Non-State-level opposition (0) 













OTHERS PARTIES AND COALITIONS  
Omitted category =PRI+C 








 0.033 0.037 .038 .037 
Municipalities  505 505 505 505 
Years 12 12 12 12 
Observations 6,060 6,060 6,060 6,060 
Note: Dependent variable CBPS. Standard errors are in brackets. The results are presented in 
standardised values. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05. McFadden's Pseudo R
2 
with best fitted model (-2 
Restricted Log Likelihood)
   
is used.
44
 These models include municipality and time fixed effects.  
 
                                                          
44
  Mixed linear model do not provide with a model of fit. The most common Pseudo R2   used in this type of analysis is the McFadden's Pseudo R2   in 
the form of: 
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As shown in Table 9.1, political competition is statistically significant as a single 
effect before and after the introduction of conditional funds.  This suggests that 
the level of political competition appears to be associated with higher 
investment in CBPS. In both periods, the political competition variable is highly 
significant at p<.001 but the impact is slightly higher in the post-reform period. 
This is opposite to the hypothesis stated above that political competition was a 
stronger indicator before the reform.   
  
Political competition appears to be a significant factor for government 
performance before and after the reform.  The state-level opposition variable 
appears more significant in the pre-reform models (27-29). It presents higher 
coefficients and it reaches a significance level at p<.001.  The parameters 
suggest that in both cases, municipalities that belong to the same political party 
as the governor have on average a lower score in CBPS. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that municipalities with state-level opposition before the reform had 
limited access to resources allocated to basic public services by the state is not 
supported. This confirms Moreno-Jaimes‟s (2007) findings that there is no 
difference in service coverage in municipalities with state-level opposition but 
this study finds evidence particularly in rural municipalities. In fact, this may 
indicate and reinforce the researcher‟s interpretation that being in opposition to 
the state governor may lead to better performance per se.  
 
An interesting result here is that the differences in parameters between 
municipalities with state and without state-level opposition appear considerably 
different between periods. Therefore, the incentive of being in opposition is not 
as strong as before.  
 
In Models 28-29, the political party variable shows that before and after the 
reform, PAN + Coalitions have higher score of CBPS than PRI + Coalitions and 
Other parties and Coalitions have lower score. Only PAN + C reach a statistical 
level at 1% after the reform where the parameters are larger.  This might be a 
consequence of the decentralisation reform.  
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Reading both state-level opposition variable and political party affiliation 
together, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that opposition parties 
were discriminated against before the reform.  
 
In Models 29 and 32, the significance level and the parameters of political 
competition are captured by the introduction of the interaction variable, but the 
interaction does not reach conventional significance level before or after the 
reform. In both periods, the parameters indicate that in high politically 
competitive municipalities where the local government and the governor come 
from the same political party, the CBPS tends to be higher. The same might not 
true if there is lack of political competition in the municipality. In this case,   the 
CBPS tends to be lower.  
 
Even though the results are not statistically significant, a general picture can be 
drawn depicting how the political situation might influence  some cases and that 
state intervention may occur only when local authorities belong to the same 
political party as the governor and there is a “warning sign” that the next 
election could be lost. Perhaps this is particular to this group of municipalities as 
they do not represent an important electoral weight.  
 
Hence, the importance of the political circumstances and intervention in this 
group of municipalities cannot be discarded, but also high changes in political 
dynamics cannot be attributed to the fiscal decentralisation reform at least in 
this group of municipalities and based on these explanatory variables.  Although 
the results are not robust, the evidence reflects a complex relationship that is 
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9.2 Empirical findings 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that favouritism for this group of municipalities 
before or after the introduction of the reform is only due to opposition status. 
However, intervention may occur under conditions of high political competition. 
Hence, municipalities with mayors from the same political party as the governor 
may be supported by state party/state government. Contrarily, the same 
municipality can win the local election without high levels of competition and the 
state party might not prioritise support to these municipalities.   This is plausible 
given that this group of municipalities are not politically important with regard to 
votes. This, however, needs further evidence. 
 
In addition, the evidence suggests and reaffirms the previous findings that 
“opposition status” encourages good performance. Municipalities with state-
level opposition have slightly higher changes in performance regardless of the 
fiscal arrangements in place. However, the introduction of conditional funds may 
have made it easy for opposition parties to differentiate themselves from others.  
 
It is important to clarify that large changes in parameters or closely fitted models 
were not expected because government performance is multidimensional and 
difficult to define and measure.  
 
9.3 Bridging methodology approaches  
 
In order to understand the relationship between the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses, it will be helpful to revisit the diagram in which the basic argument 
under investigation is illustrated. 
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In the previous chapters, using secondary data from a number of sources, the 
researcher examined the extent to which a growth in rural municipalities‟ fiscal 
resources and spending power was associated with changes in 
entrepreneurship and accountability, as measured by indices constructed from 
a range of governmental and other data sources. Whether these changes were 
partly or even wholly associated with changes in levels of political competition 
was also investigated, which is itself highly likely to affect municipalities‟ 
behaviour.  
 
As has been seen, significant changes were indeed apparent. These changes 
were, however, very strongly affected by whether or not the increases in fiscal 
resources were themselves associated with stringent controls („conditional 
funds‟) or involved funds where municipalities had a great deal more discretion 
in how they used them.  
 
To summarise the findings: 
 
 Fiscal decentralisation involving changes in unconditional (high 
discretion) funds is negatively associated with accountability measures 
 Fiscal decentralisation involving changes in unconditional (high 
discretion) funds is highly associated with changes in entrepreneurship 
as measured on the constructed index. These positive changes seem to 
be smaller than the negative effects in accountability and its significance 
power might depend on the political circumstances (political competition 
and state-level opposition) 
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 Fiscal decentralisation involving changes in conditional mandatory (low 
discretion) funds is highly positively associated with increases in 
accountability 
 Fiscal decentralisation involving changes in conditional mandatory (low 
discretion) funds is positively associated with increases in public 
entrepreneurship 
 Changes in accountability are positively related to government 
performance and the impact of accountability is lower than the impacts of 
public entrepreneurship  
 Public entrepreneurship seems to contribute directly to changes in 
government performance. The impact is larger than the drivers related to 
the political circumstances in the municipality 
 
An important remark is that the financial variables and the public 
entrepreneurship variable are robust in all the analyses performed. They hold 
the direction of association and they also reached a conventional statistical 
level. The results for the accountability index were also consistent. This was not 
the case with the political variables.      
 
The way political competition influences behavioural patterns and government 
performance seems to be more complex than is theoretically suggested. The 
main findings are: 
 There is not enough evidence to suggest that favouritism was present 
before the decentralisation reform of 1997 in regard to funds allocation  
 Political competition seems to reinforce the negative effects on 
accountability and it seems to have a negative impact on public 
entrepreneurship 
 Political competition seems to be relevant for government performance 
but its impact is lesser than the impact of the decentralisation 
arrangements 
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 Political competition becomes more relevant when it reinforces other 
political variables particularly if interpreted as a “warning sign” of losing 
the next elections   
 Being in opposition seems to drive accountability, public 
entrepreneurship and therefore, government performance  
 
Thus, the quantitative data, suggest overall, that the latest reform of fiscal 
decentralisation seems to have contributed to improved government 
performance. The reason is, to some extent, because of the fiscal arrangement 
it took via mandatory conditional funds.   
 
Mandatory conditional funds, which present lower levels of discretion, are 
important for positive changes in public entrepreneurship and accountability. In 
contrast, unconditional funds, which enjoy a larger degree of discretion, are 
likely to trade off efficiency. Politics seem also to be a relevant factor but not as 
theoretically expected. There is a complex dynamic beyond what can be 
interpreted from these analyses.  
 
But how and why might this occur? Are these findings consistent with the way 
decision-making and politics actually occur „on the ground‟? When we look in 
detail at how rural municipalities operate, and how they have changed since the 
fiscal reforms, do our results seem to be consistent with these national 
patterns?  Do they indicate how the latter might be emerging, and validate them 
by providing a convincing narrative of events since 1997? Or do they suggest 
that the quantitative data – which are inherently constrained by government 
agencies‟ own data collection responsibilities and capabilities – are actually 
missing important processes?   
 
In looking at „ground level reality‟, a case study approach was adopted, 
involving selected municipalities chosen in terms of the variables which were 
central to the quantitative data. The case studies themselves looked at the 
component variables of the index, in order to get a concrete sense of what 
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changes (or lack of change) these might actually involve. In addition, the case 
studies provided an opportunity to look at some aspects of both accountability 
and entrepreneurship which were not covered by available databases and 
therefore could not be included in the quantitative part of the study.  
 
For accountability  
 
a) Closeness to the people- The theory of decentralisation is founded on 
the argument of responsiveness to preferences and local authorities are 
thought to be closer to their constituencies. However, being close to the 
people does not mean per se that citizens‟ preferences are materialized 
 
b) Citizens‟ participation- In his famous work, “Making Democracy Work”, 
Putnam (1993) claims that “civic community” as a reference to civic 
engagement, political equity, solidarity, trust and tolerance is the most 
important performance indicator for successful decentralisation policies  
 
c) Corruption- There is a concern that delegation of financial autonomy with 
discretion is accompanied by higher levels of corruption in lower 
government levels.  This is based on two assumptions. First,  local 
authorities do not enjoy as many career incentives as  public servants do 
in other government levels (Prud‟homme, 1995 and Tanzi, 1996) and 
second, because of the contingency factor (Tanzi, 1996), or a close 
relationship between local employees which may lead to favouritism  
 
 
For public entrepreneurship  
 
a) Risk taking- Decentralisation is argued to enable local authorities to 
become more adaptable to economic changes (MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999 cited in Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008, 58) and it implies that 
local authorities will be more willing to take risks in local projects for the 
progress of their constituencies  
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b) Experimentation- Under decentralised settings, Tanzi (1996) claims that 
successful policies can be learnt and transferred among municipalities. 
This suggests greater innovation, which is a public entrepreneurship 
dimension  
 
c) Pro-activeness- Decentralisation assumes that undeveloped areas will 
pursue either public funds or private investment by using bargaining 
power and first-hand information   
 
Chapters 13 to 14 will report the results of this part of the study. They address 
research questions 4 and 5: 
 
What are the identifiable changes affecting accountability and public 
entrepreneurship in rural local government? 
In what ways has fiscal decentralisation encouraged accountability and 
public entrepreneurship?   
 
These research questions examine the extent to which, in selected 
municipalities, evidence of direct links between the fiscal changes and 
behaviour can be identified; the degree to which these are consistent with the 


















Chapter 10 - Research Methods 
 
This element of the research adopts a case study approach in order to explore 
in detail the impact of the decentralisation theory on the ground. This chapter 
explains why semi-structured interviews were used as a research technique to 
collect the data for analysis and how this research selected, handled and 
interpreted the qualitative data to ensure validity and reliability of the findings.   
 
10.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
 
The qualitative method used to collect information is semi-structured interviews.  
The reason this method was used is the flexibility to open a wider range of 
topics and to go further in the discussion of certain issues when it is necessary 
and relevant. Semi-structured interviews are also more appropriate in regard to 
the research question because they allowed incentives to be found that are less 
obvious to the researcher.  
 
The researcher also attempted to collect information from documentation and 
records in the municipalities but this particular group of municipalities lacked 




The interviews were carried out in five rural municipalities in Mexico. These 
varied in terms of their (actual) scores on the indices and to provide different 
approaches to fiscal decentralisation: and more specifically the distribution 
arrangement of unconditional funds from state to municipalities.45 The first pilot 
municipality was personally familiar to the researcher, and the other four were 
                                                          
45
 Nowadays, the transfers from federal to state governments are more standardized mainly after a reform 
in 2007 which simplified and enhanced the redistribution formulas to promote financial incentives. 
However, the reform of 2007 was not expanded to the redistribution between state and municipalities, 




not. Ten interviews (nine in one of the cases) were collected in each of main 
group of four municipalities, each one in a different state. This was in addition to 
the five interviews carried out in the pilot study. A total of forty-four interviews 
were performed. The interviews lasted forty minutes on average.  
 
As a federal system, the state governments in Mexico are entitled to distribute 
resources using their own criteria.  Therefore, there are differences in the 
intergovernmental system used to allocate resources from state to 
municipalities, mainly in regard to unconditional funds. According to Peña and 
Wence (2011), the main arrangements can be classified as distributivo 
(distributive), resarcitorio (fiscal effort) and inercial (historical) or a combination 
of these, depending on the variables used in the formulas to calculate the 
redistribution of resources.    The distributive type includes population count, 
territorial extension or the number of localities within the municipality; historical 
type is based on historical percentages, or the guarantee of providing at least 
the same level of resources as in previous years; and the fiscal effort type takes 
into account fiscal effort and local economic growth. 
 
The arrangement can change between administrations because it is legislated 
by state parliaments. This research selected one state government that fell into 
each formula-type, valid in 2011, based on Peña and Wence‟s study (2011). As 
this research investigates and collects information ranging from a wide time 
span, if these arrangements are relevant, they should be captured in the field-
work.   
 
As shown in Figure 10.1, Puebla, Guanajuato, Hidalgo and Tamaulipas are the 
states where the field work was carried out.46 Puebla was considered to use the 
distributive and historical types; Guanajuato a fiscal effort type; Hidago a 
distributive type; and Tamauipas a distributive type. In Tamaulipas one 
municipality was the pilot study and one was selected based on performance.     
                                                          
46
 The original idea was to carry out interviews in another state, San Luis Potosi instead of two 
municipalities in Tamaulipas. However, one day before travelling to the selected municipality, the local 
police chief and other members of the local government were kidnapped and the local police chief was 
found dead. This event created tension in the city. Therefore, I decided not to go ahead and instead, I 





Figure  10.1 Location of States on the map of Mexico 
Source: researcher‟s own elaboration  
 
Once the states were selected, municipalities with high levels of performance in 
accountability, in entrepreneurship, in the accumulated index, as well as poor 
accumulated performance in these four states, were selected. The selection 
considers growth overtime in performance, as well as absolute values.  
 
Based on the findings of the pilot study, the participants selected were mainly 
elected members of municipalities (mayors and councillors). During fieldwork, 
the intention was to collect information from local authorities from different 
administrative periods, as well as different political parties. At least one mayor 
from the period before the reform in 1997 was interviewed. In addition, a 
journalist and a former trustee were interviewed because the participants 
proposed them as key informants. The local council includes both the ruling 
group and the minority groups, or opposition. Opposition should be highly 






Table 10.1 summarises the number of interviews according to the participants‟ 
characteristics.   
 
Table  10.1 Description of participants 
STRUCTURE Total 
POSITION MAYOR (M) 21 




JOURNALIST (J) 1 


















GENDER MALE 30 
FEMALE 9 
 
10.3 Validity and Reliability  
 
Qualitative methods, as quantitative methods, also call for methodological rigour 
in order to enhance the quality of the research. Because validity and reliability 
are concepts developed in the quantitative approach, a theoretical discussion is 
whether these concepts should be transferred and applied to the qualitative 
paradigm to judge research quality.  
 
Broadly speaking, reliability means that results are both consistent over time, 
and that they represent the total population and therefore, can be replicated and 
generalized; and validity refers to whether the instruments truly measure the 
phenomenon intended.   
 
Some scholars have argued that the broad concepts of validity and reliability 
are suitable for all research paradigms because the main aim is to provide 




2001; Yin, 1994) (in Morse et al, 2002, 3). On the other hand, some qualitative 
methodologists have argued that reliability and validity were not pertinent to the 
qualitative paradigm and inquiry (Morse et al, 2002, 2).  
 
Other scholars have suggested a number of terms that either substitute  or add 
new characteristics to validity and reliability criteria (Seale 1999, 465) under the 
assumption that a study should be judged by the terms of its own paradigm 
(Healy and Perry, 2000).  For instance, Guba and Lincoln (1985, 1981) 
substituted validity and reliability for the term “trustworthiness” containing 
aspects such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability 
(Morse et al, 2002, 2). 
 
Regardless of labels, there are different strategies to maintain validity and 
reliability in qualitative research, and a crucial step is to select these strategies. 
Creswell and Miller (2000) suggest selecting the strategies based on the lens 
chosen to validate the research (his own, participants and external reviewers) 
and the researcher‟s paradigm assumption. On the other hand, Morse et al. 
(2002) state that recently, the strategies used for validity and reliability- mainly 
derived from the strategies for trustworthiness proposed by Guba and Lincoln 
(1981)- are inclined to be used as post hoc reflexion of the completed work 
(audit trail, members check and reflexive research) rather than, rigourous 
verification during the process of research (methodological coherence, sampling 
sufficiency, collecting and analysing data concurrently, thinking theoretically and 
theory development). Verification, they argue, improves responsiveness to data 
and reminds the researcher to be proactive and rigorous in the research. 
Therefore, verification during the process of research using sampling 
sufficiency, analysing data concurrently and so on, is an incremental 
mechanism to ensure reliability and validity.  
 
Morse et al. (2009, 9) state that “while strategies of trustworthiness may be 
useful in attempting to evaluate rigour, they do not in themselves ensure rigour. 
While standards are useful for evaluating relevance and utility, they do not in 




The reliability and validity of this research emphasise verification techniques 
rather than paradigm choice because, as discussed in Section 5.1, there is no 
consensus on the paradigm choice of mixed research and this research adopts 
a standard mixed methods research approach which means that mixed 
methods research is considered as both research design and method.  
 
In addition, this research supports the argument of Morse et al. (2009) that 
verification should lead to reliability and validity. However, it also includes a post 
hoc reflexion (13.5.1). Some of the verification techniques in this research are:  
 
Methodological coherence: The use of mixed methods answers this issue. The 
research questions are answered using different approaches based on the type 
of questions to be answered. 
 
Sampling sufficiency: The pilot study informed which participants would provide 
the best representation of knowledge about the topic. In addition, a negative 
case is included (poor accumulated performance).  
 
Thinking theoretically- The ideas emerging from the quantitative analysis were 
confirmed by the data collected in the qualitative analysis. This permitted the 
analysis to move back and forward from macro to micro perspective.  
 
Similar to the claims of Morse et al. (2009), Mays and Pope (1995, 110) argue 
that the quality of the study can be “protected throughout the research process”. 
They suggest some strategies for achieving validity, reliability and 
generalizability. The following strategies are relevant for this study.  
 
Ensuring reliability of an analysis: This is attained by disclosing data analysis in 
Section 10.4 which will provide an account of how the data were systematically 
analysed.  
 
Safeguarding validity with Triangulation: Triangulation is the collection of data 




research presents both types of research approach. The first phase informs the 
qualitative approach and confirms the quantitative approach. To some extent, 
this means a triangulation of information. In addition, although this research 
does not use different methods (or means) in a single paradigm, it does collect 
information from different sources (mayors and councillors) in order to confront 
views and identify patterns which may be misleading, taking into account only 
one source of information for analysis.  
 
Beyond basic strategies, Mays and Pope (1995, 110) state that the qualitative 
researcher should seek two goals: firstly, to specify the methods and data in 
such a way that other trained researchers could analyse them and reach the 
same basic conclusion. In this regard, as stated above, methods and data used 
for analysis will be presented in Section 10.4.; and Chapter 11 provides an in-
depth description of the case studies.  
 
In addition, the analysis benefitted from peer review through conferences and 
seminars related to the topic. 47 
 
10.4 Data analysis 
 
The fieldwork was carried out in November 2012. The time spent in each 
municipality varied from three to four days, based on the availability of the 
participants. The interviews were recorded with the participants‟ authorization 
and lasted forty minutes on average.  The interview recordings were transcribed 
and safeguarded at the end of the field-work.  
                                                          
47
 -Local Governance, Decentralization and Participation: Meta-Governance Perspectives. The Department of Public 
Administration at Tallinn University of Technology and the journal Halduskultuur – Administrative Culture, April 
2012, 27-28, Tallinn, Estonia 
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In three out of the four municipalities, initial contact was made with current local 
authorities. Only in one case did the mayor deny me access to information and 
the contact was through the opposition political party.  During the first meetings, 
an initial list of participants (former mayors and former councillors) was 
compiled. From there, the snow-ball technique was applied. The participants 
were asked to name entrepreneurial mayors and local authorities as well as key 
political actors in the municipality. Then, those additional people, whose names 
were offered through the interviews, were contacted. In some cases, the initial 
list was used because the proposed participants were not available.  
 
In addition, the researcher kept an account of important observations and 
rejections of interviews. These notes were analysed and used to understand 
contextual issues. For instance, the majority of the people contacted for 
interviews but who were reluctant to discuss the topic were women.  
 
NVivo, the qualitative software was used to manage data collected from 
interviews. Data were transcribed into Spanish and analysed in Spanish also. 
Only findings were translated into English. The data were organized and 
analysed as follows: 
 
1. Data was recorded against interview questions  
2. A classification sheet was elaborated, categorizing participants by 
position (mayors, councillor, others); the period they participated in local 
government; whether the governor was in opposition or not; whether they 
had working experience in public sector organisations; whether they had 
experience in politics; and, in the case of mayors, whether they had been 
re-elected; gender; level of education and the political party to which they 
belong. 
3.  Conceptual levels were identified in each question and grouped 
4.  Key arguments/issues were identified and the text clustered into major 
categories 





The codes and text were analytically reviewed and cross-referenced by 
categories. Patterns and themes were related to the theoretical framework and 
research questions. The data analysis consists of discussions, explanations, 
and examples.  
 
10.5 Limitations, Challenges and Other Issues  
 
The pilot case study, which is identified as an “Average Performer Town”, was 
carried out in a place familiar to the researcher. Therefore, access was not a 
challenge. Following the research strategy of this investigation, the remaining 
case studies were carried out in unknown and unfamiliar places that were 
selected based on performance. In this case, this was more challenging. 
However, on balance, most local authorities contacted were co-operative and, 
indeed, supportive of this study.  
 
The first point of contact was the current local governments. The initial intention 
was to undertake interviews with current mayors or other current officials, and 
from there acquire contact information of former local authorities, using the 
snowball sampling technique. Most current authorities at the time of the 
investigation were part of this study and were of great support.   
 
During the first contact with the participants, the research was outlined, their 
(non-financial) support was indicated and requests for interview were made. 
Caution was taken at the time about clarifying the purpose of this study and 
making it clear that drug-related issues were not part of the study as, at the time 
of my research, drug-related issues were in the headlines in Mexico and many 
rural municipalities were highly affected. Often, participants related the financial 
issues of this research to the involvement of cartels in the local economy. 
Participants were reassured that this was not the intention of the study and that 
their comments would remain anonymous. On reflection, once the interviews 





The main source of information for this research was interviews. More limited 
success was had in accessing archival documentation of municipal 
development plans and annual reports (only current and very recent local 
government administrations were obtained). This was largely due to 
unavailability of this information in local archives. This can be attributed to a 
combination of factors: many documents were destroyed or lost between local 
administrations; this group of municipalities often lack the resources required to 
gather enough copies of such information in the past and even currently; and 
nervousness of revealing too much information.  
 
This information was also requested in state parliaments but only the most 
recent administrations were acquired.  As not enough information from all case 
studies was available, it was decided to focus entirely on interviews.  
 
As stated above, in most cases, not many great challenges were faced 
contacting current and former local authorities with the exception of one 
municipality. This municipality was less forthcoming. They were less co-
operative sharing information, contact details or allowing current local 
authorities to be interviewed. At the beginning, a meeting was granted with the 
current local mayor and, at the moment the interview was about to start (with 
the consent form already signed), a phone call made the mayor change her 
mind about participating in the study and she neglected any other information or 
contact details. The reasons were unclear. However, after the interviews it was 
clear that this municipality has a strong group of political elites which may have 
felt compromised somehow.  
 
In this case, the strategy was changed and the offices of  political parties were 
sought.  Surprisingly, the opposition party was the only political party with a 
functional office. The opposition was highly co-operative and helpful, providing 
contact not only with members of their own political party, but also with former 
members of the current political party in office. However, they were not part of 




was acknowledged that the views from the current (at the time of the 




In social science research, it is widely accepted that, in particular, qualitative 
researchers should be flexible in their approach to research because objectivity 
or neutral detachment from the phenomenon being studied is not entirely 
possible. Therefore, it is important that the researchers acknowledge their 
biases, values and assumptions. (Blaikie; 2000, 54-56).  Under this 
acknowledgement, a reflection of the researcher‟s experience, beliefs and 
assumptions are presented in this investigation. 
 
The researcher has some prior knowledge/involvement in local and state 
politics but not local finance (beyond a background in accountancy). This 
research was undertaken in rural municipalities because of the gap in the 
literature and the need for delimited research, but also because of the 
researcher‟s familiarity with the rural environment.   
 
Prior to pursuing a PhD, the researcher participated for many years within the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party of Mexico as a young representative and 
campaign planner at local and state levels. PRI is best described as a central 
left party, at least ideologically. However, since graduating, the researcher has 
not been involved in any political parties and her ideological perspective is no 
longer defined to one political party. However, prior political knowledge has also 
meant the researcher tends to puzzle over how problems might be solved using 
the tools and tricks of the political trade.  
 
In regard to decentralisation processes, the researcher tends to support the pro-
arguments of decentralisation from the allocative efficiency point of view but 
before this investigation was embarked upon, the researcher was sceptical 




researcher was acutely aware of these beliefs and tried to be as objective as 
possible.   
 
10.5.2 Ethics Considerations 
 
Ethical consideration is an important part of social research. Ethical approval 
was obtained from King‟s College London on 15th February 2011   after 
submitting a research outline, protocol and potential interview questions.  The 
application was considered after minor changes.  Soon after the final ethical 
approval was received, interviews were conducted for the pilot study. Copies of 
research participants‟ consent forms and information sheets for participants in 
English and Spanish (the latter being the language in which the interviews were 
carried out) are attached in Annex 2.  
 
Among the ethical concerns is that informed consent has been given by the 
participants and that confidentiality and anonymity are safeguarded.  Interview 
participants provided signed consent forms in Spanish, their own language and 
they kept a copy of the research information sheet with details enclosing their 
right to withdraw at any time until the writing up of the thesis and assurance that 
their information would be treated in an anonymous and confidential manner. In 
respect to assuring the safety and anonymity of the data, as a precaution 
password protection was used in the database files and recorded interview 
material was deleted after transcription of interviews. 
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Chapter 11 - Case studies description 
 
In this section, the case studies used to investigate further the findings from the 
previous analysis will be described. The case studies were selected from the 
sample of rural municipalities analysed earlier. The quantitative findings 
suggested that the reforms led to general changes, but to varying degrees. 
Therefore, this research selected a range of case studies mostly “moderately 
deviant cases” in the sense that they are municipalities where the changes were 
relatively strong or relatively weak.  
 
To remind the reader, rural municipalities are defined in this study as those with 
a population of less than 30,000 inhabitants and where the economic activity 
that predominates is the primary sector.  
 
In Mexico, the decentralised resources are transferred via the states. Therefore, 
the states play an important role in the final allocation of these decentralised 
resources, mainly the unconditional funds. In order to take this into 
consideration, the case studies were selected based not only on the 
Accountability and Public Entrepreneurship Index, but also based on types of 
financial arrangements used by the states, as explained in Section 10.2.  The 
states selected were Puebla, Hidalgo, Guanajuato and Tamaulipas- one case 
study each from Puebla, Hidalgo and Guanajuato and two from Tamaulipas 
(where the pilot study was carried out). 
 
One municipality presented a high performance in both accountability and 
public entrepreneurship index and it is referred as a “Good Performer Town” or 
GPT. Another municipality has a high index in entrepreneurship (and above 
average accountability index) and its pseudonym is “Entrepreneurial performer 
town” or EPT. The next municipality presents a high accountability index and 
average entrepreneurship index. It is referred to here as “Accountable 
performer town” or APT. The municipality with poor performance in both 
accountability and entrepreneurship index is denoted as “Poor Performer Town” 
or PPT and finally, the pilot study is included as an “Average Performer Town” 
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or AvPT. However, it is important to note that the AvPT is above the average, 
but it was not selected based on performance as the previous cases were.  
 
Once the states were selected, the top score cases of the accumulated index, 
accountability and public entrepreneurship in each state were selected (see 
Table 11.1). Then, cases with higher progressive growth in the indices were 
chosen for analysis.  In the case of the poor entrepreneurial town, one of the 
lowest five scores in the state of Tamaulipas was selected. 
 
It needs to be clarified that there is not a large difference between 
municipalities‟ scores. These are not the highest scores in the states or the 
country but they are representatives of performance in each index.  
 











performer town  
1.20 1.00 2.20 
Poor performer 
town   








performer town   
1.13 .83 1.96 
Average 
performer town 
1.33 .58 1.91 
 
 
The pseudonyms given in this study are followed by a letter that denotes 
whether the interviewee is a mayor, councillor or key political actor in the 
municipality. The key political actors are interviewees with experience in the 
pre-reformed period.  
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Table 11.2 illustrates the way that interviewees will be referred to in the 
empirical Section. The first group of letters used for abbreviation represents the 
performance of the municipality in the Government Performance Index.  The 
second abbreviation separated by a hyphen indicates the function of the 
interviewees in the local government. Mayors and councillors are from different 
government periods and different political parties. The key political actors have 
participated in local politics for a long time- in an elected position, as leaders of 
specific groups or as journalists. They participated in pre-reform administrations 
and present an account of how the system was before the decentralisation 
reform.  
 
The following Sections describe each case study. However, in order to 
safeguard the identity of the participants, some information is undefined but 
designed to illustrate the decentralisation and socio-political situation of each 
case study.  
 
11.1 A Good performer town (GPT)  
 
This small town in the state of Guanajuato has just over 11,000 inhabitants. It 
has just over 50 localities. The city is well connected to three big cities without 
including the capital city. The economic activity is based on cultivating green 
















GPT-M PPT-M APT-M EPT-M AvPT-M 
C= Councillor GPT-C PPT-C APT-C EPT-C AvPT-C 
PRE= Key Political 
Actor with pre-
reform experience 
GPT-PRE PPT-PRE APT-PRE EPT-PRE AvPT-
PRE 
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alfalfa, oat fodder, green chilli, black beans, maize and sorghum.  In livestock, 
the farmers rear pigs and cattle. 
 
It is a clean and pleasant town. The town hall entrance is fully paved and the 
gardens and local market feature narrow stoned streets. Some localities are 
also well-connected to the town and to large cities. 
 
The following Figure 11.1 shows how much of the total revenues come from 
conditional funds and its relative difference to unconditional funds and fiscal 
effort.   
 
A general feature of rural municipalities is their dependency on conditional and 
unconditional funds. This high performer town follows the same pattern (see 
Figure 11.1). However, it is interesting to observe here how, for some years, the 
percentage of conditional mandatory funds relative to total revenues increased 
substantially.   
 
 
Figure  11.1 Revenue Structure as a % of Total Revenues GPT 
 
 
Figures 14.1 shows that own revenues or fiscal effort, as defined in this study, is 
less than 10% of the total budget.  
 
Looking at the annual own revenues (analysed in current pesos), in Figure 11.2 
it can be observed that own revenues have increased over time. In 2008, the 
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annual own revenues were approximately 3.5 million pesos per year (in current 
pesos 2010) which is equal to around £152,000 per year. 
 
 
Figure  11.2 Own revenues in current pesos (2010) GPT per year  
 
The largest increase in own revenues was from 2000 to 2001. After this year, 
the own revenues increased progressively up to 2007 where they slowed down.  
The high increase in own revenues from 2000 to 2001 is largely due to 
increases in the account “Contribuciones de Mejora‖ or contributions for 
improvements. Contributions for improvements are charges to individuals or 
businesses derived from a benefit obtained directly due to a public work, which 
increased the value of the taxpayer‟s assets.   
 
The political history of this small town is indeed interesting. This is one of the 
earliest rural towns to experience alternation of political parties from the centre-
left party (PRI) to the right party (PAN). However, this occurred when a member 
of the right party was an interim governor of Guanajuato, Carlos Medina 
Placencia. Medina was elected interim because the elected governor candidate 
from PRI renounced the state government position (before even taking charge), 
after several criticisms over the election results where Vicente Fox Quesada 
was his contestant.  After Medina‟s period, Vicente Fox Quesada became 
governor of Guanajuato, and later the first ever PAN President of Mexico.  
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Since 1991, Guanajuato has been governed by the right wing party and from 
2000 to 2012, Guanajuato belongs to the same political party as the president 
of Mexico.  
 
This GPT has been governed by different parties (PRI, PAN, PNA48) but each 
party has been in power for prolonged periods of time and the political control is 
in the hands of two families; small opposition parties such as PNA are 
controlled by one of these families.  
 
As explained earlier, during all the field work, the first point of contact was the 
current local administration with the exception of this municipality. In this 
municipality (GPT), the mayor originally agreed to be interviewed and was 
willing to collaborate and contact previous mayors and councillors. This 
willingness changed after a call from another member of the local government. 
Surprisingly, the political party PRI does not have an established office in the 
municipality while the PAN does. Therefore, in order to acquire information, the 
opposition political party, PAN was contacted. 
 
In this municipality, there is a particular family power dispute and it can be 
observed in the competitive index. The competition in this municipality, which 
was already high, has increased progressively in the last 5 elections (see Figure 
11.3).   
 
                                                          
48 PNA- It stands for Partido Nueva Alianza. It‎is‎also‎identified‎as‎the‎teachers’‎party.‎ 




Figure  11.3 Competitive Election index GPT 
11.2 An entrepreneurial performer town (EPT)  
 
This entrepreneurial performer town in the state of Hidalgo has just over 12,000 
inhabitants and around 40 localities. The town‟s economy is based on green 
alfalfa, oat fodder, black beans and maize.  In livestock, the farmers rear pigs, 
sheep, goats and different poultry stock. However, the soil and climate are not 
considered optimal for agriculture. They also have some communities dedicated 
to pottery.  
 
The city is not too far from the capital city, Hidalgo. However, it is midway 
between two other small cities.  Therefore, locals say that the town is a “passing 
by” town. One of the features of this small town are some recreational projects 
that stand out. These recreational projects (in addition to other projects) have 
been financed through collaboration with other municipalities and government 
agencies.  
 
In regard to revenue structure, similar to the previous case, conditional and 
unconditional funds are the main source of revenues, but in this case, fiscal 
effort represents less than 2% of the total revenues (see Figure 11.4). 
 




Figure  11.4 Revenue Structure as a % of Total Revenues EPT 
 
By 2008, this town collected own revenues of around $620,000 pesos per year 
(in current pesos, 2010). This is equal to around £27,000 per year. This is 
considerably different to the Good Performer Town. In terms of inhabitants, 
there is no large difference between the GPT and the EPT. However, they are 
highly different from an economic perspective.  GPT has fertile land and it is 
very close to an important city. This has an impact on tax revenues. On the 
other hand, EPT has poor agricultural soil and it does not adjoin a major city; it 
is only a “passing by” town between two other small cities. 
 
Own revenues in current pesos (2010) in 1998 presented a large increase (see 
Figure 11.5). This dropped to an average level in 1999. The increase in 
revenues in 1998 was due to revenues collected via ―productos”. Since 1999, 
own revenues slightly increased with an upward trend in 2002 again due to 
increases in “productos”.  Productos are revenues obtained when the local 
government provides a service as a private actor, and due to the use, rights or 
sale of private assets.  
 




Figure  11.5 Own revenues in current pesos (2010) EPT 
 
The main political parties are PRI, PAN, PRD and lately another opposition 
party was formed and won the election in 2009. However, locals claim that this 
political party is part of PRI and it was created only as a consequence of 
internal division within the PRI‟s local structure. There are some political figures 
that control the local politics in the municipality and some of them are also 
important figures within the state party politics. This municipality has not been in 
opposition to the state government. Hidalgo has been governed historically by 
the centre-left party, PRI.  The competitive index shows that lately this EPT has 
highly competitive elections (see figure 11.6).   
 




Figure  11.6 Competitive Election index EPT 
 
11.3 An accountable performer rural town (APT)   
 
This small town in the state of Puebla has around 3,500 inhabitants and 16 
localities. It is important to notice that Puebla has the second highest number of 
municipalities in Mexico with 217 municipalities, behind Oaxaca (570). They are 
dedicated to cultivating beans and maize but these are seasonal rain-fed crops. 
They do not have irrigation systems and they have only one harvest per year. 
Soil is dry and there is little rain throughout the year. Due to the weather 
conditions, livestock is not highly successful.  
 
This APT is close to a medium-sized city, with a relatively new road connecting 
them and it depends on remittances sent by co-nationals living in the United 
States.  
 
In Figure 11.7, it can be observed how conditional and unconditional funds are 
also the main source of revenues. The fiscal effort has decreased over time 
reaching less than 1% in 2008.   
 




Figure  11.7 Revenue Structure as a % of Total Revenues APT 
 
Own revenues in real values in 2008 were equivalent to around $630,000 pesos 
per year (current pesos 2010). This is around £27,300 per year. As shown in 
Figure 11.8 in 2003, there was a large increase of own revenues. The same 
trend was observed in 1998. These increases were mainly due to larger 
revenues via productos. After 2003, own revenues dropped below the previous 
year‟s standard and increased slightly up to 2006 where it starts falling.    
 
 
Figure  11.8 Own revenues in current pesos (2010) APT 
 
The main political parties are PRI and PAN.  They have faced political party 
alternation. In the last elections, PRI and PAN formed coalitions with other small 
political parties and the last three elections have been highly competitive (see 
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Figure 11.9).  This municipality has been in opposition to the state level on one 
occasion. The state of Puebla has been governed by PAN since 2011.   
 
 
Figure  11.9 Competitive Election index APT 
 
11.4 A poor performer town (PPT)   
 
This PPT belongs to Tamaulipas state. It has over 3,000 inhabitants.  More than 
60% of the land is used for livestock and around 20% for agricultural activities. 
Farming is mainly dedicated to cattle and 90% of agricultural production is 
sugar cane. This city is relatively far from the state capital and it is on the border 
with a different state. Therefore, its economic activity relies on this neighbouring 
state. It is integrated by around 40 localities.  
 
 
Figure  11.10 Revenue Structure as a % of Total Revenues PPT  
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According to historical information available, conditional funds were not granted 
until 2000. The revenues (%) missing in this graph in 1998 and 1999 were 
categorized as “other revenues” in the available database, being around 65% of 
the total own revenues in 1998 and 25% in 1999. The fiscal effort in this 
municipality has decreased over time and it represents less than 2% by 200849 
(see figure 11.10 above).  
 
 
Figure  11.11 Own revenues in current pesos (2010) PPT 
 
In Figure 11.11, it can be appreciated how the level of own revenue has been 
changing constantly. From 2002 to 2004, the “productos” category increased 
(but “derechos‖ or rights category decreased). From 2005 to 2008, “derechos‖ 
have increased but “productos” have decreased.  In 2008, own revenue in 
current pesos (2010) was around $350,000 per year or £15,200 per year.  
 
This municipality is very particular in the State of Tamaulipas. Tamaulipas has 
been historically a PRIista State and this municipality was one of the first rural 
municipalities to face political party alternation.  Some elections have been 
highly competitive but not all. In Figure 11.12, it can be observed how the fourth 
election was less competitive and there was no alternation of political parties in 
this particular election.  
 
                                                          
49
 There was no information for 2001. 




Figure  11.12 Competitive Election index PPT 
 
11.5 An average performer town (AvPT)  
 
This town was the pilot case study and, like the PPT it is located in Tamaulipas. 
The AvPT has around 30,000 inhabitants dispersed within over 190 localities. 
The economic activity is dedicated to producing sugar cane (53%) and agave 
(11%). Almost 70% of the agriculture uses irrigation and the rest is seasonal.  In 
livestock, farmers rear mainly cattle and different types of poultry stock. This city 
is well-connected to the capital city.  
 
Again, similar to the PPT, the historical information available about own 
revenues shows that conditional funds were granted in 2000. In 1998 and in 
1999, 38% of the total revenues were categorized as “other revenues” (see 
figure 11.13).  But it is clear that fiscal effort has decreased over time. 
 




Figure  11.13 Revenue Structure as a % of Total Revenues AvPT 
 
Figure 11.14 shows how own revenue collection has decreased over time, with 
the exception of 1999 and 2004, where there was a significant increase. In 
1999, the rise was due to increases in taxes and ―productos‖ and in 2004 due to 
increases in the “approvechamiento” category. The recovery in 2008 is 
observed after a dramatic fall in the previous year. In 2008, own revenues were 




Figure  11.14 Own revenues in current pesos (2010) AvPT 
 
This is a very politically competitive town (see Figure 11.15). It experienced 
alternation after 2000 and PAN has been governing the town since then, with 
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the exception of one term where PRI made a comeback. Similar to the GPT, the 
political control in this municipality is in the hands of two families and, like the 
EPT, the political elites are important political actors at the state level in their 
political parties. As Tamaulipas is eminently PRIista, this municipality has been 
in opposition to the state during three time periods.  
 
 
Figure  11.15 Competitive Election index AvPT 
 
There are some similarities in these municipalities that are important to 
highlight. In the GPT, EPT and AvPT, local politics are dominated by a family or 
groups not only playing in the local arena, but also in the state political arena. 
 
In contrast, in the APT and PPT, the influence of a political group was not 
evident. In addition, in these municipalities, participants claim that at the local 
elections the “culture” of the people was to support the person, not the political 
party or a group.  
 
In regard to local finance, this research puts emphasis on own revenue 
performance or fiscal effort. As a reminder, own revenues are not studied as a 
decentralised mechanism, but as an entrepreneurial action. The reason is that it 
is evident own revenues do not represent a main source of revenue for these 
municipalities. This is a consequence of not only political cost, but also inherent 
developmental and geographical issues.  
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The picture of “revenues” for the selected cases above is highly uneven 
between municipalities, both in terms of the overall level of revenues and their 
change over time. This highlights that places differ and there is not a simple 
uniform relationship. Therefore, as Putnam (1993) states, on the ground, the 
social phenomena are quite complicated and they cannot be captured in their 
entirety by large-scale survey data. 
 
However, as the empirical literature tends to suggest, fiscal effort has 
decreased as a percentage of total revenues in the selected municipalities. But, 
there is actually no consistent downward pattern in absolute value, in fact quite 
the opposite. This is particularly clear in the PPT (see Figure 11.11) where own 
revenues or fiscal effort declined as a % of total revenues but the absolute 
value increased after 1998 (with its ups and downs).  
 
This is relevant for this study as an increase in absolute value is also a valid 
indicator of effort for rural local governments. The reasons will be explained in 
the following chapter.  
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Chapter 12 - Rural municipalities: the context for change  
 
In order to understand what has changed as a consequence of the 1997 reform 
on decentralisation, there is a need to identify what has not changed since the 
reform, or what are the “constants” in this group of municipalities. In addition, 
there is a need to identify the changes that may have occurred that seem 
unrelated to fiscal decentralisation, and that might be particularly related to the 
recent political changes in political competition. 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first Section, two constants in 
rural municipalities are presented, regardless of how they perform; first, 
closeness to the people and second, financial dependency. The extent to which 
this group of municipalities enjoy a close relationship with their citizens is 
explained, together with how this may lead to the loss of authority and recent 
changes in the way citizens participate. These characteristics also support and 
help validate decisions made in selecting key variables for the entrepreneurship 
index.   
 
In the second Section, the strong political party loyalty in these municipalities 
and deficiencies in the local council system are highlighted. Again, these are 
common to this group of municipalities, regardless of performance. How political 
loyalty seems to lead, in some cases, to poor political practices is explained and 
it is argued that political competition seems to be gradually improving the work 
of the council system.   
 
During the interviews, participants often explained attitudes and behaviour by 
referring to popular sayings.  Popular sayings can teach us about culture and 
society. They have compressed knowledge passed on from generation to 
generation. Thus, in order to visualize the participants‟ thoughts more clearly, 
the subsequent Sections use popular sayings that were (in most of the cases) 
used by the interviewees when making their points.   
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12.1 As the saying goes… Small town, big hell  
 
Participants refer to the saying “small town, big hell” to portray the level of social 
scrutiny citizens in this group of municipalities have on local authorities.  
Communication in small towns is easily passed on with “gossip” which is a “big 
hell” or a big problem for those involved in the gossip. Somehow this gossiping 
warns the local authority that everything they do would become public 
knowledge.  
 
In this Section, it is intended to put across three important features of rural 
municipalities related to closeness to the people and financial dependency: 
 
a) In this group of municipalities, social scrutiny seems to be a strong 
mechanism for accountability. 
b) Citizens seem to participate less directly with local authorities but more 
through political parties. 
c) Closeness to citizens facilitates collection of quality and relevant 
information but it also seems to weaken authority. This “loss of authority” 
is a threat to accountability. 
 
 
The reason social scrutiny is highly important is because closeness to the 
people is highly remarkable.   
 
APT-M ―I did not differentiate among people. I gave access to the people 
that supported opposition, I gave attention and respect to all of them, I 
did not differentiate between blue (conservatives), red (central-left) or 
yellow (left). …..People are never happy, but when the majority is 
satisfied we can be calm … as they say small town, big hell. People here 
know everything, they talk to each other and nothing can be hidden from 
them‖. 
 
PPT-M ―Because it is a very small town, people are checking on you. If 
you go to one community, they are there and they know...they tell 
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you...the other mayor used to get this amount of money, you got this 
money and you are not doing anything.... ‖  
 
Their performance in the local government is important for local reputation. 
 
PPT- M- ―We have three years in which we can serve our city. Three 
years where citizens will judge you and will reward or punish you for the 
work you do. That is why you need to do your best. WHAT SORT OF 
PUNISHMENT?. My punishment would be that if I behaved wrong, the 
day I finished my mandate I could not look people in the eye or they 
would show me disrespect. This would be a punishment. In this way they 
are telling me I did badly because I am among them every day.‖  
 
The importance of constant social scrutiny and the closeness with their citizens 
benefit the flow of information between local authorities and citizens, as well as 
the quality of information they obtain.   
 
In these municipalities, local authorities are well-informed of both their 
municipality and their citizens. The information for decision-making is obtained 
before they are even elected and after they take office.   Before they are 
elected, both mayors and local councillors express that being part of the 
community allows them not only to know what the important services and 
projects are for their municipality, but also to distinguish among individuals in 
terms of whether or not they need any social support. 
.  
 
EPT-M ―…because we live in a very small community, we know each 
other very well. I cannot go unnoticed and neither can the people that 
express their needs. I know if they need help or not‖ 
 
The other means of collecting information is through political campaigns. In 
these municipalities, candidates visit all communities from door to door, and 
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sometimes even twice during the political campaign. Asking for support in 
person is vital for a successful campaign.   
 
PPT-M ―… You learn while in the political campaign. You visit 
communities, neighbourhoods and you see what the problems are and 
the people tell you what they need and how to do it‖ 
 
AvPT-M ―Since the political campaign, we learn what people need, what 
public work they want. Once in the local government, you continue 
listening to what the people need‖ 
 
Once they take office, the mechanisms to collect information are meetings with 
communities and groups, directly in the office and letters.  As anticipated, 
mayors tend to highlight more meetings and councillors a direct encounter.  
 
PPT-M ―... at the beginning you have to present the municipal 
development plan, which is, in fact, the list of necessities of the 
municipality. We went to all the communities …we invited all the people 
and asked them what they wanted, which are the needs that are a 
priority. Based on this, we planned for its execution gradually during the 
three years of the administration…. ― 
 
Even though meetings are by far the most efficient way to dedicate time to all 
citizens, for a mayor this is not enough. He must dedicate office time for ANY 
person that wants to present his/her situation directly to him.  On the other 
hand, most councillors rely on people coming forward to talk to them.  
 
AvPT-M ―…In the morning when I wake up in my home, I usually have 10 
or even 30 people waiting for me. They want to talk to me... People here 
are not used to making appointments. If you ask them they will get 
offended. If you tell them, talk to the treasurer, they will say, no, I want to 
talk to the mayor...‖ 
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PPT-C ―…we live in a very small municipality, even when I go to buy 
tortillas, the people tell me; we need this, we have this problem, can you 
help us? It is so easy to come forward to talk to us‖. 
 
Oates‟ (1972) argument of the importance of closeness to the people is well-
grounded in this group of municipalities, particularly in regard to information 
advantage.  They have different means to collect quality information and with 
high levels of validity.  
 
Thus, it can be argued that there is a close relationship between local 
authorities and citizens in this group of municipalities. There is a high level of 
social scrutiny and this allows for collection of relevant information.  
 
This is an expected result. However, a closer look at how citizens participate in 
the local government presents important insights.  
 
When local authorities were asked whether participation has changed over time, 
they present a very interesting point, again regardless of their current 
performance. They consider that people were no longer willing to participate in 
what they called “faenas‖ or work as co-operation. The constant issue put 
forward by the interviewees was that citizens only participate in exchange for 
individual benefits and political status. Some of them link this particularly to the 
decentralisation reform; others blame the political division in the municipality.      
 
PPT-M ―People used to participate a lot. We did not have problems. 
Today, we need to make a party, a celebration if we want the people to 
get together. Before it was not like that, they participated more. Now 
there is more political division‖ 
 
EPT-C ―…people are used to asking for individual benefits... Nobody 
wants to invite people for work because they think people would be angry 
and people do not want to participate…WHEN DID IT CHANGE? Around 
12 years ago. People saw that the local government was getting more 
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money and they think that they do not need to help anymore. They also 
believe local authorities take the money for themselves. I have been 
outside and, to be honest, I had the same idea and I constantly hear this 
comment from the people‖.  
 
APT-M ―The way people participate has changed. Now they want the 
mayor to do everything. They only work if they are paid. It has changed a 
lot‖.  
 
Thus, co-operation of citizens seems to be changing. Regardless of the reasons 
(decentralisation or politics), another interesting assertion is that while direct 
participation or co-operation in local issues has decreased, participation in 
regard to political party affiliation has improved.      
 
The rise of political party affiliation does not necessarily mean more 
participation by citizens in the local government, neither does turnout during 
elections.  
 
GPT-C ―I have seen more participation directly with the political parties. 
In regard to participation directly to the local government, it is very little. 
In fact, we have invited citizens to meetings to take decisions- about 
public work…  I believe they do not do it (they do not participate) 
because they (local authorities) take reprisals against citizens (because 
of political reasons)‖. .. 
 
PPT-PRA ―Before people used to participate more...now there is a lot of 
division because of politics (people are divided supporting political 
parties). We should have only one party... ‖. 
 
Then, rural municipalities benefit from high social scrutiny but direct 
participation of citizens in collective affairs seems to be changing. This seems to 
be partially due to increases in local government budget, but also due to 
political issues. This reinforces the choice to consider co-operation as an 





One other “constant” in these municipalities is financial dependency. Since 
before the 1997 reform, this group of municipalities were highly dependent on 
intergovernmental transfers. After the reform, the financial dependency 
increased even more, but expenditure decisions also increased. The financial 
dependency in this group of municipalities derives from the tax system being in 
place.  
 
Own revenues in local government consist of taxes, aprovechamientos, 
derechos and contribuciones de mejora. The most important tax for local 
governments is the property tax and its surcharges. During field work, local 
authorities were asked to describe the tax system in place. Unsurprisingly,   all 
participants mentioned and referred directly to property tax.  There were 
minimal comments regarding other types of taxes such as Real Estate Transfer 
Tax. 
 
In all case studies, participants claim that property tax is insufficient for 
undertaking their duties as providers of public services. 
 
APT-M ―Own revenues collected through taxes… are very scarce.  Here, 
we can say that the only tax that exists is the property tax… But, it is very 
scarce because some people have not legalized their lands. It is in fact, 
very limited. For instance, if a mayor is running out of money for the 
month and calls the people to pay the property tax, two, three, or four 
people show up…it is around 50 pesos (2.5 pounds) for a piece of land. 
What you can collect is insufficient, and to make things worse, it is paid 
annually‖.  
 
The previous statement shows the perception of a low level of revenues 
collected through property tax. However, the level of revenue depends largely 
on the municipality‟s characteristics and rural municipalities represent a difficult 
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test to the tax system. But, they also represent the best scenario for tax 
principles, namely identification of authority-investment by the tax payers.  
 
The previous quote points out the issue of unstable revenues.   Another 
participant talks about this matter clearly.  
 
PPT-M ―We do not have a collection base. In the three years we were in 
the local government, we collected 130 thousands pesos the first year; 
160 in the second year and less in the third year. It varies a lot. We gave 
tax payers the opportunity to pay from January to March. They received 
discounts for late payments50 and, sometimes, we extended until June. 
Whatever we collected in that period, was what we got. After June, it was 
very rare that people would come forward to pay. From there you can 
plan in what to spend‖. 
 
There is no doubt that administrative capabilities are more challenging for rural 
municipalities. Interestingly, the administrative problems mentioned by 
participants are insufficient budget level, extra funds bargain, and in particular, 
tax legislation problems but no tax administration issues. This does not suggest 
that the problem does not exist but it shows the level of concern by local 
authorities. 
 
The reasons for low tax revenue collection, according to the participants are  
local economy and culture. 
 
Defaulting is a “culture”, participants claim, and it needs to be overcome in order 
to increase revenue collection.   
 
APT-M ―- (A participant explaining different programmes run by the local 
authority to collect more revenues from taxes) - It did not work. 
Sometimes we visited the communities. We sent the treasurer to different 
                                                          
50
 Local authorities are entitled to cancel some fees and surcharges. Cancelling surcharges is used by local 
authorities to motivate households to pay property tax.  
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communities. We expected people would pay. We thought they did not 
have time to go to the local government to pay or they did not want to 
spend money in transportation. It did not make any difference. We 
collected very little. Citizens really do not want to pay‖. 
 
PPT-M ―There is a lot of defaulting…At the beginning of our 
administration 2008-2010, we reviewed how much we lacked due to 
defaulting. We had almost 1 million pesos. We invited the citizens to pay 
this off in different ways. We even offered them to not pay a surcharge, 
but it did not make any difference...‖ 
 
Interestingly, the municipality where local authorities consider that defaulting is 
not a problem is the municipality measured and selected as a poor performer. 
Consistent with this observation is the fact that PPT has one of the most stable 
patterns of own revenues (see Figure 11.11). 
 
PPT-C ―We have a very good tax collection system. Most of the people 
pay. I do not know if it is fair because of the economic level of the 
municipality. I think it is OK. The problem here is how to gain money in 
another way….when we find a way to generate wealth it would be 
different‖.  
 
PPT-C ―People here pay taxes. All business owners are up-to-date with 
their payments‖. 
 
A common annual property tax programme used by local governments to 
increase tax collection rapidly is to exempt citizens from paying tax surcharges 
applicable to overdue property tax payments. Most municipalities, regardless of 
political parties, talked about this annual programme and participants expressed 
how taxpayers take advantage of it. 
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APT-C ―People here are very passionate about politics. If they do not like 
the mayor or the mayor is from another colour (political party), they do 
not pay taxes. They wait until the next administration. If the candidate 
they support does not win, they will go on and on (-without paying)‖. 
 
This is a red light in terms of efficiency and it immediately rings the bell as a 
political cost consequence. Indeed, there are political costs involved when 
enforcing local taxation. Taxes are not popular among people and, therefore, it 
can be seen as a threat to political support. However, it seems that there is 
more than political cost reaction in this group of municipalities.  
 
APT-M ―Sometimes I feel very bad because we get people that have a 
piece of land, but they do not even have a fence and they already owe 
4000 pesos (200 pounds). Once I told them to pay half or 1000. I asked 
the accountant if there is problem with that (discount) or if I had to pay for 
it myself. But if we agree as a council, we can do it (discount). It is good 
because there are some people that are really poor and we can exempt 
them…at least we help them in a way…‖ 
 
Closeness to citizens can be two sided. On the one hand, the local authority 
can collect improved information about citizens‟ preferences or needs and, 
therefore, improve their welfare; and citizens can relate their tax contribution to 
the benefits they receive, facilitating their political choice.  On the other hand, 
very close relationships can put a toll on the exertion of authority.  
 
Regarding the latter, the majority of local authorities recognize that application 
of authority is difficult. Citizens tend to ask to be exempted from taxes as a 
favour. This behaviour is facilitated in this environment of close relationships.  
Tax payers can take advantage of knowing the tax authority and the social 
relationships they have. In addition, as observed in the previous quote, local 
authorities also face dilemmas of being all too aware of peoples‟ conditions. 
Although it is not a justification for misbehaviour, it shows an important element 
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that needs to be considered when evaluating local authorities‟ incentives to 
increase the collection of taxes. 
 
Following the same discussion, local authorities were asked whether the 
collection of taxes by other public authorities would be more efficient. There are 
opposing views in this regard. There is fear that local governments might lose 
discretion over these resources, and this is not acceptable because, although 
low, it is used for petty cash accounts that are important for welfare support. 
Moreover, participants mistrust state government to pass down the tax 
revenues and they believe that vulnerable people might not be differentiated by 
the state. 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of collection efficiency, most participants agreed that 
state governments would be more efficient in collection (no difference in 
responses from mayors and councillors or political affiliations). The reason they 
put forward is that state governments are more respected by citizens, and 
politics and friendship are not mixed.  
 
EPT-M ―Sometimes political and social situations mix and it is not easy to 
apply authority. You do not want to generate conflicts or inconformity. In 
these municipalities, due to political reasons, it is very difficult to apply 
regulations as they should...‖ 
 
A major concern about own revenue collection is discretion on expenditure. 
Most participants pointed out that own revenues are used for public service 
maintenance and social support.  
 
Empirical research presents a rational explanation of low fiscal effort. It states 
that increments in transfer will decrease tax efforts due to „fiscal laziness‟ 
(Raich, 2003: 2). In practice, rather than a lazy attitude towards tax collection, 
local authorities in rural municipalities face the challenge of identification and 
proximity. The application of authority represents a challenge in this 
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environment.   This is not far from the business saying- “do not mix business 
and personal relations or do not do business with friends and relatives”.  
 
Hence, perception of low tax revenue compared to the level of expenditures 
required, high political cost and the challenge of authority are not encouraging 
attributes for a tax system. Rather, raising taxes represents an entrepreneurial 
action. This reaffirms the use of fiscal effort as one the indicators used to 
construct the entrepreneurial index. 
 
12.2 As the saying goes… You cannot deny the cross of your parish 
 
In this Section, the political dynamic in rural municipalities will be explained.  
 
This popular saying… You cannot deny the cross of your parish… means in this 
case that you cannot deny the “political party” you belong to. This is remarkably 
evident in this group of municipalities.  
 
In this group of municipalities the council system is not fully developed. For 
many years, it was integrated by one political party.  However, the increasing 
level of political competition seems to have changed local politics in a number of 
ways. There are two general points to be noted in regard to local politics:  
 
a) Political competition seems to have strengthened the council system but 
there are still important deficiencies  
b) Due to party loyalty, there are political revenge practices used by some 
municipalities that are a threat to accountability 
 
In this group of municipalities, immediate re-election is not permitted. Therefore, 
political incentives work through keeping the political party in power; the 
mayor‟s re-election after an intermediate period; and pursuing a public service 
career.   
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Party continuity  
PPT-M ―I believe that during my mandate I was fair –with the people. I 
helped the people that really needed it. The proof is that the next mayor 
was also from my party...‖  
 
Re-election  
APT-M ―I feel I did something –well. This is why people supported me 
and I won- the (re-) election. It is not easy to run for election after having 
being mayor previously. We (him and his team) did something with the 
little money we received… ―  
 
A former mayor from the same municipality also commented about the mayor 
quoted above.  
 
APT-C ―Right now the mayor is somewhere working. He has been 
elected twice. He was re-elected because the first time he did a lot and 
the people saw he worked very well. That is the reason we helped him- 
to become mayor again‖. 
 
These statements present an interesting account. In this quote the participant 
suggests that citizens not only judge honesty and fairness but also compare 
entrepreneurial behaviour. This highlights the presence of yardstick competition 
in local politics and the ability of citizens to make inferences in regard to 
accountability and public entrepreneurship behaviour through the ballots.   
 
Another political incentive mentioned by participants is to build a career in the 
public sector.  
 
Public service career 
EPT-M ―I can give you an example –of personal and political attributes of 
a responsible local authority.  I consider myself a responsible person. I 
had the opportunity to be mayor, maybe I was not the best but I was 
accountable to my people. Now, I have the opportunity to be Secretary of 
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the town council (county clerk). The same people gave me the 
opportunity to be here or at least, they are allowing me to remain here. If 
I were not a responsible person, the people would have asked -the 
mayor- to remove me from the post. They would be here showing their 
discomfort.  
 
In this group of municipalities, there are important deficiencies in the political 
system. The local council system is highly relevant in order to avoid absolute 
power. However, it seems that some councillors still have a rather poor 
understanding of their role and during the field work this was often the case for 
women councillors and young women councillors.  The following quotes from 
women councillors reflect this point.  
 
APT-C ―I did not know how to work, what my job was‖. [18-25 years old 
councillor]  
 
APT-C “The difficulty was that I did not know what to do in the job‖. 
 
PPT-C ―I am not a politician and, therefore, it was difficult for me. I did 
not know anything. You get familiar with the job gradually‖. [18-25 years 
old councillor]  
 
 
Some councillors expressed that they did not have difficulties in their work 
because the mayor solved the problems or because opposition did not 
intervene.  
 
APT-C ―We did not have difficulties. We always agreed in the council 
meetings…ARE YOU FROM THE SAME POLITICAL PARTY AS THE 
MAYOR? Yes. HOW DID YOU WORK WITH THE OPPOSITION? She 
never had problems with us. She never said anything‖.  
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PPT-C ―I was very disappointed because it -being a councillor- was not 
what I expected. I thought I would intervene more in the decision-making 
but the decisions were unilateral. The mayor was the one who took all 
the decisions. Sometimes we did not even learn about things that were 
happening there, about the funds that we got. Other people (not 
members of the council) were more aware than us. That was a constant 
during the three years‖. 
 
Others participants claim that the councillors‟ role is underestimated and used 
only for obtaining a regular wage.  
 
EPT-C ―… the mayor has a lot of power. … I think that the council should 
have more obligations also. They need to do their job because there are 
councillors that only come when we have meeting and not all the time. At 
that time there were only two or three of us that were here every day 
checking….‖     
 
GPT-C ―…in small cities like this there are councillors from different 
parties who unfortunately because of human nature and also because 
we are Mexicans, act according to their own convenience. They are paid 
and nothing else matters…‖  
 
The councillor‟s seat is often negotiated due to political reasons within the 
political parties. In this practice, women and young people are often used to fill 
positions in order to complete gender and young representation. Women and 
young councillors work under the political control of others and this might 
generate the problem of lack of knowledge in their role in the local council as 
presented above. From the 9 women councillors interviewed, three were young 
women between 18-25 years old. The women councillors‟ quotes mentioned 
above present the women councillors‟ age in order to highlight this point. 
 
Moreover, three out of nine women councillors interviewed have family ties to 
local politicians.  




EPT-C ―… Our municipality has always been governed by PRI but when I 
was elected as council from my party PRI because my husband was 
competing within the party to be the candidate… (He lost the 
candidacy)… he proposed me as a councillor‖. 
 
It is important to clarify that woman councillors were less willing to participate in 
the interviews. 
 
Although there are still high levels of deficiency in the council system, there is 
some evidence that it has improved due to political competition.   
 
A councillor that has been elected twice, before 1997 and recently, expressed 
the following:  
 
EPT-C”… (First time as councillor)… Well, at that time we did not do our 
job in the council as we should. The mayor decided everything; he was 
the one that gave orders. We were- all- from the same party (the 
opposition did not get enough votes for a seat in the council). So, we did 
not have any problems. Whatever the mayor said, we approved it and 
signed it‖.  
 
EPT-C ―… (Second time as councillor)…well, it was different... This time I 
was on the other side, I was in opposition. I had some obstacles. It was 
illogical that because I was in opposition I did not have access to 
information… I had to sign the income law but I did it only if I got 
something for my people (negotiation)…‖ 
 
During the interviews, the councillors were asked for examples of situations 
where they expressed their disagreement, or a veto was used by the local 
council.  In all municipalities, they claim they have been opposed to some of the 
mayor‟s proposals. In three of them, which are the ones categorized as high 
performers, GPT, EPT and APT, at least 50% of the participants gave examples 
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of veto by the council and there was no distinction between councillors that 
were from the same party as the mayor and opposition councillors. Interestingly, 
the lowest performer in the group, PPT, presented the lowest incidence of 
reported disagreement with the mayor.  
 
EPT-C ―at the beginning we did not agree with a plan to take a loan from 
a bank for 2 million pesos for equipment and transportation. We did not 
have anything here (previous local government did not leave 
transportation or equipment). But the mayor did not explain very well and 
we asked him to bring us a person from the bank to explain to us how 
much interest they would charge. In the end we did not approve it.‖  
 
GPT-C ―We did not pass a plan for a greenhouse. WHY? The plan was 
to build six greenhouses. The people that applied for the project would 
contribute with some money and SEDESOL (federal agency) the other 
part. We did not agree that the people interested in the project were part 
of the local government‖. 
 
In the quote above, the participant expressed that he disagreed on a project 
because people working on the current- at the time- local government wanted to 
benefit from it. This is a problem in this type of programme, which, in many 
cases, benefit political elites or political groups. In spite of that, this quote 
presents a good example of the importance of council systems in rural 
municipalities and how the democratic mechanisms promote, to some extent, 
accountability.     
 
On the other hand, mayors also claim that decisions are taken due to political 
reasons:  
 
GPT-M ―We know that many times politics is mixed (with the local 
government‘s work). In the last year I was mayor, we needed a qualified 
majority to approve the annual budget. I remember it was March and 
they (the opposition) had not approved the budget yet. …I had a meeting 
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with the opposition and in this way we could approve the budget. They 
did not approve it in January and February because it was an electoral 
year‖.  
 
The number of opposition seats in the local council is determined according to 
the number of votes.  Political competition has increased and, as a 
consequence, the local council system is gradually maturing.  
 
Theoretically, political competition is an ultimate aim in a democracy but 
surprisingly, in one of the municipalities a concern regarding political 
competition arises.   
 
GPT-C ―I do not know if the political competition has been beneficial or 
detrimental. Honestly, we are living under a government where for two 
long periods, I do not remember exactly the years, two families have 
governed our city. The conservative party has been in power for 12 to 15 
years... The current mayor and his wife….They have governed for a long 
period. In the previous elections, they also competed in the campaign 
(they lost)… But the situation did get better because now the central-left 
party took power with another family. He has been mayor twice, and now 
his sister is the mayor. We know that he helped her during the campaign 
even though she is coming from another party.‖ 
 
The high level of political competition in this municipality has created a kind of 
“modern caciquismo”.  The reason is, in part, because of the multi-party system 
which has segregated minority parties and the political reform to form coalitions.     
 
EPT-PRA ―…..60% of us are from the central-left party, 40% is divided 
among the other parties. Here we only have three parties, central-left, left 
and conservative. Let‘s say 20% left and 30% right and now, we have the 
green party, which we know is the central-left party‘s younger brother. 
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A relevant issue that has direct financial and performance implications in local 
governments is the use of political revenge practices between political parties. 
These political revenge practices have occurred in three out of five 
municipalities studied here. When a different party wins the election, the mayor 
will deliberately donate assets and clean out the local government office.   
 
APT-M ―The first problem is that when the administration changes colour 
(party), there is egoism. When we started here (in the office) it was 
empty, we did not have chairs, computers, cars, equipment such as 
backhoe, dump truck, nothing, why?  We were opposition…For us, it was 
difficult to start because they also left debts, debts with suppliers...‖ 
 
EPT-C ―We also left them (the opposition party) without cars (they had 
also been left without equipment at the beginning of their mandate).  I 
signed for two trucks to be given to a common land... In this common 
land, cattle had been stolen and nobody wanted to offer his truck to go to 
the peak because it was far. We gave them the trucks that the mayor had 
got‖. 
 
Similar political practices were commented on by participants but in relation to 
state-municipal intergovernmental transfers.  
 
Participants who were mayors before the decentralisation reform explain that 
funds were allocated arbitrarily due to political reasons but even municipalities 
governed by the same political party as the state did not have financial security.   
 
EPT-PRA ―Before I did not have problems with the money, but other 
parties did. The state government retained the money and did not give 
them enough. They (local mayors from the opposition parties) were my 
friends and they struggled a lot‖.  
 
PPT-PRA ―…I had to lobby a lot to get money for public work. I got some 
money, for instance, to put lamps in the street. Imagine! It cost 13,000 
Rural Municipalities: The Context for Change  
294 
 
pesos...very cheap. At that time, I think the state government did not give 
money to any municipality because they kept the money for themselves. 
This was in the first few years. By the end, the governor did some public 
work...possibly because it was election time but I cannot be sure of that.  
 
In the quantitative analysis (Section 9.1) one of the hypotheses tested was 
whether there was evidence to suggest favouritism in municipalities that belong 
to the same political party as the state government before the reform, by 
comparing their performance after the introduction of the conditional mandatory 
funds. The hypothesis was not proved and the findings (though not strong and 
statistically insignificant) suggested that municipalities that were in opposition 
had, on average, a higher and stronger performance in the coverage of basic 
public services (before and after the reform).  Hence, being opposition was 
suggested as an incentive for good performance. 
 
In the previous quotes, participants gave a plausible explanation as to why the 
statistical analysis did not find favouritism before the reform. They explained 
that rural municipalities were disadvantaged, regardless of whether they were in 
state-level opposition or not. This is probably because, in most cases, rural 
municipalities represent low electoral political weight and, before the reform, the 
hegemonic party used to dominate local politics and minority parties were 
almost non-existent. 
 
However, due to higher political competition, intervention in this group of 
municipalities has now emerged. 
 
PPT-M ―I have always been from PRI (central-left party). Before we did 
not have too much support from the party, they did not mind (the 
municipality) because we did not have any competition. Recently 
because of the political competition, PRI (the party) is intervening more‖.  
 
Recalling some of the results from the quantitative analysis, even though they 
did not reach a conventional significance level, the interaction of political 
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competition and state-level opposition (Section 9.1, p.239) suggested that under 
high levels of political competition, municipalities without state-level opposition 
are more likely to present a higher Coverage of Basic Public Services before 
and after the reform.  In contrast, if the level of political competition is not 
considered, these municipalities are likely to have on average a lower score in 
Coverage of Basic Public Services. Thus, political competition was considered 
as a “warning sign” that could drive performance or a case of intervention.   
 
Interestingly, the quantitative analysis also suggested that being of the same 
political party did lead to fewer accountability actions (Section 7.1, p. 204) and 
fewer entrepreneurial actions (Section 7.2, p. 212). In addition, the interaction of 
political competition and state-level opposition in the models of behavioural 
patterns suggest that under levels of high political competition, being of the 
same political party did lead to fewer accountability actions (Section 7.1, p. 205) 
but higher entrepreneurial actions (Section 7.1, p. 212) compared to parties that 
are in opposition.   Thus, again, actions and aims differ.  
 
The previous statement gives a plausible explanation to these findings and 
reinforces the interpretation of higher political competition being a “warning 
sign”. This warning sign to political parties leads to a higher interest in local 
politics. This may influence the selection of candidates, or state government 
intervention may take place to support local governments directly. In this group 
of municipalities, this seems to occur only when there is a warning sign of 
political failure, not otherwise. The reason might be that rural municipalities do 
not represent important political weight and more importantly, they are highly 
loyal to political parties.  
 
Thus, in this case, the qualitative data helps to explain why the statistical 
analysis did not find a clear and simple relationship that the theory of fiscal 
decentralisation might have led us to expect.  
 
Another good example of how politics, and in particular state-level opposition, 
influence the behaviour of local authorities is the case of a mayor from the APT 
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who has been re-elected twice. This mayor was mentioned by other 
interviewees, regardless of political party affiliations, as a good mayor in his first 
administration, and participants pointed out that the mayor‟s former good 
performance is the reason he was elected again. The difference between now 
and then is that, during the first administration, he was aligned to the governor‟s 
political party and now he is not. This mayor claims that the governor has shut 
down the doors for the opposition and that cuts in unconditional funds and 
extraordinary funds from the state programmes have been applied. He also 
claims that the governor is using the National Institution of Geography and 
Informatics, which is the main source of statistics in Mexico, to justify the cuts.  
 
Highly emotional, he explains that people perceive that he is not working as 
before, and this worries him to the point where it has affected his health. These 
claims are corroborated by another councillor also participating in the same 
administration. The focus of her conversation was about how resources have 
been cut in this administration and the mayor‟s impotency to achieve citizens‟ 
expectations.   
 
This municipality (APT), as well as another case study (EPT), presented the 
same problem of lower revenues because of changes in marginalization status. 
But, in this case, the political context overshadows the problem at the point that 
the mayor has closed any relation with the state government and dependencies. 
In the same municipality in 2005, the council requested an inspection to INEGI 
because their revenues dropped by 20% due to changes in marginalization 
status. After a fieldwork inspection by INEGI they were reset as a marginalized 
municipality and their revenues increased.  
 
As observed above, there are complex political issues at ground level. It is 
important to notice that there are no straight answers, no clear information even 
for those facing the problems. The aim of presenting this case is to illustrate 
how, on the ground, politics and financial issues affect local authorities‟ 
behaviour.  
 





To sum up, this chapter describes the social and political dynamics common to 
all rural municipalities. We can now visualize a rural local government as a 
place where citizens‟ voice and scrutiny is important, where  local authorities 
enjoy high quality information but also struggle with the loss of authority due to 
their close social proximity to citizens. In addition, we are aware of the important 
role of political loyalty and the political deficiencies in the council system. These 
characteristics were present before the 1997 decentralisation reform and they 
are still true after the reform excepting the level of development in the council 
system which seems to have improved as a result of higher political 
competition. At this point it is necessary to find out what has changed with the 
introduction of the decentralisation reform. The next chapter intends to address 
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Chapter 13 - Fiscal decentralisation in practice: impact on accountability  
 
In this study, accountability is defined as the virtues of local authorities to 
behave according to public expectations, demonstrating such attributes as 
transparency, responsiveness, and responsibility, which further improve 
efficiency. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, the delegation of financial resources via fiscal 
decentralisation might lead to positive changes in accountability because local 
authorities can respond to citizens‟ preferences as they are close to their 
people, have quality information and citizens can judge their performance. This 
implies a high level of participation and involvement by citizens. 
 
However, the results in the quantitative analysis suggest that changes in 
accountability might depend on specific fiscal arrangements.  The findings 
present contrasting results between unconditional funds and mandatory 
conditional funds. Mandatory conditional funds were likely to increase 
accountability and unconditional funds likely to be detrimental. To remind the 
reader, mandatory conditional funds were introduced in 1997.  
 
In this chapter the aim is to observe whether accountability on the ground is 
indeed discouraged by unconditional funds and encouraged by conditional 
funds and if so, in what ways. One of the issues encountered in phase two is 
that one important source of funds could not be included in the indices, namely 
extraordinary conditional funds. These funds are earmarked for specific 
expenditures and they have different policy arrangements. In some cases these 
funds are allocated with some decision-making in work execution and 
sometimes they are fully managed and executed by federal and state agencies. 
They are highly specific and are allocated in a more discretionary manner. 
These types of funds are not included because extraordinary funds are not part 
of the local budget. Therefore, the national database for local government 
finance does not integrate this information. 
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In the previous Section, it is evident that local authorities seem well informed of 
citizen‟s preferences and are socially scrutinized by citizens. However, 
participation seems to be changing and there is less direct participation with 
local authorities.  
 
In this Section extraordinary conditional funds are examined.  Evidence related 
to these extraordinary conditional funds will be corroborated as well as evidence 
related to the other funds. This will enable us to suggest whether or not there is 
evidence on the ground that tends to strengthen and increase confidence in the 
findings from the quantitative analysis.  
 
13.1 As the saying goes, don't bite the hand that feeds you    
 
This saying reflects the idea that local authorities should be accountable to the 
people over whom they have stewardship.  In the public sector, the issue is that 
there are multi-principals. In this sense, the principals could be the citizens that 
elected the local authorities for the position or the political allies that lobby for 
resources for them.  
 
This seems to be an important reason for contrasting differences in 
accountability between the different types of fiscal arrangements. However, 
each type of fund has in its own specific benefits drawn from the developmental 
characteristics of rural municipalities.  In the next Section, the accountability 
benefits and issues in each type of funds will be outlined, which seem to be 
specific to this group of municipalities. 
 
a) Unconditional funds  
 
From the local authorities‟ point of view, unconditional grants in principle enable 
efficiency of allocation. It gives them the freedom to distribute resources 
according to citizens‟ needs and preferences as well as undertake projects that 
cannot otherwise be included in the conditional mandatory funds. However, with 
this type of funds, citizens‟ involvement is not as evident because citizens are 
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not directly involved in decision-making for expenditure allocation (see Section 
4.2, incise d, p.98-100 for more details).  
 
EPT-M ―This type of revenue allows doing what the citizens‘ prefer… 
how they require the public work. If they want the sewage pipe this width, 
if they want a larger sport field. With the conditional ones you have to 
spend it on certain norms and procedures‖.  
 
EPT-M ―There is nothing like these funds. Because you can redirect a 
little more to generate employment… you get more freedom and I think it 
makes the system more efficient- but always supervised‖.  
 
Participants agree that unconditional funds are more prone to be used for 
current spending. However, there are contrasting views between mayors and 
councillors.  On the one hand, mayors consider that a high level of expenditure 
on salaries is a way to increase employment and welfare and on the other hand, 
councillors point out that unconditional funds are subject to misuse on 
unnecessary expenses.  
 
AvPT-M ―Sometimes you have to sacrifice efficiency in the public 
administration to favour the citizens, for instance, employment. I have a 
case of two individuals that got into a fight because they wanted the post 
as street sweeper... Sometimes you can invest in equipment that can 
make the provision of services more efficient but the same investment 
can generate employment for various years or months to many people. It 
is sad but people in this municipality are grateful to have a job with 
minimum salary because there is no other option‖.  
 
PPT-M ―the only source of employment is the local government. This is 
the reason we do not want public service careers… in this way, every 
three years you give the opportunity to other people to work here. They 
can work on something other than farming and being a housewife‖ 
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Mayors consider that this type of revenue does not discourage accountability 
and present examples of expenses that are not part of public investment and 
are against efficiency grounds but important. 
 
PPT-M: ―Current spending is mainly used for paying the ambulance. We 
have only a health unit but it is not specialized. The ambulance service is 
free and every month part of the budget goes there. The closest hospital 
is 55 km away. You have to pay return fuel but often they go to the 
capital and other big cities. Part of the budget goes there…another 
example of current expenditure is the caterpillar machine. State 
government helps with the rent but the local government pays for the 
fuel. We try to keep the rural roads as good as possible. In addition to 
this, there are people that come forward to talk about their needs, health 
issues, and medicines. Money goes there‖.  
 
EPT-M ―... Even money that is not earmarked, you have to be 
accountable for. The fact that it is not earmarked for specific work does 
not mean it is not transparent. Maybe it can be the case that the local 
authorities buy something that is not really necessary in the municipality. 
But, logically, part of the council would not agree. For instance, here a 
former mayor bought a car that was not appropriate for the local 
government. The councillors obliged him to sell it back and invest the 
money back in the municipality…There is still corruption but in minimal 
proportion. We have progress in this matter. Although the resources are 
not earmarked, you cannot spend it on something that is not beneficial 
for the people‖.  
 
There is no doubt that honest management is a very personal matter. Efficient 
audits and vigilance by upper government levels are highly important to keep 
local authorities accountable, but as the previous quote explains, the maturity of 
the political system, particularly the council system, is also highly relevant.  
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b) Mandatory conditional funds 
 
During field work, the aim was to investigate whether there was evidence that 
local governments were indeed delivering good services, particularly with 
reference to the mandatory conditional funds earmarked to basic public 
services. Participants were asked about the general level of public services and 
whether it has changed over time.  The majority of the participants agreed that 
the level of public services has changed significantly in recent years. But, more 
importantly, some of them directly referred particularly to these mandatory 
conditional funds. Others only remember that in the mid-1990s (around the time 
the conditional funds were created), the local government acquired a lot more 
money and invested in local services. 
 
APT-M ―The municipality has changed its physiognomy. I never thought it 
would change but since we received the money from mandatory 
conditional funds - It changed. It is very good. It benefits communities. 
Everything has changed. We were very behind, marginalized…. Now, 
everything has changed‖.  
 
Another participant that has worked on three occasions for the local government 
as a treasurer states that: 
 
GPT-PRA ―…. (He) believes mandatory funds have helped a lot... from 
one year to another the local budget increased a lot… Before, we did not 
have enough to pay the payroll and to maintain public services….it is 
easier now because the state government gives us 12 million, 1 million 
each month, we had a set date for the deposit. Then, we can plan for 
public work investment…‖ 
 
Participants also pointed out local communities have largely benefited from the 
reform. They remarked on the importance of the reform in regard to changes in 
local services not only in the municipal seat, but also in the communities. A 
participant expressed that the reform improved the redistribution within the 
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municipalities because the allocation of resources is decided at the local level 
with citizens participating directly; while before the reform, the state government 
invested in public works that were not necessary and were often not used by 
the communities, which they call “white elephants”.  The mandatory conditional 
funds are not only earmarked for general expenditures, but also require direct 
participation by citizens. 
 
EPT-M ―Before, the state government decided what to do…sometimes 
the communities did not even ask for that (specific work), did not even 
want it. They were ―white elephants‖ because they did not want that and 
just left it abandoned and it was money wrongly spent. With all the 
changes that have happened in the government now there is money to 
do public work and to do what is needed‖. 
 
These “white elephants” are not captured by the accountability index. The part 
that is captured by the index is the redistribution of CBPS in the municipal seat 
and in the communities. However, the “white elephants” tend to confirm that 
decentralised funds such as conditional mandatory funds and unconditional 
funds are especially likely to be responsive to local preferences and used 
efficiently, just as theory would suggest. 
 
In addition, the field work presents some evidence that the mandatory 
conditional funds, which delegated higher financial resources to local 
governments and increased public investment, appear to benefit the 
redistribution of basic public services denoting responsiveness to citizens; and 
seem to involve citizens in decision-making which denotes transparency.  This 
reinforces the quantitative findings that mandatory conditional funds are likely to 
improve accountability.   
Conditional mandatory funds are delegated in order to reduce disparities in 
development and help federal governments to achieve more standardized 
outcomes throughout the country.  
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However, conditionality of funds conflicts with the core argument of 
decentralisation, namely autonomy, and higher conditional mandatory funds 
might increase dependency and discourage any further investment in public 
works using unconditional grants, as well as affecting tax effort.  
 
In all municipalities, both mayors and councillors consider that the advantage of 
mandatory conditional funds is that they are less prone to be diverted to 
unnecessary expenses and/or that they are obliged to invest more in 
infrastructure.  
 
The disadvantage is the impossibility to use these resources in unpredictable 
circumstances:  
 
PPT-M ―Sometimes there are unpredictable details. The first year of my 
administration we had a big flood in the city and because everything was 
earmarked I did not know what to do. The second year we had the swine 
flu problem. In all Mexico we were known because of this pandemic. We 
were in quarantine and we had many doctors and nurses here…this is a 
resource you did not plan for. You need to take from other sources but 
you cannot…‖   
 
This goes in line with the findings in the previous chapter that show a positive 
relationship between mandatory conditional funds and index of accountability. 
Particularly, it is reflected in the variable public work investment in the 
accountability index.  
 
All positive comments regarding conditional funds were related to the 
mandatory conditional funds created after 1997 to close the gap for local 
infrastructure. An interesting remark is that all participants expressed their 
agreement for the financial resources to be earmarked. They consider that this 
facilitates investment in infrastructure. The negative comments are related to 
funds reassigned by agreement either by the states or federal government: i.e. 
Fiscal decentralisation in practice: Impact on accountability  
305 
 
the „extraordinary‟ funds referred to above, and which are excluded from the 
national data bases. This is discussed next.  
 
c) Extraordinary conditional funds 
 
The majority of participants who were mayors after the reform did not present 
favouritism concerns with respect to unconditional funds and mandatory 
conditional funds. However, in some cases they argued that extraordinary 
conditional funds from state or federal agencies were often denied due to 
political reasons.   
 
Extraordinary funds require high levels of lobbying. In three of the five 
municipalities, mayors that were in opposition to the state government were 
keener to obtain extraordinary funds from federal agencies instead of 
negotiating state funds.     
 
APT-M ―‘the governor treats us differently because we are another colour 
(political party)… Sadly, it is the way Mexican politics works. Fortunately, 
I have the federal government from the same party… because of that 
and my previous job in a federal agency, I bypass the state government 
(this means he went directly to the central government). I did not wait for 
the governor to help me. Honestly, I avoided it because I knew he would 
tell me- yes -but not when. People here want results. I looked for other 
ways, knocked on other doors and they heard me. The member of  
parliament and the president (of Mexico) helped me, they assigned 
extraordinary resources to us‖.  
   
PPT-M ―We do not have problems (with the state funds) but when you 
request something (discretional grants) they tell you- wait, we will see 
what we can do. …we know politics is mixed with everything.  It is logical 
that the municipalities that are from the same group as the governor 
have a few more resources. We are fortunate that we met a local 
parliament member who is today mayor from another rural city (the 
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average performer town).  He helped us a lot with different federal 
agencies in Mexico City… we obtained projects for our city… We went 
directly to Mexico City to present the projects, budgets, monitoring…. We 
got the funds to build 300 council houses in our municipality… nobody 
had done it before. Thank you to the federal agency and the federal 
government‖.  
 
The political use of extraordinary conditional funds is not surprising but it is 
highly interesting that this group of municipalities have been able to engage in 
this political dynamic with federal agencies.  
  
The rationale from the local authorities' point of view is that it does not matter 
from where the resources are channelled (state or federal government) as long 
as they benefit the municipality. However, the types of projects promoted by 
state and federal government have different aims. This might have collateral 
problems as some of these investments are not a priority in the municipality.  
 
PPT- C ―The extraordinary conditional funds are sometimes for 
investments that are not really necessary. EXAMPLE: A public square. I 
believe it is more important to invest in a road than in a public square‖  
 
Others raise the concern that some extraordinary conditional funds are aimed at 
individual support rather than collective benefits while these municipalities still 
require investment in projects that benefit the community as a whole.   
 
PPT-C ―Recently we have obtained a lot of federal resources for our 
municipality. It is good. However, federal projects are more directed to 
private benefits than collective.  We have the council houses here. They 
benefited individuals directly and it is fine. But, the problem is that we still 
have a lot of deficiencies in our community; we do not have paved 
streets, electricity, cultural spaces, and sport facilities. Why do they not 
provide funds for that? I know that it is difficult to satisfy everybody but 
we have other problems that take priority‖. 




Three out of the four municipalities that obtained federal projects express the 
concern that projects are left unaccomplished because the municipality does 
not have the level of development to afford it.   
.   
GPT-C ―We have many houses that were made for lizards. I mean it 
literally. Many houses are used only by lizards and other animals. They 
live there because the houses are empty‖. 
 
EPT-M ―We got council houses… houses are not in use because we 
could not finish a well for drinking water, electricity and sewage. We were 
about to install the water and some people did not allow us. The central-
left candidate (they had elections at that time) who is now the mayor told 
some people that we must pay them for the duct that would cross their 
neighbours‘ land. He did it for political reasons. In the end I thought – I 
am not going to end my mandate fighting with people. Now that he is the 
mayor he has not yet fixed the problem”.  
 
In these cases, extraordinary conditional funds may damage citizens' welfare.   
 
In addition to unnecessary investment or types of investment that are not a 
priority, participants mentioned two accountability issues in regard to the 
extraordinary conditional funds: the work execution by contractors hired directly 
by the state or federal agencies and the inflexibility in operational rules.  
 
EPT-M  ―Sometimes it is not good because contractors from other cities   
come and, sometimes, they do their work well but not well enough for us. 
We are the ones that remain here. We face the consequences of what 
we do. The contractors come and go. They do their job and take the 
money but nobody takes responsibility for the durability of the work‖.  
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EPT-C ―The advantage of using unconditional funds is that you do not 
get into legal trouble. I know some local authorities that got into problems 
for using extraordinary conditional funds… it is better not to touch them‖. 
 
When local authorities were asked for suggestions in regard to 
intergovernmental transfers, in one municipality, the majority of mayors 
proposed that transfers should not pass through the hands of state government 
and should be sent directly from federal government to local governments. Their 
concern was not related to political revenge practices towards opposition 
parties, because, in this particular municipality, there were no political party or 
state level differences. It is again a perception of weak accountability by the 
state.  
 
EPT-M ―…These federal funds should be given directly to municipalities 
without passing by the state government. In this way we can make the 
most of the resources. We will use them 100%. Obviously, the 
expenditure can be categorized. We know there are a lot of necessities 
in local government and, in particular, in rural local governments‖. 
 
Thus, both conditional mandatory funds and unconditional funds give room for 
better decision-making in allocation of resources based on the needs and 
desires of local citizens. However, these funds present different concerns. The 
problems with conditional mandatory funds are related to some constraints of 
efficiency, such as a restriction to use the resources for unpredictable 
circumstances. On the other hand, the problems with unconditional funds are 
related to financial responsibility- the misuse or unnecessary spending and/or to 
opt for inefficiency over efficiency. The difference between them is citizens‟ 
involvement in decision-making. With conditional mandatory funds, it is 
obligatory for local authorities to include citizens in decision-making and work 
oversight (this is part of the earmarked funds regulations), whereas with 
unconditional funds it is not. 
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On the other hand, the extraordinary conditional funds are an important source 
of investments for development. However, they rely on direct relations with 
government officials. In this case both types of issues are present. On efficiency 
grounds, inflexible operational rules and work execution by the state (in some 
cases) restricts efficiency. In regard to financial responsibility, these funds are 
prone to collateral effect (the white elephants) as investment is not decided at 
the local level. 
 
The next Section will focus on a key variable that was not captured in the 
accountability index, corruption.  
 
13.2 As the saying goes, you do not (need to) give (somebody) money, put 
(him) where the money is  
 
This saying portrays the general idea that money changes the behaviour of 
people, leading to corruption.  This section explores whether higher resources 
at the local level appears to encourage corrupt practices by local authorities.  
 
Unfortunately, in the previous quantitative analysis, the accountability index 
does not include a direct measure of corruption. It only includes a measure of 
citizens‟ involvement, legal transparency and financial responsibility.  Measuring 
corruption at this level and for this group of municipalities is more than a 
challenge, not only due to technical measuring problems (with secondary 
databases), but also because it is a highly sensitive issue. However, qualitative 
analysis gives the opportunity to explore corruption through the participants‟ 
experience. 
 
In order to explore the issue of corruption, participants were told that some 
people think that rural governments must not receive unconditional funds 
because they spend the money wrongly and among few people. They were 
asked to state whether they agreed with the statement and to give an example.  
The majority of the participants agree that corruption exists. However, 
considering it is a very delicate matter, it was affirmed by some but not others.  




The most common types of corruption mentioned by participants were 
systematic corruption, embezzlement and, the most cited, favouritism.  
 
Systematic corruption  
PPT-C ―Well, in this municipality...when I was there it was not possible. 
Now, there are some resources of federal projects (for start-up 
business)... where ....for example you tell the mayor- help me to get this 
project and I will give you 50 or 100 thousands pesos. The mayor helps 
you to get the project, you get the money (to set up a business) give part 
to the mayor and you do not do the project..." 
 
Embezzlement  
GPT-C ―Some municipality budget goes to DIF (System of integral 
development of the family)…at the end of the mandate, the mayor also 
has to prove what the DIF did. But in reality here is where more of the 
resources are used to their convenience; here is where the unconditional 
funds are used wrongly because DIF has a programme of economic 
allowances for medicines and other sort of help. They are prone to be 
misused. In fact, we have cases where the beneficiary signs the 
allowance receipt blank. They are granted with 50 pesos in cash but the 
allowance appears in treasury for 300 or 400 pesos...‖ 
 
Favouritism   
PPT-C ―Here, most of the mayors benefit their family and closest friends. 
The best government programmes and projects are for them. We have 
seen how some mayors finish their mandate with a lot of money as well 
as their relatives‖.  
 
Unfortunately, corruption exists at all levels of governments and local authorities 
express that because of the increase in resources, there is more corruption.  
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APT-M …‖You always have the best intention to do the best for the 
municipality. Everyone should do that. We say it, but when we are inside 
it is different. If you are not doing it (corruption), there is a bunch of 
people waiting to see what they can take. Money shines to all of us‖. 
 
GPT-C ―When I was young I did not understand public administration and 
maybe, the money at that time was little. I remember very well, we only 
had one party here, PRI, and we did not have any disputes, competition 
or anything. They only decided who the next mayor was and that was it. 
Now things have changed, there is a lot of money in between‖. 
 
At first glance, unconditional funds seem to facilitate corruption because local 
authorities have more freedom on expenditure decisions. In other words, they 
have more discretion and this is a significant concern, because they represent a 
big proportion of the total revenues budget.  
 
In addition, the quantitative analysis adds strong support to this assumption as 
the first phase of this research suggests that an increment in unconditional 
funds is likely related to a negative change in accountability. It means that to a 
given increase in unconditional funds, local authorities are likely to diminish 
infrastructure investment, raise current expenditures, invest less in public 
services in the communities and be less engaged in transparency arrangements 
in terms of legislation and institutional openness. But, interestingly, most 
examples from participants for systematic corruption were related to funds 
where state intervention was necessary- Extraordinary Conditional Funds, not 
unconditional funds. The reader can observe this in the previous selected 
examples of corruption.  
  
In addition, an interesting difference between the case studies is that 
participants from the PPT mentioned examples of both favouritism and 
systematic corruption and both were related to the extraordinary conditional 
funds. Contextually, this municipality (PPT) presents a very significant 
difference with the rest of the municipalities. The state-level has always been 
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from PRI and this municipality was from PAN in several administrations. Hence, 
PRI still has a strong political power in the state. These local administrations 
governed when PAN was in power at the national level and the corruption 
examples are related to federal government funds. However, most examples 
were presented by respondents belonging to PRI. This municipality benefited 
largely from federal funds but these resources are off local budget. Hence, 
these public works were not captured in either of the indices.  
 
The relation between extraordinary conditional funds and corrupt practices is 
not limited to the PPT, in all municipalities corrupt practices were also 
exemplified using extraordinary conditional funds. However, in the PPT case, it 
was more apparent given the political circumstances.  
 
In contrast, participants, regardless of municipalities, did not provide examples 
of corrupt practices using mandatory conditional funds at all. This does not 
prove that mandatory conditional funds cannot be used in corrupt practices or 
indicate that the corrupt agent is generally the state government.  However, this 
evidence along with the results from the quantitative analysis, give room for  
inferring that mandatory conditional funds might improve accountability 
behaviour as they are likely less prone to corrupt practices and more likely to 




This analysis reaffirms and helps to provide additional possible explanations for 
some findings from the previous empirical national data analysis. Fiscal 
decentralisation through conditional mandatory funds has benefited rural 
municipalities because local governments have been delivering better services 
after the 1997 reform, in regard to redistribution, and there is less concern about 
corruption practices.  
 
The evidence indicates that the more the funds are a function of direct relation 
with state officials, the less they promote accountability. This is evident on 
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special projects based on extraordinary conditional funds but it seems highly 
plausible that the same is true for unconditional funds but in this case it is 
because of lack of direct relation with citizens.  
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Chapter 14 - Fiscal decentralisation in practice: impact on public 
entrepreneurship   
 
 
This study argues that fiscal decentralisation implies not only changes in 
accountability behaviour, but also entrepreneurial behaviour.  As explained in 
the literature review, public entrepreneurship is a difficult concept to define.  
 
In the first phase of this investigation, some interesting and suggestive findings 
were found from national data. However, these findings suffer from all the 
drawbacks of quantitative data sets with limited and rigid data-collection 
constraints and variables.  Nevertheless, they were useful in two ways. First, 
they present the “big picture” and second, they inform us in the selection of 
cases.  
 
The most important suggestive finding is that fiscal decentralisation might be 
related to entrepreneurship through both unconditional and conditional 
mandatory funds but the strong association with unconditional funds seems to 
disappear in the presence of some municipal political circumstances.  
 
In addition, as with the accountability analysis, there is one important source of 
funds that was not included directly in the quantitative analysis, i.e. the 
extraordinary conditional funds because this type of funds is not considered part 
of the local government budget. However, in the qualitative analysis, these 
funds appeared relevant. Therefore, this research will seek to understand in 
which ways the extraordinary conditional funds are also related to public 
entrepreneurship.    
 
Before doing so, it is important to clarify what local authorities on the ground 
perceive as an entrepreneurial action. Then this research can aim to ratify 
whether the entrepreneurship index used in the previous empirical analysis is 
reliable by exploring in more detail each of the entrepreneurial dimensions; pro-
activeness, innovation and risk taking. 
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This chapter is structured as follows: the first Section explores the definition of 
public entrepreneurship from the local authorities‟ point of view and the 
subsequent Sections discuss each of the entrepreneurial dimensions, pro-
activeness, innovation and risk taking, embedding the discussion of 
unconditional, mandatory conditional and extraordinary conditional funds.  
 
14.1 Defining public entrepreneurship in rural local governments 
 
As discussed in the literature (Section 3.2), there is not yet a consensus on the 
extent and aspects of public entrepreneurship but the concept has evolved from 
a definition of economic maximisation toward innovation and creativity. 
 
Before presenting the definitions from the participants‟ point of view, this study 
presents briefly how public entrepreneurship was defined and operationalized in 
this research.  
 
In the first phase of this study, public entrepreneurship was defined as the 
behaviour of local authorities to act in ways that improve efficiency. It aimed at 
including the three usual dimensions of entrepreneurship: pro-activeness, 
innovation, and risk taking. However, two or more of these three dimensions are 
likely to be encountered in one entrepreneurial action or it can be the case that 
only one dimension is present. For instance, we can categorize pro-active 
behaviour to pursue extraordinary funds as entrepreneurial because of the effort 
and dedication to obtain it. In this case, the pro-active dimension is present. The 
same example could involve local authorities needing to find out innovative 
ways to fulfil the requirements of this particular fund. In this case, both pro-
active and innovative dimensions overlap.  
 
The three dimensions are all very difficult to operationalize and measure. In the 
quantitative work this research used four variables- co-operation with public 
organisations, public service association, property tax update and  fiscal effort 
(the collection of own revenues as a percentage of total revenues). The aim of 
these indicators was to capture the entrepreneurial actions likely to embrace 
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one, two or all three dimensions of public entrepreneurship: pro-activeness, 
innovation and risk taking. Therefore, the ultimate aim was to get a general 
picture about whether local authorities were involved in actions that might 
suggest entrepreneurial behaviour.    
  
In the in-depth case studies, with very different sorts of data, this research takes 
another look at the concepts by considering actions such as co-operation, 
grant-application facilitation, win-win negotiation, pro-active pursuit of funds and 
work efficiency.  
 
These types of actions were selected based on: actions identified during a pilot 
study at the start of this investigation and were: co-operation, grant-application 
facilitation and win-win negotiation; and other additional actions were identified 
during the second phase of this study which were: pro-active pursuit of funds 
and work efficiency.  
 
As shown in Table 14.1, all five entrepreneurial actions denote some sense of 
co-operation either with local citizens or other public institutions but the 
entrepreneurial actions, grant-application facilitation and win-win negotiations 
also describe the use of own revenues as an entrepreneurial action. This is the 
reason fiscal effort was incorporated as an indicator in the public 
entrepreneurship index. Grant-application facilitation and proactive pursuit of 
funds are similar in the sense they both aim at getting extra funds. However, 
they are different because in the former, local authorities are intermediaries 
between public agencies and social groups that are eligible for funds, and in the 
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   Table  14.1 Entrepreneurial actions‟ definitions and dimensions 
Type of entrepreneurial actions Definitions Dimensions 
1) Co-operation  The use of co-operation to minimise costs 












Local government can assist and participate 
actively with local groups in being eligible 
for funds granted by the state or federal 
government directly for a specific sector 
using own revenues. 
 
3) Win-win negotiation Local government can negotiate with 
groups, communities, public and private 
sector for sharing costs for focused projects 
using own revenues. 
4) Proactive pursuit of funds Local authorities can increase the local 
budget by pursuing funds other than basic 
public services.    
5) Work efficiency Local authorities can innovate in order to 
minimize cost or maximize revenues. 
 
During the field work the researcher asked participants to define public 
entrepreneurship. This was not an easy task for the participants as they had not 
thought about this matter before. These definitions present an interesting 
pattern. The following quotes present a range of responses.  
 
EPT-PRE ―…Being an entrepreneur is to look for more resources”.  
GPT-C “The entrepreneur does not have only one aim; he/she has three 
or four or five aims (for getting more resources)‖.  
 
PPT-C ―…an entrepreneur has vision; he/she knows how to apply the 
resources and where the municipality is going. …‖.  
 
AvPT-M “One can go for the easy way. I get one peso, I spend it within 
the regulation, I justify it and prove the expenses (Accountability). The 
other way is I get one peso ... what are we going to do with it? We go out 
and listen to the people, we observe their interest and based on that, we 
start working together (Entrepreneurship)…‖. 
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APT-M ―We do not have enough financial resources and we have to do 
amazing things with it. We need to be creative for instance, co-operate 
with citizens ... they work and we provide the material. It is not easy to do  
Everyone is about to fight against necessity. ..An entrepreneur looks for 
more, he looks at the future‖. 
In these definitions, it can be seen that participants refer to efficiency in different 
ways, ranging from pro-active pursuit of funds by increasing the budget; 
innovation in order to minimize cost or maximize revenues; and vision, a point 
of direction where the municipality is going.  
 
These definitions denote the dimensions of pro-activeness and innovation but 
not much of risk-taking. In this case, participants are purely defining positive 
attributes of public entrepreneurship. However, during the conversations some 
participants also pointed out some negative aspects. These aspects can be 
considered to be more related to risk taking. This point will be reviewed in 
Section 14.4.  
 
The first quote was the most mentioned definition by participants. It defines 
entrepreneurship only as a way to increase investment by a pro-active pursuit of 
funds. Therefore, this action is related to the pro-activeness dimension. Co-
operation with citizens was used to portray innovative ways to minimize cost or 
maximize revenues.  In addition, by investing in projects other than basic public 
services (through extraordinary conditional funds), there is “vision” for the long 
term social and economic capital.  
 
There is a difference between the responses of mayors and councillors and key 
political actors in respect of the entrepreneurship definition. For instance, the 
first three quotes above belong to councillors and a key political actor (ending in 
–C and –PRE). In these quotes participants refer mainly to a proactive pursuit of 
funds, in particular extraordinary conditional funds.  
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But, in the last two quotes, which belong to mayors (ending in –M), mayors went 
beyond increments in investment and also considered dimensions such as 
innovative ways to minimize cost or maximize the financial resources. This 
includes co-operation with citizens such as sharing costs or “faenas” (citizens 
using their labour skills in the projects). Moreover, in some entrepreneurial 
examples, increases in fiscal effort and pro-activeness, which is the pursuit of 
funds, could also be identified. This difference in defining entrepreneurship 
behaviour was a general pattern in the responses.  
 
Speaking of entrepreneurial examples, following the same argument that 
mayors and councillors/key political informants define entrepreneurship in a 
different way, the same pattern is also evident in the examples provided by 
councillors/ key informants and mayors. Councillors and key informants mostly 
presented examples related to extraordinary conditional funds as 
entrepreneurial action which denote a pro-active action. Mayors, on the other 
hand, presented, in addition, examples of co-operation with citizens and public 
organizations which denote more an innovative dimension.  
 
Thus, the findings suggest that public entrepreneurship is perceived differently 
by different actors. Mayors, who are the entrepreneurs in this study, embrace 
two dimensions (pro-activeness and innovation), whereas local councillors and 
key informants seem to interpret public entrepreneurship largely as pro-active 
behaviour to pursue funds. In addition, the discussion leads to the interpretation 
that risk-taking is not evidently considered as an entrepreneurial action or at 
least, it is not considered a positive attribute of public entrepreneurship.  
 
The next Section will explore whether, on the ground, the evidence tends to 
reinforce confidence in the findings from the statistical analysis and if so, in 
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14.2 As the saying goes, to be the rice in all kinds of mole 
 
Mole is a traditional and popular Mexican food combining chillies and chocolate 
usually accompanied by rice as a side dish. There are different types of mole 
dishes. Therefore, being “the rice” in all kind of “mole” means to be someone 
that is everywhere and gets involved in everything or a pro-active individual.  
 
As mentioned above, pro-active pursuit of funds, particularly via extraordinary 
conditional funds, was the most cited entrepreneurial dimension by councillors 
and this was also mentioned by mayors. However, there are other interesting 
remarks about how other types of funds, in particular the decentralised funds, 
are used indirectly to obtain extraordinary funds, which denotes a proactive 
dimension.   
 
Most of the entrepreneurship examples indicate that entrepreneurial actions 
were about pursuing extraordinary conditional funds from federal and state 
government through their respective agencies. From now on this type of 
entrepreneurial actions will be referred to as “proactive pursuit of funds”.  
 
The researcher asked participants to explain the entrepreneurial feature of 
these proactive pursuits of funds. Most  participants refer to the fact that they 
were not only public services, but related to employment or economic 
development, such as extraordinary funds for business projects, dams, 
highways; or they explain that these projects were aimed at long-term social 
and capital development such as businesses and sports complexes.  
 
 


























Type of Entrepreneurial 
behaviour  
Industry √    Win-win negotiation 
Refurbishment of 
public buildings 
√  √  Win-win negotiation 
Trust  √    Work efficiency 
Basic Public Service 
(electricity) 
√ √   Win-win negotiation 
Highway   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Industry √  √  Win-win negotiation 




















Trash collection √  √  Co-operation  
Collection of toys √   √ Co-operation  
Hunting ranch √  √  √  Co-operation  
Streets √  √  Work efficiency 
Refurbishment of 
public square 
  √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Highway   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Clay and Craft Ovens   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Sport complex   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Industry   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Water treatment 
system 
  √  Proactive pursuit of funds 















Suspension bridge √   √ Win-win negotiation 
Land valuation √   √ Co-operation 
School services √   √ Grant-application facilitation 



















 √ √  Win-win negotiation 
Roads   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Water-well   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Stoves   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 












Council Houses   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Drip irrigation   √  Proactive pursuit of funds 
Health center √  √  Win-win negotiation 
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Table 14.2 displays the lists of projects participants referred to as 
entrepreneurial in each case study. The table also shows the source of finance 
used to carry out the project. This permits the observation of which type of 
funds is likely to be used more often for entrepreneurial activities. In addition, 
the table classifies the projects according to the five types of entrepreneurial 
actions mentioned in Table 14.1.   
 
As shown in Table 14.2, all case studies mentioned proactive pursuit of 
funds, regardless of their performance and proactive pursuit of funds is the 
most mentioned type of action. In addition, some examples combine other 
sources, such as own revenues, or the use of fiscal effort, and unconditional 
funds to obtain extraordinary funds. Combining funds means that part of the 
finance for a project comes from state/federal agencies and part from local 
governments. The local governments‟ financial resources come from 
unconditional or own revenues.  This will be referred to as “combined funds” 
from now on.  
 
In the grant-application facilitation actions, local governments increase local 
investment by supporting local social groups to be eligible for special funds 
using own revenues. 
 
AvPT-M ―A trusteeship programme called Quality School in Mexico 
required schools to give $83,000 (Pesos) for being eligible for a school 
project valued $300,000. We wanted to support all local schools. In the 
annual competition for the hometown queen, the local government 
together with all local schools presented an innovative idea. The local 
government would double the amount invested in the competition. It 
promoted the participation of schools and students‘ mothers. They 
collected as much money as they could. After the competition, I 
organised an open public meeting where I invited the governor (who was 
from an opposition party) and together with the local teachers, we asked 
the governor to collaborate in the same way. He accepted and the result 
was that as an example, if a school collected $100,000 it ended up with 
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$300,000. They agreed that part of the money collected would go to the 
Quality school programme which was $83,000. This left them with 
$217,000 but they received funds from the Quality School programme 
valued at $300,000, which gave them a total of $517,000. This practice 
was performed during three consecutive years and school investment in 
infrastructure, maintenance and equipment amounted overall to $1 
million pesos per school‖. 
 
EPT-M ―…We help a group of citizens to get funds for public housing. 
These are people that do not have houses, for instance, single mothers.  
They tried for many years to get this fund but they could not do it 
because the local government did not support them. There was no 
guarantee that they would finish it.  We got 105 council houses with the 
support of two public institutions and TELEVISA (a private institution)…. 
They gave this fund to us because we were working efficiently. We 
assumed the responsibility to execute the work. We worked with this 
group of citizens but they did something wrong during the work execution 
and we had to intervene. We levelled the ground where the houses were 
about to be built. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY THERE WAS NOT 
SUPPORT FOR THIS GROUP BY OTHER LOCAL AUTHORITIES? 
Because they thought the leader of this group was deceitful. He 
promised for many years he would get the funds but he could not. He 
had the intention but he did not have the necessary support to achieve it. 
He had a big obstacle he could not overcome. We went to Mexico City 
and to the state government and we got it‖.  
 
Another way pro-activeness is manifested in rural local government is when 
there is co-operation with different sectors, including the private sector.  
 
EPT-M ―…it is not only about getting money from state government; a 
mayor can also get money from the private sector. CAN YOU GIVE ME 
AN EXAMPLE? When I was a mayor, Channel 13 gave us toys for 
children‘s day. Sabritas (a crisp company) gave us crisps for the children. 
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PEMEX (Oil Company) gave us some wheel chairs for disabled people. 
...I know that there are other public institutions that can help, even in the 
embassies. It is all about knocking on people‘s doors‖. 
  
AvPT-M ―We also worked with the private sector…but sometimes it did 
not work. For instance, we had a project for an oxidation pond to avoid  
pollution of the river. A company in the city was polluting but the 
company did not co-operate, but they did co-operate in other projects 
such as rural roads, paving and other projects‖. 
 
In addition, in the win-win negotiation, extraordinary funds can be obtained if 
local governments finance part of the project using money from own revenues, 
unconditional funds or conditional funds (when the projects are dedicated to 
basic public services or according to the funds‟ specifications) and the other 
part is financed by private, public or social organisations. For instance, in the 
following example it can be observed how different sources of finance are used 
to carry out one specific project.   
 
GPT-M ―…People want jobs. In my time as a mayor, the local 
government supported a textile factory. The textile industry came to ask 
for support and we agreed (the textile industry was redirected to the local 
government by the state economic development ministry). Local 
government participated with installation expenses. WHERE DID THESE 
RESOURCES COME FROM? We paid this from own revenues. But 
there is always somebody that wants to lead. A woman, I still see and 
remember her –with a disappointed face-, became leader (of the 
workers) and told the people (workers) that the factory was paying very 
low wages. The factory‘s owners opted to move to another city where 
they did not have such problems…‖. 
 
Based on this classification, another important distinction in Table 14.2 is 
between the types of entrepreneurial actions mentioned above and the 
performance of municipalities. GPT, EPT and AvPT presented more examples 
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of extraordinary conditional funds that were combined with other types of funds, 
“the combined funds”. In contrast, the APT and PPT mentioned less of this type 
of combined funds and largely use examples of proactive pursuit of funds. In 
fact, 5 out of the 7 entrepreneurial actions were carried out in the municipalities 
considered as good performers and these projects were financed with different 
types of funds.  
 
The index of public entrepreneurship may have captured part of the “combined 
funds” with the operationalized variable fiscal effort. In this case, the types of 
entrepreneurial action expected to be described were win-win negotiation and 
grant application facilitation.  However, as observed in Table 14.2, co-operation 
with public organisation and public service association was, in some cases, also 
accompanied by combination of funds.  One other important trend to consider is 
that most combined funds considered entrepreneurial were often financed 
through the use of fiscal effort compared to unconditional funds.   
 
In Table 14.2, the underlined tick in the column conditional/ own revenues refers 
to funds financed through own revenues. It can be observed that 11 out of 13 
examples were financed by own revenues. 
 
In the previous discussion, it was clear that unconditional funds and, to a lesser 
extent, conditional mandatory funds, can be used as a part of a mechanism of 
combined investment between municipality, state and central government, 
similar to fiscal effort.  
 
In regard to conditional mandatory funds, a participant claimed:  
 
GPT-C ―Mandatory conditional funds are, in my point of view, very 
efficient. This type of fund invites mayors to spend resources for the 
good of their people…It has some ―padlocks‖ for the mayors…. And as a 
result, mayors can work harder and seek MORE funds”.  
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Thus, unconditional and conditional funds might not be direct factors for a pro-
active behaviour on entrepreneurship as they are mandatory for all rural 
municipalities. But they have contributed indirectly to a more pro-active pursuit 
of funds. 
 
According to the previous empirical research, unconditional and mandatory 
conditional funds are positively associated with entrepreneurship. It means that 
an increase in unconditional and conditional funds is associated with, and 
seems likely to encourage, co-operation with private, other public sector 
agencies and society, as well as increases in own revenue collection.  
 
In the field work, it seems clear that one way unconditional and conditional 
mandatory funds have an effect on entrepreneurship is by indirectly enabling 
local authorities to pursue extra funds.  Thus, they have an important but 
indirect effect on the pro-active dimension of entrepreneurship and 
extraordinary conditional funds have a direct effect.   
 
This proactive behaviour, the pursuit of funds through combined funds, seems 
to be bound up with the decentralisation process as fiscal decentralisation 
secured local governments fund for basic expenses (unconditional funds) and 
services (conditional mandatory funds) and this enables them to pursue 
extraordinary funds. In addition, with these decentralised funds, local authorities 
are enabled to allocate funds (due to high discretion) through own revenues and 
unconditional funds (mainly). 
 
14.3 As the saying goes, where there's a will, there's a way  
 
The fiscal decentralisation theory assumes that higher revenues encourage 
local authorities to seek new ways to attract both businesses and people in 
order to activate the local economy and extend the tax base.  
 
Attracting businesses and extending the tax base are two actions that were 
likely captured in the index for entrepreneurship because, to some extent, the 
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index measures direct increases in own tax collection through fiscal effort which 
are a consequence of attracting more business to the municipality and 
extending the tax base.  
 
In regard to the local economy, participants in the case studies presented 
examples of local authorities‟ awareness of the needs of employment and the 
importance of extending their tax base. Some examples that reflect their 
commitment to creating employment are the following:  
EPT-M ―…I managed to get an investor for the city and I got very 
disappointed because in the end, I realized that the payment for ―taxes 
for the use of land‖ was collected by the state, not the local government. 
This happened because we did not have all the proper paper work, 
namely the urban development plan and legislation. I called the local 
council out for an urgent meeting and told them ―how is it possible that 
the business we invited would pay $2.7 million pesos in taxes to the 
state? This factory agreed with the state to pay $200,000 in instalments. I 
managed to get $400,000 out of the $2.7 million for the local 
government… The previous administration left us with a tax collection of 
$400,000 pesos. I took it to $800,000 pesos. All of this because of the 
business we invited. Now, the tax is paid here to the local government. 
This increases our own revenues”. 
EPT-M ―We invited investors to come here. In fact, we suggested to the 
governor to build the new refinery in this area because here there are 
many lands that do not produce anything. I told him that we have PEMEX 
(Mexican Oil Company)‘s duct so, why do you need to destroy productive 
lands somewhere else and you do not take advantage of these lands that 
are almost dead? People from the CFE (Electricity Company) helped us 
to take aerial maps and advised us in order to present a good project. A 
lot of people were very interested because the economy would flourish. 
Derived from this, I achieved to bring an investor (textile industry). We 
managed to give jobs to the people. For me, this was very important. At 
the end, we did not achieve our aim (of bringing the refinery). The 
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governor already had commitments somewhere else.  I told him that he 
would pay 100 thousands pesos for each hectare there, it was very 
expensive. I convinced the other investors because the land here is 
cheaper…‖. 
 
GPT-C ―We invited a company to set up here….they found a piece of 
land that belongs to the city. We were supporting them but the problem 
was that our city does not yet have good road communication. The 
investors said that it took them too long to reach the city‖. 
 
Some of the projects mentioned by participants in regard to employment were 
unsuccessful. For instance, the second and third quotes are examples of “good 
intentions” where local authorities initiated change (pro-activeness) finding 
innovative ways to gain investment. However, the end results were 
unsuccessful. Regardless, this investigation is not aimed at successful 
entrepreneurship actions only. The definition of public entrepreneurship does 
not require success in all actions. It aims at exploring incentives that may or 
may not result in success.   
 
The important point to reflect on is that, even though local authorities have 
quality information and willingness to foster investment, most examples related 
to employment did not last long or were never accomplished due to different 
circumstances. In this regard, participants pointed out that they are at a 
disadvantage compared with other municipalities.    
 
GPT-M ―…we cannot compete with other neighbour municipalities 
because they are in the industrial corridor. We cannot because we do not 
have anything‖ 
EPT-M ―…rural municipalities need more resources in order to compete 
with other neighbouring big municipalities. Developed cities have and 
continue to have money because they generate their own resources. Our 
municipality does not generate because the geographical conditions do 
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not generate… if they do not give the resources directly at least they 
should help us to build infrastructure that can increase resources here in 
the municipality‖.  
 
The results of such competition seem to support Prud‟homme‟s (1995) 
argument of unequal competition and poor regional redistribution. For rural 
municipalities there are obstacles due to poor infrastructure and inherent 
geographic characteristics of rural areas.  
 
The other innovative aspect that decentralisation implies to promote is related to 
cost reduction ether by running public services better or by investing in public 
works. The decentralisation policy seems to have improved this aspect. 
Interestingly, EPT and GPT were the only municipalities that present examples 
of how work execution can lead to work efficiency (see Table 14.2).  
 
Work execution is seen as an opportunity to be innovative. Work efficiency 
minimizes the cost or maximizes the resources local authorities use in public 
works. Theoretically, there is a fear that higher conditional funds would increase 
dependency and discourage both further investment in public works using 
unconditional funds and fiscal effort. However, on the ground some evidence 
suggests that the opposite could also occur under the premise that local 
authorities execute the work.   
EPT-M ―We faced the worst financial crisis of our time, we faced the 
influenza pandemic, the local budget was cut by more than 4 million and 
nevertheless, I can tell you honestly we did more than in other 
administrations. We looked for more investment. We asked PEMEX (Oil 
Company) for a donation. We built a road from here. The previous 
administration, they arranged this road from here up to my parents‘ 
house but they stopped there because it was my parents‘ home. This 
happened when I lost the first political campaign. But, we built the road 
from here and for more than four kilometres with PEMEX support. You 
can see, it is very good quality. We built it for 1.2 million pesos. We hired 
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a machine to make our own material; we bought some things and lobbied 
others. We made the tarmac, so it was cheaper. We looked for ways to 
make more with less‖.  
 
GPT-M ―… There are some funds (extraordinary conditional funds) that 
are completely earmarked and they have a set date to execute the work 
and if you do not finish you have to return the money. The mandatory 
conditional funds are not like that. Sometimes we had an excess 
because of interests or savings from public work. Then, we could 
propose some other public work and we could do the public work in the 
next accounting exercise. When I was there, we never returned money‖.  
 
Under extraordinary conditional funds, local authorities might or might not 
execute the public work depending on the specifications of the fund. If they 
execute the work, it is seen as an opportunity to be more efficient. This allows 
local authorities to save from their own resources and invest in other public 
works. Inversely, as observed in the next quote, work execution by the state is 
perceived as a disincentive for productive efficiency and as a threat to allocative 
efficiency.  
 
APT-M ―When I execute the public works, I am able to decrease the cost. 
HOW DO YOU DO IT? For instance, for public work worth 1.5 million 
pesos you can buy cement at 500 pesos but in reality it cost 100 pesos. 
In this way, I can save. Public work worth 1.5 million I know I can do it for 
500- 700 thousand (pesos)…it is the engineers‘ mafia. They tell you what 
to do... Another example, the new state programme called PESO A 
PESO (50%-50% share between state and local governments). Not even 
people from the same political party as the governor agree with the 
programme. The state executes the work. A public work worth 1 million 
pesos, they value it for 2 million pesos. Let‘s say that we execute the job 
and the state government says it costs 2 million pesos. In this case, it 
does not matter if they inflate the numbers, because we can do 
something with the savings. But that is not the situation, they execute the 
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work. The municipality puts one million pesos (50% share) and I know 
that I can make it for 700 thousand. We are giving away 300 thousand 
pesos to them and we are still the means to get 1 million more. In the first 
year of my administration, it happened. I did not know. They took me by 
surprise. I gave them 5 public works at around 5 million. But sewage that 
cost 1 million pesos, they value it for around 3 million pesos. I did exactly 
the same sewage work for 1 million pesos and with the same level of 
quality. Besides, if they do the work, they do not come back to fix 
details‖. 
 
The execution of work by state government seems to discourage 
entrepreneurship.  The other issue is related to the use of excess when savings 
are achieved. This is not a problem under the conditional funds and, therefore, 
this is clear evidence that fiscal decentralisation via conditional funds has, in 
some cases, been an important enabler for local authorities to become more 
innovative in the ways they perform their work.   
 
EPT-M ―…the problem is that, if the funds are completely earmarked, 
then they have a period for execution and if you do not execute it, you 
have to take it back‖.  
 
GPT-S ―Sometimes we get budgets that are high and we could manage 
to get an excess. This is good, it means you are investing properly, 
because most of the time it is the opposite, you do not have enough 
money. We should be able to use this excess for things that are not 
earmarked because we have already achieved the objective. Now we 
can use the money for something else‖. 
 
At this point, the reader is aware how difficult it is for this group of municipalities 
to increase tax effort. All municipalities collect the same taxes and use the same 
revenue sources. However, some rural local governments try to implement 
innovative actions in order to increase tax effort. Therefore, fiscal effort reflects 
success in some fund-seeking areas.  Some examples are:  
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AvPT-M “A co-operative farm with a population of 250 inhabitants had 
had a property-tax debt with the local government for many years. I had 
a meeting with the community and suggested that if they paid the debt 
off, the local government would provide the same amount of money to 
invest in a local project. They accepted and decided to invest the money 
in a bridge because this community is located between two rivers and 
every year, at least three times, the river used to flood, leaving the 
community isolated from its hometown. A suspension bridge was built.”  
 
AvPT-M “I hired an expert in land valuation but we did not have enough 
money for sophisticated studies. I decided to invite students from the 
local high school to collaborate as part of the compulsory social service. 
Students were trained and divided into groups to visit local properties 
that were detected as irregular due to low land valuation. In the end, the 
revenues from property tax increased by 78% that year without raising 
the tax rate. Then, the initiative of local government minimised costs and 
increased its own local revenues in adverse circumstances‖ 
In Table 14.2 it can be seen that municipalities that score high on the 
entrepreneurship index (GPT and EPT) tend to also be the municipalities that 
presented examples of work efficiency (and combined funds). This tends to 
suggest that the entrepreneurship index is indeed providing a measure of public 
entrepreneurship. 
 
In particular the EPT illustrates a relevant example of entrepreneurship 
behaviour- the hunting ranch. This project was the most remarkable, expensive 
running project that I encountered in this group of municipalities, not only 
because of the extent of investment, but also because it was based on careful 
consideration of the municipality‟s strengths and a novel effort of co-operation 
between municipalities.  
 
This hunting ranch was proposed by a local citizen and supported by the mayor 
of the EPT at the time. They invited and organized mayors from three nearby 
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rural municipalities and applied for funds from the agency in charge of 
promoting eco-tourism. It consists of sustainable hunting of wild boar, turkey 
and deer. The municipalities agreed to set aside money from their own 
revenues and unconditional funds to finance part of the project. The project 
progressed significantly during the time the entrepreneur mayors were in office. 
However, after the pioneers finished their administration, the participants claim 
that not enough effort was been made for the project to grow.  
 
Thus, on the ground, the actions of the EPT seem indeed more entrepreneurial 
compared to the other municipalities. This supports the idea that the index, 
though imperfect, did capture entrepreneurial actions and that decentralisation 
increases entrepreneurship behaviour under certain circumstances, as 
hypothesised.    
 
The evidence suggests that fiscal decentralisation, particularly the 
decentralisation reform from 1997, benefited rural municipalities by having 
regular grants. Local authorities could engage in more decision-making, as well 
as experiencing less political arbitrariness. This has given room for innovative 
actions in rural local governments. This seems to be the reason and increases 
confidence in the findings from the quantitative analysis that fiscal 
decentralisation, if seen as stable, is likely to increase public entrepreneurship. 
Innovation in rural municipalities should be understood in terms of work 
efficiency, co-operation and tax effort.  Co-operation and tax effort were likely 
captured by the entrepreneurial index developed in phase one. However, the 
index does not capture work efficiency. 
 
14.4 As the saying goes, nothing ventured, nothing gained  
 
This saying means that you should not expect to achieve anything noble if you 
never take any risk.  In this Section the researcher will explore whether public 
entrepreneurship may lead to risky actions and whether this is a consequence 
of fiscal decentralisation. 
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Risk-taking is a key dimension in public entrepreneurship. However, there was 
no good data to measure it directly. In Section 14.1, the discussion showed that 
risk-taking behaviour was not included in the definition given by participants. 
However, theoretically risk-taking is a key dimension.  
 
It was argued that the participants were inclined to describe only positive 
aspects of public entrepreneurship and this might indicate that risk-taking is not 
considered a positive attribute. In this regard, when participants tried to 
compare accountability and public entrepreneurship, some of them ended up 
raising concerns about the risk-taking behaviour of public entrepreneurship.   
 
PPT-C ―I think that being accountable and being entrepreneurial could go 
hand in hand. I mean that you can be both accountable and 
entrepreneurial. But, there are mayors that are entrepreneurs but 
unaccountable and vice versa…we need a mayor that does both, a 
mayor that is accountable in how he manages the resources and 
(entrepreneur) that has vision, that knows how to apply the resources 
and where the municipality is going. …Entrepreneurship helps a lot but 
being entrepreneurial could cause some problems with accountability…”. 
 
GPT-C ―…being accountable and entrepreneurial go hand in hand 
because a person who is responsible if he/she is enthusiastic, would be 
entrepreneurial… if he/she looks for more projects for the benefit of the 
municipality… But if the mayor is only a little responsible I would say that 
a mayor could be shameless and be apparently entrepreneurial but not 
responsible. The thing is a mayor always has commitments with people 
and very often they do not do things adequately‖.   
 
From the field work, it seems that the concern is mainly present in the pro-
activeness dimension of public entrepreneurship, and particularly with the 
extraordinary conditional funds classified as proactive pursuit of funds.  The 
risk-taking behaviour of pursuit of funds presents two issues and the evidence 
was already discussed in previous Sections. 




First, the pursuit of funds might be based on political reasons, not on local 
necessities. In Section 13.1, it was pointed out that two municipalities governed 
by mayors that belong to a different political party than the governor obtained 
deliberately federal projects instead of negotiating state funds.  They rejected 
any relation with the state government due to political rivalry and sought 
extraordinary conditional funds directly from the federal government which 
belongs to their political parties.  Then, a closer look at local political dynamics 
showed apparent changes in the political bargain dynamics with other 
government levels. This is part of the risk-taking behaviour of local authorities.    
 
The use of extraordinary funds for political reasons is not surprising but it is 
interesting that this group of municipalities, which are politically not as 
significant as populated cities, are engaging in such dynamics. This seems to 
be bound up with both the decentralisation process and the political 
circumstances. On the one hand, unconditional and conditional mandatory 
funds are compulsory for all municipalities, and local authorities, to some extent, 
enjoy a more stable revenue for current and basic public services. In contrast, 
the extraordinary funds are at the expense of political bargains. On the other 
hand, due to changes in political competition at all levels of government, there is 
more diversification of political parties in the government.  
 
The rationale from the local authorities' point of view is that it does not matter 
from where the resources are channelled (state or federal government) as long 
as they benefit the municipality. 
 
Indeed, the pursuit of funds is a desirable action. However, as claimed before, 
the types of projects promoted by state and federal government have different 
aims. The case studies here show that extraordinary conditional funds may be 
used for investment that is not a priority in this group of municipalities and in 
some cases, even involving the risk of the projects remaining uncompleted, as 
in the council houses examples presented in most case studies. This might 
have collateral problems in rural municipalities such as “white elephants”, as 
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participants called unnecessary investments.  Three out of the five 
municipalities that obtained federal projects express this concern.   
 
Second, because the risk-taking behaviour seems to be particularly evident with 
extraordinary conditional funds, there is more concern about corruption 
practices. It is important to remember that in Section 13.2, the discussion about 
corruption presents two remarks with regard to extraordinary conditional funds. 
First, they seem to be more prone to corruption practices because they are 
highly politicized and second, citizens are not aware of the specifications of 
these funds.  In this case, negotiation and political abilities determine whether or 
not a local government obtain the funds.  
 
A mayor explains this very clearly:  
 
AvPT-M ―It is obvious that how you ask is what you get. You have to be 
very polite. In my case, I am in state-level opposition with the governor. I 
have to invest more into politeness (sarcastic); I have to dedicate more 
attention to the governor. I should not greet someone with somebody 
else‘s hat (it means: to take (unfair) advantage of an achievement that is 
somebody else‘s). I have to show the people that the governor, as well 
as myself, is working for them. Politicians are like actors. They need 
applause. Then, we need to tell the people that the governor is 
supporting us‖.  
 
Thus, risk-taking behaviour in rural municipalities is not straight forward. It 
seems that rural authorities do not embrace it as a positive aspect of public 
entrepreneurship and the actions where it might be present are sometimes a 
matter of concern, particularly in relation to the pursuit of extraordinary funds. 
Nevertheless, as the pursuit of funds seems to be an indirect consequence of 
the decentralisation process, it seems pertinent to state that risk-taking 
behaviour has increased.   
 





The first aim of this chapter was to ratify the idea that decentralisation increases 
entrepreneurship behaviours as claimed in the previous findings.  
 
Indeed, there is evidence to support the findings that fiscal decentralisation via 
unconditional and conditional funds might contribute to increasing 
entrepreneurship behaviour. This is an important piece of the puzzle for public 
entrepreneurship. The means by which this sometimes occurs is by giving more 
financial stability to local governments and room to pursue funds beyond basic 
public services.  
 
The decentralisation process indirectly encourages public entrepreneurship by 
promoting a pro-active pursuit of funds (pro-activeness) and directly by enabling 
work efficiency (innovation).  
 
The pro-active pursuit of funds seems to encourage “combined funds” to 
acquire extraordinary conditional funds and this reflects some success of fiscal 
effort and unconditional funds in some fund-seeking. In addition, decision-
making, though limited, in conditional funds gives room for work efficiency in 
local projects using innovative means to make the most of the money.  
 
Although risk-taking behaviour was not considered as a relevant positive aspect 
of public entrepreneurship by participants, it seems that risk-taking tends to 
appear in the pro-active pursuit of funds, raising some concerns about 
efficiency.   
 
The second aim of this chapter was to confirm whether municipalities that 
scored high on the entrepreneurship index tend to also be more entrepreneurial 
on the ground. In this chapter it has been demonstrated that indeed the 
municipalities with a higher score on the index were more entrepreneurial on 
the ground. This means that the entrepreneurship index, although imperfect, did 
capture part of the intended effect. Fiscal effort was the variable that might have 
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captured most of the effects but also the indicators to denote co-operation did 
contribute.  
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Chapter 15 – Fiscal decentralisation, a trade-off of efficiency: 
Conclusions  
 
In this final chapter the findings from the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses are integrated and related to the theoretical framework. It 
discusses the theoretical implications and the main areas of contribution 
that this research has provided to new knowledge. Then, it outlines the 
policy implications for rural local governments and lastly, presents 
limitations of the study and suggestions for further research. 
 
15.1 Fiscal decentralisation and behavioural factors 
 
A major part of this research involved operationalizing key concepts 
identified in the theoretical literature. Taking into consideration the 
availability of municipal-level data sources in Mexico, this research used a 
range of variables to compose two indices intended to measure 
Accountability and Public Entrepreneurship.  
 
The Accountability index includes indicators aimed at capturing 
transparency, responsiveness and responsibility. Among these indicators 
were promotion of citizens„ participation, average number of local 
regulations in place, percentage coverage for a number of basic public 
services in/outside the municipal seat (excluding water and sewage 
service), and the percentage of administrative and public works spending.  
 
Similarly, an index for Public Entrepreneurship was built. In this case, the 
indicators were aimed at capturing three dimensions: pro-activeness, 
innovation and risk-taking. The indicators were based on different actions 
identified as entrepreneurial. From these entrepreneurial actions two 
characteristics stood out: co-operation and the use of own revenues to 
carry out local projects. Therefore, variables that could capture these two 
characteristics were selected among them: whether municipalities have 
been involved in co-operation with other municipalities for any specific 
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project; or with public, private or social groups for the delivery of basic 
public services; the level of fiscal effort in the municipality; and whether 
there have been recent updates in the tax system.  These indices, 
although imperfect, were used to build up a general picture that could be 
used as a base to compare and interpret information on the ground.  
 
This research tested the hypothesis that increases in the level of funds 
obtained due to decentralisation encourage both Accountability and Public 
Entrepreneurship as the fiscal decentralisation theory implies. Two sets of 
funds were tested, unconditional and mandatory conditional funds. The 
difference in these two types of funds lies in the level of discretion each 
one designates; this being that unconditional funds delegate higher levels 
of discretion than conditional funds. However, the conditionality on 
conditional funds still leaves open some room for allocation decision-
making.  
 
In order to test these propositions, national data were analysed and case 
studies of individual municipalities were also carried out.  
 
One hypothesis tested was that unconditional funds were positively related 
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As shown in Figure 15.1, the “big picture” derived from data analysis was 
that increases in unconditional funds seem to have been detrimental for 
accountability and significantly positive for public entrepreneurship.  
 
On the ground, it has been confirmed that unconditional funds do seem to 
discourage some aspects of accountability. It is important to remember 
that the index of accountability did not directly capture corrupt practices. 
Nonetheless, in the field, unconditional funds were generally perceived 
more susceptible to corrupt practices and misuse. In other words, these 
funds are not conducive to increasing, or encouraging, accountability. 
Fieldwork also suggested that the negative association that is captured in 
the national data was mainly due to those indicators which are associated 
with responsibility (administrative spending level and public work 
investment).  
 
However, although they seem to work against accountability, unconditional 
funds seem to benefit responsiveness by enabling local authorities to 
undertake actions urged by their citizens, and the reason is potentially the 
freedom in allocation decision. In this aspect, the field work shows that 
responsiveness was generally perceived as positive in this group of 
municipalities.   During the field work, it could also be observed that the 
indicators used to measure the responsiveness dimension of the index 
were viable and appropriate measures. 
 
 
Figure  15.2 Theoretical framework results: Conditional funds and Behavioural 
patterns 
 
 Fiscal Decentralisation, a Trade-off of Efficiency: Conclusions  
342 
 
In contrast, the “big picture” of conditional mandatory funds emerging from 
the national data shows that increases in conditional mandatory funds 
seem to encourage positively both accountability and public 
entrepreneurship, as shown in Figure 15.2. 
 
On the ground, it was found that the means to promote effective 
accountability through mandatory conditional funds is not only related to 
the earmarked nature of the fund. Once more, it was found that that 
delegation of authority to allocate the funds within the municipality, 
although limited, nonetheless enables local authorities to respond to 
citizens‟ preferences, as the theory of fiscal decentralisation suggests.  
 
Similar to the unconditional funds, mandatory conditional funds give 
enough authority for local authorities to allocate the resources based on 
citizens‟ desires. However, the earmarked nature of the conditional 
mandatory funds seems to curb to some extent corruption and misuse, 
because citizens are informed and become involved in the allocation of 
these mandatory conditional funds.  Again, as the theory of 
decentralisation suggests, qualitative case studies support the idea that 
the citizens‟ voice is heard because of the close relationship between 
authorities and citizens.   
 
As shown in Figure 15.2, the “big picture” also suggested that mandatory 
conditional funds might be related to increases in public entrepreneurship.  
 
In the field work, evidence was found that mandatory conditional funds are 
indeed used for entrepreneurial actions. In particular, these funds were 
used to maximize resources for local projects or minimize costs for public 
works. In the field work, most of these actions fell into the “innovative 
dimension” of public entrepreneurship and particularly for this group of 
municipalities, the evidence suggests that in the use of conditional 
mandatory funds local authorities make use of co-operation in order to 
maximize resources or minimize costs.  




It could be argued that co-operation can also (or partly) be categorized as 
pro-activeness. Indeed, this could be the case. However, for the use of this 
study co-operation was classified in the innovative dimension because an 
important pattern was found in the empirical work. This being that, when 
using conditional mandatory funds, rural local authorities are more inclined 
to consider co-operation as a way to “innovate” whereas for obtaining 
extraordinary conditional funds co-operation is considered as pro-activity.   
 
The importance of co-operation supports Mack‟s (2008) findings that 
connection with the local community is an important factor in public 
entrepreneurship and also Faguet‟s (1997) argument that co-operation is 
facilitated in rural municipalities because it is easy to “wear the same 
shoes” and local authorities have a close relationship with their citizens. 
However, it needs to be considered that co-operation in rural municipalities 
is not set in stone. Local authorities need to persuade citizens and other 
private and social groups to engage in co-operation and this is considered 
an entrepreneurial action in this group of municipalities. 
 
On the ground it was also found that the municipality considered most 
entrepreneurial presented more types of entrepreneurial actions compared 
to the rest of the case studies. Therefore, this gives some confidence in 
the interpretation of the statistical results.  
 
The field work results support the choice of indicators to capture the 
entrepreneurial behaviour of rural local governments. The inclusion of 
fiscal effort and the indicators measuring co-operation were particularly 
useful.  
 
The importance of fiscal effort for public entrepreneurship supports Barlett 
and Dibben‟s (2002) findings that local authorities tend to engage in 
innovative enterprises due to local fiscal pressure. But, in addition, this 
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study shows that using own revenues potentially for increasing the local 
budget through combining funds is a more important driver. 
 
These findings are consistent with the decentralisation theory in some 
ways but much less so in others. Decentralisation theory suggests that 
with fiscal decentralisation, accountability and public entrepreneurship 
could be expected to improve. Moreover, it suggests that this should be 
particularly true with the unconditional funds as they delegate higher 
degrees of autonomy, which is the core of the decentralisation argument. 
In contrast, the findings of this research imply that “some degree of 
flexibility” in allocation decision, but not full autonomy, can be an important 
element to motivate local authorities in rural municipalities to behave in 
both a more accountable and a more entrepreneurial fashion.  
 
This is to some extent similar to the findings presented by Kim (2010). He 
found that the organizational characteristic “flexibility” promotes public 
entrepreneurship but, as argued above, in this research only “some degree 
of flexibility” might be necessary.   
 
Full discretion (through unconditional funds) might lead to poor 
accountability due to corrupt practices, and poor responsibility in the use of 
financial resources. However, unconditional funds because they allow 
greater allocative discretion, also give scope for gains in responsiveness 
and they can drive pro-activeness when they are used as a mechanism to 
pursue additional funds.   
 
While the research was designed to use mixed methods throughout, using 
case studies to explain relationships that appeared in the statistical data, 
this was impossible in the case of extraordinary conditional funds. The 
evidence on their use is nonetheless important, and sheds further light on 
complex fiscal incentives.   
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In general, local authorities called attention to the political agenda of state 
and federal governments that characterized the extraordinary conditional 
mandatory funds. Apparently, this has led to new political games in rural 
municipalities, where the conditional extraordinary funds play a key role as 
they are sometimes used to support municipalities controlled by opposition 
parties. This, however, is not only limited to state level, the field work 
demonstrates that both state and national level governments are 
sometimes part of this new political dynamic.   
 
On the ground, it was clear that local authorities consider extraordinary 
conditional funds as a driver of pro-activeness and those extraordinary 
conditional funds are at the heart of overlapping incentives where the 
decentralised funds, unconditional funds, fiscal effort and, to a lesser 
extent, mandatory conditional funds, are combined in order to obtain 
extraordinary conditional funds. Thus, the pursuit of funds – which may not 
be successful- can be categorized as risk-taking behaviour of rural local 
authorities and, in the field work, this behaviour was found to lead in some 
cases to poor responsiveness.  Thus, there is some evidence supporting 
the claim that accountability and public entrepreneurship can have some 
contending elements, particularly due to the risk-taking behaviour of public 
entrepreneurs.  
 
As fiscal decentralisation includes different types of funds promoting 
different types of behaviours, it follows that fiscal decentralisation presents 
evidence of a trade-off in efficiency.    
 
15.2 Fiscal decentralisation and the political environment   
 
Drawing on the premise that local politicians attempt to maximize their 
political survival by behaving in a more accountable and entrepreneurial 
fashion, this research tested the hypothesis that political competition may 
either reinforce the impact of fiscal decentralisation or it may, irrespective 
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of fiscal decentralisation, be a major independent factor that explains 








As shown in Figure 15.3, the “big picture” shows that greater political 
competition – measured using the difference in the share of votes obtained 
by the two strongest parties- seems to reinforce the negative changes in 
accountability through unconditional funds and it may also discourage 
directly public entrepreneurship.  
 
However, the impact of political competition was not statistically significant. 
Moreover, the statistical analysis found that other political variables did not 
show a consistent and robust effect. These other variables include: state-
level opposition, political party affiliation, and the interaction of political 
competition and state-level opposition.  
 
Once the evidence on the ground was collected, the influence of local 
politics on behaviour became obvious, as does the strong influence of 
state and national politics.  More importantly, the influence of state and 
national politics became relevant once the extraordinary conditional funds 
were in the picture and extraordinary conditional funds were found to be 
more prone to corruption and risk-taking behaviour. Therefore, on balance, 
the evidence tends to support an important- but in some cases negative- 
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influence of political competition and state-level opposition on local 
authorities‟ behaviour.  
 
In summary, the overall evidence suggests that fiscal decentralisation, 
specifically delegation of allocation decision, may explain some of the 
changes in both accountability and public entrepreneurship, and political 
competition may reinforce some of these effects.  
 
15.3 Behavioural patterns, political competition and Government 
performance  
 
In addition to having looked at behavioural changes in Accountability and 
Public Entrepreneurship, this research tested the association of 
behavioural patterns and political competition on government performance. 
In the final analysis, the contribution of this research is based on the idea 
that fiscal decentralisation through changes in accountability and public 
entrepreneurship have tangible effects on government performance. Thus, 
the hypothesis was that accountability, public entrepreneurship and 
political competition are positively associated with government 
performance, measured as coverage of basic public services. 
 
Local government performance was operationalized using a single 
indicator. This study recognizes this measure is imperfect because 
government performance is multidimensional. However, the rates of 
coverage of water and drainage as a performance indicator were selected, 
partly because a good data series was available, but also, crucially, 
because these basic public services constitute part of the legal 
responsibilities of local governments in the country. In addition, citizens 
expect, as a minimum, to enjoy these basic public services and, in rural 
municipalities, coverage of these services is still behind the national 
average.   
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To remind the reader, the variable local government performance 
includes only water and sewerage services. Water and sewage services 
were excluded from the variable Fair Distribution of Resources of the 
Responsiveness dimension of Accountability index in order to hold back 
these key indicators as an outcome variable. 
 
The analysis of government performance was framed, once more, under 
the theoretical premise that fiscal decentralisation through changes in 
behavioural patterns promotes better government performance.  
 
Because of data limitations in the index variables, this study presents two 
different models of local government performance. In both cases, 
Coverage of Basic Public Services is used as a dependent variable. In one 
model, the independent variables are accountability index and the political 
variables. In the other model the independent variables are public 
entrepreneurship index and the political variables.  
 
 
Figure  15.4 Theoretical framework results: Behavioural patterns and 
Government performance 
 
As shown in Figure 15.4, and as this research framework expected, the 
findings suggest that changes in accountability, public entrepreneurship 
and political competition seem to be associated with positive changes in 
CBPS. More importantly, the decentralisation variables appear to explain 
most of the positive changes in CBPS in the models and increases in the 
public entrepreneurship index explain more the positive changes 
compared to increases in accountability indices.    These findings support 
the original argument that accountability and fiscal decentralisation have a 
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positive but different impact on government performance and that public 
entrepreneurship might have a larger effect.  
 
This research also incorporated political competition and the other political 
variables in the model of government performance.  Indeed, the statistical 
analysis presents a positive association between political competition and 
government performance, but its effect is lower than the behavioural 
patterns and, in most cases, this did not change if the models included 
other political variables.     
 
This is opposite to the previous findings of negative association between 
political competition and behavioural patterns. The reason is the selection 
of variables. While government performance denotes outcomes, the 
behavioural indices include actions.   Therefore, means and ends seem to 
differ.  
 
Thus, the findings suggest that fiscal decentralisation arrangements 
appear indeed relevant and are associated with measurable changes in 
local government performance. 
 
15.4 Government performance: a fuller model 
 
The previous statistical analyses were based on changes after the 1997 
reform in Mexico. There are no data to test behavioural patterns before the 
reform, but there is sufficient information to test for changes in the political 
environment. This final analysis explored whether the influence of political 
competition on government performance has changed since the mayor 
decentralisation process of 1997, using a dataset from the pre-reform 
period, from 1990-1997, and the post-reform period, from 1998 to 2008.   
 
Under the premise that political competition encourages better 
performance, this study analysed again to what extent political competition 
was likely to increase CBPS before and after the reform, in addition to 
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incorporate the other political variables in the model. In the model, CBPS is 
included as a dependent variable and political competition and other 
political variables as independent variables.  This model was run for the 
pre-reform period and replicated for the post-reform period. Figure 15.5 
highlights the main analysis and results. In the pre-reform period, there 
were no conditional mandatory funds; in the post- reform period, the 
mandatory conditional funds were already in place.   
 
 
Figure  15.5 Theoretical framework results: Government performance and 
Political competition before and after the 1997 fiscal decentralisation reform  
 
As shown in Figure 15.5, in both periods political competition explained 
increases in CBPS, although modest.  However, the effect appeared larger 
in the post-reform period.  
 
There was not enough evidence to accept the hypothesis that there was 
state-favouritism in municipalities before the reform. This is consistent with 
Moreno-Jaimes‟ (2007) findings that there is no difference in service 
coverage in municipalities with state-level opposition, but this research 
presents evidence for rural municipalities in particular. 
 
The results suggest that there are no relevant changes that could be 
attributed to the decentralisation reform based on these political variables, 
but it gives insights that intervention may occur in more complex situations 
and corroborates a constant statistical finding that being in opposition per 
se drives better performance. In the field work, it was found that, before the 
reform, favouritism or patronage from state and federal levels was not a 
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major issue in these municipalities, but, rather, many rural municipalities 
were segregated from the state governments, potentially because small 
rural municipalities have low political weight. However, due to higher 
political competition, intervention in the case studies towns emerged.  
 
Moreover, in this group of municipalities, there is a general perception that 
Coverage of Basic Public Services has improved in recent decades and 
especially the redistribution of basic public services within the municipality. 
This improvement was in many cases related directly to the 
decentralisation reform of 1997.  
 
Based on both pieces of evidence, it can be argued that political 
competition plays (to a lesser extent) an important but complex role in 
government performance. It seems to be a double edged sword for 
government performance.  
 
In summary, there are reasons to believe that there are specific fiscal 
arrangements towards rural municipalities in Mexico that can be promoted 
further in order to benefit its structure of incentives. These incentives are 
not confined to controlling corruption and accountability measures in 
general, but they can also boost entrepreneurial behaviour, and this 
behaviour, in turn, can lead to a greater impact on government 
performance.   
 
This implies that the current decentralization strategy in rural Mexico 
requires important changes for its success, placing special attention on the 
design of an adequate structure of incentives to make local authorities 
more likely to comply with their statutory and expected duties, but also to 
enable them to behave in a more entrepreneurial fashion. 
 
15.5 Theoretical remarks   
 
This study is based on the general theoretical assumption that fiscal 
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decentralisation promotes both allocative and productive efficiency and, 
therefore, government performance. Thus, it argues for the importance of 
evaluating the mediating behavioural factors between fiscal 
decentralisation and government performance. 
 
The theoretical framework proposed here assumes that allocative and 
productive efficiency are related to actions of accountability behaviour and 
public entrepreneurship. Therefore, the findings from accountability and 
public entrepreneurship are related to the arguments of fiscal 
decentralisation‟s efficiency in general. 
 
In regard to allocative efficiency, Tiebout‟s (1956) theory of citizens “voting 
with their feet” implies that local authorities would behave in a more 
accountable fashion in order to maintain citizens‟ support by providing the 
public services citizens prefer. In this group of municipalities, there are low 
levels of own revenues through taxes, they lag behind basic public service 
provision, and citizens struggle with basic needs, therefore, Tiebout‟s 
(1956) theory is not fully applicable. Instead, as Prud‟homme (1995) 
argues, revealing preferences is not the main concern in this group of 
municipalities, rather it is satisfying “basic needs”. Therefore, there are not 
potential large gains from the matching preference theory. 
 
On the other hand, Oates‟ (1972) theorem of comparative advantages (in 
allocative and productive efficiency) of provision of public services 
between the central and local government appear relevant in this group of 
municipalities but only to some extent. This research cannot compare 
central and local government provision of basic public services but it 
presents a case to understand the extent of the advantage of rural local 
governments.  In this regard, the findings suggest that being close to the 
people and to first-hand information can help to improve responsiveness, 
part of accountability, and innovation, part of public entrepreneurship, but 
the structure of fiscal incentives can lead to issues of responsibility and 
risk-taking behaviour. This is consistent with Bellone and Goerl (1992) and 
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Borins‟ (2000) arguments that accountability and public entrepreneurship 
share some contending elements. Thus, if the structure of incentives is not 
adequate, fiscal decentralisation can lead to a trade-off of efficiency.  
 
Some reasons have already been discussed in the literature, for instance 
Tanzi (1996) warns about the contiguity factor, which is especially relevant 
to this group of municipalities. The contiguity factor means that the fact that 
people have known each other since childhood may lead to alliances and 
preferential treatments among citizens. Indeed, this study presents 
evidence of issues related to the contiguity factor. But more importantly, it 
highlights how some funds are more prone to be used for these aims and it 
is not only due to flexibility or discretion, as in the case of unconditional 
mandatory funds, but also due to political bargaining games, as in the case 
of extraordinary conditional funds. In addition to the contiguity factor, this 
study found that loss of authority, due to contiguity factors, can lead to 
inefficiencies. 
 
In regard to productive efficiency, the fiscal decentralisation theory 
presents arguments suggesting entrepreneurial behaviour. In general, the 
theory suggests that delegation of higher resources to local government 
levels promotes competition. Horizontal competition (Tiebout, 1956, Tanzi, 
1995) is achieved by local authorities competing for investment and 
revenues, as well as by allocating expenditures efficiently compared to 
other jurisdictions. In addition, because central government power is 
diversified, the leviathan hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980) states that the central government does not monopolize control 
over the economy, and Jin and Zou (2002) state that it downsizes central 
government and spreads power away from the centre (citied in Ezcurra 
and Pascual 2008, 1188). Thus, competition is increased and territorial 
imbalance decreased.  
 
This study presents some evidence that horizontal competition in this 
group of municipalities is not generally positive. The level of development 
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of these municipalities, geographical disadvantages and the low levels of 
revenues along with limited taxing power leave them with disadvantage 
over other more developed municipalities.  This is in spite of improvements 
in public entrepreneurship, which this research argues fiscal 
decentralisation promotes (more than the expected benefit in 
accountability). Therefore, the extent of the impact of public 
entrepreneurship in this group of municipalities is limited. 
 
In regard to tax collection, even though local taxes are an important part of 
the decentralisation theory as Tiebout (1956) suggests, there are concerns 
that higher revenues from the centre are likely to induce less fiscal effort. It 
is argued that this group of municipalities may increase total expenditure 
without increasing tax collection, the so-called “flypaper effect” or that local 
authorities can become just “fiscally lazy” and be discouraged from 
increasing own revenues (Melo, 2002).  
 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that in this group of municipalities, own 
revenues have declined as a percentage of total revenues and also, there 
have been insignificant increases over time in absolute real terms. This is 
consistent with the theoretical literature. However, this research also 
presents evidence that, for public entrepreneurs, own revenues can 
represent an effort to increase efficiency, if they are used as a mechanism 
to increase the local budget via other types of funds.  
 
The findings are also consistent with Tanzi‟s (1996) argument that fiscal 
decentralisation can promote “experimentation” by taking advantage of 
local knowledge and proximity to citizens. However, this study found 
evidence that some specific arrangements, in this case in the form of 
conditional mandatory funds, are more likely to be used to minimize cost 
and maximize revenue. This is in spite of emphasis on control which 
Bovens (2010) warns is likely to damage creativity and efficiency.  
 
Finally, the findings are not consistent with some aspects of the political 
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theories; among them the “retrospective vote theory” which argues that the 
performance of government influences the vote of citizens. As votes are 
used as a performance indicator, then good performance might lead to re-
election. Thus, the theory is based on the general idea that political 
competition drives good behaviour and therefore, better performance. In 
this research, the evidence tends to suggest that, in decentralised settings, 
political environment derived from more political competition seems to lead 
to poor behaviour and that this has changed the dynamics of local politics 
with other government levels. The negative effect of political competition 
seems to be particular to this group of municipalities because party loyalty 
is very strong.    
 
15.6 Theoretical contribution 
 
 The development of a framework for the analysis of how fiscal 
decentralisation impacts government performance  
Based on the theoretical assumption of fiscal   decentralisation, this study 
identifies two factors that moderate the key relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and local government performance, namely accountability 
and public entrepreneurship. This research has attempted to disaggregate 
these behavioural patterns in order to understand the extent of impact on 
government performance and the potential arrangements to promote the 
right incentives for rural municipalities. 
 
Therefore, this research contributes to the fiscal decentralisation theory by 
looking at these mediating factors and demonstrating that the 
understanding of the impact of fiscal decentralisation is altered. The 
theoretical implication of this result is that the link between fiscal 
decentralisation and government performance is based mainly on changes 
in public entrepreneurship. Accountability accounts for smaller changes in 
government performance and fiscal decentralisation presents more gains 
from public entrepreneurship than accountability. 
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 Expanding the theory of public entrepreneurship and 
developing and testing public entrepreneurship index  
Given data restrictions at local government level in Mexico and particularly 
in rural municipalities, this study developed two indices that differentiate 
behavioural patterns. The indices attempt to cover important dimensions of 
accountability and public entrepreneurship, the latter being previously 
highly theoretical.  One index measures actions that are related to 
accountability behaviour. The second indices measures public 
entrepreneurship, which has to do with more proactive, innovative and risk- 
taking behaviour. In addition to developing the indices, this research 
differentiates gains coming from accountability and public entrepreneurship 
and the extent of its impact in a decentralised setting.  
 
Thus, this research contributes to theory by expanding the theory of public 
entrepreneurship to one specific phenomenon, fiscal decentralisation. The 
theoretical implication is that only some degree of discretion with allocation 
decision-making seems to be likely to drive public entrepreneurship based 
on innovation.  Full discretion may contribute to negative changes in 
accountability.  
 
The intention has been not to make strong inferences regarding the 
reliability and validity of the indices, since the limitation and constraints of 
the data are recognised, as well as the complex relation between 
dimensions. But, after corroborating the use of these indices on the 
ground, it can be argued that these indices are likely to capture the 
intended effects. Therefore, this research contributes with measurement 
tools which can be used to look at patterns across a country.  
 Developing a logic to reconcile fiscal decentralisation and 
political competition  
Another theoretical contribution in this study is the development of a logic 
that reconciles the expectations from the theories of fiscal decentralisation 
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and political competition. Both theories are argued to contribute to better 
government performance and the pro-arguments of fiscal decentralisation 
are often linked to democratic mechanisms.  This research presents 
evidence that fiscal decentralisation plays a more important role in 
government performance than political competition and presents some 
evidence that, in a decentralised setting, political competition could be 
detrimental in rural municipalities.   
 Applying the theory of fiscal decentralisation in rural settings 
to explain complex relationships 
In addition, this study contributes to the fiscal decentralisation theory by 
applying the theory in a particular setting: rural municipalities. It explains 
how the phenomenon occurs by expanding the understanding of the 
complex interrelationship between different types of funds. Thus, it shows 
how fiscal decentralisation works in practice in rural municipalities, as well 
as its limitations. 
 
15.7 Policy implications 
 
As can be seen from the above summary of findings, this study‟s research 
questions have developed new knowledge in understanding the type of 
incentives promoted by the fiscal decentralisation process.  This 
knowledge can be used for improving policies aiming at promoting better 
financial performance. 
 
The findings suggest that specific fiscal arrangements play a fundamental 
role in how local authorities behave and that there is scope to promote 
public entrepreneurship, if the correct fiscal arrangements are set in place.  
 
Some of the findings in this research indicate that further fiscal 
arrangements are required in order to make the decentralisation policy 
more effective for government performance.  From the researcher‟s point 
of view, most of the changes have to deal with the issues of delegating 
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more decision-making within a conditional frame. In other words, more 
resources should be decentralised earmarked to general expenditures. But 
it is important that decision-making is delegated to rural local authorities. 
This implies not only decision-making in allocation of expenditures, but 
also in execution of public work.  This research suggests that while the first 
may improve accountability through responsiveness to citizens, the second 
may promote a more entrepreneurial behaviour by boosting innovation.    
 
These are not necessarily the only changes needed. This thesis has 
provided several pieces of evidence showing weaknesses in accountability 
behaviour particularly using unconditional funds. This research has 
reaffirmed that local governments rely heavily on intergovernmental 
transfers. However, it also shows that this may not have a negative impact   
per se, if there are mechanisms enabling and promoting actions leading to 
expansion of local budgets.  Unconditional funds can be subject to such 
incentives under appropriate intergovernmental arrangements. 
 
One of the most serious concerns is the use of extraordinary conditional 
funds.  Although they are used to standardize the country‟s development, 
more control is needed to end the discretionary allocation and political 
party influences in obtaining these funds.  The problem does not rely solely 
on unfair distribution of resources but also, in some cases, on inefficient 
and wasteful investments due to the conditionality of such funds.  
 
Another contribution of this investigation to public policy is that it advances 
the fact that government performance seems to be more responsive to 
incentives of policy process rather than democratic mechanisms.  
 
This is not to say that political competition does not matter at all; as 
revealed in the previous findings, political competition is significantly 
important in rural local governments as it works as a mechanism of political 
and social punishment. However, in a decentralised setting the positive 
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effects of political competition might not be strong enough to be 
crystallized in improvements in policy outcomes. 
 
Another piece of evidence implying serious failures in the local government 
system is the underdeveloped council system that, nevertheless, has 
improved due to the changes in the political landscape.  A more developed 
council system can benefit accountability without needing to impose highly 
rigid constraints on the funds for the sake of better accountability.  
 
15.8 Limitations of research   
 
This empirical research has relied heavily on the availability of secondary 
databases at the local level in Mexico. Despite the fact that there have 
been improvements in data collection across the country, it was a 
challenge to rely on this information, particularly for rural local 
governments. There is still a considerable shortage of information that 
prevented the inclusion of a larger sample in the study, as well as the 
creation of a more comprehensive assessment of the government 
processes.  
 
Therefore, the possibility cannot be ruled out that such results could have 
been affected by potential selection biases in the surveys‟ responses and 
in the observations included in the analysis. Observations with missing 
values were excluded from the statistical analysis. Therefore, the sample 
was considerably reduced and the observations might carry some biases. 
But there is no evidence to believe that these observations have a 
potential inclination that could jeopardize the overall findings. This decision 
was made in order to follow the overall research approach for the selection 
of cases in the second phase.  
 
In addition, some of the limitations of the study are linked with how the 
concepts of accountability, public entrepreneurship and government 
performance were operationalized. This research took advantage of the 
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few measures available. However, only some of the indicators used to 
measure the dimension of the index on accountability and public 
entrepreneurship seem to have been valid and some could be improved. 
For instance, the indicator used to operationalize transparency included 
the indicators of citizens‟ participation, based on the existence of formal 
institutional mechanisms. After analysing the information in the field, it 
became clear that, in rural municipalities, citizens rely on informal 
mechanisms. It is difficult to capture these informal mechanisms. Based on 
the field work, the researcher believes that a better indicator could be the 
number of open council meetings in the municipality. Even though it does 
not capture the informal mechanisms, this is considered as an attempt to 
be “transparent” in local issues and it can be quantified.  
In regard to the entrepreneurial index, the indicators fiscal effort and 
whether there has been an association with public, private and social 
groups were potentially valid indicators. However, they capture only 
associations for basic public services. It would be important to include an 
indicator that captures associations for business projects and economic 
development. For this group of municipalities it would be particularly 
important to incorporate rural development projects. This can be done by 
incorporating databases from the state agencies in charge of this matter, in 
Mexico, the Rural Development Ministry.  
 
Although the selection of case studies followed a methodological rigour for 
case selection process with the aim of avoiding biases in 
representativeness and subjectivity, there are limitations in the techniques 
used for collecting information, and the in-depth evaluation of each case 
study. This research relied on semi-structured interviews and did not 
collect any other means of information to corroborate the respondents‟ 
information. The researcher attempted to collect municipal plans and 
annual reports but in rural municipalities, electronic versions are a recent 
development and they do not keep a record of this information in the 
municipality; it is sent to state parliament. Other studies can use this 
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information in order to corroborate and expand further the interpretation of 
the actions carried out in the municipalities.   
 
In addition, relying on interviews posed a concern in regard to the 
respondents‟ biases due to political inclinations. During this research, the 
first step was to contact people through the current local governments and 
then, snowball sampling was the approach. This sampling technique was 
useful for identifying potential entrepreneurs in the municipalities but it 
carried some problems in terms of representativeness and in some cases 
related to party affiliation. This was corrected when possible.  
15.9 Further research  
 
This thesis has developed a theoretically sound framework to analyse 
behavioural patterns by providing some instruments for gaining further 
insights into how fiscal decentralisation may encourage government 
performance. Further improvements in methodology to corroborate the 
findings, such as  survey instruments would be areas for further research.  
 
In addition, further research can be carried out to examine this theoretical 
framework in urban municipalities. Given the findings that there is a fragile 
accountability incentive behind the decentralisation reform, and that urban 
municipalities have a weaker relationship with citizens, the findings are 
likely to be different for urban municipalities.   
 
There is also much to do in understanding the public entrepreneurial 
actions in local government. In this research, the focus was on 
encouragement to promote entrepreneurial behaviour, but it did not 
address successful entrepreneurial actions. Further research can address 
questions aiming at understanding in which ways fiscal arrangements lead 
to successful entrepreneurial actions.  
 
Disentangling how much these two behavioural patterns have an impact 
on government performance requires further exploration, as well as more 
 Fiscal Decentralisation, a Trade-off of Efficiency: Conclusions  
362 
 
refined data on the many other forms of incentives driving these 





Annex 1- Alternative Statistical Analysis Models  
 
 Statistical Analysis Models of Accountability with municipal fixed effects.51 


















































(=1 if there is state-level 
opposition;=0 otherwise) 












OTHERS PARTIES AND 
COALITIONS  
Omitted category =PRI+C 





Political Competition  
    -.002 
(.043) 
Pseudo R
2   
 
.069 .070 .071 .070 .070 
N 505 505 505 505 505 
Note: Dependent variable ACCOUNTABILITY. Standard errors are in brackets. The 
results are presented in standardised values. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05. McFadden's 
Pseudo R
2 
with best fitted model (-2 Restricted Log Likelihood)
 
is used. These models 
include municipality fixed effects. 






Statistical analysis models of Public Entrepreneurship with municipal fixed 
effects  
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(=1 if there is state-level 
opposition;=0 otherwise) 












OTHERS PARTIES AND 
COALITIONS  
Omitted category =PRI+C 




State Level Opposition* Political 
Competition  
    .120* 
(053) 
Pseudo R
2   
 
.007 .006 .005 .004 .004 
N 505 505 505 505 505 
Note: Dependent variable PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP. Standard errors are in 
brackets. The results are presented in standardised values. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05. 
McFadden‟s Pseudo R
2 
with best fitted model (-2 Restricted Log Likelihood
 )  
is used. 






Statistical analysis models of Government Performance and Accountability 
with municipalities and time fixed effects.  
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.047 .046 0.046 
N  505 505 505 505 
Note: Dependent variable CBPS. Standard errors are in brackets. The results are 
presented in standardised values. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05. McFadden's Pseudo R
2 
with 
best fitted model (-2 Restricted Log Likelihood)
   
is used.
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 These models include 
municipality and time fixed effects. 
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  Mixed linear model do not provide with a model of fit. The most common Pseudo R
2  
 used in 
this type of analysis is the McFadden's Pseudo R
2  
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Note: Dependent variable CBPS. Standard errors are in brackets. The results are 
presented in standardised values. ***p<.001 **<.01 *p<.05. McFadden's Pseudo R
2 
with 
best fitted model (-2 Restricted Log Likelihood)
   
is used.
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 These models include 
municipality and time fixed effects.   
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  Mixed linear model do not provide with a model of fit. The most common Pseudo R
2  
 used in 
this type of analysis is the McFadden's Pseudo R
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Annex 2- Information sheet and consent form 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC Reference Number: REP(EM)/10/11-20  
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
Fiscal decentralization in rural local government: a case study of Mexico.  
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project.  You should only 
participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you 
decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being 
done and what your participation will involve.  Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you 
would like more information. 
 
This study aims to investigate the incentives generated by the decentralization process undertaken 
in the country. The delivery of authority to local governments to collect taxes, increments in 
transfers and right to borrow are assumed to have impacts on the performance of the local 
governments, especially in combating poverty and in welfare enhancement. Have the 
decentralization of revenues and decision-making increased accountability and entrepreneurship in 
local governments, especially in relatively undeveloped municipalities? How and when does it 
happen? In order to answer these questions, the views of local leaders, elected representatives and 
managerial staff are of the utmost importance. 
 
 If you agree to take part in this research, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be 
asked to sign a consent form. The interview will be held in your office, at the time most convenient 
for you. It is important to emphasise that data obtained from you will be incorporated in the study as 
anonymous pieces of information only. Anonymity and confidentiality of your statements are 
guaranteed, unless you explicitly agree to be named for particular parts of discussion. You may 
withdraw your data from the project at any time and without giving a reason up until it is transcribed 
for use in the final report, i.e. until 15
th
 October 2013. Recording of the interview is for my personal 
use only and the interviews will be wiped upon transcription. You are allowed to see the transcripts 
of the interview and modify/add more information. This should be on request. The reasons for 
recording the interview are: 1) it is impossible to get a complete and accurate account any other 
way; 2) writing during the interview will distract the researcher and interrupt the flow of the 
conversation; 3) selecting the important points to write down implies judgements about relative 
importance but it is difficult to decide on the spot what is really important; 4) tape-recording will allow 
the researcher to listen to the interview several times and discern them better. 
 
Note that the researcher undertaking this study is a PhD candidate. The reason for doing this 
research is the importance of the subject and also that it contributes to obtaining the degree. This 
research is financed by the Mexican National Council of Science and Technology given its status as 
the student‟s sponsor. After completion, you will receive a copy of the final report.  
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not.  If you decide to take part you are still free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
For further information please contact:  
PhD student       Supervisor 
Flor Silvestre Moreno Ramírez    Alison Wolf 
E-mail: Flor_silvestre.m@kcl.ac.uk    Sir Roy Griffiths Professor of  
       Public Sector Management 






HOJA DE INFORMACIÓN PARA PARTICIPANTES 
REC Número de Referencia: REP(EM)/10/11-20 
A USTED SERA ENTREGADA UNA COPIA DE ESTA HOJA DE INFORMACIÓN  
Descentralización Fiscal en gobiernos municipales rurales: el caso de México 
 
Nos gustaría invitarlo a participar en este proyecto de investigación de postgrado.  Debe 
participar solo si usted quiere.  No tomar parte en el estudio no le afecta de ninguna 
forma. Antes de que decida participar, es importante que entienda porque se está 
haciendo esta  investigación y lo que envuelve su participación. Por favor, tome un poco 
de tiempo para leer cuidadosamente la siguiente información  y discuta con otros si así lo 
desea. Pregúntenos si hay algo que no es claro o si le gustaría más información.  
 
 Este estudio tiene como objetivo investigar los incentivos generados por el proceso de 
descentralización llevado a cabo en el país. Se asume que la delegación de autoridad a 
gobiernos locales para colectar impuestos y el  incremento a las transferencias tiene un 
impacto en el desempeño de los gobiernos locales, especialmente en lo referente al 
rendimiento de cuentas y al fomento de proyectos emprendedores. ¿Ha la 
descentralización de recursos y la delegación de toma de decisión mejorado el 
rendimiento de cuentas y fomentado la implementación de proyectos emprendedores de 
los gobiernos locales, especialmente en municipios subdesarrollados? ¿Cómo y cuándo 
se generan esos incentivos? Para responder estas preguntas, el punto de vista de líderes 
locales y  representantes electos es de vital importancia.  
 
Si está de acuerdo en tomar parte en esta investigación, se le dará copia de esta hoja de 
información y se le invitara a que firme el formato de consentimiento. La entrevista será 
tomada en su oficina, o en el lugar y  la hora más conveniente para usted. Es importante 
enfatizar que la información obtenida por parte de usted será incorporada en el estudio 
como información confidencial. La anonimidad y confidencialidad de sus comentarios 
están garantizados, a menos que usted indique explícitamente que su nombre puede ser 
presentado para alguna parte específica de la investigación. Usted puede solicitar que la 
información no sea incluida en el proyecto en todo tiempo y sin dar explicación alguna 
siempre que la información no haya sido usada en el reporte final, ejemplo hasta el 15 de 
Octubre del 2013. La grabación de la entrevista es solamente para mi uso y la entrevista 
será borrada cuando se transcriba. Usted puede solicitar la transcripción de su entrevista 
y modificar/agregar más información. Esto debe solicitarlo. Las razones para transcribir la 
entrevista son: 1) No hay otra forma de obtener la información de  forma completa y 
exacta; 2) escribir durante la entrevista puede distraer al investigador e interrumpir el 
seguimiento de la conversación; 3) elegir los puntos importante para escribirlos es una 
decisión subjetiva por parte del investigador y es difícil decidir en el momento lo que 
realmente es importante; 4) la grabación permitirá al investigador escuchar la entrevista 
en repetidas ocasiones y analizarla mejor.  
 
El investigador que realiza este estudio es Candidato a Doctor. La razón de realizar este 
estudio es la importancia del tema y que le ayudara a obtener el grado académico. La 
investigación está financiada por el Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología quien es el 
que beca al investigador. Después de concluido el estudio, usted recibirá una copia del 
reporte final.  
 
Es su decisión tomar parte o no en esta investigación. Si usted decide participar, todavía 
tiene la libertad de renunciar en cualquier momento y sin dar explicaciones.  
 
Para más información, por favor contactar a las siguientes personas:  
Candidato a Doctor       Supervisor 
Flor Silvestre Moreno Ramírez    Alison Wolf 
E-mail: Flor_silvestre.m@kcl.ac.uk   Sir Roy Griffiths Professor of  
       Public Sector Management 






CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH 
STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened 
to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Fiscal decentralization in rural local governments: a case study of 
Mexico  
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: REP(EM)/10/11-20 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the 
research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have 
any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to 
you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be 





 I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer 
wish to participate 
 in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without 
giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw my 
data up to the  
point of publication on 15 October 2013. 
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes 
explained to me.  
 I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the 
terms of the  
Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
 The information you have submitted will be published as a report and you will be 
sent a copy.  
Please note that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not 
be possible to 
 identify you from any publications. 






agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my 
satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written 
above and the Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the 
research study involves. 
 







FORMATO DE CONSENTIMIENTO PARA PARTICIPAR EN EL 
PROYECTO DE INVESTIGACIÓN  
Por favor llene este formato después de haber leído la información de la hoja de 
Información y/o haber escuchado la explicación acerca del estudio.  
Título del estudio: Descentralización Fiscal en municipios rurales: el caso de 
México  
Referencia el Comité de Investigación Ética de King’s College: REP(EM)/10/11-20 
Gracias por considerar tomar parte en esta investigación. La persona organizando 
la investigación debe explicarle el proyecto antes de que usted decida participar. Si 
tiene alguna pregunta sobre la hoja de información o sobre la explicación que se le 
dio, por favor pregunte al investigador antes de que acepte participar. A usted se le 
dará una copia de este Formato de Consentimiento para que la conserve y le sirva 




 Entiendo que si en cualquier momento de la investigación decido renunciar 
a mi participación, puedo notificarle al investigador y mi información será 
eliminada sin necesidad de dar 
explicación. También entiendo que esto puedo hacerlo antes que la 
investigación sea  
publicada hasta 15 de Octubre de 2013.  
 
 Doy mi consentimiento para que procesen mi información personal para las 
razones que se me explicaron. Entiendo que esta información será 
manejada de acuerdo al Acta de Protección de Información de 1998.  
 
 La información que usted provea será publicada como un reporte y usted 
recibirá una copia. 
 Por favor, comprenda que la confidencialidad y anonimidad serán 
mantenidas y usted no 
 será identificado en ninguna publicación.  
 Doy consentimiento a que la entrevista sea grabada.  
 
Declaración del participante: 
Yo -
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Estoy de acuerdo que el proyecto de investigación nombrado arriba me lo han 
explicado de forma satisfactoria y  estoy de acuerdo en participar. He leído la 
información de arriba y la hoja de información acerca del proyecto y entiendo lo 




Firma ___________________________  Fecha _________________ 
 
Por favor, 








Financial Autonomy    
Accountability  
Public entrepreneurship    
 
Beginning the Interview  
o Express thanks for agreeing to meet and find out about the 
research  
o Explain the investigation‟s aims and hand over the 
information sheet (in Spanish) to participants and tell them to 
keep it 
o Explain that participation in the study is voluntary and in case 
of accepting being part of the study, the interviewee can still 
withdraw at any time  
o Explain that the interview can be stopped at any time the 
interviewee wants without any need to justify ending the 
interview.  
o Explain that the interviewee‟s comments would be treated as 
anonymous in the study 
o Ask if they wish to participate and if so, hand over the 
consent form to be signed (in Spanish) 
o Consent form to be signed and the information sheet handed 
out to the interviewee to be read. 
o Ask for permission to tape record the interview. Explain the 
reasons for recording and that the interviews will be 
transcribed and the records deleted after transcription.   
 
At the end of the Interview  
o Express thanks for participating in the study 
o Ask if the interviewee is interested in receiving the study‟s 
results and if so, ask for an email or address where the report 
can be sent. 
o Ask the interviewee to name two entrepreneurial local 







Preguntas para la entrevista (Spanish) 
 
Estas preguntas sirvieron solo de guía para el investigador  
 
INTRODUCCIÓN 
Me podría decir cómo comenzó a participar en los asuntos públicos hasta 
alcanzar la posición actual.  
Me podría explicar brevemente la situación económica y social del 
municipio.   
¿Cuáles son las dificultades que un presidente municipal o un miembro 
del cabildo enfrentan al principio de la administración? 
 En su punto de vista, ¿Qué es lo que significa ser responsable y ser 
emprendedor en un municipio rural? 
 
AUTONOMÍA FINANCIERA 
En su punto de vista, ¿Qué implicaciones tiene para las presidencias 
municipales el ser financieramente dependientes del gobierno central? 
¿Cómo describe el sistema de impuesto actualmente implementado? 
Los ingresos locales que se obtienen de la colección de impuestos 
locales, ¿Son importantes  cuando se planean los gastos del municipio? 
¿En que gastan? ¿Me podía dar ejemplos?  
En su punto de vista, ¿Qué dificultades enfrentan las autoridades locales 
cuando se quiere incrementar la colección de impuestos? 
Cuando se pone más empeño en incrementar los ingresos por medio de 
colección de impuestos locales, ¿cree usted que afecta la forma en que se 
administran otras áreas financieras?  
¿Cómo se puede fomentar y facilitar el  incremento en el nivel de 
colección de impuestos? 
¿Considera que las fórmulas de redistribución de fondos a gobiernos 
locales por parte del Estado son justas? 
¿Cuáles son las ventajas y desventajas al usar recursos provenientes de 
fondos condicionados de aquellos incondicionados?  
Si tuviera la oportunidad de sugerir una reforma sistema de transferencia 
de recursos a los municipios, ¿Qué cambios propondría? 
 
RENDIMIENTO DE CUENTAS 
¿Cómo se da cuenta de las demandas y preferencias de la comunidad en 
lo que respecta a servicios públicos? 
¿Cuáles son los mecanismos usados para dar prioridades a las demandas 
ciudadanas? 
¿Qué rol juega el partido al que usted pertenece en la toma de decisiones 
del municipio? 
¿Cómo puedo yo, como ciudadano, saber lo que pasa en la ciudad y 
como el municipio invierte el dinero? 
¿Podría describir como se incluyen los ciudadanos en la toma de 
decisiones? 





La gente algunas veces dice que los municipios rurales no deben de 
obtener recursos incondicionados porque el dinero se hecha a la basura o 
se gasta entre pocas gentes y buscando el interés personal. ¿Ha usted 
alguna vez visto que esto pase? ¿Me podría dar ejemplos? 
 
ACTIVIDADES EMPRENDEDORAS 
¿Me podría dar un ejemplo de un proyecto emprendedor en el municipio? 
¿Podría describir el proceso seguido al implementar una actividad 
emprendedora? 
¿Cuánto tiempo  dedica a las negociaciones con dependencias Estatales 






Interview Topic-questions  
 
These questions were for the researcher‟s guidance only.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Could you tell me how you became involved in public affairs until you 
reach your current position? 
 Can you explain briefly the economic and social background of this 
municipality?  
 What are the challenges a (mayor, council) face at the start of the 
administration? 




 In your view, what are the implications for local governments to be 
financially dependent on the central government? 
How would you describe the tax system currently implemented? 
Are the local revenues collected from local taxes important when planning 
local spending? Where are these resources spent? Give examples. 
In your point of view, what are the difficulties that a local authority faces 
when they want to increase their own revenue collection?  
Does emphasizing ones own revenue collection affect other areas of 
financial management? 
How can fiscal effort be fostered and enabled?  
Are the redistribution formulas fair for rural municipalities?  
What are the advantages and disadvantages of using conditional funds 
compared to unconditional funds? 
If you had the opportunity to suggest a reform in the way 




How do you find out what the demands of the local community are in public 
services? 
What are the mechanisms used to prioritize public demands? 
What role does the party you belong to play in the decision-making 
process by the local government under your supervision?  
How can I, as a citizen, know what is happening in the city and where the 
local government is investing public resources?  
Can you describe how your administration includes citizens in decision-
making?  
How do you recognize if a local authority is being accountable?  
People sometimes say that rural municipalities should not receive 
unconditional funds because the money will be wasted, or spent on a few 




Can you give me an example of an entrepreneurial project carried out in 
the municipality?   
Can you describe the process used to implement an entrepreneurial 
project (based on the previous example)? 
How much time do you spend on negotiating resources with State and 









ACCOUNTABILITY- The virtue of local authorities to behave according to 
public expectations that further improve efficiency.  It is evaluated based 
on three dimensions: transparency, responsibility and responsiveness.  
 
BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS-The actions of local authorities associated 
with accountability and public entrepreneurship. 
 
CBPS: or Coverage of Basic Public Services. The level of coverage in 
water and sewerage in the municipality which local governments are 
lawfully responsible to provide.   
 
CIDAC: or Centre for Research in Development. An independent, not-for-
profit think tank that undertakes research and proposes policy alternatives 
for the medium and long-term development in Mexico. 
 




-ALLOCATIVE: the mix of goods and services that matches the goods and 
services desired by the local citizens. 
 
-PRODUCTIVE: the production of public goods at the lowest possible cost 
(i.e. minimising the cost of producing the goods and services that people 
want). 
 
FAISM: or Municipal Social Development Fund. A conditional mandatory 
fund earmarked to public services including water, sewage, street lighting, 
public safety, traffic, street cleaning, and garbage collection.  
 
FD: or Forms of Public Service Delivery. The arrangements to administrate 
and deliver local public services which could include:  Direct provision by 
local governments; administration and delivery of services by State 
government, or by the Federal government, or by local social groups or by 
private individuals; or by more than two municipalities (intergovernmental 
associations) following an agreement with the local government.  
 
FENAMM: or National Federation of Municipalities in Mexico. A civil 
association that aims to straighten municipalism in Mexico. Members: 
mayors, councillors and government officials.   
 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION- The transfer of authority and 




subordinate or quasi-independent government organizations or the private 
sector. 
 
FORTAMUN: or Fund for Municipal Strengthening. A conditional 
mandatory fund earmarked to programmes and actions that foster 
development in the municipality or financial investments. 
 
FUNDS, Types- 
-CONDITIONAL. A revenue sharing fund with tied expenditure 
assignments created in order to promote national standards by 
conditioning the funding to federal expenditure priorities. 
-UNCONDITIONAL: A revenue sharing funds assigned to lower 
government levels without labelled or controlled expenditures created to 
deal with regional inequity. 
o MANDATORY CONDITIONAL FUNDS: Earmarked funds regularly 
and lawfully distributed among lower government levels. They  
delegate some degree of discretion but to a lesser extent than 
unconditional funds. 
o EXTRAORDINARY CONDITIONAL FUNDS: Discretionary funds for 
specific expenditures, which are not regular or repeated year after 
year. They are typically heavily regulated and delegate less 
discretion in allocation of resources than mandatory conditional 
funds. 
 
GDP: or Gross Domestic Product. A monetary measure of the value of all 
final goods and services in a country produced in a period.  
 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS- Someone who hold an office in the local 
government regardless of rank and position.  
 
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE- For the purpose of this study, absolute 




-MUNICIPAL SEAT: the city or town selected as a capital of the 
municipality where most of the administration is place.  
 
-OUTSIDE MUNICIPAL SEAT: The cities or towns that are not considered 
municipal seat but are integral part of the municipality. 
 
INAFED: National Institution of Federalism and Municipal Development. A 
decentralised agency in Mexico under the responsibility of the Secretary of 
Interior that coordinates and implement policies and programmes designed 
to strengthened intergovernmental relations between the federal 





INEGI: or Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography. An 
autonomous agency in Mexico dedicated to coordinate the national system 
of statistical and geographical information at the municipal and state level. 
 
LPS: or Local Public Services. Local services that the municipalities are 
lawfully responsible to provide. It includes: water, sewage, street lighting, 
public safety, traffic, street cleaning, and garbage collection. 
 
MAYOR- Elected citizen to head the local government.  
 
MUNICIPALITY (or LOCAL GOVERNMENT, terms used interchangeably): 
A second level administrative division of states in Mexico.     
 
NPM: or New Public Management. A public management idea of 
modernizing public sector based on market-oriented management as a 
mean to achieve greater cost-efficiency for governments. 
 
 
PRONASOL: or Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity 
Program). A social spending programme in education, health, 
transportation, and regional development. 
 
SEDESOL: or Ministry of Social Development. The government 
department in charge of social development efforts in Mexico.  
 
SGTs: or Second Generation Theories of Fiscal Decentralisation.  A set of 
theories evolved from fiscal federalism that embody the political process 
and the possibility of asymmetric information across political agents. 
 
SIMBAD: Municipal System Database developed by INEGI.  
 
STATE- LEVEL OPPOSITION: Municipalities where the mayor and the 
state governor belong to different political parties. 
 
POLITICAL COMPETITION: The margin of victory between the two 
principal political party contesters.  
 
POLITICAL PARTY. An organisation whose members share 
similar political aims and opinions and seeks to influence public policy 
through elections.  
 
-PRI: Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRIista). Left centre wing party.   
 
-PAN: Partido Accion Nacional (Nacional Action Party) (PANista). Right 
centre wing party. 
 
-PRD: Partido de la Revolucion Democratica. Left wing party.  
 
-PNA: Partido Nueva Alianza or PANAL. Party originally created by 





-COALITION: An alliance or agreement between political parties for co-
operation, often for the purpose of contesting in elections.   
 
PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP- The behaviour of local authorities to act 
in ways that improves efficiency.  
 
RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS- In the context of this research, a 
population of less than 30,000 inhabitants and where the economic activity 
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